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Abstract
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions: (1) how can food act as a means of
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested
identities for minority religious immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? (2) What
impact does the context of reception, particularly the host society’s unique and complex history
and interaction with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism, have on these
identity negotiations? To examine these questions, I conducted a comparative ethnographic study
of the foodways of North African Muslim immigrants in Paris, France, and Montréal, Canada, in
2012-13.
The results presented here show that food is often the most important symbol of identity
engaged by my informants. By choosing which religious/cultural food practices to continue and
which ones to alter, by choosing to label them in precise ways, by relegating these practices to
specific places and times, my informants reveal the complex and varied ways that Muslims
negotiate their identities in transnational context. In settings such as Paris and Montréal, where
outward/public signs of religiosity can be seen as problematic, and food culture is central to
national identity, I argue that these kinds of actions take on particular importance for immigrants
living in these cities.
In line with scholarship in religion and migration, I show how reception directly
influences the practices and identities of its immigrant communities. While the fear may be that
by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate difference, that highlight the
“homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may not integrate fully into the host
culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. In Canada, within multi- and inter-cultural
contexts my Montréal informants felt more Canadian or had a greater desire to “be Canadian,”
and on the whole felt free to express and engage their individual identities, whether religious,
ethnic or cultural, In France, the opposite was true. I use food as the lens to reveal that France’s
universalistic and assimilationist immigration policies undermine its efforts to emphasize
equality.
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Chapter 1: Why, What and Who?
1.1 Scholarly Grounding: The Why of the Research Project1
It was a windy November day in 2010 and the Metro station that I was running through in Paris’
Marais district was bustling with activity. People were speed walking from one train to the next
in that very Parisian way that screams, “I am late for something important, don’t get in my way”
without ever lifting one’s head or saying a word. Taking a brief reprise from my own fast paced
trek across the city of lights I stopped to take it all in, smiling with utter contentment that I was
once again in the city that I love. I ran onto my train just before the doors closed, spun around
and was immediately faced with a clear sign that there were individuals who did not belong in
Paris (according to some). In front of me was a sign for a piece of theatre contrasting pork-eating
French with the “non-pork-eating other.” I had read about the infamous “sausage and wine
party”2 that had caused a great deal of controversy just a few months before, but I had convinced
myself—wanting to see multi-religious/ethnic acceptance among the French—that such a thing
was not a common occurrence. This poster, in my face, in the Metro, on just a regular work day,
let me know that something bigger was going on. In that moment, and the many others that
occurred over the next month of my trip, it became obvious to me just how prevalent the tension
between Muslims and non-Muslims in France was, a tension often communicated through food.
I came to this project out of an obsession with all things food and all things French. On
my many visits to France, like the one I describe above, I noticed that how and what the Muslim
community in France ate was a point of interest for media, politicians and in everyday
conversation on the street between friends and neighbours. This led me to question why people
cared so much about what, and how, people ate. Why were the foodways3 of this religious group

1

I follow French style and format by using numerical headings throughout this work.
Sophie Taylor, “Banned Paris “sausage and wine” party goes ahead at Arc de Triomphe,” last updated June 19,
2010, http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2010/06/19/banned-paris-sausage-and-wine-party-goes-ahead-at-arcde-triomphe/.
3
Throughout this work my use of the term “foodways” is reflective of Marie Dallam’s definition of the term in her
“Introduction: Religion, Food, and Eating,” in Religion, Food & Eating in North America, eds. Benjamin E. Zeller,
Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson and Nora L. Rubel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), xvii-xxxii. There
she states that foodway “refers to a set of beliefs and practices that govern consumption. In other words, a
foodway is an expression of our “ways” around food: how we grow or acquire it, how we prepare it, how we
display or use it, and how and when we consume it. To talk about the foodways of a group, then, is to talk about
2

1

interesting to the population at large? What vested interest would media, government, and
regular citizens have in talking about this so frequently and in so many contexts? Was France,
the mecca of culinary identity, the only place where these issues came to light or would the food
practices of Muslims be an issue in other secular, western contexts as well, such as Québec?
I went into the field with these open questions, but ultimately the main questions that
emerged from my fieldwork were: How can food act as a means of reimagining, recreating,
reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested identities for minority
immigrant religious communities in highly secular contexts? Does food emerge as a more
“politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other religious practices? In
secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic, could
subtler/more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant to
engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally, in contexts like
France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the
foodways of the host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as
especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), could
my participants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their transnational
identity? Would they even want to? Finally, what is the impact of these societies’ unique and
complex histories and interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism on
these foodways and their affiliated identities?
1.1.1 Lay of the Land in the Study of Islam in France and Canada4
I found support for my curiosity when I began to examine the literature on Islam in France and
Canada. While this field is growing, multifaceted and rich, when I began pursuing this topic, the
field was still largely in its youth.5 Authors such as Jocelyne Cesari and John Bowen were

what people consider food, what they do with food, what they think about the food and the eating, and their ideas
about what the food means to them” (Dallam, “Introduction,” xviii).
4
I reserve discussion of the other two fields with which I am in conversation, namely religion and migration and
religion and food, for Chapter 9, showing how I discovered many of my academic interlocutors after I conducted
my field work and allowed my informants to direct my findings. This choice comes out of an intentional decision to
structure the dissertation as a chronological reflection of my ethnographic process itself. That being said, I address
many of the scholars in these four fields throughout the dissertation itself.
5
While the English sources about Islam in France and Canada were emerging at the time I began my dissertation
work, the French field was further along on this topic. There are also undoubtedly many excellent sources written
in Arabic, which I did not have access to due to the language limitations I discuss in Chapter 9.

2

publishing important works which often highlighted the political policies, especially secularism,
that influenced the integration of Muslims in France. Cesari’s works, When Islam and
Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States6 as well as Why the West Fears
Islam: An Exploration of Islam in Western Liberal Democracies,7 are foundational for insight
into the study of European Islam and Muslim integration in “Western” secular liberal
democracies.8 Her work was essential in my early inquiries into this topic in order to see what
were the larger topics and trends in the field. As I read her work, I began to wonder, though, how
the trends and issues that she was highlighting played out on the ground in France, and
specifically in relation to the most “grounded” of all practices: food. For example, in When Islam
and Democracy Meet Cesari suggests that Muslims in Europe have three modes of integration
open to them: acceptance, avoidance, or resistance.9 I wondered, in light of my observations on
the ground in France, how Muslims would see their own integration, and which of Cesari’s three
modes of integration would be most prevalent. I posited that the food practices of Muslims in
France may be one way to gain insight into the various modes of integration at work in this
context. Furthermore, since Cesari’s When Islam and Democracy Meet is a comparative project
between Europe and the U.S, my project would add nuance to this North American/European
comparison by focussing in on two specific locations within these broader continental settings:
France and Québec, and more specifically, Paris and Montréal.

6

Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
7
Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Islam in Western Liberal Democracies (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
8
See also, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2008), for an exploration of the very question of Western “secularism.” Of particular
note is Hurd’s exploration of the relationship between secularism and Islam in Chapter 3 of her work. Hurd
suggests that French secularism in particular was constructed in direct contact with Muslim society through the
French colonial project, such that the “othering” of Muslims becomes foundational to the very notion of French
Laïcité. I return to Hurd’s understanding when I discuss laïcité in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. Joan Wallach Scott
similarly argues that Islam, and in turn Muslims, are set up as the counterpart to the French Republic and
consequently to its form of secularism in her work The Politics of the Veil (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2007). She argues that this construction of Muslims as outside the realm of what it means to “be
French” inevitably has an impact on “the reaction of Western European leaders to Muslim immigrants in their
midst” (Scott, Politics of the Veil, 9).
9
Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet, 175.

3

John Bowen’s work was also foundational in creating this project. The main questions of
both his Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space10 and his
Can Islam be French?: Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State11 piqued my interest in
the study of Islam in Francophone, secular contexts. Bowen states that in Why the French Don’t
Like Headscarves his main question is “whether Muslims who wish to publicly practice their
religion can make their way in French society without having to pretend to be something other
than Muslims,” and in Can Islam be French the question is “Can Islam become a workable
reality for Muslims who wish to live fulfilling social and religious lives in France?”12 In both of
these works Bowen shows how the answer to both of these questions is a complicated “yes and
no.” He argues that while
perhaps an Islam of faith and properly circumscribed devotions could be French, but an
Islam of schools, mosques, and people whose everyday demeanor marked themselves off
from others and who sought religious knowledge outside the country – that was a
different story.13
Joan Wallach Scott in her work The Politics of the Veil posits questions similar to Bowen’s.14
Rather than looking at integration as assimilation, Scott suggests that the way forward is to
consider the negotiation of difference. For her this means asking the following questions: “how
can individuals and groups with different interests live together? Is it possible to think about
difference non-hierarchically? On what common ground can differences be negotiated?”15
In line with these questions and conclusions, presented by both Bowen and Scott, I
sought to explore how the things of “everyday demeanor” that Bowen discussed above,
specifically food, could help to answer his main questions. By exploring how and what Muslim
immigrants in France and Québec ate, I see this project as giving another possible viewpoint on
the questions that Bowen asks in these two works, as well as the questions that Scott poses about
the negotiation of difference. I wanted to examine “whether Muslims who wish to publicly
practice their religion, by fasting for Ramadan, buying and eating halal meat, not drinking wine
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with friends and colleagues, etcetera could make their way in French/Québécois society, without
having to pretend to be something other than Muslims.” Related to this, I wanted to examine
what it meant for the identity negotiations of my informants if they thought that they did have to
pretend to be something other than Muslim, and if food was one of the ways in which this
“pretending” got worked out. Furthermore, taking Bowen’s question from Can Islam be French I
wondered to what extent food played a role in the “workable reality” of Islam in the French
context, and whether or not it could be one piece of evidence for the ability, or restriction on,
people of difference being able to live together. Could it be, in response to Scott’s questions, part
of the common ground on which differences could be negotiated? Ultimately, while both of these
authors examine these questions around the symbol of the veil, I wanted to draw light to some of
the other signs of difference between Muslim and non-Muslim French highlighted by numerous
people on the ground in France.
The field of Islam in Canada, although relatively new, was also gaining significant
momentum when I began this project. While there were general sources before the 21st century,
it is in a post 21st-century context where there has been a significant rise in scholarship in this
area.16 This dissertation, alongside these other texts, helps to fill a gap in the scholarly literature
in providing an insight into the daily lived religious practices of one group of Muslim
immigrants in one Canadian city.17 Since undertaking this study an important book was
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published on the so-called “Muslim Question” in Canada.18 Abdolmohammad Kazemipur
examines both Canadian and Muslim exceptionalism in regards to multiculturalism and
immigrant integration in his impressive work The Muslim Question in Canada: A Story of
Segmented Integration.19 He suggest that
in the global debates on multiculturalism, special places are occupied by Canada and by
Muslims: Canada is used as evidence that multiculturalism works; Muslims are used as
evidence that it does not. Given this, it is important to examine the experiences of
Muslim immigrants in Canada.20
Like Kazemipur’s work, this dissertation is an effort to “examine the experiences of Muslim
immigrants in Canada,” specifically in Québec, and even more specifically in Montréal.
Kazemipur goes on to suggest that there is poor awareness of Muslims’ lived experiences in
Canada,21 and that scholars must go beyond the voices that appear in the media and in
organizational Islam, as this often leads to a “politically correct image that may or may not
reflect the realities of the lives of Canadian Muslims.”22 My research helps to fill these two gaps
in the literature on Islam in Canada by focussing on the lived experiences of Muslims and by
giving voice to some members of the Muslim population outside of the media/Muslim
organizations.
Finally, in his effort to complicate the notions of Canadian and Muslim exceptionalism
Kazemipur highlights the experiences of Muslims in Québec to show how these exceptionalisms
may not capture the whole picture. He shows that, statistically speaking, the “responses of
Muslim in Québec in regards to the various indicators of attachment to and comfort in Canada
present a more negative picture than the rest of Canada.”23 This statistical finding, among the
others that Kazemipur highlights in his work, supports the idea that the experience of Muslims in
Québec are potentially more similar to those in France than to the Rest of Canada (ROC). My
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work questions these statistical findings, and provides insight into the way that attachment to,
and comfort in, Canada gets worked out in the everyday practices of Muslims in Montréal.
While quantitative work abounds, exploring trends and statistics and overarching themes
present in work on Islam in France and Canada, as we see in Kazemipur’s book, qualitative
ethnographic work is still fairly new. Concerning France, qualitative ethnographies have
increased and are prevalent, they tend to focus on what I call the three Ss: scarves, schools and
suburbs. John Bowen’s work on the headscarf,24 Tricia Danielle Keaton’s important work on
young Muslim women in the Parisian suburbs,25 Jennifer Selby’s work on gender politics and
Islam in France,26 Mayanthi Fernando’s work on the contradiction of secularism,27 are all
examples of impressive ethnographic accounts of Muslims lives in France and their negotiations
of identity in light of French secularism. My work expands on these foundational works by
showing how these negotiations happen around food instead of scarves, in all settings of the
community’s life instead of just in the school system (or other organizational structures), and in
central Paris instead of the suburbs.
Taking the study of Muslims in France out of the suburbs and locating it firmly within the
twenty districts of central Paris is one of the most significant contributions of this present work.28
Jennifer Selby describes the “tremendous juxtaposition in sights, smells, language, ethnicities,
and social services between the two spaces” (i.e. Paris and the banlieues, or suburbs).29 In fact,
most work done on North African Muslims in France focusses on the banlieues, in these
tremendously juxtaposed spaces. Unlike Selby’s experience of travelling from her apartment in
central Paris to her field site in Petit Nanterre, going from my apartment in the Marais to my
field work site, or to any of my 33 interview sites, did not lead to an experience of juxtaposition.
Considering that most work had been done in the suburban setting of Islam in France, I set out to
explore how the kinds of negotiations that my informants undertook might be different from or
similar to those presented in the works from Bowen, Keaton, Fernando and Selby. How might
24
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the position of my informants in central Paris lead to more or less conflict? How much would the
juxtaposition between cultural and religious frames of references be more or less prevalent in
central Paris? Without the juxtaposition of physical space would my informants’ own bodies and
experiences become the exemplars of juxtaposition in Paris?
These contrasts of space and experience often lead to feelings of conflicting identities.
All of the above-mentioned studies on Muslims in France consequently address
the dilemma of how to be Muslim French in a world in which Muslim means not French
and French means not Muslim—that is, how to inhabit an identity that is unintelligible in
the terms of dominant discourse, and how to be recognized as oneself when one is
unrecognizable as what one is.30
While these other ethnographic accounts examine this dilemma often in relationship to the broad
political movements and moments that influence this experience, I look at how this dilemma is
worked out in my informants’ every day, mundane lives and practices.
The women of Jennifer Selby’s project confound expectations regarding this dilemma,
showing how some Muslim women in France interact with secular institutions and policies while
at the same time publicly demonstrating their religious faith, i.e. they show how Muslim can
mean French and French can mean Muslim. Over six chapters, Selby shows how articulations of
secularism in France as well as articulations of feminism “affect the lives of visibly religious
banlieuesarde Muslim women in France.”31 She highlights the three main themes, and
consequently conclusions, of her work by showing that, (1) in commissions and feminist
activism, “French secularism is justified and articulated as paramount to ensuring Muslim
women’s equal access and full rights in France,” and at the same time leads to these very women
being excluded from public debate;32 (2) “national identity concerns emerge through discussions
of the appropriateness of women’s bodies in the public sphere;”33 and (3) the “polarizing focus
on women’s bodies (by men and women) establishes a fetishism of the hijab that masks broader
questions and issues.”34 Directly related to this third theme/conclusion is Selby’s example of the
Affaire du Porc which she discusses in Chapter 3 of her work. In this chapter she shows how her
informants are not particularly concerned with the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious
30
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symbols (i.e. the hijab) in public schools, something that both she, and her readers, would have
expected. This does not mean that Muslim women in Petit Nanterre are not invested in
discussions of secularism; they just invest in other ways, e.g. in the Affaire du Porc. In this
discussion Selby shows how the women in her study are concerned not solely with the offence to
their religious practices in this event, but in the affront to secular neutrality: “the teacher
transgressed the students’ right to choose not to eat religiously inappropriate foods.”35 In this
Selby positions the real lived experiences of her informants in opposition to the picture that one
may get from the commissions she discusses in her work, namely, the Stasi and Debré
commission. She shows how the women of her study live publicly religious lives while being
politically involved in the secular Republic. Selby argues that, in fact, the
Affaire du Porc reminds us that sometimes these commissions fail to consider the way
they pejoratively and uniformly position visibly religious women, and how they may
overemphasize headscarves at the expense of noting other kinds of political engagement,
which might refute portrayals of the same women as overtly “oppressed.”36
It is my hope to add to the picture that Selby paints in her work, providing further nuance to the
ways that Muslims in highly secular contexts interact with, and sometimes profess, both
secularity and religiosity.37
My project also adds to the new and growing ethnographic work being done in the field
of qualitative ethnography of Muslims in Canada. Paul Eid’s impressive work on Arab youth in
Montréal provided me with a solid understanding of how ethnic and religious identity
negotiations happen on everyday levels for Arab Muslim immigrants in Montréal.38 In this work
Eid shows the importance of ethno-religious identity for second generation Arabs in Montréal,
and how this identity is often less contested than in a place such as France. In fact, in his
conclusion he suggests that “further comparative research is needed to get a better understanding
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of how France’s and Canada’s respective approaches to integration and diversity affect their
Arab minorities’ responses to discrimination and stereotyping.”39 I see the present work as an
answer to this call by Eid, showing how Arab, in this case, Maghrébine, minorities respond to
discrimination and stereotyping (or lack thereof) through the ways that they interact with, alter
and redefine their foodways in both Paris and Montréal. It also offers new insight into how these
negotiations take place not only in the second generation, but also for first generation immigrants
in both locations.
Another ethnographic study of Muslims in the “West” which influenced my construction
of this project is Rima Berns McGown’s Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of
London and Toronto.40 Like McGown, who compares London and Toronto in her work, I believe
that the “opportunity to understand the process of integration” is “enriched by the comparative
perspective.”41 McGown’s work highlights the two levels of integration possible for any
immigrant: external and internal, and emphasizes the fact that because neither Islam nor the West
are monolithic entities, the way that any given individual engages these two integration processes
is not monolithic either. Because of this, McGown states that it is her intention “to illustrate the
complexities of the process of individuals’ renegotiating identity as Muslims in the West.”42 My
work expands this illustration by demonstrating how these complex negotiations happen in two
other Western contexts, namely, Paris and Montréal.
1.1.2 Religious Studies Research Philosophy
So there were gaps to be filled, questions to be answered and conclusions to be expanded upon in
the field of Islam in France and Canada. As I hinted at above, the more that I thought about the
kind of project that might help to achieve some of these goals, the more it became clear that I
would take a lived religion approach.
Coming out of an early academic background in textual studies, I have studied religion in
drastically different ways over the years. I have paid close attention to the “institutional
representation” of a religious tradition as it is presented in that tradition’s scriptures and in recent
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years I have paid close attention to the lived experiences of religious individuals who are in daily
conversation with their various institutional beliefs and practices.43 In my work, I have taken
seriously both the so-often-labelled “institutional, normative, authoritative, great” side of religion
as well as the “everyday, popular, mundane, little” side of religion. The idea that religions “have
a strongly normative character, offering compelling ways to act, to live, to be and to perceive the
world—and yet how people actually live religious lives appears to be a very different business”44
sets up a clear dichotomy between text and lived experience, institutional and popular, grand
schemes and daily practice. This is a false dichotomy, though, as religion is all of the above; it is
located “exactly in that moment where daily practice and grand schemes come together.”45
Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec suggest that in fact grand schemes are not separate from daily
life, but are in constant communication with it, and are therefore continuously under
construction.46 Peter Beyer similarly states that
we cannot appreciate what is happening religiously if we concentrate only on the
systemic or lived manifestation, because the systemic if most often an integral aspect of
the lived and because the lived is most often more than a simple manifestation of the
systemic.47
Work that examines the daily lived practice of religious individuals and communities can
consequently give insight into the grand schemes, or the systemic manifestations, of religion.
1.1.2.1 Lived Religion and the Dissolution of Dichotomies
Lived religion shows how these two facets of religion are not dichotomous but are in fact
congruous. Orsi suggests that everyday religion calls into question three other dichotomies on
which the study of religion has been historically shaped: (1) sacred/profane, (2) us/them
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(insider/outsider), and (3) presence/absence.48 Lived religion challenges the sacred/profane
dichotomy by showing that the two are “never distinct in an absolute way, but are braided in
people’s everyday experience.”49 It challenges the us/them dichotomy by showing that the
scholar of religion is not all that different from those religious practitioners whom he/she studies.
In fact, according to Orsi lived religion reveals that both “us” and “them” “are contending with
similar life challenges and that all of us equally must deal with the inevitable doubleness of being
both agents of our own lives and experiencing ourselves as powerless, determined, of having
chosen and of having no choice.”50 Finally, every day/lived religion dissolves the long-held
dichotomy of presence/absence of the gods in people’s lives. Orsi explains that historically the
practices that were oriented toward engaging the “presence of the gods in particular things or
particular times and places...were taken by modern religious theorists as evidence of the most
‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ level of religiosity...‘good’ modern religion did not include real
presences.”51 Everyday religion challenges the notion that “good religion” must exclude real
presence.
Throughout this dissertation I will show how food is a perfect emblem of lived religion as
it serves to break down these dichotomies in tangible ways. Eating, one of the most profane and
mundane activities, can also take on sacred meanings; it breaks apart the dichotomy between
sacred and profane. As a common experience to almost every living being, our consumption of
food serves to break down the distinction between “us” and “them,” which Orsi suggests is
essential in a lived religion approach. Finally, food helps to disband the dichotomy between the
presence and absence of the gods in people’s lives as it often serves as a symbol of the god(s)’
presence in a given situation, or even within a given practitioner. One only needs to look to the
Catholic understanding of the Eucharist to appreciate how food can make the idea of the absence
of the gods in one’s life an absurdity. The Eucharist is the Christian sacrament/ritual which
involves the consumption of bread and wine. While this ritual is understood and symbolized by
Christians in various ways, Catholics hold the doctrine of transubstantiation, which means that
the bread and the wine consumed in the Eucharist are transformed into the actual body and blood
48
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of Christ, which the practitioner then takes into him/herself through consumption. As Michel
Desjardins and Ellen Desjardins state, this gives “believers direct corporal access to God through
food.”52 You do not get much more “present” than that. According to scholars of lived religion,
religion must be taken as a sum of all these dichotomies: institutional and popular, sacred and
profane, us and them, presence and absence, grand schemes and daily practice.
One problem is that when one examines lived religion in the hopes of gaining some
insight into the grand schemes of religion, or vice versa, one is often confronted with
ambivalence and inconsistency. Individual religious practitioners may act in completely
contradictory ways to the commonly understood, and even personally understood, “institutional,
authoritative,” grand schemes. For example, an informant may tell me that he/she eats only halal
meat but then may order chicken from a restaurant without checking if it is halal certified or
not.53 A lived religion approach allows the anthropologist to take this sort of inconsistency
seriously, rather than just trying to solve it.54 In fact, by focusing on the daily lived practices of
religious individuals we can see how the stuff of the everyday can serve as intentional space,
things that people use to “make sense of their often confusing and troubled experiences and
expectations.”55 Schielke and Debevec suggest that
if we ask people about their specific concerns, experiences and trajectories, and if we
look at the way people live their lives of which religious beliefs and practices constitute a
part, we gain an image in which religion is a highly immediate practice of making sense
of one’s life, coming to terms with fear and ambivalence, all-present at times and absent
at other times, very sincere in some moments, and contradictory in other moments.56
Believing that one can gain insight into all sides of the religious equation by examining daily
religious practice—daily lived practice is not as apparent in the study of grand schemes alone – I
focus on lived religion.
Before I continue I must pause to describe what I mean by religion, and relatedly lived
religion. I agree with Meredith McGuire’s definition of these two concepts, namely that religion
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“consists of how people make sense of their world—the stories out of which they live.”57 If
religion is about making sense and living out of stories, then, according to McGuire, lived
religion is “constituted by the practices people use to remember, share, enact, adapt, create, and
combine the stories out of which they live. And it comes into being through the often-mundane
practices people use to transform these meaningful interpretations into everyday action.”58 I
argue that food is one of those “often-mundane practices” that people can use in the process of
transforming the invisible to the visible.59 Food acts as a means of crossing and dwelling60 within
and between all these realms. According to Graham Harvey food may in fact define religion.61
1.1.2.2 Making Homes and Crossing Boundaries: Food in Tweed’s Theory of Religion
The other orienting philosophy of religion and religious studies with which I entered into the
field revolves around Thomas Tweed’s theory of religion as found in his work Crossing and
Dwelling: A Theory of Religion,62 specifically as this theory applies to food practice. While
Tweed’s entire theory can be applicable to a project such as mine, I am going to focus primarily
on the last five words of his definition of religion, namely, that religions “make homes and cross
boundaries,”63 as this part of his theory was influential in constructing my dissertation project.
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Tweed tells the reader that religions are about situating people in time and place, about
creating boundaries and then showing people how to cross those very boundaries. He breaks this
part of his definition of religion into two parts and theorizes that religions are about dwelling and
crossing. In relation to dwelling practices, people attempt to situate themselves in four different
areas, which he calls chronotopes: the body, the home, the homeland and the cosmos64 (food
practices can be tools to situate in all these areas). Dallam suggests that Tweed’s concept of
dwelling is “helpful for discerning ways that people understand their physical and spiritual
world(s) and position themselves within it/them. By extension, these concepts help us conceive
of foodways as expressions of identity within a constructed sacred cosmos.”65 Tweed suggests
that religions and religious practices, of which foodways are a part, I would add, act as watch and
compass, they situate people in time and place.66 In his work Tweed uses the example of the
mural and the cornerstone in the temple of Our Lady of the Exile in Miami to show how artifacts
can be used to situate people. By looking at the mural people can see where they sit in relation to
the larger community and can be transported back to the Cuba of memory and desire simply by
looking at it.67 I understand food as serving a similar purpose, it can aide in people’s
transtemporal and translocative practices. By eating a particular home food, the religious
immigrant taps into times and places where he/she ate that food before, and imagines him/herself
in line with those who ate/eat that food as well.
My placement of food within Tweed’s understanding of religion as a means of “crossing”
and “dwelling” finds support in the work Remembrance of Repasts: an Anthropology of Food
and Memory by David E. Sutton.68 Sutton suggests that food can “hide powerful meanings and
structures under the cloak of the mundane and the quotidian.”69 His work dissects exactly how
food acts as a powerful tool for those trying to cross borders of time and space, specifically
through food’s relationship to memory. He suggests that food “has the effect of placing one in
time,” that it “evokes wholeness,” creates links with imagined communities, and most
importantly it “does not simply symbolize social bonds and divisions; it participates in their
64
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creation and re-creation.”70 Food acts as a tool in an individual’s transtemporal and translocative
efforts; something that becomes especially important for immigrants.
In Lynne Christy Anderson’s work Breaking Bread: Recipes and Stories from Immigrant
Kitchens there are many examples of immigrants who see food as the way to situate themselves
within a community with a past, both temporally and geographically.71 Many of Anderson’s
informants speak of feeling like they are in their homeland again simply by eating the food of the
homeland. On the transtemporal side of things, other examples from Anderson’s work show how
it is through food practice that people feel connected to those who ate the same food in the past
and those who will eat the food in the future. A Moroccan subject in her study stated that it is by
eating Moroccan food that she remembers that she is Moroccan, and it is also how she teaches
her children that they will be welcomed by other Moroccans when they return; if they all eat the
same food.72 Sarah Sussman similarly states that, no matter whether her informants are in Paris
or Montréal, as long as they continue to cook their food they remain connected to a long history,
and place themselves within that history and ensure its survival.73 Food connects these
practitioners to the past and moves that past into the future. I show throughout my work how my
informants, like those mentioned in Tweed, Sutton, Anderson, and Sussman, use food and
foodways as transtemporal and translocative symbols in their everyday religious lives to make
homes for themselves in their immigrant contexts.
But Tweed states that religions are not just about dwelling, they are also about crossing.
In this he deals with terrestrial, corporeal and celestial crossings.74 He shows how religions help
followers to cross the ever-present boundaries that are in our lives. Two of the important
crossings that often involve food are the life cycle transitions that are often dealt with in religious
traditions, and the mapping of the celestial crossing. First, as we human bodies age and change
religions address and regulate how these changes happen. Food is representative of these
crossings. For example, Tweed explains that when a baby is born into a Muslim family the
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Shahadah is whispered in his/her ear and then a chewed-up date is placed in his/her mouth.75 The
Muslim life, in this case, begins with God and food and the transition, the crossing, from spirit to
human, from fetus to child, is represented through food. Furthermore, as was made evident
throughout my time in the field, major life cycle events, such as marriage, were heavily entwined
with food. Food was a means of highlighting the transition from one stage to the next.
Tweed goes on in his exploration of religion’s ability to help the practitioner “cross” by
discussing transporting and transforming teleographies. Transporting teleographies result in a
movement in location, a crossing of the various outside boundaries in our lives, whereas
transforming teleographies are more about a movement in inner orientation or condition.76 One
can see how food aides in the crossing of celestial boundaries. In many religious communities,
food not only situates and connect people with the broader living community, but it can also
cross the celestial boundaries and connect the living community to those who have passed from
this realm of existence. As I explained above, Orsi suggests that everyday religion highlights the
possibility for real presence of the supernatural in the lives of religious practitioners, and food is
one means of crossing the boundary between presence and absence.
Going in to the field, I wondered how much of Tweed’s theory would hold up when
examining the “real lives of real people.” I wondered how much my informants would use their
religious and cultural food practices in tangible ways to “create homes and cross boundaries.”
While I was not seeking direct answers to this question in my project, this theory/philosophy of
religion oriented my early thinking about what was happening and what I was observing.
1.1.3 About the Author
My interest in addressing these questions, issues and scholarly gaps emerges from my academic
background in the study of religion. My undergraduate degree in religious studies at the
University of Waterloo provided me with my foundation in the study of religion; through this
experience I not only gained an important knowledge base in numerous religious traditions, but I
also learned of the various approaches to studying those traditions. After completing an honour’s
undergraduate thesis in textual studies, I pursued a Master’s degree in Early Christianity and
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Early Judaism, where I continued to focus on scriptural analysis and the consequent textual
representation of Christianity in the context of the McMaster University program.
As I finished my Master’s degree I began to question how religious individuals may
interact with these texts that I was studying in their everyday lives. I knew what the texts said
about a given topic, but I wanted to know what religious individuals thought about those texts,
and how they enacted what was presented in those texts in their “real lives.” Having studied the
complex relationship between the “law” of the Hebrew Bible and the “law” as presented in the
Christian New Testament I was acutely aware of how individuals across traditions might interact
around shared (and often conflicting) religious perspectives. Because of this, and because of my
various interests in my undergraduate degree, I applied to a doctoral program at Wilfrid Laurier
University with the intention of examining a topic in interreligious dialogue. I was curious to
explore the ways in which religious individuals interacted with, and informed, various “others”
about their religious lives, and how religious “others” came together to pursue mutual
understanding within small, local organizations for interreligious dialogue. The doctoral program
in which I enrolled focused on “religious diversity in North America,” thus providing an ideal
educational background in which to study how individuals located within the diverse North
American context, and specifically within Canada, come together in conversation and
collaboration.
As I entered in to coursework in religion in North America, I saw that these kinds of
negotiations between and amidst various religious (and irreligious) actors and communities
happen on more mundane levels and in more everyday contexts than the interreligious
organizations I was hoping to study. People were meeting the “other,” and moreover, presenting
themselves through their everyday religious practices, and food was one such practice that
seemed to be utilized in this process. Although many of the texts that I was reading in those early
days of my doctoral work did not explicitly mention food as part of this process, I could see
examples of it abounding in the literature, yet very few people were seeming to take it seriously
as a means of access to larger questions of how people live out their religious lives in highly
diverse North American societies. Leaving a concentrated study of interreligious dialogue
behind, I began to pursue how people negotiated their religious identity through food in
religiously diverse, and highly secular contexts.
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This academic trajectory provides a position within which to study a topic which explores
Islam in the “French” “West,” religion and migration and lived religion, specifically food and
religion. Having pursued early graduate studies in textual analysis I have taken seriously the
position of religious texts not only within religious organizations but also for the individual
religious actor. When my informants interact with, profess, and reimagine the textual grounding
for their food practices, I can understand the complexities that are present within those texts as
well as the transmission and utilization of them by a given religious community. My interest,
openness to, and knowledge of interreligious dialogue provides me with the necessary tools to
effectively engage with my informants in those everyday moments of encounter that would
inevitably occur in the field. Finally, my doctoral studies in religious diversity in North America
provides me with extensive preparation not only in the reality of diversity in various Western,
secular nation states, but also relevant histories, policies and experiences which govern or
influence the everyday lived religion of minorities in those contexts.
1.1.4 Scholarly Grounding: Summary
In this section I have highlighted the scholarly context out of which my dissertation project grew
and the many reasons for taking on this research. I began with an overview of key works in the
field of Islam in the West, specifically Islam in France and Canada, and showed how the work
that is to follow is my attempt at answering some of the questions which arose for me out of my
reading of these sources. I discuss how my work aims to fill some of the gaps present in the
literature on Islam in France and Canada and to provide a qualitative view of some of the
quantitative trends that have been underscored in past work. Furthermore, I argued that this work
is an effort to expand on the qualitative work which already exists, by showing how negotiations
of religious, national, secular, etcetera, identities for Muslims in France and Canada happen
outside of the context of the three Ss: scarves, schools, and suburbs.
Next I turned to what I call my “philosophy of religion/studying religion” and gave a
brief overview of lived religion. I argued that lived religion allows the researcher to see religion
as a sum of all possible dichotomies, including institutional and popular, sacred and profane, us
and them, presence and absence, grand schemes and daily practice. Furthermore, religion is
about making sense of these dichotomies and constructing stories out of the experiences of living
within them. I showed how I see religion, in agreement with McGuire, as a means of making

19

sense and living out of stories. More importantly I showed how my work is situated within the
understanding of lived religion as the “the practices people use to remember, share, enact, adapt,
create, and combine the stories out of which they live. And it comes into being through the oftenmundane practices people use to transform these meaningful interpretations into everyday
action.”77 Food is one of these mundane, everyday practices/actions that transforms the invisible
to the visible.
More than just transforming the invisible to the visible, food plays a significant role in the
religious process of crossing and dwelling. Because of this, I outlined Tweed’s theory of religion
as found in his work Crossing and Dwelling and situated my research project within that frame. I
focused on the last five words of Tweed’s definition of religion, namely that religion, “makes
homes and crosses boundaries,” to show how food might be a tangible means of enacting this
home making and boundary crossing.
Finally, I closed this section with an overview of my own personal scholarly background
that led me to this study. My diverse experiences in the study of religion have provided me with
familiarity with a wide variety of approaches to, and understandings of, religion that proved
particularly helpful in this project.
Before I describe the methods which I engaged to try to fill these gaps, expand on these
fields, and address these questions/hypotheses, I must address a “gap” in this introduction itself.
While I hinted at the fields of food and religion and religion and migration throughout this
“scholarly grounding” section I did not directly address those two fields here, but instead reserve
that discussion for my concluding chapter. This was a conscious decision that I made for two
reasons. First, placing this discussion at the end of the dissertation allows me to bring my
research, after I have presented it, in conversation with key studies and research areas. It allows
me to “bring it home,” so to speak, by showing exactly how my findings fit with these two key
areas of research. Second, I have purposefully constructed the writing of my ethnography as a
reflection of the ethnographic experience itself. The fields that I engage in this introductory
chapter are the fields out of which my study emerged; they were the works that were on my radar
before I went in to the field. I then present the “stuff” of my research in the main body chapters,
illuminating the work that I conducted during my ethnographic research experience itself, hinting
at the important works in the relevant fields throughout. Finally, I spend some dedicated time
77
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situating my work within the most relevant fields at the end of this dissertation because this is
when I did this situating effort. Once I had finished my data collection, analysis and writing, I
then examined the fields of religion and migration and food and religion to see where my work
fit. While this is an unconventional structure, it is the natural outworking of my attempt to give
voice to my informants without imposing overly restrictive theories or ideas about religion and
food and religion and migration on to their daily lived experiences. It was an effort to stay true to
my methodology, and the structure of the dissertation reflects that.
1.2 Context/Methodology/Method: The What and How of the Research Project
My philosophy of studying religion as lived religion and the idea that lived religion is about the
various ways in which people “make homes and cross boundaries” inevitably affects the kind of
methodology, as well as the specific methods, I utilized in this project. In line with Birks and
Mills, I see methodology and methods as two separate, although often related, things. According
to Birks and Mills, methodology is “a set of principles and ideas that inform the design of a
research study,” while methods are “practical procedures used to generate and analyse data.”78 I
address my specific methods below, but first a word on my chosen methodology: ethnography.
As I mentioned above, Schielke and Debevec suggest that “if we look at the way people
live their lives of which religious beliefs and practices constitute a part, we gain an image in
which religion is a highly immediate practice of making sense of one’s life.”79 To understand
how this “practice of making sense” gets worked out it is essential to learn from the people doing
the living. Ethnography is an effective approach to gaining insight into the ways in which people
live their lives, in the case of this ethnography their religious and cultural lives, and consequently
into the resultant “practice of making sense” that occurs. According to James Spradley,
ethnography is the methodology that “aims to understand another way of life from the native
point of view.”80 Ways of life, ways of knowing, are the focus of ethnographic research, whether
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the ethnographer shares those ways of life/knowing with his/her informants or not. Spradley goes
on to suggest that ethnography is not about studying people, but instead about “learning from
people”; the researcher becomes a student and his/her informants become teachers, instructing
the research either directly or indirectly in the meanings of actions and events.81 This
understanding of my informants as teachers was essential to my project. As I discuss in detail
below, I came in to the field with few preconceived notions about the religious and cultural lives
of my informants. This context allowed me to easily take on the necessary role of student in my
interactions with the community.
Spradley emphasises the importance of learning culture by living culture with one’s
informants. Just as a child learns “culture by observing other people, listening to them, and then
making inferences,” the ethnographer engages in the same process in the field, “going beyond
what is seen and heard to infer what people know.”82 The ethnographer makes his/her
“inferences from three sources: (1) from what people say; (2) from the way people act; and (3)
from the artifacts people use.”83 Spradley suggests that one can evaluate the adequacy and
authenticity of the description that one gains from these inferences if one considers the
ethnography as a set of instructions for how to act appropriately in that cultural context.84 This
idea becomes complicated in a study of a community that has various understandings of their
cultural context; in a community that has many different teachers teaching the researcher
different things. For example, in a study such as mine, where diversity of experience is the
overwhelming norm, especially in Paris, I imagine that someone picking up my work would have
a hard time reading it as instructions on how to behave if celebrating Ramadan with any given
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant in Paris; the Montréal side of things may fall more in line with
practice. Regardless, because the ethnographer makes his/her inferences from people’s words,
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actions and artifacts, ethnography does not just equal participant observation; there are many
methods used, all employed alongside the pure “challenge of just getting by from day to day.”85 I
address some of my challenges of “getting by from day to day” in section 1.4.2 below, but for
now I turn to the methods that I employed in my ethnographic study.
1.2.1 Grounded Theory Methods
While I did not use a classic Grounded Theory (GT) approach/methodology I did apply GT to
my ethnography. GT goes beyond mere description and exploration. According to Birks and
Mills, grounded theory
differs from other approaches to research in that it serves to explain the phenomenon
being studied…. [It] explicates a phenomenon from the perspective and in the context of
those who experience it. Theory as the product of the investigative processes is the
hallmark of grounded theory research.86
My study is thus a modified and selective GT approach. I was interested in explicating the
phenomenon from the perspective and in the context of those who experience it, so I came into
the field with few preconceived notions or theories to do so, but I did not create a theory per se to
explain the phenomenon I was studying. I figured out which theoretical frames, bodies of work,
or areas of study it fit once I was home from the field.87 Because I selectively employ GT
methods, rather than specifically generate a grounded theory, Birks and Mills suggest that my
work is more descriptive and exploratory research, more in line with qualitative data analysis
(QDA) by Glaser (2004) or the generic inductive qualitative model (GIQM) by Hood (2007).88
While I use many of the elements of GT, I do not use them all, a necessity for pure GT according
to Birks and Mills; GT is a methodology that requires using specific methods to a specific end.
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My end goal was not to generate theory, but to describe and explore the possibilities of what
might be happening for my informants who were living out their religious and cultural lives
amidst a seemingly hostile backdrop.
Some of the philosophies present in GT did in fact inform my approach in the field. For
example, and as I mentioned above, I tried to enter the field with relatively little orienting theory.
Although I entered my fieldwork right out of my comprehensive examinations, and thus
inevitably had some orienting theoretical principles in my mind, I was not trying to impose the
data that I found on the ground into a theoretical framework.89 I allowed my informants to direct
how I viewed their experience, rather than trying to direct them into distinct categories or boxes.
In this way, I fell in line with another of the principles of GT, unlike studies where the “research
question directs how the study proceeds. In grounded theory, it is the research process that
generates the question.”90 While I had curiosities that led me into the field, and “broad” research
questions, as I described above, the overarching question that I was seeking came out after the
fact. For example, it was not until February 2016, two and a half years after I left the field, that I
wrote down the ultimate “questions” that my work addresses. Overall, I utilized “the value of
grounded theory methods” for my research design.91
I engaged several of the essential methods for a GT study around which Birks and Mills
write their work. I used an adaptation of the initial coding process they outline.92 This helped me
to identify important words or groups of words and concepts while I went along. While I did not
transcribe and analyze my interviews as I conducted my fieldwork, I did write memos (another
of Birks and Mills essential methods)93 and journals which helped me to do this initial coding
work. This brought up thought-provoking and unexpected themes as I was conducting my work
and led me to engage in one of the essential GT methods, namely, theoretical sampling.94 While I
did not select specific people to interview, or drastically change the kinds of questions I was
asking my informants, I did make some subtle strategic decisions to access topics that were
emerging in the field. For example, while in Paris, my informants spoke a great deal about the
89
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difference in “goût” (taste) between home food and host food.95 While I did not have a fixed
question on this in my original list of questions, I ended up adding this to the questions that I
would use to further probe my informants when the opportunity arose. When I finished my data
collection, I engaged in “constant comparative analysis,” comparing incident to incident, incident
to codes, codes to codes, codes to categories, and categories to categories, to bring things
together that had never been associated before.96 While normally this method would be used as
data is generated, I used it to help me analyze my data once it was all collected and transcribed.
Finally, the last method that I used in my study was “theoretical sensitivity.”97 Theoretical
sensitivity according to Birks and Mills is the “ability to recognize and extract from data
elements that have relevance for your emerging theory,”98 or in my case, my emerging
description. One’s theoretical sensitivity grows the longer one is engaged in the research, and is
highly dependent on the researcher’s own history and knowledge. This theoretical sensitivity is
reflected in section 1.4 below.
1.2.2 Spradley’s The Ethnographic Interview
Alongside, and in conjunction with, these GT methods, I also leaned on James Spradley’s classic
method for ethnographic interviews (step two in his twelve step developmental research
sequence).99 Spradley shows how this interviewing method is different from simple friendly
conversation in four key ways.100 First of all, “turn taking is less balanced.”101 While in a
friendly conversation the two people involved take turns asking and responding to questions, in
the ethnographic interview model the ethnographer asks almost all of the questions and the
informant does almost all of the responding. Furthermore, the turn taking is asymmetrical as
well, because the informants’ responses take up most of the time in the conversation. The second
difference that Spradley highlights is the role of repetition. While in a friendly conversation

95

I explore this argument in Chapter 4 in section 4.4.2.1.
Birks and Mills, Grounded Theory, 11, 94.
97
Ibid., 11, 58-63.
98
Ibid., 59.
99
For an overview of the twelve elements in the ethnographic interview see Appendix A.
100
While it is important to note that the ethnographic interview is different from friendly conversation, both kinds
of conversations were important elements of my work. While I conducted semi-structured interviews that
generally followed Spradley’s pattern of ethnographic interviews, I also engaged in hundreds of friendly
conversations that make up an important part of my data.
101
Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 67.
96

25

repetition is used infrequently, it is a hallmark of the ethnographic interview. The ethnographer
not only repeats things the informant has said but also restates and repeats questions over and
over again.102 The third difference between the ethnographic interview and friendly conversation
is another one that highlights the asymmetry of the ethnographic interview. Unlike friendly
conversation where both parties may express interest and ignorance in what the other person is
saying, in the ethnographic interview it is primarily the ethnographer who engages in these
efforts.103 Finally, while it is common in the context of friendly conversation to abbreviate one’s
stories or responses to questions, in the ethnographic interview “the ethnographer encourages
expanding on what each person says.”104 The questions which I asked, and the way in which I
asked them, in my semi-structured interviews were much more specific and elicited a great deal
more detail than the kinds of questions that would arise in a given conversation on the street, in
the mosque or in the living room of my informants’ homes.
1.2.3 Methods Applied
What did all this look like on the ground in the field, though? To try and understand how my
informants addressed their immigrant religious experiences, specifically through foodways, I
engaged in extensive participant observation. I also conducted semi-structured interviews,
interviews that have a fixed set of questions with enough flexibility in the question to take the
conversation where the informant leads.
First, I would like to briefly situate the two fields in which I conducted this work as they
relate to this project. Both Paris and Montréal are large urban centres, and as such have high
concentrations of immigrant populations. As I will describe in more detail in Chapters 2 and 6,
both Paris and Montréal are home to many Maghrébine Muslim immigrants. While it is difficult
to know the exact numbers of Muslims in both locations, especially thanks to the fact that France
does not document religion in its census information, there are some helpful estimates on which
we can draw to start to paint a picture of the demographics present in both locations. According
to some estimates, 40 percent of France’s Muslim population lives in and around Paris.105 This
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means that, of the estimated 6 million Muslims who live in France, approximately 2.4 million
Muslims live in the greater Paris area. This equates to roughly 24 percent of the total population
of that region. In Montréal, according to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), 9.6
percent of the population of Montréal reported themselves as Muslim.106 While there is a greater
concentration of Muslims in Montréal than in the Canadian population overall (sitting at 2.8
percent according to the 2011 NHS data),107 this percentage is still less than half of the
proportion of Muslims living in Paris.
Before heading in to these fields, I successfully applied for research ethics approval from
Wilfrid Laurier University’s Research Ethics Board (REB).108 To be granted ethics approval I
created, submitted and subsequently revised a set of preliminary interview questions which
became the outline for my semi-structured interviews.109 Considering my informants’ safety and
comfort to be of utmost importance I also created an informed consent form which each of my
65 informants signed.110
The results from my fieldwork in Paris are based on the data that I collected from July 8
until December 20, 2012, in Paris, France, much of it centered at the Grande Mosquée de Paris,
the most well-known, central mosque in Paris, and in France. Like Selby, I began in the field by
undertaking what she calls “extreme volunteerism,”111 principally by volunteering in the Mosque
kitchen each day during the month of Ramadan, helping to prepare the iftar (the breaking of the
fast meal during Ramadan). Through these volunteer activities I made myself and my project
known, which provided me with the necessary credibility and trust within the community to
conduct my fieldwork. For over five and a half months I spent over 800 hours interacting with
people at the mosque and elsewhere, talking with people about food, helping the women in the
mosque kitchen, eating meals at restaurants, drinking many cups of mint tea, attending a
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wedding, sitting in the park outside of the mosque, celebrating the major religious festivals,
etcetera. The participant observations were recorded in extensive field journal entries. This early
engagement with the community at the Grande Mosquée provided me with initial contacts whom
I began interviewing and who in turn provided other contacts for me to interview; this led to a
snowball method of generating interviews.
I conducted 33 semi-structured interviews over this period. My interview subjects ranged
in age from 18 to 64 and were relatively evenly split between males (14) and females (19). All
33 of the informants were either born in one of the three countries of the Maghreb that are the
focus of this study (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) or as second generation Maghrébines in
France. The largest group of informants was born in Algeria (20) followed by French-born
informants (6), Moroccan informants (4) and finally, Tunisian informants (3). Eighty-one percent
of my interview data comes from first generation Maghrébine Muslims in France. Furthermore,
all but one of my 33 informants live and/or work within the 20 districts of central Paris, not in
the banlieues, and all my interviews were conducted within the city centre.112 This is an
important difference from many previous ethnographic studies conducted on Muslims in France,
most of which are conducted in the suburban context.113
The results from my fieldwork in Montréal are based on the data that I collected there
from February 8 until August 11, 2013, with a brief return trip to Montréal for the Eid Al-Adha
celebration on October 15, 2013. In Montréal I took a similar approach to that of Paris, starting
with a well-known mosque and proceeding from there, although most of my participant
observation was done in people’s homes. Unlike in Paris, where I was kept firmly on the outside
and given close but restricted access to the community and to individuals, in Montréal I was
quickly invited in to the inner circles of the community and spent most of my time researching in
the home context.114 Over those six principal months I spent over eight hundred hours partaking
in participant observation, talking about food with people in the mosque, their homes and on the
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streets, preparing food and eating meals at my informants’ homes, volunteering at the mosque
during Ramadan for one of the iftar meals, discussing food with a group of women at another
mosque, drinking many cups of mint tea and eating many North African sweets, having long
conversations about the nature of Islam and Christianity on my informants’ couches, etcetera.
My initial contacts in Montréal came from my early visit to the mosque, as well as a contact of
one of my informants in Paris who lives in Montréal.
I conducted 32 semi-structured interviews in Montréal. My 32 informants ranged in age
from 22 to 73 and were made up of two-thirds female informants (22) and one-third male
informants (10). Almost all my informants were first generation Maghrébines with 31 of the
informants being born in one of the three countries of the Maghreb that are the focus of this
study (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). Only one informant was a second generation Maghrébine
(Tunisian) born in Canada. Of the first-generation informants, the largest group was born in
Algeria (20), followed by Morocco (9), and finally, Tunisia (2). All my informants lived either
directly on the island of Montréal or in one of its adjacent neighbourhoods, namely Laval.
Once my year of fieldwork was completed, all 65 interviews were individually
transcribed and the field journals were compiled into electronic format. Using the GT methods
that I describe above, I then used the data analysis program NVivo to code and perform analysis
on all my data. The results of all that data gathering and analyzing are what I present throughout
this dissertation, especially in chapters 3 through 8.
1.2.4 Important Terminology
Before I continue, I would like to clarify some of the terms that I use throughout the work. Let
me first make some preliminary comments about my choice of the word “informant” in my
work. Spradley suggests that informants are (1) native speakers and (2) a source of information,
i.e. teachers for the ethnographer.115 Furthermore, work with informants is categorically different
from work with subjects and respondents. Informants are different from subjects, as, according to
Spradley, “work with subjects begins with preconceived ideas; work with informants begins with
a naïve ignorance.”116 Since my relationship with the individuals in the community that I was
studying began from relative ignorance, as I discuss throughout this chapter, subjects would not
115
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be the right term to use. Informants are also different from respondents, according to Spradley.
Respondents tend to answer surveys or queries using the ethnographer’s language and culture,
while research with informants depends more fully on the language of the informant.117 While I
did not conduct my research in Arabic, the maternal language of most of my informants, I did
not conduct it in English either (my maternal language) but in French, which is the secondary,
often used, and sometimes maternal language of my informants.
In searching out my informants I had two criteria for their self-identification: they had to
claim first or second generation Maghrébine identity and they had to claim Muslim identity in
some way. Let me describe how I approached both these terms/identities in turn. First, it is
essential to address what I mean by the term(s) Maghreb(ine). When referring to the Maghreb I
generally follow the Oxford Dictionary of English definition of the Maghreb as “a region of
North and NW Africa between the Atlantic Ocean and Egypt, comprising the coastal plain and
Atlas Mountains of Morocco, together with Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Tripolitania.”118 For
the purposes of my project, Tripolitania is not included and only the three countries of Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia comprise what I refer to as the Maghreb. I limit the Maghrébine region to
these three countries since they were all either protectorates or colonies of France and
consequently provide the largest numbers of Muslim immigrants to both France and Québec.
Furthermore, when discussing the Maghreb with my informants these three countries were the
ones that they mentioned. My informants never included Libya in their definitions or
understandings of the Maghreb, but always mentioned one/all of the three which I include in my
definition. In fact, regional identity was quite important to my informants and was often used
interchangeably with their homeland national identity.
My informants would sometimes talk about being “Algerian” or “Moroccan” or
“Tunisian” and sometimes talk about being “Maghrébine.” They would say things like “coming
from the Maghreb” as a blanket statement, knowing that I was aware of which specific country
in the Maghreb that they were from. The only times that the distinction became important were
in brief moments when my informants would speak about the specific recipes that varied across
the Maghreb. For example, they would make a distinction between Moroccan harira and
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Algerian chorba (soups commonly made for the iftar during Ramadan). Other than these specific
differences in national dishes, my informants did not seem to see any problem with using their
regional and specific national identities interchangeably.
My use of Maghrébine throughout the text refers to an individual who comes from one of
the three countries I include in my definition above (Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia), either as a
first or second generation immigrant, and someone who continues to identify with their
homeland national identity, regional identity or both. Throughout the text when I refer to
“Maghrébine identity” I mean either (1) one of the three national identities that make up the term
Maghrébine (rather than listing all three I use Maghrébine as a blanket term to cover the
possibility of all three national identities, as my informants did in their interviews), or (2)
regional identity, which my informants often use interchangeably with their national identities.
Finally, it is important to address what I mean when I use the term “Muslim” throughout.
Falling firmly in line with Spradley’s category of “standard ethnography” I attempted as often as
possible to allow for the concepts and meanings, and definitions for that matter, of my
informants to permeate the ethnographic description.119 Therefore, I did not impose a specific
definition of Muslim on to my informants, nor did I ask about, or restrict, the sectarian
background of my informants.120 In agreement with Baumann, that “by stereotyping informants
as ‘belonging to’ or even ‘speaking for’ a pre-defined ‘community’, one runs the risk of
tribalizing people, instead of listening to them, and might end up studying communities of the
researcher’s own making,”121 I did not look for a specific “kind of Muslim” to interview but
allowed my informants to define what being a Muslim meant to them.122
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The definitions of what is meant to “be Muslim” were vast and varied.123 Natash Bakht
states that “many Muslims would be outraged by the contention that one is not a Muslim if one
does not pray five times a day. They would rightly argue that what it means to be a Muslim
depends on numerous personal, cultural, and religious choices.”124 As a result, I had informants
who suggested that being a Muslim meant practicing the five pillars of Islam. Some posited that
the five pillars were not enough, and one must do more to “be a Muslim,” i.e. fast on other days
of the year than just Ramadan, pray more than five times a day, study and read the Quran often,
restrict even more foods than just the commonly understood food restrictions, etcetera. Others
proposed that it was a born identity, something someone did not choose but simply was, based on
the circumstances of one’s birth. Others still stated that being Muslim was a cultural identity, one
that one absorbed from one’s surroundings and enacted as it related to one’s cultural preferences
and practices. My informants addressed the ideas of “good Muslim” versus “bad Muslim,”125 and
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“practicing Muslim” versus “non-practicing/believing Muslim,”126 but there was no consensus as
to what any of these terms meant. Remarkably, my informants were engaged in various
“meaning-making” endeavors that had some relationship to the “Pre-Text, Text, or Con-Text” of
Islam.127 I interviewed any “Muslim” who understood him/herself as “Muslim” within this
context.
Furthermore, speaking of “context,” there is one last term I would like to address here:
“the West.” The “West” is a highly-contested term, with many scholars arguing against the
binary understanding of “the West” versus any variety of other terms that are so often placed in
opposition to it. With the advent of Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, these binaries
and essentialisms have become problematic. My use of the term throughout the work is mostly
about a particular orientating location. When speaking of “Islam in the West,” I am referring
primarily to any manifestation of Islam outside of majority Muslim contexts and within generally
European, North American or Australian Muslim minority contexts. It has nothing to do with the
long-held understanding by some that “West” and thus “Westernization” equals “modern” and
thus “modernization.”
1.3 Subjectivity: The Researcher’s Ethnographic Self
There are some key components to myself as a researcher that inevitably influenced the data that
I was able to gather during my fieldwork (ethnographic discovery) and on the way that I present
that data here (ethnographic description).128 Someone with a different background, both personal
and academic, with a different set of strengths and weaknesses, most likely would have wound
up with an entirely different set of findings. These personal idiosyncrasies affected how I
gathered my data, what I paid attention to, what I probed further on, what I missed, etcetera, and
126
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they affected how I understood that data and consequently communicated it in this ethnographic
account. It is important to note these identities that I carried with me into the field shaped, and
were shaped by, my informants throughout this ethnographic endeavour.
1.3.1 Ethnographic self as resource
Prior to the 1970s the “person or self of the anthropologist remained unseen and mostly
unheard.”129 The ethnographer was meant to keep him/herself out of the equation as much as
possible with the hope of maintaining as close to absolute objectivity as possible; this was the
positivist model. According to Peter Collins and Anselma Gallinat, a paradigm shift occurred
within the field in the mid-1980s. This shift was from complete separation and consequent denial
of the role of the researcher self, to a “new self-conscious and critical anthropology.”130 Since the
time of this paradigm shift, which Collins and Gallinat largely attribute to Writing Culture: The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography,131 any ethnographer is quick to note the ways that his/her
history, background and personality affects his/her research. Still, this transparent selfconsciousness is often relegated to the introduction of the work, and in many cases the
ethnographic self is left there. The ethnographer acknowledges his or her own particularities,
stressing the importance of reflexivity, but then the reader never sees him/her again. While I
address my “self” and its influences on my study in-depth below, I try to incorporate my own
voice throughout the whole dissertation. I present insights into my life in the field to show how
my own set of experiences inevitably affected my field work, the collection of my data and
ultimately the writing up of my ethnography.132
Before I address those specific elements of my ethnographic self that most strongly
influenced my work, I would like to make a quick note about memory. Our memories and our
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ability to remember, or lack thereof, influence our fieldwork experience. As stated by Simon
Coleman,
recalling the field and not just fieldwork itself, involves a combination of the
serendipitous and the structured. The mediations of memory can act as ghosts in the
ethnographic machine, and these can affect both ethnography as data-gathering process
(writing down) and ethnography as authorship (writing up).133
In terms of the influence of memory on data-gathering, one’s memories can change one’s
approach to a given situation. The experience or recall of one site or one ritual can activate
memories from another. For example, after weeks of preparing the iftar meal with the women at
the Grande Mosquée in Paris, the memories of these experiences may have clouded my later
experiences of the iftar preparation. I may not have paid close attention to the intricacies of that
specific day, acting almost on autopilot fueled by my memory of what the preparation process
was supposed to look like. Secondly, and more importantly, memory offers some semblance of
insider status. Coleman suggest that re-entry into a familiar field “implies a movement across
this threshold from outsider’s to insider’s view as memory of past involvement is engaged.”134
For example, he describes how going back to a service of the community that he studied flooded
him with memories of his time in the field and as a result provided him with some comfort and
familiarity with the situation that he would not normally have had. His memories provided him
with instructions on what to do and how to behave, making him feel and appear much more like
an insider than an outsider.
While I do not have multiple field sites of which to remember, a similar situation arose
for me when entering the field in Montréal. Having spent six months in a Maghrébine Muslim
community in Paris, I was familiar with the sights, sounds, tastes and daily rituals of life. These
memories travelled with me to Montréal and inevitably affected my approach to the community I
met there. Entering an informant’s home and smelling mint tea, as I discuss in the introduction to
the Montréal case study, put me at ease and made me feel like an insider from the beginning of
my time in the field in Montréal; a feeling I did not really experience at all during my time in the
field in Paris, as I discuss below. I went through the process which Coleman calls “embodied
forgetting,” in that this “sense of being at home” within the ritual lay latent until it was
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“reinvoked, with a jolt, by re-entry into the field.”135 Memory has a real effect on the fieldwork
experience.
The other influence that memory can have on an ethnography is in the writing up of that
project. While ethnographers are often “concerned with how to translate an ‘authentic’ sense of
‘being there’ to the reader, we can also add that ethnographies also contain tensions linked to
how ‘being then’ can be worked into a text that may be written many years later.”136 How does
one effectively communicate what it was like to be in the field, what the informants’ lives were
actually like, etcetera, when the fluid process of memory making and recall is constantly
changing? Collins suggests that “narrative memory” is essential in the writing up of ethnography.
Narrative memory, according to Collins, is the idea that “memory is largely a matter of being
able to tell the right story at the right time.”137 In fact, he goes on to say that what we hold on to
in our memories is merely a skeleton of a story that we then tell in the way we want, often
manipulating our own experiences to fulfil our needs.138
Given these realities, it is my hope that I have told, not only the “right story,” but the
story that best reflects my informants’ understanding of their experiences. I do acknowledge,
though, that my storytelling is inevitably affected by the things that I “remembered,” that seemed
interesting to me. These memories, the making and recalling of them, were clearly influenced by
who I am as a person.
1.3.2 Reflexivity/My Ethnographic Self
First, while no one comes into the field as a completely blank slate, we all bring distinct
philosophies and theories about life and our work with us, I entered the field with a great deal of
openness and a general lack of preconceived notions about my subject. I was a new
ethnographer. Coming from graduate studies in biblical studies, not only was this my first time in
the field, but the social scientific study of religion and the ethnographic methods that I described
above were new territory for me. This methodological novelty proved to be both helpful and
difficult. My newness to the world of fieldwork led to a great deal of insecurity in my early days
in the field. I struggled with questions of “where do I start? What approach do I take? Will
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people think I am not a serious researcher? How do I prove to the communities that I want to
study that I know what I am doing when I am feeling so lost?” These overwhelming feelings left
me almost depressed in my first weeks in the field, unable to convince myself to get out and start
taking the necessary first steps to building rapport with my informants. I am sure that this early
self-consciousness led to missed opportunities and inevitably shortened my already limited time
in the field in Paris.
Despite this self-consciousness, and thanks to helpful conversations with my colleagues, I
realized that, no matter what you know (or do not know) ahead of time, nothing can fully prepare
you for the fieldwork experience. Context is key. Every community is different. Every
underlying history, every cultural context, every researcher adds nuance to the fieldwork
experience that makes it impossible to fully prepare for what one will experience in the field.
Reading about a fellow scholar’s study, listening to a conference presentation on the topic, taking
the best ethnographic fieldwork class in the world, while all valuable for tips and tricks of
fieldwork, cannot possibly provide a framework and expectation for a specific study in a specific
context. For example, a study on evangelical youth in a southwestern Ontario university, such as
Paul Bramadat’s The Church on the World’s Turf,139 is going to look completely different from a
study on Maghrébine Muslims in Paris and Montréal. So many influencing factors are different,
and so, while stories of conversion attempts may be familiar and thus encouraging, my response
to such conversion attempts was going to have to be different than Bramadat’s. I think the
realization that fieldwork is something that one cannot fully be prepared for, because of the
absolute unexpected nature of fieldwork, was a helpful one for me to make early on in my
research in France. No matter what level of training I would have had, it could not have possibly
prepared me for what I would actually meet on the “ground” so to speak. Once I realized this, I
could relax into the process a bit more and the daily unexpected events that arose in the field
provided me comfort in the fact that there really was no preparing for such an experience.
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If my experience is any indication, being good at fieldwork is not necessarily about how
much you know about a particular topic or the training you have to conduct a particular kind of
research, but about how good you are at relating to people. Furthermore, in line with grounded
theory methods, I had a blank canvas on which to paint not only my experiences but my method.
I was not coming in to the field with preconceived notions of how the fieldwork process would
work, and honestly this worked out in my favour on several occasions. I could build rapport
much faster with my informants since I was not limiting myself to a particular way of doing
things. Not knowing how fieldwork was supposed to work allowed me to learn what fieldwork
is—like not having a definition of religion that we impose on a religious group but allowing
them to define what religion is for them—and being in the field defined what fieldwork is for
me.
The second area in which I approached my research topic with very few preconceived
notions was in relation to Islam. I am not a classically trained scholar of Islam. While I am
trained in the tradition, having completed course work on the subject in my undergraduate and
graduate studies, I was not an expert in the topic when I began my fieldwork. This relative
unfamiliarity with the religious tradition of my informants provided a fertile ground for learning
from them exactly what Islam was to them; Spradley suggests this unfamiliarity is beneficial to a
good ethnographic study. He suggests that isolated societies with which we have absolutely no
prior contact, knowledge or shared cultural understandings are the ideal setting for ethnographic
studies because they are settings where “all the assumptions we often share with those we study
are absent.”140 This lack of expert grounding can allow the researcher to learn more fully from
the informant. While my informants and I had much in common, including a common secondary
language that we spoke together,141 my general naïveté about Islam allowed me to function in
some ways as an ethnographer in a semi-isolated society. I had no detailed, fixed notions about
what Islam was, or should be, about which food practices were “essentially religious” and which
were cultural, and therefore my informants could fully teach me about what these things were to
them in their own terms.
Similarly, because I am not a scholar of Islam, my informants did not get thrown off by
my repetition of simple questions about their daily religious lives and practices. My efforts to
140
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understand their lives on a simple, everyday basis made sense to them. This also meant that they
tended to express every little detail about their lives and traditions, knowing that I had not heard
it before. Just as much as I would not feel the need to explain my understanding of the religious
reasons behind my Christian practices to a scholar of Christianity, if I had been a scholar of
Islam my informants may not have felt like they needed to explain things in any real depth to me,
assuming that I already knew why they would do or believe such and such a thing. Because I did
not have this scholarly knowledge, and asked questions accordingly, my informants gave rich
explanations in their own terms about what they understood Islam to be, and what they
understood Muslim or Maghrébine food practices to be.
My identity as a religious outsider, then eventually a semi-spiritual-insider, were essential
aspects of myself that influenced my study as well. I knew going into the field that I was going to
be seen as an outsider, I am not Muslim after all. What I was not expecting was 1) how much I
would feel like an outsider, 2) the benefits of being made to feel like a complete outsider, and 3)
the surprising things that provided me with what I call semi-spiritual-insider status. First, there is
a difference between telling yourself that you are an outsider because you do not share all of a
group’s convictions, and actually feeling the fact that you are an outsider. Like I said, I knew I
was not going to have complete insider status, that I would not understand some of the things
that happened at the mosque because I am not a follower of Islam, but what I did not know was
how isolating of an experience it was to be an outsider. I can handle not understanding certain
rites and rituals. I can handle not following certain conversations. I can handle not experiencing
things on the same level as an insider might. What was difficult to handle, in Paris in particular,
was the feeling that my outsider status made me bad, made me on some level not trustworthy,
made me someone of whom to be suspicious. I had never felt that way in my life. I was not
prepared to feel that way. This experience constantly led me to question my own morals and
values. Maybe if I was being treated like an outsider and all the suspicion that goes along side
that, I might actually be a bad person. It took me a while to acknowledge what was my own
emotional baggage and what was being put on me because I was not “one of them.”142
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This othering was happening for very particular reasons and it is important to note that I
did not feel at all like an outsider when I was in Montréal. Paris was a different story. Despite
making up a far more significant percentage of the overall population than they do in Canada,
Muslims in France are seen as an ultimate “other.” Whether it be from the difficult colonial
history that is made evident by their presence in France, or the challenge that many of their
practices and beliefs pose to the principle of laïcité that is mentioned daily in media and
conversation on the street, they are a “they.”143 I heard many stories from friends and informants
about being made to feel like an outsider by those “non-Muslims” around them. I witnessed with
my own eyes French women being told to go back to their country simply because they were
wearing Islamic dress. I saw dear friends of mine being asked if they were disguising
themselves, being looked upon with looks of disgust simply because you could only see their
faces. I felt peering eyes and looks of judgement when I wore my veil out of the mosque and on
the subway on my way home. I had non-Muslim friends look at me with frustration when I
would arrive to meet up with them in my veil from the mosque and tell me “enlève ça!”144 and
friends who would be frustrated with me because I was wearing “too much clothing” for the
season. It was not just women who experienced this prejudice, although their stories were more
frequent. I also met men who decided to shave their beards because if they kept them people
would immediately think that they were “dangerous salafists.”145 I had informants tell me that it
was just easier to shave than to deal with one more thing that made them feel like an outsider. I
saw constant news reports about the problem of immigration from Muslim countries, about the
halal food market taking over France and French people having “no other choice” but to eat halal
and thus support the industry. I heard friends talk about how inappropriate it was to have a
permanent exhibit on the “art of Islam” open at the Louvre, because it “did not fit with the
principles of France.” I heard, saw, and read politicians claim that Islam was taking over France
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I address both France’s colonial history and its approach to secularism, laïcité, in Chapter 2.
“Take that off!”
145
Jennifer Selby explains, in her article “Islam in France Reconfigured: Republican Islam in the 2010 Gerin Report”
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 31, no. 3 (2011): 383-398, how the term “Salafism” has been employed in
France, particularly in French politics and policy, as a synonym for fundamentalist, extreme, radical Islam. Once set
up in this way, it is then used as the ultimate representation of “otherness” or difference from French values. This
term plays an important role in discussions around, and legal projects involving, the banning of the niqab. She goes
on to explain that while Salafism is not widespread in France, reports such as the Gerin Report paint this tradition
as one that “must be feared and contained” (389). The description above shows how my informants interact with
and are impacted by this kind of rhetoric.
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as was made obvious by the “fact” that Muslim children were stealing chocolate croissants from
their non-Muslim school mates during Ramadan. Unfortunately, the list of examples of Muslims
being “othered” in France can go on and on and on.
I did not witness many of these things right away, though. I did not have conversations
with Muslims about the prejudice they were experiencing, about how journalists would want to
talk to them just to get a good story, about how hard or easy it felt to “integrate” into French
culture, simply because all of this prejudice, the history of feeling on the margins of the French
society, of not quite fitting in, led most Muslims in France to mistrust anyone who was not a
Muslim. I had a hard time getting people to talk to me. I struggled with gaining acceptance from
the people I was meeting. As I started to make inroads people started to use the verb “se méfier”
to describe Muslim responses to anyone outside of the community. I would hear this word
multiple times a day, every single day, early on in my work in France, and by the end of my time
there found myself using it to explain what was going on in the interactions of Muslims with
non-Muslims in France. I had no idea what the verb viscerally meant at first and people were
throwing it at me all the time. People would tell me this is why I was having a hard time really
getting into my work, because Muslims have learned, through many hurtful experiences, to “se
méfier” of others. I learned that this word meant more than simply “to mistrust” or “to be wary
of”; it has a gut-wrenching edge to it. This was clearly the lens that I was being viewed through.
While I understood why, especially after viewing all of the above-mentioned examples, Muslims
had developed this approach to outsiders, it was sad to see. It was sad, I thought, that people’s
initial response to someone who wanted to talk to them would be one of suspicion. It was sad
that no matter how many times I said “je ne suis pas une journaliste” I still sensed that that was
exactly what many people thought I was.146 It was sad that even after months in a community,
building up friendships, offering help, and gaining trust and trusting others, that people still
mistrusted me. While building trust is a hard enough task for any fieldworker, breaking into the
circle of trust in a community that has “mistrust first” as its motto made for exceptionally
difficult work.
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Spradley suggests that the informant-ethnographer relationship is frequently confused with other relationships
(Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 26). While some may have to convince their informants that they do not work
for a government agency, or the police force, or any such thing, I had to convince my informants in France on an
almost daily basis that I was not a journalist.
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Despite how uncomfortable of an experience my religious outsider status continued to be
for me throughout my six months in Paris, it was an exceptionally beneficial fieldwork
experience to have. As someone who studies an “othered” group, a group that is viewed as
“outsiders” and feels like “outsiders” in their current setting, it was a valuable experience to feel
that myself. To feel the confusion of not being able to follow a conversation, to feel like my
outsider/other status made me not as good from the get-go, to feel like even after putting a lot of
effort forward I was still not quite “one of them” was all eye opening for me. It helped me to
gain even the slightest bit of empathy for the daily experiences that immigrants and especially
marginalized immigrants have in their host countries. In the moments when I wanted to cry,
when I did cry, I tried to hold on to those feelings and use them to understand my informants
better. Once I got to the interview stage of my research these experiences helped to add a depth
of understanding to my informants’ responses about integration and accommodation, identity and
need for community that I would not have been able to really grasp had I not struggled through
similar issues in my attempt to get into the community in Paris. Empathy is key to understanding,
and while I could not empathize with the actual details of the tradition, this experience of being
“othered” allowed me to empathize at least on some level.147
Since I was not a Muslim, I could not participate in some of the rituals, and thus missed
out on some opportunities to observe and listen to what people had to say about their food
practice in the early days in the field. Slowly but surely, though, I was able to break down some
of those barriers and be brought into the community on a deeper level. I found fairly early that
there were things that helped me to gain access to the community in ways that others probably
could not. While I was technically a religious outsider, there were things that gave me semispiritual-insider status in the community. The most significant of my identities which seemed to
have the greatest effect on bringing down the “outsider” persona was my Christian identity.
Upon meeting me people would ask if I was a Muslim. I anticipated that this would happen and
wondered how best to respond to this inquiry. I knew ahead of time that my religious identity
would most likely help rather than hinder my position in the community, so I would say no and
explain that I was a Christian. My preconceived notion proved to be correct: my Christianity
147

I do not want to equate my brief experiences of feeling like an outsider to the real struggle that many of my
informants go through on a daily basis in their lives in France and Québec. For some the experience is mild, much
like mine, while for others their experiences of being “othered” are pervasive, overwhelming and sometimes even
violent (both emotionally and physically).
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gave me some level of spiritual street credibility. I belonged to the people of the book, I was not
that far off from truth, there was hope for my soul, and there was a conversion possibility.148 I
discovered quickly that if I had not been a “person of the book” I probably would not have been
given the same initial access, or the depth of access that I was granted. Sharing the basic
understanding of one God, sharing the same basic spiritual history, gave me an immediate boost
in trust points. I was not fully an insider but I was also not completely an outsider.
I wonder if some of the importance placed on my Christian identity came from the fact
that we were in France, in a country where people were either not religious or would at least not
talk about their own faith convictions with strangers. My openness to talk about this made me
more like my Muslim informants who tended to be quite open about their religious identity, often
wearing symbols of it on their heads, in a culture which is generally not open about such things.
It was always interesting to me to see how people, usually in the mosque, would respond to me
when I was being introduced to them and how my introducer would respond in turn. After
answering that I was not a Muslim, and getting a somewhat negative look in return, my
introducer would often retort on my behalf with “but she is a practicing Christian” and the tone
would immediately change. Shoulders would relax, conversation would continue normally, and I
would be “allowed” to stay. Throughout my fieldwork I struggled with how much to use my own
spirituality as a way in to the community. I ended up not thinking about it too much and allowing
myself to answer naturally, not lying at any point—and if that helped me, then so be it.
To this point in the discussion, in relation to my identity as a religious outsider/semispiritual-insider I have primarily addressed the Paris side of my fieldwork. The noteworthy point
to be made here is that these aspects of my own religious life/identity had a different effect on
my work in Montréal. While I had to struggle with my outsider identity in the community in
Paris, even while gaining some “spiritual street cred” by being Christian, my different religious
identity was never an issue for the community in Montréal. I was granted full access to people
and rituals right from the beginning of my time in the field in Montréal. While the door was open
for me from the beginning, my Christian identity granted me semi-spiritual-insider status in this
community as well.
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These were various responses that informants professed when hearing about my Christianity, or responses that
became obvious over time spent in the field.
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Again, in a context like Québec where religion is sometimes presented as problematic
and often presented as fully private, my willingness to talk about my own faith provided a
rapport between myself and my informants from the beginning. They too would ask if I was
Muslim, and they too were pleased when I responded with my Christian identity. While in
France my religious identity simply provided the ground for some level of trust to be present, in
Montréal my Christianity not only helped to build trust, but also allowed me to engage in much
deeper strains of theological conversation with my informants. My informants were interested in
learning about Christianity and thus would spend hours with me discussing the similarities and
differences between the two traditions. These moments of interfaith dialogue between my
informants and me inevitably led to me getting a longer, and deeper glance into their daily lives,
not to mention many more dinner invitations.
The final identity that influenced my data collection and writing is my identity as a
woman. There are two aspects of this identity that I feel are important to present here. First,
because this study is a study of food, and food is often the domain of women, I, as a woman, was
able to gain access to places and events that a male researcher would not have been able to
access. While men came in and out of the kitchen at the Grande Mosquée in Paris, the
preparation and cooking of the iftar meal during Ramadan was understood as women’s work. I
easily fit in to this setting. In Montréal, during my many visits to informants’ homes, I was
invited in to the kitchen to see the food preparation in action, something that my male colleagues
would not have been able to do given the cultural constraints placed on gender interactions in
this community. Furthermore, because of some understandings of, and approaches to, gender and
sexuality among some of my informants, I was able to conduct interviews with both women and
men, again an option that would not necessarily have been open to a male ethnographer.
Conversely, because I was a woman, I did not necessarily have equal access to men’s
experiences. For example, at various iftars during the month of Ramadan (not all) and at the
celebration of the Eid al-adha that I attended in Montréal, the men celebrated/ate in another room
in the home. Since I am a woman, it was expected that I would stay with the women, so I do not
know what kind of experience the men were having during these celebrations. I was told it would
have followed a similar pattern to the women, but I missed out on the conversations that were
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had around the table; consequently, my participant observations of these moments are highly
skewed to the female perspective.149
The other aspect of my identity as a woman that influenced my ethnographic experience
is the role of sexuality in the ethnographic process. I knew that gender issues would come up in
my fieldwork, that being a woman was going to affect my work in specific ways, as I discussed
above, but I did not expect sexuality to play such a large role in my work. I even expected, given
what others had told me, that I would receive some marriage proposals but did not think that I
would receive the kind and number of proposals I did. Unfortunately, my Paris fieldwork
experience was not the first time I came across the issue of having to let someone down gently
and carefully to not affect my future research. When I was in Paris earlier, in 2010, to lay the
groundwork for what would become my dissertation fieldwork, an Algerian journalist took quite
the liking to me and took advantage of my vulnerable position and my eagerness to get to know
the community in order to attempt to grow closer to me. He knew people of influence in the
community, and just as easy as he could open those doors for me he could also close them off. I
can remember feeling off, feeling like I may be in a dangerous situation, but having to tread
carefully with how I refused his advances because I was afraid he would destroy my chances of
researching in the community before they even began. I hated that I had to deal with that. I hated
that I felt like I had to almost take the abuse because I did not want to lose out on data and
connections. I hated that I was in a position that made me feel beyond uncomfortable, even
violated. As seen in Gwen Sharp and Emily Kremer’s article “The Safety Dance: Confronting
Harassment, Intimidation, and Violence in the Field,” this problem is especially prevalent for
novice researchers who are “often more concerned with their methodology and response rate
than ensuring their own safety.”150 I can remember hearing the voices of imagined fellow
academics and professors in my head convincing me that getting the data was the most important
thing—more important than my gut telling me to get out of there.
Those feelings of unease arose again during my fieldwork in Paris when I received a
marriage proposal from someone who held a very important role within the community I was
studying. Although I was not afraid for my safety like the first time, I still felt like I needed to be
149

I was able to attend a couple of iftars in Montréal where the men and women ate and celebrated together as a
family, which provided me with some insight and access to the men’s experiences of these important events.
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Gwen Sharp and Emily Kremer, “The Safety Dance: Confronting Harassment, Intimidation, and Violence in the
Field,” Sociological Methodology, vol. 36 (2006): 321.
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especially careful with how I would turn down this proposal in order to protect all of the work
that I had put into my fieldwork over the preceding month. I wanted to respond with a laugh and
a “are you serious? You cannot propose to someone after only knowing them for a month!” But
instead I had to watch my words, and feign interest. If I offended this person I could very well
lose everything that I had built towards. He could turn the entire community against me, could
make it impossible for me to continue there and need to start over somewhere else. Having
already spent a great deal of time in the community building rapport and connections, starting
over was simply not an option for me. His proposal made me appreciate that I had not fully
realized that the sexuality and relational impulses of my interviewees could affect my work in
such a way. It is quite possible that because this man was interested in me I was able to gain
access that I would not normally get. It would have also been possible that, if I had offended him
in my refusal, all my access would go away. A broken heart is bad in any circumstance and can
lead the broken hearted to react in harsh ways. I remember being frustrated that I had to deal
with such a thing. Of course I was flattered, flattered that someone of such status, who could
propose to any one, would ask me, an outsider, but I was upset that I had to be so careful with
my response. I was aggravated that I had to think hard about how to express honestly my refusal
without offending. I was discouraged by the idea that my male colleagues most likely never had
to deal with such problems. I was annoyed that the idea of possible marriage proposals was a
joke to many people, something funny and not to be taken too seriously. I remember hearing
comments from colleagues and friends alike “it might not have been a serious proposal,” “he was
probably just trying to compliment you,” “I’m sure he wasn’t trying to make you
uncomfortable,” etcetera. I was irritated that people seemed to think that it was his intentions that
seemed to matter, not how they made me feel. I was frustrated that they presumed to tell me that
I got it wrong, that I was being too sensitive, that it could not possibly have been that tough. I
was bothered that in my academic career I was dealing with what felt like a version of the
slut/prude paradox that many young women face. If I was harsh and closed off I may not have
gained access to certain experiences, but at the same time, if I had used my sexuality to my
advantage there would be another ethical dilemma at hand.
I do wonder how much of this issue of sexuality and the slut/prude paradox relates to my
specific situation though. I was a young, seemingly unattached, Western woman researching
highly male dominant communities where marriage is exceptionally important. If I were a man I
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probably would not face the same level of advances. If I were an older woman, or a woman
whose husband was always with her, would it have been the same? Regardless, even though I
can reason why this may have been the case, it still led to complicated situations that I had to
navigate in the field. Not only were marriage proposals an uncomfortable situation that arose
within my fieldwork, but the feeling of being flirted with, and in some circumstances harassed
were also present. At first I wondered why I was getting a better response rate from men than
from women, whom I or my previous interviewees approached for an interview. Topics that
would not come up for others in the field came up often in my work, especially with men. My
relationship status, my thoughts on marriage, my physical appearance, etcetera, were constantly
questioned and commented on.
A significant problem in our field, and many others for that matter, is that there is no
upfront training in how to be safe in the field. Sexual and emotional safety is a topic we seem to
ignore, or are too afraid, or perhaps too embarrassed, to talk about. I remember many instances
of feeling exceptionally uncomfortable but pushing myself through the interview any way to get
the “much needed data,” because I thought that was the most important thing. That was what was
emphasized in my dissertation proposal defense, that is what is emphasized in conversations
about our research process. I was able to find some suggestions of how to avoid such danger, but
not until after the fact, once I knew that my safety had already been compromised and I wanted
to figure out if I was the only one that had experienced such a thing. That being said, the
suggestions that are out there of how to avoid said danger are not always helpful either way.151
The suggestion to dress conservatively not only reinforces the “blame the victim” attitude, but in
my case it made no difference at all. Dressing conservatively, even veiling, did not help me. This
often led to more comments being made about “how beautiful” I was. Other suggestions about
making sure other researchers know where you are, that you are in contact with members of the
research team, etcetera, do not help those field workers who are alone in the field, quite possibly
in another country.
It is fascinating to me that our ethics forms ask what are the risks to our informants but
not to us as researchers. Furthermore, we tell our interviewees that they can end the interview at
any time, but we do not necessarily know this to be true for ourselves as well. I did not know this
151

To see a summary of some of the various suggestions that have been made for staying safe in the field,
including a list of realistic strategies that the authors present, see Sharp and Kremer, “Safety Dance,” 324-326.
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was really an option for me until I got home and read Sharp and Kremer’s work. Trusting your
gut in the field is essential. When I was with the Algerian journalist I knew it was wrong. His
physical advances were wrong, but my fear of losing out won over my gut feeling that I was in
danger. This is problematic.
Not only did the sexuality and relational desires of my informants have an influence on
my work, but my own sexuality did as well. While my own interests seemed to be generally kept
at bay, I could not help but notice how my tone and approach changed a bit when interviewing
men versus women. Almost innately, in the presence of a strong male character or an attractive
one, I would somewhat revert to a slightly meek, more giggling version of myself. I did not
notice this in the moment, but could hear it when I listened back to my recorded interviews. Why
did this happen? Did that affect my data? Did I ever allow myself to be distracted by attraction
and subsequently not probe into responses to my questions enough? Or did I ask more questions
and extend the interview out of sheer interest to keep talking to the attractive person on the other
side of the cafe table? When dealing with other humans, when placed in close quarters over long
periods of time with them, when experiencing highly emotional and personal moments with
them, when talking about important and stimulating topics with them, closeness and attraction
seems almost inevitable. The question becomes how to address this inevitability and to create
healthy and safe environments in which to do our work. Sometimes I feel like we think that as
researchers we can check our humanity at the door and not have such things affect us, but the
truth of the matter is that we cannot. We cannot leave our identities at the door, but we must be
aware of them, and acknowledge the potential effect that these identities might have on the
outcome of our work.152
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For matters of space I cannot fully address some of the other identities that influenced my work in the field.
Another interesting one that I will mention briefly here was my Canadian/non-Québécois identity. In France, my
identity as a Canadian helped to separate me from the what my informants saw as the unaccepting, racist, and
judgemental French majority population. Not only that, but it placed me outside of the realm of laïcité, and in my
informants’ eyes firmly within the multicultural camp; being Canadian was a beneficial identity claim. Similarly,
being a non-Québécois Canadian was also beneficial for me in my Montréal fieldwork. My informants saw me as a
fellow “outsider,” as someone trying to figure out how to function within intercultural Québec.
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1.4 Summary of the Dissertation
In the chapters that follow I attempt to answer the questions: How can food act as a means of
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested
identities for minority immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? Does food emerge as a
more “politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other religious
practices? In secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic,
could subtler/more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant
to engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways? Additionally, in contexts like
France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the
foodways of the host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as
especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), could
minority immigrants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their transnational
identity? Would they even want to? If they did, how would “French/Québécois Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants” create and maintain their hybrid transnational identities in contexts that are
seemingly hostile toward them because of those societies’ unique and complex histories and
interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism?
My study shows not only that the host contexts have unique histories and interactions
with “the other” but that “the others” also have unique responses to these contexts. Québec is not
a mini-France, as some may assume, and there is no unified way that Muslims across or even
within cultures and contexts respond to the challenges to identity that they face.
While the way my informants negotiated these identities was remarkably diverse, I
demonstrate how food played a significant role in all of their negotiations; food was often the
most important symbol of those identities, whatever those identities were. By highlighting food
and foodways I show the importance of lived, everyday religious practice as a means of creating
and maintaining transnational identity for minority immigrant communities in highly secular
contexts. Food is often a more “politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression
because of the malleability of categorizing a foodway as cultural rather than religious, and the
general private (versus public) nature of foodways. In contexts such as Paris and Montréal,
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where outward/public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic,153 and food culture is
central to national identity, these kinds of actions may take on importance for the minority
immigrant individuals living in these cities.
In this chapter I addressed the why, what and who of this project. I began with a brief
overview of the foundational works on Muslims in France and Canada which oriented the
development of this project. I presented the kinds of questions, gaps and calls for research in this
field which my work directly addresses. I then discussed what I am calling my philosophy of
religion and religious studies. I see religion as a means of making sense of the world/one’s life
and I believe that people engage in this sense-making in their everyday lived practices which
help them to both “make homes and cross boundaries.” Because of this, I believe that one can
gain significant insight into how people make sense of their worlds, their often conflicting,
uncomfortable, difficult worlds, by examining the “stuff” of people’s lives, specifically food. In
this I showed how this dissertation expands upon the field of lived religion and Tweed’s
definition of religion to explore religion and movement specifically through the lens of food.
Next I turned to a brief explanation of my academic background in the study of religion to show
how I was uniquely situated to undertake this work. Throughout this dissertation it will become
clear how my training in religious studies, textual studies, interreligious dialogue and religious
diversity in North America helped me to understand the religious lives of my informants and
even helped me in my field work. I then described my broad methodology, and the methods I
employed to enact this methodology. In this I presented my approach to and understanding of
ethnography as a means of learning from one’s informants in their own words, and outlined the
Grounded Theory methods that I used in my field work and analysis. I also briefly addressed
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Both France and Québec have, in the recent past, proposed or implemented various laws to ban the wearing of
religious symbols in public spaces. In France there was the 2004 ban of the headscarf, along with crosses and
turbans and other symbols of religious identification in state schools in France, as well as the 2011 ban on the
niqab in all public places. Recently, the French Prime Minister suggested that the headscarf should also be banned
in universities (it is not, at the time of this writing, banned in university settings). In Québec, in 2013 the then PQ
government, under the leadership of Premier Pauline Marois, proposed the now infamous “Charter of Québec
Values” (Bill 60). This Charter would ban the wearing of overly conspicuous religious symbols, i.e. the kippah,
turban, hijab, or large crosses, for public-sector employees, such as teachers, nurses, doctors, civil servants and
police officers. Bill 60 was never implemented in the province, as Marois called an election and lost, but its ripple
effects are evident in the province. In 2015, Liberal leader Philippe Couillard proposed a new religious neutrality
legislation in Bill 62. In this Bill, reminiscent of Bill 94 which was tabled in 2010, people giving and receiving public
services would need to have their faces uncovered, making the niqab and burka banned in these contexts. Overall,
overt symbols of religious identification are problematic in both of these contexts.
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James P. Spradley’s ethnographic interview structure, with which my interviews fell in line.
After presenting the specific details of my ethnographic study in Paris and Montréal, I addressed
three important terms that I use throughout this work: informant, Maghreb(ine) and Muslim. I
finished this chapter by describing my ethnographic self which was, and continues to be, in
constant communication with my informants and data.
I break the body of the dissertation into two parts: 1) the Parisian case study, and 2) the
Montréal case study. Comparative studies which are situated in two, or more, distinct cultural
settings inevitably provide insight into the ways that context affects individuals and communities
living therein. While I was expecting minor differences between the experiences of my Paris
informants and my Montréal informants because of this fact, I could not have predicted how
different their experiences would be. Because of this, it is essential to describe the cultural and
historical contexts within which my informants were living their transnational lives. Chapters 2
and 6 directly address this issue by presenting the unique histories of both France and Québec in
relation to four essential topics that influence a study such as this, namely, colonialism,
immigration, secularism and nationalism.
In Chapter 2 I present France’s colonial history in the Maghreb and show how that
history leads to a wide variety of “colonial memories,” or lack thereof, present in France today.
These colonial memories have both negative and positive effects on the relationship between
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant communities and the non-immigrant, non-Muslim majority
French population (which can be worked out in the realm of food). I then go on to explore the
immigration history of Maghrébines to France showing how this history sets the stage for a
variety of conflations of terms in France, i.e. “immigrant” with “Muslim,” “Muslim” with
“Maghrébine,” and vice versa. These conflations often lead to the immigrant individual feeling a
great deal of pressure to show how he/she is different from these identities and falls in line with
the secular national identity in France.
These two terms, secular and national, orient the second half of Chapter 2. I present
France’s understanding of secularism, namely, laïcité, and describe both the strict and soft forms
of laïcité. I argue that, because of France’s approach to secularism, the Muslim immigrant in
France may find him/herself under more pressure to label religious food practices as cultural
food practices in order to not offend the secularist sentiments that rule the nation. Finally, I close
this chapter by investigating what it means to “be French” as well as who is seen as having

51

access to this national identity. I suggest that food and drink, specifically wine drinking, are
particularly important aspects of the unified culture that is essential to the Republican national
tradition. I question if individuals or communities who do not engage in these essential national
identity practices can really claim that identity, e.g. can a Muslim who does not drink wine really
“be French?” Thus, I conclude this chapter with an exploration of the concept “French Islam.” I
posit that ultimately having a “French Islam” leads to hyphenated identities for those who claim
membership in this group. This hyphenation often leads to conflict arising out of the pressure
from both sides to prioritize each side over the other.
In the next three chapters I present the results from my ethnographic case study in Paris.
Each chapter explores one significant theme that arose out of my Parisian data. In Chapter 3, I
address the spectrum of approaches to identity consolidation taken by the Maghrébine Muslim
community in Paris, and the role that food plays in these negotiations. Chapter 4 investigates the
presence and influence of transnationalism on my informants. I argue that food can serve as the
symbol par excellence of both similarity and difference between “us” and “them,” and can
consequently be used by the immigrant to aid in or detract from their “integration” into the
French culture. Finally, Chapter 5 presents an overview of the ways that my informants practice
their religion every day in a relatively secular France, and address how they justify these
seemingly problematic practices in light of French laïcité. In this chapter I show how my
informants’ attitudes toward their food practice change depending on whether they understand
and label a given practice as cultural or religious.
Overall, in these three case study chapters I show a glimpse into the varied and complex
approaches to daily life that are present in the Maghrébine community in Paris and how their
approach to their food practices changes or remains consistent with what they did in the
homeland. I challenge simplistic notions of Muslim identity formation in France. This case study
shows how my informants’ food practices reveal that categories of “good and bad Muslim,”
“practicing or believing,” simply do not cover the diverse identities present in this immigrant
location.
Part 2 takes a similar structure to Part 1, with one historical/contextual chapter, followed
this time by two case study chapters. Chapter 6 takes the identical structure to Chapter 2,
providing an overview of the impact of colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism on
the Québécois context within which my Montréal informants live. While Québec did not play a
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colonizing role in North Africa, as France did, its own identity as a “colonized nation” imparts
essential characteristics to the Québécois context; characteristics that lead to symbols of
Québécois identity taking root, namely, religion (and eventually secularism) and the French
language. Because of this history, any individual or community which differs from either of
these identities is seen as threatening and unwelcome in the eyes of the majority Québécois
population. I then go on to present the immigration patterns and history of Muslims to Canada,
and then specifically to Québec. I address the reasons that Maghrébine Muslims have immigrated
to Québec, alongside the distinct immigration policies in the province that have clear
consequences for this community, specifically the emphasis on the French language.
In my attempt to address Québécois secularism I present what church/state relations
looked like in the province before 1960 (Catholicism had a prominent role in Québec politics and
culture), the Quiet Revolution, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, rigid versus open secularism
and Québec’s unique approach to multiculturalism, which is called interculturalism. Because of
Québec’s intercultural approach to laïcité I argue that while the province is seen as a highly
“secular” setting, religious minorities in the province do maintain a great deal of freedom to
practice their religious traditions and live out their religious identities, leading to less pressure to
alter such practices. In this context, specific foodways take on added cultural and religious
importance.
I close this chapter with an examination of Québécois nationalism and national identity.
The fact that there is a common national culture with which any immigrant is expected to
interact, and be changed by, à la interculturalisme, makes the situation in Québec distinctive in
Canada. I argue that that common national culture is based on the French language and a secular
mindset. Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Québec, who are by and large French-speaking
thanks to the immigration policies present in the province, feed into one aspect of the Québec
common culture; but they are also seen as a threat to the secular characteristic of that common
culture. I respond “both yes and no” to the question: Can a Maghrébine Muslim living in Québec
claim both sides of a potential “Québécois(e) Muslim” identity?
The following two chapters examine the experiences of my informants through the
exploration of three themes: identity, transnationalism and practice. Chapter 7 reviews the
various ways that my informants identify themselves, interact with, and present those identities
through their food practice in Montréal. I show how, in line with the idea that “everyone is an
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immigrant in Canada” and it is the origins that make you different that ultimately make you fit
with the national identity, my informants would stress their Maghrébine identity in word and
action. Food plays an important role in defining and presenting my informants’ Maghrébine
identity; it is part of the communal identity that must be protected. Religious identity is also
essential for my Montréal informants; it was an actively chosen identity made up of the things of
everyday. Food played a vital role in one’s religious identity; in fact, in this chapter, I show how
in Montréal my informants often felt the need to “go further” in their practice, to go beyond the
traditional Muslim food practices in order to demonstrate their Muslim identity in this context.
After discussing all these various identities that my informants claim, I then address how my
informants see themselves as holding different identities from the non-Maghrébine/Muslim
Québécois(es) that surrounded them: there is a distinct “us” and “them,” and food is the realm
within which my informants demonstrated these identity differences. I show how food can also
act as a powerful means of bridging the gap, often perceived as being larger than it actually is,
between these different communities.
In the second section of Chapter 7 I investigate the many ways in which my informants
attempt to bridge the transnational gap between homeland and host land. I show how my
informants use specific foods and food practice to help gain access to both sides of their
transnational identity. They use food to access memory and consequently recreate “home” in the
host land. They also engaged in food practices that allow them to tap into the host land side of
their transnational identity; they prepare and consume “Québécois” food. I then present the idea
that food can be a tool that both sides use to aide in the process of immigrant integration.
Chapter 8 addresses how my informants defined, and consequently interacted with,
culture and religion through their food practices. When considering food practice the lines
between these two categories often become quite blurry. By examining the specific foodways
that make up the four categories of food practice that I explore in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, I
show how an individual’s understanding of a practice as cultural or religious will alter his/her
interaction with it. My informants would not shy away from labelling a practice religious, but
would almost always give another, more scientific, or logical reason for why they engaged in
such exercises. True to Québec interculturalism, my informants kept their religious identities but
also adjusted them, and their reasoning and understanding of them, to fit into the common
culture of Québec.
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I return to some of the overarching themes of this dissertation in Chapter 9, the
conclusion. After briefly outlining those themes, I compare the data that I collected in Paris and
Montréal, to show the effect of context, which I outlined in Chapters 2 and 6, on the immigrant
experience of my informants. I show how differences in the host land’s approach to nationalism
leads to significant differences in the desire/ability of my informants to claim French/Québécois
national identity. Consequently, often as a direct result of this national contextual disparity, I
show how my informants interact differently with the concepts of religion and culture in Paris
and Montréal. I then explore the real practical impact of these differences on some of the
everyday lived religious/cultural practices of my informants. I close this section of Chapter 9 by
examining one of the similarities that are found in both my Paris and Montréal data set, namely
the use of logic to support one’s religious food practices.
After this I acknowledge some of the limitations of my study: access to the communities
and time in the field, not knowing the home context of my informants, using a research language
that is not my native language (as well as the second language of many of my informants), and
limitations in method such as the snowball method of sampling.
I then take an unusual turn and discuss the scholarly context within which I situate my
work. This situating work came at the end of my dissertation process, after I had collected,
analysed and written my ethnography, and as I noted earlier, I therefore place it at the end of the
dissertation itself. In this section I critique and commune with significant players in the fields of
religion and migration, and food and religion.
I close Chapter 9, and the dissertation, with the proposal of possible future avenues of
research which largely emerge from the time and contextual limitations of my ethnographic
fieldwork. The contexts in which my research takes place ultimately influence the kind of lived
Islam which I encountered on the ground in both Paris and Montréal. By comparing these two
distinct contexts through the lens of food practice I present the colourful and complicated picture
of the everyday lives of Muslims in “Multicultural Montréal” and the “Secular City of Lights”
(Paris).
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PART 1: Everyday Islam in the City of Lights
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Chapter 2: Colonialism, Immigration, Secularism and Nationalism: The Four Influential
Factors of the Parisian Context of Reception154
2.1 Introduction
It was the first week of my fieldwork in France and I was settling in to the city and situating
myself as a young ethnographer in a foreign land. Within the first few days I had already had
multiple conversations with my French friends, and their friends, about my research. Everywhere
I looked, every conversation I had, I was reminded why I was there; there was clearly something
complicated and notable happening in France in regards to the Muslim population living there.
Within the first four days I had experienced both blatant and subtle expressions of racism and
prejudice against people of Arab, and particularly Maghrébine, background. I had witnessed an
uncomfortable situation in a cell phone shop where a man came in and made a scene, only for the
people around me to quickly label him as an Arab, understood Muslim, before any other
descriptive word, once he was out of the store. I had conversations with my non-Muslim French
friends who spoke clearly about the “problem” of third generation Maghrébine youth in France. I
had seen multiple posters in the Metro system imploring Muslims to “go home,” alongside more
subtle posters promoting pieces of theatre which explored the Muslim “problem,” or propaganda
against halal.155 I overheard multiple conversations on the train or in restaurants over dinner
about “them” trying to take over France. Within four days it became clear to me that something
was happening in France that was different than other places I had been, that caused a setting that
would inevitably affect my potential informants. It was clear—on the ground, and not just from
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“Introduction,” International Migration vol. 51, no. 3 (2013): 1-7; Philip Connor, Immigrant Faith: Patterns of
Immigrant Religion in the United States, Canada and Western Europe (New York and London: New York University
Press, 2014); Margarita Mooney, “Religion as A Context of Reception: The Case of Haitian Immigrants in Miami,
Montréal and Paris,” International Migration vol. 51, no. 3 (2013): 99-112.
155
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often made the distinction between halal and halal meat to be clear which meaning of the term we were referring
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my previous readings—that something, or some things, in France’s history had led to this type of
outworking of prejudice that seemed to be present.
Before I can present the findings from my ethnographic study it is important to situate my
research in specific histories and contexts, which will inevitably influence how my data is
presented and viewed. More importantly, it is essential to know the background context with
which my informants are interacting in their daily lives. To understand what food practice may
reveal about individual identities and integration efforts one must understand the historical and
cultural contexts that set the stage for these negotiations for any immigrant community. The
focus of this chapter is the specific history and context of France as it relates to the Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants of my study.156 France’s unique history and interaction with colonization,
immigration, secularism and nationalism all have a significant impact on any French citizen
living in the Republic today, but even more so on the country’s immigrant population, especially
people arriving from North Africa.157 The French context is a particularly remarkable one in
regards to Islam in the West. As argued by Laurence and Vaisse,
Because of the size of France’s Muslim population—the largest in Western Europe—and
because of France’s secular sensibility and its all encompassing definition of citizenship,
which aims to subsume other racial, ethnic, or previous national identities, the French
experience with Islam is a particularly noteworthy example of the encounter of Islam and the
West.158
Because of these reasons, and the ones that I mentioned above, the French context provides a
certain type of setting for life as an immigrant Muslim in the so-called “West.”159
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To “set the scene” for the France with which my informants interact I explore the four
influential factors of French colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism. First, I
briefly address the history of colonization undertaken by France, specifically as it relates to the
colonization of North Africa, and the effects of this history on the attitudes towards and within
the Muslim communities located there. Second, I outline the immigration history of Muslims to
France, with a specific focus on the immigration history of Maghrébine Muslims to France. I
answer questions such as, “Under what circumstances did Muslim communities come to
France?” What are the specific orienting immigration policies present and how do they affect the
Muslim immigrant experience? Third, I provide an outline of the historical relations between
church and state in France and how these act as a base for France’s approach to secularism, i.e.
laïcité. Finally, I discuss the notion of French nationalism that arises from all these other factors
and that consequently affects the idea of “who can be French.” In this I explore whether it is
possible to have a “French Islam.” All these historical and contextual considerations will lay the
groundwork for understanding how my informants live their North African, Muslim and French
lives out in France, a topic I address specifically through the lens of food practice in chapters 3, 4
and 5 of this dissertation.
2.2 France’s Colonial Presence in the Maghreb and its Affect on Maghrébine Muslims160
and within generally European, North American or Australian Muslim minority contexts. Furthermore, in line with
Abdolmohammad Kazemipur’s exploration of “Muslims and/in the West” in his work The Muslim Question in
Canada, it is my goal to show throughout this work that neither “Muslims/Islam” or the “West,” for that matter,
are monolithic entities. Instead, each is composed of vast and various ethnic, cultural, religious, and political
entities. Kazemipur suggests, at the very least, both “Islam” and “the West” can be divided into three identifiable
variations. For “Islam”—Arab, Turkish and Persian. For the “West”—Southwestern Europe, east-central Europe,
and North America (to which I would add Australia). My work examines one of these variations of Islam, namely
the Arab, and more specifically the Maghrébine version of Islam, and two of the variations of the “West,” namely
Southwestern Europe and North America.
160
For general overview of the French colonial effort and its effects on Maghrébine immigrants in France see:
Bowen, Can Islam be French?; Bowen, Why the French don’t like headscarves; Mary Dewhurst Lewis, The
Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007); Eid, Being Arab; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004);
Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jacques Frémeaux, “Les ambiguïtés de l’idéologie colonial” in Histoire de l’Islam
et des musulmans en France du moyen-age à nos jours, ed. Muhammed Arkoun (Paris: Albin Michel, 2006);
Shahnaz Khan, Muslim Women: Crafting a North American Identity (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
2000); Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam; Todd Shepard, “Excluding the Harkis from Repatriate Status,
Excluding Muslim Algerians from French Identity,” in Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Paul A. Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Jamel Stambouli and Sonia Ben Soltane, “Muslim immigrants in
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The colonial history of France in the Maghreb has a direct impact on the lives of Maghrébine
Muslims in France today. When examining food, one begins to get a glimpse into the ripple
effects of this history. The French colonizers did not just bring “civilization” with them to North
Africa, but they also brought baguettes. While regional styles of bread continue to be an
important element to Maghrébine meals, baguettes are also found all over Maghrébine tables.
For many of my informants, they could not eat couscous without baguette. It was an essential
element to any meal experience, acting particularly well as a utensil to pick up morsels of meat
or vegetable from the communal plate. I noticed baguettes on every plate that I helped to prepare
at the mosque and on every plate that I ate with my informants in their homes or in Maghrébine
restaurants in the city. Most people would acknowledge that this was a French colonial influence
on traditional food practices, but was one that was thoroughly engrained in their understanding
of their own religious and cultural meals.161
Furthermore, the colonial influence on familiarity with, and ownership over, different
food practices is obvious when one examines couscous itself. Not only did the French colonizers
bring baguette to the colonized, but they were also introduced to the main food of the colonized.
France’s role in colonizing Algeria meant that not only were Algerians French citizens, a notion I
complicate below, but Algerian food practices were colonized and adopted into the French
national food culture as well; one only has to consider the second place ranking of couscous
among French nationals’ favourite foods. This leads to a potential for understanding and
solidarity arising from shared food practice between the former colonizer and former colonized
subjects in France. Unfortunately, the impact of colonization on relations between Maghrébine
Muslims and non-Muslims in France has not always been so positive.

France: Religious Markets and New Mechanisms of Integration,” in Gender, Religion and Migration: Pathways of
integration, eds. Glenda Tibe Bonifacio and Vivienne S. M. Angeles (Plymouth, UK: Lexington books, 2010); Elaine
R. Thomas, Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France: A Comparative Framework (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
161
One would be hard pressed to find support for the words of Frantz Fanon when examining this practice. Fanon
states: “To destroy the colonial world means nothing less than demolishing the colonist’s sector, burying it deep
within the earth or banishing it from the territory. Challenging the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of
viewpoints. It is not a discourse on the universal, but the impassioned claim by the colonized that their world is
fundamentally different” (Frantz Fanon, Wretched, 6). The continued place of baguette in the lives, and on the
plates of Maghrébines challenges the idea that the colonist’s sector is buried or banished in the Maghreb. I will
further address the ways my informants do NOT reflect a Fanonian approach to decolonization below.
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France’s colonial empire spanned from the seventeenth century until roughly the 1960s.
Two aspects of France’s colonization efforts affect a study such as this: France’s colonization in
North America (which I return to in my discussion of colonization in Canada/Québec in Chapter
6) and France’s colonization of North and West Africa. After focussing its colonization efforts in
North America and the Caribbean, France began its second colonial empire with its conquest of
North Africa in the mid-nineteenth century. In becoming a “protector,” or colonizer, of Algeria
between 1830 and 1847, Tunisia by 1881, French West Africa between the early 1880s and
1912, and Morocco in 1912 (among many others), France had secured a stronghold in North
Africa by the early twentieth century.162 By 1962, with the independence of Algeria being
secured, the colonial era of France ended. Bowen states that it was the “histories of French rule
in three North African States—Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria—that most sharply marked French
Muslim policies and attitudes.”163 One then must take these histories into account if one hopes to
understand these policies.
France’s colonization of North Africa took on an air of moral crusade. As argued by
Laurence and Vaisse,
in the nineteenth century, the European powers considered Muslim countries as places to
be ‘civilized’—especially Algeria, which was colonized after harsh military campaigns in
the 1830s and 1840s and thereafter was periodically prone to violent uprisings and
repression.164
Colonial efforts in North Africa were then seen as a way to enlighten the Islamic world; it was
seen as a humanitarian or civilizing mission.165 The French colonizers did not venture forth as
explorers, as they may have done in their colonial efforts in North America, but as “liberators,”
mostly of women who were seen as being oppressed in these contexts.166 The vision that North
Africans were “both dirty and violent” was heightened when members of the protectorates and
colonies began migrating to the metropole in the early twentieth century and local reports began
to emerge of their behaviour in the cities and towns to which they were immigrating.167 Although
the French saw their colonization work as a liberating, humanitarian and civilizing mission,
162
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Frantz Fanon, one of the most important voices representing the colonized, states that this is in
fact not possible. He suggests that “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body
endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater
violence.”168 This greater violence, as represented in the Algerian war, only increased the
negative stereotypes that many French held of North Africans (and vice versa).
The French Algerian war began in 1954 and ended in 1962.169 Not only was this a war of
decolonization between France and Algeria but it was also a civil war between Algerian
loyalists, who wanted to maintain a French Algeria, and Algerian Muslims who did not. Fetzer
and Soper suggest that “one cannot overemphasize the searing effects of the Algerian War of
Independence on the psyches of both ethnic European and ethnic Arab or Berber residents of
France and Algeria.”170 It was a bloody and lengthy war, which led to “Arab” being viewed by
the majority of the French population as a “cowardly, blood-thirsty brute, the throat-slitter or the
terrorist.”171 Furthermore, according to Fetzer and Soper, because the “Front de liberation
nationale (FLN) drew much of its rhetoric and at least some of its motivation from Islam,”
French colonizers and citizens alike linked Islam with violence, and consequently “developed a
tremendous fear of this religion.”172
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In Algeria, Muslims were given the opportunity to apply for full French citizenship on
the condition that they give up their right to be governed by sharia (Islamic law).173 Todd
Shepard explains that
the Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865 asserted that every “indigenous Muslim is French”
(thus recognizing their French nationality) and extended French citizenship to a small
number of “indigenous” men and their descendants. In exchange for full citizenship,
these men abandoned their “local civil status”: the right, in personal or civil matters, to be
governed by local laws, what the text termed “Muslim law” for “Muslim natives” and
“personal status” for “Israelite natives.174
While this offer was made to a few men in 1865, in 1919 a law was passed that extended
naturalization to Arab men who were willing to relinquish this “indigenous” status, including
their right to follow Islamic law.175 Because “some Islamic authorities in Algeria declared that
crossing this legal line was tantamount to abandoning Islam,” many did not take this offer.176 As
a result, Muslims in the French colony, in these early years, had what Shepard calls a
“nationalité denaturé (denatured—or meaningless—nationality).”177 It was only in the midtwentieth century, in 1944, when all subjects of French colonies were granted full citizenship
without having to renounce their religious identities/local civil status.178 With the end of the
Second World War, “the Republic broke with the post-1789 insistence that citizenship be one
and indivisible,” and as a result introduced “for what began to be called ‘Muslim French from
Algeria’ the possibility of both full political rights and the maintenance of local civil status.”179
Even with the political acceptance of Maghrébines, specifically Algerians, as full-fledged
citizens180 of the French Republic they were still considered irreducibly “other,” and were held to
the periphery of the labour market and other French social structures.181 Algerian French
nationals in France in particular were often subjected to “summary arrests, lengthy detentions,
repatriations” and other discriminatory actions that revealed “the formal nationality held by
Algerians often came with fewer benefits than the foreign status of many Europeans.”182 This
173
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could be further viewed by the fact that French Algerians were given citizenship cards that
labelled them as “Français musulman(e)” (French Muslims), not simply “French.”183 This label
of “Muslim” was more of a legal than a religious category but still had a significant impact.184 In
fact, after the Algerian war of independence “French military personnel were ordered to
discriminate ethnically between Muslim and other “French” refugees seeking passage to
France.”185 By placing a label on their very citizenship documents that was different from the
“European French” they were immediately othered.186 Because of the length and intensity of
France’s colonial presence in North Africa, especially Algeria, and because it is historically
recent, many North African immigrants express “contempt for France as represented by its
symbols (its flag, its representatives, and its national anthem).”187 Many North Africans in
France remember the colonial presence and the war of independence from personal experience
(or from stories of the experience of their parents) and as a result still feel emotionally connected
to that history. Symbols such as the flag, national anthem, citizenship cards, etcetera,
consequently draw out raw emotions and responses from many in the country.188
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The war itself was not recognized as a war until well after the bloody and brutal
conclusion. For years it remained “the war without a name”189 and it was only in 1997 where “an
official recognition of a state of ‘war’ in Algeria between 1954 and 1962” began to take shape.190
This “official recognition” culminated on the 10 of June 1999 when a law was passed by the
French Parliament to make the term “Algerian War” official in legal texts.191 The silence around
this war for over 30 years understandably led to a mis-remembering of the events by many on an
official level. Because there was a general failure by France to “remember” the Algerian War,
this memory was not transmitted to younger generations.192 Thus a conflict of memory could be
established on the ground in France between those who remembered their own experiences in
this “war” and those for whom this “war” was non-existent in memory.193
In addition, “signs of a colonial mind-set are abundant, from the headscarf ban of
2004...to the social situation in the cités, especially housing discrimination and zoning, and the
persistence of racial discrimination.”194 According to Stambouli and Soltane, the notion of
colonial memory has a large effect on current immigrant integration issues. This debate “not only
heightens individual memory for those who lived this epoch” but brings forth “issues loaded with
memories” for many others as well.195 One particularly strong colonial memory is that of Islam
as a force of resistance. Fremeaux, suggests that Islam has preserved a military role in North
Africa and this is one of the major characteristics that the French remember of Islam out of their
colonial interactions.196 North Africans could also remember Islam in this context, but with
positive rather than negative connotations. Islam could be seen as a liberating force for the
colonized North African people rather than a force of barbarism. Frantz Fanon, in his work The
Wretched of the Earth, suggests that the equation of Islam with barbarism was the work of the
colonizer to “convince the indigenous population it would save them from darkness.”197 He calls
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for an awakening of Islam, a pointing to “the great chapters of Arab history” as a “response to
the lies of the occupier”198 and as a means of claiming a separate identity from the colonizer.199
One cannot help but assume that the projection of Islam, and thus of the North African
people, as barbaric and militant negatively affects the image of Muslims in France, leading to the
image of people who fight rather than integrate. An excellent example of this tension can be
found in the “friendly” soccer match between France and Algeria that took place on October 6,
2001. This match was the first between France and Algeria since Algeria gained independence
from France in 1962 and while it was meant to show solidarity between France and Algeria, it
ended with the opposite effect.200 Some soccer fans “booed the national anthem, threw objects at
two government ministers and—once the French lead had reached 4-to-1—ran onto the field,
forcing the game’s cancellation.”201 This event led to questions of whether or not Muslims from
former colonies had successfully integrated into French culture or not, and who was responsible
for the outcome. Moreover, the colonial history of France has a current effect on notions of
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“French Islam.” Because of France’s colonization of much of Muslim North Africa it “found
itself ‘a great Muslim power,’ aiming to encourage ‘moderate’ forms of Islam overseas and, as
part of that effort, at home.”202 By colonizing large parts of the North African Muslim world,
France had to interact with Muslims on a level that it had not done before; Muslims were now
French citizens, often second rate citizens, but citizens none the less, in large numbers. With the
colonization of Algeria in particular the notion of “French Islam,” or better yet, of “French
Muslims,” became a reality that could not be ignored.
2.3 The Immigration of Maghrébine Muslims to France: Migratory Movements and
Demographics
The colonial history outlined above has a significant effect on the immigration history of
Muslims to France. While immigration from Muslim inhabited countries is not a recent
phenomenon, the Muslim population that is present in France today “traces its direct or indirect
origins to former French colonies in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa and to Turkey” and
most immigrated “in the wake of the colonial wars of independence.”203 Although there were
other phases of Muslim immigration in France, the focus of this section is on immigration in the
twentieth century. Moreover, this is not primarily a work on French immigration patterns and
policy in general. Instead, in this section, I focus principally on the immigration of Maghrébine
and Muslim communities to France in the twentieth century.
2.3.1 Cesari’s Three Migratory Movements of Muslims to France
Cesari outlines the three migratory movements of Maghrébine Muslims to France in the
twentieth century in her article in Bramadat and Koenig’s International Migration and the
Governance of Religious Diversity.204 The first wave which she describes began during the First
202

Bowen, Headscarves, 34; See also, Bowen, Can Islam be French, 15.
Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam, 1, 16.
204
Jocelyne Cesari, “Islam, immigration and France,” in International Migration and the Governance of Religious
Diversity, eds. Paul Bramadat and Matthias Koenig (Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University,
2009). Cesari provides a clear and concise exploration of specifically Maghrébine Muslim immigration to France in
th
the 20 Century. For other effective overviews of Muslim and Maghrébine immigration and the policies that
influence that immigration see: Azzam Amin, “L’Intégration des jeunes français issus de l’immigration: Le cas des
jeunes issus d’immigration arabo-musulman et turque: Maghreb, Moyen-Orient et Turquie,” Connexions, 83
(2005): 131-147. For comparative study of immigration and integration between Maghrébine, Middle Eastern and
203

67

World War and continued through the interwar period. It was during this time that Maghrébine
immigrants started coming to France in large numbers, to serve in the army205 and “fill a labour
gap in the post-war reconstruction boom.”206 Factors in the home countries of these immigrants,
such as political repression and economic hardship, also increased migration to France.207 Cesari
points out that these “immigrants” were in fact not immigrants at all, but French nationals
coming mostly from Algeria, which was part of France at the time.208 These immigrants were
mostly male and both they and the French society thought that their stay in France would only be
temporary.
The second wave that Cesari mentions took place from the 1950s to 1974. Cesari
suggests that this wave is similar to the first wave, merely an intensification of it, but with “one
crucial difference: the workers were now nationals of newly independent states.”209 There was a
severe labour shortage in the post-World War II era and French industries recruited or
“regularized” workers from the highly Muslim populated and former French colonies or
protectorates of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.210 In fact, a conscious policy of immigration was
drawn up between industry and the state in order to supply the country with a sufficient labour
force. France “signed agreements with Algeria in 1968 in addition to agreements with Morocco
and Tunisia in 1963.”211 Because of this, between 1950 and 1974 the foreign population of
France doubled; more specifically, according to Jo McCormack, in 1946 Maghrébines
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“constituted 3 percent of the foreign population, but by 1990 they represent 45 percent.”212 Like
in the first phase of migration from North Africa, these immigrants did not intend to stay in
France. Rather, their goal was to “earn as much money as possible and then return home.”213 As
a result, these migratory movements were seen by both the French host and the Muslim
immigrant as temporary. As presented by Stambouli and Soltane, “these men were not recruited
to engage the French public space, or to hold a place within it as social actors. Rather, there were
only supposed to be workers in French industries.”214 Because these immigrants were seen as
temporary, there was no real need to develop policies of integration. The French saw them as
outsiders and the Muslim immigrants viewed themselves as separate as well, creating their own
communities in the cités215 of Paris. Notions of French national identity are consequently not
seen as threatened by the influx of immigrants during these first two phases. Consequently, the
systemic segregation of these communities was started at this time; the foundation for separation
between “us” and “them” was firmly established in physical and psychological ways, even if it
was not labelled as such at this point in time.
The third and final phase outlined by Cesari began after the oil crisis of 1973. It was with
this phase that France closed the door to unskilled workers, and family reunification policies
took over the immigrant dynamic.216 In fact, in 1974 France officially closed its doors to
immigration. This did not mean that immigration halted completely, but “it did mean a
movement toward selection and selective exclusion” in France’s immigration policies.217 While
formal immigration stopped, family members of the unskilled workers that made up the second
wave of immigration constituted the largest number of immigrants in France during this third
phase. While the state wanted to limit family reunification as well at this time, in 1978 the
Council of the State blocked the right of the state to control this process and thus this decision
“enabled a constant number of North African family members to enter the country each year.”218
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Formerly split up families were now being reunited and the Muslim population in France grew
exponentially. In fact,
the reunification of families became a continuing source of immigrants during the late
1970s and early 1980s. Family reunification from all countries grew from 55,000 a year
in the late 1960s to 81,000 in 1973, before decreasing over time to about 25,000 in 2004.
The arrival of foreign spouses, meanwhile, increased from 23,000 in 1990 to more than
60,000 in 2004.219
This change in immigration dynamic also altered the Maghrébine Muslim community presence
on the ground level in France. The community transformed from a generally separated, primarily
single male populated community to one consisting of families that now interacted more readily
with French public life. They moved from the “segregated environment of the workers’
dormitory to the integrated world of the public housing project, and they increasingly
encountered representatives of the school system, members of the bureaucracy, and social
workers.”220 It was with this third migratory phase that Muslims became much more visible in
France. This visibility led to French society suddenly needing to interact with a group who had
competing and sometimes contradictory “social, moral and religious values” to their own.221 In
reaction to this, the subsequent French governments tried repeatedly to not only reduce
immigration but “encourage” immigrants to return to their home countries. These efforts were
largely unsuccessful and have thus left France as “one of the most multi-ethnic societies on the
continent.”222 Moreover, due to this new ethnically diverse setting in France, questions of ethnic,
religious and national identities, and conflicts between them, came to the fore.
Immigration remains high in France with 8.9 percent of the total population in France
being immigrants as of January 1, 2014.223 The family reunification process continues to supply
large numbers of immigrants from the Maghreb in contemporary France. Furthermore, many of
these immigrants continue to come from the countries of the Maghreb. In fact, according to the
INSEE, France’s national statistic body, in the year 2012 43.2 percent of immigrants had African
birth countries (13.1 percent from Algeria, 12.1 percent from Morocco, 4.4 percent from Tunisia,
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and 13.6 percent from “other countries in Africa”).224 In spite of policies that help to restrict
immigration to France, there are still on average 200,000 immigrants arriving each year on
French soil (roughly 59,200 Maghrébine immigrants in 2012).
2.3.2 Demographics of Maghrébine Muslims in France Today
Ultimately, the immigration pattern and history of Maghrébines to mainland France has led to a
distinct view of this community on the ground today. Muslims in France represent 123 different
nationalities, yet, nearly three quarters are from the countries of the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco,
or Tunisia.225 While it is difficult to evaluate the number of Muslims living in France due to the
fact that the “French Republic considers ethnic and religious affiliation a private matter and
therefore keeps no such official statistics on citizens of immigrant origin,”226 estimates range
between 4.7 and 6 million Muslims living in mainland France.227 This equates to anywhere
between 7.5 to 10 percent of the total population of France. As a result, Islam has a significant
presence in France. Considering the fact that of the potentially six million Muslims living in
France, approximately 40 percent live in and around Paris,228 the region of Paris is consequently
home to approximately 2.4 million Muslims. This is significant because, while the population of
Greater Paris is approximately ten million, the population of the city of Paris itself is roughly 2.2
million.229 There are, as a result, as many Muslims living in the Greater Paris region as the
general population of Paris itself. Taking into account that 75 percent of immigrants in France
are Muslims,230 one can see how “Muslim” and “immigré(e)” become conflated terms in France.
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In fact, Scott explains that largely due to these immigration patterns in France there is a
conflation of “Muslim” with “North African” and “immigrant” with “North African,” such that
immigrant = North African = Muslim, or any other variation of that equation.231 The continued
use of the word “immigré(e)” to refer to second and third generation Maghrébines in France is
one example of the refusal to accept this community as French.232 One who is an “immigré(e)” is
on the outside, whether or not that term technically applies to them or not. Since the 1970s many
other modifications have been made to immigration policies in France but most do not have a
direct effect on the experience of Maghrébine immigrants in France, other than the “Loi
Mehaignerie” which I discuss later in this chapter.233 This label is applied not only to those
French nationals with what is considered “problematic” national heritage, but also to those who
have “problematic” religious heritage as well. This otherness based on religious background is
what I turn to next.
2.4 The History and Development of French Secularism: Laïcité
France has its own understanding of secularism, or laïcité as it is called, which significantly
affects the context in which Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live. To understand the political
policy of laïcité in France one must explore the history of the relationship between church and
state in the country. Once one understands this history one can see how this policy, and others
like it, develop and can have some understanding of how it influences the experience of those
religious “others” that interact with it. The history of Church-State relations and secularization in
France is especially rich and complex. The Catholic Church had a long history of ruling power
over secular and sacred institutions in the country, and because of this and the subsequent
rejection and relegation of the Church into the private sphere, the French context provides a
complex backdrop for religious traditions to attempt to find space for themselves in the public
sphere. Fetzer and Soper suggest that official and unofficial policies on Muslim integration are
fully related to the church-state relations of a given country. They state, “public policy on state
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accommodation of Muslim religious practices in Britain, France and Germany varies based in
part on the inherited relationship between church and state in each nation.”234 The ghosts of the
past are felt in the present.
2.4.1 The Secular Republic
The history of the relationship of the state with the Catholic Church in France is indeed well
known. As Fouad Douai, the manager of the Strasbourg mosque in France, observed: “France
was once the ‘eldest daughter of the Church.’ To stop being the ‘eldest daughter of the Church’ it
was necessary to spill blood, which made...the French allergic to everything religious.”235 The
battles were many and varied between the Catholics and the anti-clerics since the time of the
French Revolution and thus a strict separation between church and state is held in high regard in
France. Cesari suggests that the strict separation of church and state goes beyond “political
independence of religious organizations” and is in fact “accompanied by the memory of
antagonism between church and state.”236 The French have a strong collective memory of the
time when everything was under the control of the church and they do not wish to return to that
situation. In 1905, the French government passed a law that officially separated church and state
in France. This law “took public status away from organized religions but allowed them to
reorganize as private associations”; it “officially and explicitly ended the regime of recognized
religions begun under Napoleon.”237 Religious action or symbols that seem to threaten that
separation become highly problematic in the eyes of the French.238 It is important to note that it
is not simply Islam that the French see as problematic, but religion in general is not popular in
France.239 Margarita Mooney states that this is why “immigrants to France, whether they are
Christian, Muslim, or another religion, encounter a hostile context of reception regarding
religion.”240
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In fact, freedom from religion was one of the founding principles of the Republic that the
French hold in such high esteem.241 Religion is a highly private affair in France. The notion of
“the Republic” is especially important in this regard. Bowen explains that,
according to the Republican way of thinking, living together in a society requires
agreement on basic values...French Republicans seek to rigorously and consistently
justify policies according to this idea. To do so means adhering to a certain brand of
political philosophy, one that emphasizes general interest and shared values over
individual interests and pluralism.242
This freedom from religion is an important distinction between the relationship between church
and state in France than from that found in the United States.243 While in the United States
secularism was established to protect religion from the state, in France, the drive for secularism
was one of freeing “the state from undue religious influence.”244 This distinction between
protecting the state versus protecting religion is an important one to keep in mind as we explore
the notion of whether or not it is possible to have a “French Islam.”
If Muslim immigrants can maintain the secularist way of life, that is, keeping the public
and private realms separate, not only at a state level but in the lives of individuals,245 the issues
are not as prevalent. In fact, Stambouli and Soltane argue that
North African Muslims do not need to be integrated; they develop a sort of autarchic way
of living in accordance with their faith. French public opinion accepts this situation as
long as the tolerance zone instituted between discrete faith practice and secular French
public space is not violated.246
While it is primarily the non-Muslim majority French society that argues for a strict separation of
church and state based largely on its historical fight for such a thing, there are influential
members of the Muslim community in France that agree on this issue. The recteur of the Grande
Mosquée de Paris is one such proponent of this separation.247 In an interview with researcher
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Nathalie Dollé, Dalil Boubakeur states that there should be a separation of church and state,
promoting leaving the things of God to God and the things of the State to the State.248 As an
“integrated Muslim” he agrees with French Republican understanding of secularism, which
creates the specific laïcité present in France.
2.4.2 Laïcité
In reading anything on the separation of church and state or secularization in France, one cannot
avoid the term laïcité.249 While North Americans are more than familiar with the notion of
secularization and even with the idea that France is a highly secular country many do not know
that France has its own variation of secularization known as laïcité. Any discussion of Muslims
in France, “French Islam,” or religion in France in general, must include some explanation of this
term and its influence on French society.
According to Bowen, laïcité is a “philosophy about religion’s place in politics and
society” and it “can be translated as ‘secularism.’”250 One may say that laïcité is France’s version
of secularization but then, like in any use of the term secularization, one must go on to explain
interview my informant called me in a panic and asked me to come back to the mosque to discuss the interview.
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what that means in the French context. While at its base, like most definitions of secularism,
laïcité refers to the separation of church and state, it is unlike other definitions in that it also
“rests on the notion that the secular and the sacred can be divided in the lives of individuals.”251
Hurd suggests that, unlike Judeo-Christian secularism, which stops at “the functional
differentiation of the secular and the religious spheres,” laïcité “also adopts two corollaries to
this differentiation argument, advocating the privatization and, in some cases, the decline or
elimination of religious belief and practice altogether.”252
Jean Baubérot is considered one of the main experts on laïcité, and most recent
discussions of the term rely on his works for an exploration of its history and influence. In his
works, Baubérot reveals a dual orientation toward religion in France. On the one hand, state
religion had a long history in France. On the other hand, a withdrawal from religion to protect
the right of individuals to make their own decisions on matters of faith was a well-established
stance in post-Revolution France.253 This leads to an inherent contradiction in France’s approach
to secularism. Like the colonial memory of France in North Africa and its influence on the
stereotypes of Muslims in France, the Catholic Church’s involvement in bloody Revolutionary
struggles influences France’s ability to gradually ease into a process of secularization.254 The
constant back and forth between Republican and Catholic monarchical states throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to a heightened tension between church and state, not
found in other locales. This tension between Church and Republic came to a head during the
Third Republic, and, with the series of laws that secularized the public classroom in the late
nineteenth century, “laïcité became an object of struggle and emerged as a word.”255 Bowen
emphasizes that although many view “laïcité as a guiding concept in French history, the word
does not appear in the very law (of 1905) that is celebrated as its embodiment.”256 In fact, it was
only made a “constitutional principle for the first time in 1946, and reiterated in the 1958
Constitution.”257 While the groundwork was laid for this legal-political-social concept in the late
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not actually solidified in law until the middle of
the twentieth century.
While laïcité is generally viewed as a strict separation of the public from the private, of
the church from the state, it is possible to use the term to support a more open understanding of
this relationship. According to Keaton, “la laïcité was intended to establish equal protection for
all people under a ‘neutral,’ non-religiously influenced state, while allowing freedom of religious
expression and free thinking within state institutions.”258 At its foundation, then, laïcité
encourages religious freedom. Where tension arises is in the notion of what religious freedom
entails. In many Western contexts, religious freedom is a matter of freedom of religious belief.
Starting with the Protestant notion of “by faith alone,” it often followed that one is given the
freedom to believe whatever one chooses. The tension arises when people from Muslim nations
immigrate to these Western, Christian-based, contexts with the equally important emphasis of
freedom of religious practice alongside freedom of religious belief. For many Muslims, the two
go hand in hand and freedom of religion means not only believing what one chooses, but having
the right to enact those beliefs in practice, and in public.259
Fetzer and Soper suggest that there are two kinds of laïcité: strict laïcité and soft laïcité.
While strict laïcité would advocate for the absolute rejection of all religious practice and belief
from public institutions, soft laïcité allows for some indication of religious practice in the public
sphere. What it does not allow is the government establishment of religion.260 Bowen also breaks
laïcité into two forms: political and social laïcité. Political laïcité refers to the state refraining
“from imposing a particular religion, or from allowing any religion to impose itself through the
medium of the state.”261 Social laïcité also requires the
separation of state and churches but also a further privatization of religious affiliation,
such that even nongovernmental actors, when they inhabit the public sphere, refrain from
doing so religiously. According to this idea, French citizens become complete political
individuals by being socialized in public institutions, and they retain their citizenship
qualities by continuing to interact in such institutions qua citizens—and not as Muslims,
Protestants, or, perish the thought, Scientologists.262
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If one applied Bowen’s typology of laïcité to Fetzer and Soper’s, then soft laïcité is the
implementation of political laïcité alone, while strict laïcité is the implementation of both
political and social laïcité.
According to soft laïcité, “the state should respect all religious beliefs but also foster the
free exercise of religion by, for example, funding private religious schools.”263 Proponents of
soft, or open, laïcité criticize on a couple of fronts those who hold to strict laïcité. First, they
criticize strict laïcité for trying to “make secularist laïcité the ‘state religion’ in France.”264
Ironically, they argue, the very notion of laïcité has become somewhat of a religion in and of
itself in France. It becomes the focus of French identity; that thing which makes France, France.
France is a secular state and if you are French you are encouraged to be publicly and privately
secular.265 Laïcité is held as central not so much because of firm legal and cultural frameworks
but because of the fear over a loss of identity, a questioning of what it means to be French. As a
result, any tradition that may threaten this perceived “state religion” is looked upon with caution.
In fact, with the debate over religious signs in schools in 2004, the popular, mainstream media
consented, with much of the French population, that “laïcité was in peril and that Islam was the
cause.”266 Bowen explains that the legacy of combat between the church and the Republic helps
to explain why the “contemporary presence of Islam in the schools” is seen “as threatening to
turn back the clock on at least two struggles: the fight to keep religion from controlling young
minds, and the struggle to forge a common French identity.”267
A second criticism of strict laïcité by those who hold to soft laïcité is that laïcité is not
necessarily hostile to faith, but instead fosters an environment where faith of every variety can
flourish since there is no one tradition that has ultimate sway in French government and society.
Furthermore, Fetzer and Soper argue that soft laïcité is a reaction against the sterilization of
society that is a possible outcome of strict laïcité. Here they suggest that strict laïcité removes all
“cultural diversity” and strips “public school students of all individuality.”268 In many of the
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examples that Keaton gives of peoples’ responses to the question, what is laïcité?, we can see
this stripping of cultural diversity. For teachers and students alike, laïcité can mean erasing
differences and seeing everyone as the same.269 Strict laïcité then leads to cookie cutter versions
of all French people. Finally, strict laïcité is seen, by those who hold to soft laïcité, as a violation
of international human rights.270 The argument that is made is that the basic human right of
freedom of conscience and religious liberty is violated by the maintenance of strict laïcité. Fetzer
and Soper conclude that while soft laïcité can find support in French constitutional history, and is
consistent with the integration of Muslims into French society, strict laïcité is not.271
What makes the debate about laïcité difficult is that “laïcité remains one of those
‘essentially contested concepts’ that is politically useful precisely because it has no agreed-on
definition.”272 As we can see above, some hold that laïcité guarantees religious practice in the
public sphere while others think it prevents it; some see it as the guarantor of religious identity,
others see it as masking that identity.273 The question becomes, is it possible to be a secular, read
“French,” Muslim? Both Hurd and Scott suggest that the concept of laïcité itself was built
directly on a comparison to, or better, a contrast with Islam.274
In the political imaginary of laicism, Islam is represented as an impediment to the
rationalization and democratization of modern society. Laicism therefore reproduces
itself and the national identities with which it is affiliated as legitimate, democratic, and
modern by representing Islam as irrational, despotic, and antimodern…negative
representations of Islam do not merely reflect the political authority of laicism. They help
to constitute it.275

269

Keaton, Muslims Girls, 188-189.
Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 76.
271
Ibid., 156.
272
Bowen, Headscarves, 32.
273
For works addressing the effect of secular French policies such as laïcité on Muslims, or the interaction of Islam
with laïcité see: Soheib Bencheikh, Marianne et le Prophète: l'Islam dans la France laïque (Paris: Grasset, 1998);
Bowen, Headscarves; Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders?”; Cesari and McLoughlin, European Muslims;
Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State; Myriam Hunter-Henin, “Why the French don’t like the Burqa: Laïcité,
National Identity and Religious Freedom,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 3 (2012): 613639; Hurd, Politics of Secularism—especially Chapter 3 on “Secularism and Islam”; Laurence and Vaisse,
Integrating Islam; Yolande Jansen, “Secularism and Security: France, Islam, and Europe,” in Comparative
Secularism in a Global Age, eds. Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
69-85; Scott, Politics of the Veil—especially Chapter 3 on “Secularism”; Elaine R. Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a
Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” Ethnic and Racial Studies vol. 29, no
2 (2006): 237-259.
274
Hurd, Politics of Secularism, 54-58; Scott, Politics of the Veil, 98.
275
Hurd, Politics of Secularism, 54.
270

79

If laïcité is constituted via the idea that Islam is its opposite, how could Muslims in secular
France have a hope to ever claim the national identity which is dependent on that secularism?
2.5 French Nationalism: Who Can “Be French”?276
France and its citizens have a strong notion of nationalism. The idea of “being French” is a
central topic for anyone within the boundaries of the Republic, and in fact is highly based on the
notion of the “Republic” and all that it stands for. Hargreaves, in his survey of discussions of
French immigration, race and ethnicity expressed that the “prevailing conceptions of nationality
and citizenship in France are rooted in the revolution of 1789.”277 Notions of “Frenchness” are
consequently rooted in the Republican tradition. Freedman explains that the French Republican
ideals of universalism, unitarism, secularism and assimilation dictate, to a large extent, French
nationalism.278 It follows that, to “be French” is to be unified with other French people, to not be
distinct.279 According to Scott, universalism is the key to French national identity and is based on
the equation that universalism equals equality. She explains that in France “equality is achieved,
in French political theory, by making one’s social, religious, ethnic, and other origins irrelevant
in the public sphere; it is as an abstract individual that one becomes a French citizen.”280 So,
anything that marks one out as distinct goes against what it means to be French. The question
then arises: what universal attitude or background is the norm to which all others should
assimilate? Who should have access to the title of “French national/citizen”?
In her 2012 work Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France: A
Comparative Framework, Elaine R. Thomas suggests five models of political membership; five
ways of understanding who is a part of the national “we.” She explains that one can see
citizenship in the national identity as a matter of descent, culture, belief, contract or monetized
276
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contract.281 All these notions of how one claims French nationality or citizenship are at play in
France, but the first two have been powerful in dictating who, or who is not, “French.” While in
the early twentieth century the descent arguments of both jus sanguinus (descent) and jus soli
(territorial birth) tended to determine who “was French,” these notions came under scrutiny in
the late twentieth century.282 Instead of French nationality being determined simply based off the
fact that one was born on French soil (jus soli) and/or to French parents (jus sanguinus) debate
began to arise in the 1980s over a need to make French citizenship a matter of choice and not just
birth.283 This resulted in the passing of the Loi Méhaignerie in 1993 which required French born
children of immigrants to request French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21 instead of it
just being granted to them automatically when they were 18 years old (the way it was before this
law passed). The importance of the cultural way of understanding citizenship, as argued by
Thomas, began to play a role in defining who could be “French.” It was not just about being
passively given French citizenship, but actively seeking it, knowing all the cultural implications
that it entailed. Hence, one’s national status was a matter of “express individual choice.”284
To work out the universalism, assimilation, etcetera, of the French Republican tradition
to which one was agreeing by claiming French citizenship there is often an “imposition of
cultural unity in the form of a centralized and secular Republic with one language (as opposed to
many regional languages) and a unified culture.”285 This unified culture is important when
considering what it means to “be French.” Other than the form of French secularism (laïcité) that
I discussed above, there are other clear examples of cultural beliefs or practices that form the
basis for this “unified culture” that Freedman mentions. The question that is foundational to this
study is if the food that one might eat and the liquid that one might drink contribute to the unified
culture of the nation? In the case of France, the argument is often clearly stated in the
affirmative.
2.5.1 Wine and French National Identity
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While one can look to political statements about who is “French” based on the “facts” of
citizenship, these ideas often get worked out in distinct ways on the ground; how people within a
nation view that nationhood is often different from the politics surrounding it. In fact, when
speaking to the average French person, they may cite the Republican ideal of secularism, but
shortly thereafter they may also cite the fact that they drink wine. Food and drink is in fact a
foundational aspect of French nationalism, what it means to “be French” for many people on the
ground in the Republic. French culinary identity in general is essential to French national
identity. When considering what it means to “be French” many culinary images come to mind:
wine, French cheese, the baguette, French pastries such as the croissant, the pain au chocolat,
pâté, foie gras, charcuterie (cured meats, usually made from pork), cassoulet (southern French
casserole of which pork is an essential ingredient), etcetera. Perhaps unlike any other country in
the “West”, with the possible exception of Italy, France is known for its food; therefore, to “be
French” is to be a part of this great culinary tradition. In fact, Michaela DeSoucey suggests that
part of the idea of national identity is “the idea of the nation as a protector of cultural
patrimony,” of which food is one of the most important aspects in France.286 She goes on to
suggest that “Gastronationalism287 buttresses national identity against perceived threats from
outsiders who wish to eliminate certain objects or practices.”288 While all of the above food
products have been the focus of some attention in discussions around “Frenchness,”289 and have
acted as fodder for Gastronationalism, I focus on wine in this section for a couple of reasons.
First, unlike some of the other products in this list, wine is one of France’s top ten exported
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products and France is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of wine.290 Second,
the French not only export a great deal of wine, but they consume it in large quantities as well;
the average resident of France drinks roughly 42.5 litres of wine each year.291 Furthermore, while
you may not find all of the products listed above on every French restaurant menu, you would be
hard pressed to find an establishment that serves French cuisine without wine.292 Wine is big
business, as well as often personally important, to the French.
Marion Demossier in her 2010 work, Wine Drinking Culture in France: A National Myth
or a Modern Passion, argues that wine is indispensable to French nationalism. In fact, she states,
on the first page of her book that the
majority of French people have little or no knowledge of wine. Yet, paradoxically, wine
drinking and the culture associated with it are seen by many as an essential part of what it
means to be French. For French people, wine, or more precisely the love of good wines,
characterizes Frenchness in much the same way as being born in France, fighting for
liberty or speaking French.293
Wine consumption, or simply a passion for wine, takes up an emblematic spot in the definition of
what it means to be “French.”294 There are many reasons why wine has taken up such an
290
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important place in French nationalism, from it being associated with French soldiers during the
First World War, or the creation of the Comité de Propagande du Vin by the French government
in 1931 which “embodied official views of wine in inter-war France,”295 or the fact that wine
production is one of the most important branches of French agriculture, etcetera. Ultimately, for
these and many other reasons,
Wine has, therefore, deep historical resonances for French national culture, inspiring
patriotic sentiments with its representations rooted in the essentialist concept of the
nation, and it remains a powerful symbol of cultural continuity in the face of the changing
relationship between global, national and regional identities in France.296
If drinking wine is one of the many, and some would argue essential, ways to demonstrate one’s
“Frenchness,” what happens for those individuals who do not consume wine, or even worse,
view it as haram, sinful, problematic, in their efforts to claim French national identity? Can a
“French Muslim” really be “French” without consumption of one of the national symbols of this
identity?

2.5.2 French Islam297
This idea of “French Islam” is particularly important, to this study and to a greater understanding
of what is “Frenchness” in general. As a result, to understand France’s notion of nationalism I
explore the topic of “French Islam” here.298 Questions to be addressed in the subsequent section
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are as follows: What does one mean by the term “French Islam?” What is the difference between
“Islam de France” and “Islam en France?” How do the multiple and hyphenated identities of
Muslim immigrants affect the notion of “French Islam?” Is there a spectrum of “French Muslim”
identity? Should one speak of “French Islams” rather than “French Islam?”299 What does the
identity of “French Islam” reveal about “French” nationalism more broadly? If French national
identity is, as I described above, based on universalism which strives for equality, an equality
that is based on the principles of laïcité, which in turn was constructed in direct opposition to
Islam, is “French Islam” even possible? Relatedly, what impact does the colonial construction of
what it means to be French, or better, who is excluded from “being French,” as we can see in the
citizenship cards of the “Français musulman(es)” that I mentioned above, have on those who
claim this identity? With an understanding of this essential topic, we can have a better
understanding of the kinds of issues that my informants are constantly working out in their
efforts to “integrate” into the French national identity, to claim both sides of a potential “French
Muslim” identity.300
2.5.2.1 “French Islam” Definitional Issues
What exactly is “French Islam?” Is ‘French Islam” about a uniform Islam in France, a seeming
impossibility considering the vast diversity of Muslims in the world, or any manifestation of
299
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Islam in this locale that fits with French values, approach to church-state relations, etcetera? Can
only a certain kind of Islam be “French Islam?” To have a voice in the public sphere do Muslims
need to unite into a single unit? Does that unit need to mobilize in a particular way? Does it have
to be “French” to have any real effect? What needs to change about “Islam,” or the various ways
that people enact “Islam,” for it to become “French Islam?”301
“French Islam” often refers to manifestations of Muslim identity that are in line with
traditional “French” ideals of laïcité, secularism and the modern Western nation-state. It is
frequently used to refer to Muslims living in French societies who claim both a Muslim and a
French identity. “French Islam” cannot insist upon a universal Muslim community in these
locations; a diversity of ethnic identities is possible and inevitable. That being said, because the
emphasis in France is primarily on national or “French” identity, these communities will often
take on universal characteristics. This is most evident in the fact that the “French” part of the
identity is stressed, mostly by the French host society, and consequently, other identities that
may seem as threatening to this identity are regularly suppressed, or at least relegated to the
private sphere.
Tariq Ramadan, a leading albeit controversial302 scholar in the interaction of Islam and the
West, addresses the question of what it means to be a European Muslim in his work To be a
European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context. His conclusions provide
insight into specific European contexts, such as that in France. Ramadan suggests that there are
four parts to Muslim identity: faith, practice and spirituality; understanding of texts and context;
education and transmission; and action and participation.303 After explaining the central
importance of these four aspects of Muslim identity, Ramadan then suggests that
the great responsibility of Muslims in the West is to give an adapted European shape to these
four dimensions of their identity in light of their Islamic sources which, as to their conception
of life, death and creation, remain the fundamental reference.304
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According to Ramadan, Muslims in European contexts should not ignore or dismiss any of these
four aspects of their identities but rather alter them in the necessary ways to hold both their
Muslim and European identity. Ramadan suggests that through this process an “original Muslim
identity” emerges that is “neither totally diluted within the European environment nor in reaction
against it, but rather based on its own foundations according to its Islamic sources.”305 This leads
me to the question how much can you alter these foundational aspects of identity and still claim
authenticity. While the first two aspects of Muslim identity mentioned by Ramadan are adaptable
to Western contexts, matters of individual belief and practice are supported by secular,
democratic nations; the other aspects are where tension may arise. How one educates one’s
children and lives out one’s identity in other public spaces, perhaps by what they do or do not
eat, are the key issues in the negotiation process between Muslims and their European host
countries. In fact, in many European nations, particularly France, these last two aspects are
expected to remain private. Ramadan states that “the accomplishment of Muslim identity is to
express and manifest one’s belief through coherent behaviour.”306 This coherent behaviour often
includes things such as prayer, fasting, eating halal food, and wearing the hijab; many of which
are contested in some way, shape or form in European countries. Bowen suggests that
perhaps an Islam of faith and properly circumscribed devotions could be French, but an
Islam of schools, mosques, and people whose everyday demeanor marked themselves off
from others and who sought religious knowledge outside the country—that was a
different story.307
If Muslims in France are being asked to alter this aspect of their identity to a large extent, to keep
it firmly within the private realm, can they still be seen as fulfilling this part of their identity and
as a result maintaining their Muslim identity? Is it possible to have “coherent behaviour” without
being able to wear the veil, or eat halal food at school, or pray in public places?308 Who decides
what level of alteration is acceptable and what level is not? Can one be a part of this “original
Muslim identity” if one removes her veil to attend public school, but insists on wearing it in
other public spaces? Does this emphasis on behaviour in line with belief ultimately mean that
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Muslims can be “Muslims in France” but not “French Muslims?” What is the difference between
“Islam en France” and “Islam de France?” It is to this distinction that we turn our focus now.
Cesari suggests that there is a new promotion of national forms of Islam, and “Islam de
France,” that is, “French Islam,” is one example of such a thing.309 She goes on to suggest in a
later publication that this “Islam de France” has a form based on the interaction with the French
culture (which arises out of the history of France, its colonial and Republican past). She states
that “to be Muslim in France means to lose one’s relationship to Islam as a cultural and social
fait accompli, and instead to open it up to questioning and individual choice.”310 The question
becomes whether it is possible for Muslims to live with Islam not being a “cultural and social fait
accompli?” Based on Ramadan’s proposal of the four parts to Muslim identity above, one may
argue it is, in fact, not possible.
Whether it seems possible or not, according to Bowen most Muslims in France would claim
that there needs to be an “Islam de France,” rather than simply “Islam en France.” While this
may be a desire of Muslims living in France, how Muslims and non-Muslims alike understand
this term varies. Bowen states,
for some Muslims and many non-Muslims, the phrase “Islam of France” connotes an Islam
of piety, without the antiquated trappings of Islamic law, and with less emphasis on the
practices of prayer and sacrifice. For other Muslims it inspires an effort to rethink Islam in a
European context without compromising on either its core principles or its norms and
practices. For many non-Muslim French people, it means cultural “assimilation” to French
language and culture or social “integration” into a “mixed” society—to be demonstrated by
choosing designer headscarves over the Islamic kind, eating the same food as everyone else,
or interacting regularly with non-Muslims. For many in the government, however, the phrase
means an Islam regulated by the state and bounded by the state's borders, with French
Islamic institutions and French-trained imams.311
Many different understandings of the term lead to the possibility that everything, and at the same
time nothing, is “French Islam.” It does appear that assimilation to French language and culture
is an essential piece of creating an “Islam de France,” but it is difficult to know exactly what that
entails. Ultimately, the centrality of the separation of public and private and the secular
foundation of French identity leads to a major conflict between the two parts of the “Islam de
France” identity. The apparent lack of separation of public and private life, and the emphasis on
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coherent behaviour in line with belief in the Muslim tradition, are seen as a direct threat to the
“French speaking culture.” For example, Hurd states that
up to the present, being a French supporter of laicism has generally meant not being
Muslim, at least not openly and publicly. One could be Jewish (at times) or Christian, but
within the concept of “secular Muslim European” has been lodged an assumption that the
“Muslim” part is subordinate to the “secular” and “European” parts.312
What side of the identity one emphasizes, then, becomes a central question in the discussion of
“French Islam.” As I argued above, emphasizing both identities may be a difficult task when
both tend to require that each remains, using Cesari’s language, a “cultural and social fait
accompli,” and when, according to Hurd, the Muslim side tends to be “subordinate” to the other
side.
2.5.2.2 “French Islam” Identity Issues
There is a complicated situation that arises in the interplay of Republicanism in France,
immigration and related notions of identity. Amselle suggests that the Republican model is in
fact viable “only if it rests on the prior existence of a plurality of groups that, within the context
of organic solidarity, are supposed to form a harmonious synthesis.”313 There needs to be a
diversity of groups present, but the expectation is that those differences, at least visible
differences, would be erased in a truly Republican, secular country. France needs immigrants and
different groups to be present, but the expectation is that they will integrate to such an extent that
an “organic solidarity” emerges. Because of the emphasis in the Republic that all are supposed to
become one, any notion of “French Islam” is problematic because it highlights a diversity that
should not be present in the Republican state. This tension leads to a complicated balancing act
between recognition of a “plurality of groups” and an overarching unity present in France.314
While most would not use the term “multiculturalism” to define the situation happening in
France, Amselle does just that. He suggests that the French approach to multiculturalism
“culminates in the division of the population into minority ‘communities’ on the one hand and
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the majority ‘French ethnic group’ on the other.”315 This would seem to indicate that having a
“French Islam” is acceptable under French multiculturalism, as long as the “French” part of the
identity is emphasized and the “Islam” part of it is seen as the representation of the minority
community of which one is a member.
What becomes essential in French multiculturalism, and similarly in Québec
interculturalism, as I present later, is the interplay between the rights of the individual and the
rights of the collective; in France both are protected by Republican standards. One can hold any
identity if that identity does not threaten others; when an identity does threaten others, limits are
put in place. One may argue, that it is possible for a “French Islam,” if the second identity, Islam,
does not threaten the first identity, French. This tends to be the argument given in the literature
on “French Islam” and by politicians and Muslims alike: one can be a “French Muslim” if the
religious identity does not challenge or interfere with what it means to be “French.” What is
noteworthy is that, according to the French approach to national identity, any public expression
of minority identity would innately threaten, challenge and interfere with what it means to be
“French.” As Susan Worbs describes it,
France has a tradition of “assimilation policy” that is rooted in the historical process of
centralization and nation building…The very idea of “minorities” or even “races” and
policies referring to such categories is rejected in French politics.316
So even if Republican multiculturalism protects minority identities, it relegates them to a
particular time and place; often in the privacy of one’s home. There seems to be a privileging of
the collective identity over the individual identity and the question begs to be asked, what
happens if the first identity, French, threatens the second, Islam? Is this not also a violation of
Republican ideals? In fact, Scott suggests that the critics of French secularism see this approach
as violating the democratic principles on which the Republic is founded. In “its claims to
universalism” secular nationalism has “justified the exclusion or marginalization of those from
non-European cultures (often immigrants from former colonies) whose systems of belief do no
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separate public and private in the same way, do not, in other words, conform to those of the
dominant group.”317
Ultimately, having a “French Islam” leads to a hyphenated identity. The creation of
hyphenated identities—Muslim French, French Muslim, etcetera—inevitably lead to questions
about to which side of the hyphen one belongs.318 These questions become prevalent for secondgeneration Muslim immigrants. As argued by Cesari, “while first-generation immigrants often
live in a state of relative harmony with the religious, social and national aspects of identity, their
children face a tension, if not an outright conflict, between the layers of individual, collective,
and national identity.”319 Young French Muslims who have known no other country as home
other than France are often forced to question their national identity because of the strong
relationship between ethnic and religious identities. Thus, conflict will often arise over which
part of one’s identity to emphasize. By stating that “the Republic does not recognize people
based on their origin. You are French, and there are French people of all ethnic origins,” past
president of France, Jacques Chirac, reveals the centrality of French identity above all other
identities.320 Consequently, this centrality is represented by physical action, or inaction, by those
who claim French identity. Evidence that one is French is found in outward manifestations of
that identity, and when one’s outward manifestations of identity (what one eats, how one dresses,
etcetera) highlight a different identity, problems may arise. After all, French universalism
suggests that “in theory there is no possibility of a hyphenated ethnic/national identity—one
belongs either to a group or to the nation.”321 While official statements or policies may indicate
that certain identities (ethnic or religious) do not matter in the French context, it becomes clear
that on the ground level this is not necessarily the case. Ethnic, religious and other national
identities are often highlighted and the relationship between them is often misrepresented.
It is critical to note the conflation of the term Islam, or Muslim, with many other identity
labels in France. For example, as I noted earlier, immigrant and Muslim have become
synonymous terms.322 Furthermore, increased numbers of Muslim or Arab immigrants, with no
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real increase in interaction with those immigrants, leads to a tendency to place a “one-size-fitsall” label on Arabs living in the West. The relationship between religion and ethnicity and the
conflation of the two in many of these Western contexts is also important to note. Because the
host society does not often separate ethnic from religious identity for the Muslim immigrants in
their midst, difficulty often arises for the Muslim communities themselves to dissociate the two.
The conflation of ethnic and religious identities is crucial in the discussion of “French Islam.” If
both the majority French culture, and the Muslim immigrant communities, have a difficult time
dissociating ethnic identity from religious identity how is a “French Islam,” as an overarching
label, possible? If Islam in France is specifically Maghrébine Islam (Algerian Islam, Moroccan
Islam, Tunisian Islam) how can there be a “French Islam?” More essentially if these ethnic
identities are understood to be foundationally in conflict with “French” identity, how could these
conflated identities fit with the French identity? If in the term “Muslim” in France the term
Maghrébine is implicit is it possible to also be “French?” Is it possible to have what Zabel states
of her mixed identity in Canada in France? She states: “I am an Arab. I am a Syrian. I am a
Muslim. I am a Canadian. I am an Arab Muslim Canadian. I am very comfortable and proud of
my identities”323 While these identities are separated out for Zabel, is it possible to do the same
in France where the ethnic and religious aspects of identity are fused? Perhaps part of the fear of
establishing a “French Islam” is that these two terms will become conflated as well.
The fact that ethnic and religious identities are merged, or more specifically, immigrant
and Muslim, or Muslim and other,324 leads one to the idea that this conflated identity is
inherently different from one’s national identity. In France “people are increasingly concerned
with their collective identities as either ‘Maghrebi’/‘Muslim’ or ‘French.’”325 In this quotation
we can see the fusing of ethnic and religious identity (Maghrébine/Muslim) and the fact that this
conflated identity is separate from national identity (French). Even if Muslim immigrants are
acknowledged as being from France, they are often labeled as coming from the “‘other France.’
Rarely are they seen for what they are: French nationals.”326 If Muslim immigrants, no matter
what their ethnic background, feel inherently foreign based on that identity, two possibilities
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arise for French Islam: first, they hold onto their “foreign” identity and inherently remain outside
of what it means to be “French,” and “French Islam” is not really a possibility. Or second, they
sacrifice that “foreign” identity to become “French,” and “French Islam” is not really a
possibility. Furthermore, this tie between ethnic and religious identity often leads to reluctance to
take up French national identity on the part of many Muslims (particularly Algerian Muslims) in
France. Cesari states that “they were reluctant to acquire French nationality, viewing that
acquisition as a betrayal of their nation’s prior struggle against colonialism,” and “adherence to
Islam is still one of their primary bulwarks against assimilation.”327 Holding on to identities that
distinguish rather than integrate does not bode well for a “French Islam.”
Overall, notions of conflated identities and religious and ethnic identities that are seen as
in conflict with modern Western notions of the secular state make the idea of “French Islam”
seem more like an ideal than a reality. The strength of this statement varies from location to
location with the situation in Canada/Québec, as we’ll see, appearing more welcoming for
Muslim immigrants to adopt such a hybrid identity, than for those same immigrants in France. In
fact, Fetzer and Soper ask the question, “the situation for Muslims in some parts of France
appears so bleak that one wonders why more do not emigrate to a more hospitable country such
as Britain or Canada.”328 Regardless of which situation may be more welcoming it seems evident
from the exploration above that the emphasis on “French” identity in France prejudices the
debate of the possibility of “French Islam.”
Perhaps the best way to describe Muslims in France, then, is as French and of Muslim
329
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Ramadan actually suggests that it is in fact pointless to dispute over the “terminological

choice between ‘a French Muslim’ or ‘a Muslim Frenchman.’”330 Instead, Bowen suggests that,
rather than asking if one identity should be highlighted over another, the better question may be
“Can Islam become a generally accepted part of French social landscape?...quick off the mark
there are signs that suggest yes, perhaps, and others that indicate no, maybe not.”331 Whether or
not there is, or can be, a “French Islam” does not take away from the fact that in the current
globalized world, these two strong identities must be in negotiation to an extent that was not
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needed before. Those who hold to both sides of this identity are in an especially problematic
place, holding two identities that each requires absolute adherence and dedication; after all, how
can one be both “French first” and “Muslim first”? These conflicts of identity are consequently
worked out in the hybrid-identifier’s daily life.
2.6 Conclusion
How Maghrébine Muslims live out their daily lives in France, especially as it relates to food
practice, is the focus of this dissertation. To fully understand the experience of my informants, to
understand how and why they may or may not change their food practice, and to understand the
contextual pressures that they face in their daily lives, it is essential to understand the French
setting that acts as the backdrop to their daily experience.
To understand how it is that Maghrébine Muslims will find some French food practices a
normal expression of their own food customs, one must understand the colonial relationship
between the two locations. While the colonial past between France and the countries of the
Maghreb leads to negative colonial memory and thus stereotyping behaviour by both sides, it can
also have positive effects. In the section on colonialism, I began by presenting a brief exploration
of the role of the baguette and couscous in the relationship between colonizer and colonized. I
showed how baguette is brought by the French colonizers and becomes an essential element of
Maghrébine food culture. On the other hand, the colonizer also picks up some of the local food
culture through the experience of colonization, and thus couscous is enveloped in French food
culture as well. I suggested here that these culinary familiarities may serve an important role in
cross cultural understanding and solidarity in present day France.
France’s colonization of North Africa not only has a direct influence on the familiarity
with the food of the other, but also the prejudice against it. Thus, I addressed France and North
Africa’s historical colonial relationship. After addressing a brief overview of that history, I
discussed how France’s colonization of the countries of the Maghreb, and particularly Algeria,
took on an air of moral crusade. The French colonist was seen as a liberator, of women in
particular, in a backward and unenlightened Muslim world. The Algerian, Muslim colonial
subject, although technically a French citizen during this time, was set apart as separate, as
different, as not fully French, being given distinct citizenship cards that labelled them as

94

“Français musulman(e)” rather than simply “Français.” The situation was one of hostility, often
based on the understanding that the Maghrébine Muslim subject was barbaric and violent. The
image of Maghrébines as violent was concretized in the eyes of the non-Maghrébine French
through the experience of the Algerian War between 1954 and 1962. Islam became directly
affiliated with this bloody decolonization effort and thus for many non-Muslim French in both
the colonies and the metropole, Islam was understood as a violent force; an understanding that
was then applied to all Maghrébine Muslims, not just Algerians.332 This colonial history and the
interaction between France and Islam in the colonial context means that a wide variety of
“colonial memories” or lack thereof are present in France today. These colonial memories
inevitably affect the relationship between Maghrébine Muslim immigrants and the majority, nonMuslim French population. When events and situations arise that confirm these negative colonial
memories, the situation becomes problematic for all sides.
I followed the discussion of colonization with an examination of the immigration history
of Maghrébine Muslims to France, and showed how one can see the tensions that may be present
to transform one’s practice as a reflection of a French identity and not an “immigré(e).” Because
of France’s colonization of North Africa, and the mere fact of geographical closeness, much of
France’s immigration numbers come from the countries of the Maghreb. Hence, in the second
section of this chapter, I discussed the migratory movements of Maghrébine Muslims to France
and the effect of these immigration patterns on current relationships between immigrant and nonimmigrant French. I used Jocelyne Cesari’s 2009 chapter in Bramadat and Koenig’s work to
present the three migratory movements of Muslims to France. This overview provides important
historical context for some of the infrastructure that supports, or does not, the Maghrébine
Muslim community in Paris. For example, during the first two waves of Muslim migration to
France, the migrants expected to return to their home contexts and thus lived in temporary
housing developments meant for single young men in the suburbs of Paris. With the third wave
of migration, and the change from labourers to family reunification, the Muslim community on
the ground level in France changed drastically, and yet the infrastructure was not in place to
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accommodate this change, thus creating the overcrowded banlieues that are common place in
Paris today.
After presenting these early migratory movements I outlined general demographics about
Muslim immigration in France. I showed that while Muslims in France come from 123 different
nationalities, the majority come from the countries of the Maghreb. Additionally, I presented the
fact that approximately 75 percent of immigrants in France are thought to be Muslim, leading to
a conflation between the term “immigrant” and “Muslim” (as well as Muslim and North
African). Since there are roughly six million Muslims in France, and approximately 2.4 million
of them live in the greater Paris region, a city that has a population of roughly 2.2 million within
the bounds of the twenty “arrondissements,” one can see how the argument is made by some in
France that “the immigrant community,” understood “the Muslim community” is overwhelming
the city and consequently the country. Furthermore, because such a large proportion of Muslim
immigrants in France are Maghrébine immigrants, one can understand how the conflation of
cultural and religious food practice are a reality in the French context. “Muslim food” in France
is often conflated with “Maghrébine food” and vice versa which may influence the interaction
with and between Muslim and non-Muslim French.
Moreover, because of France’s approach to secularism, the Muslim immigrant in France
may find him/herself under more pressure to label religious food practices as cultural food
practices to not offend the secularist sentiments that rule the nation. To understand the history
and context that may lead to this kind of sentiment I spent the next section of this chapter directly
addressing the French approach to secularization, namely laïcité. After a brief examination of the
history around the separation of church and state in France, and the 1905 law which officially
removed the power of the Catholic church, and any religion for that matter, from the state, I then
presented the Republican notion of “freedom from religion.” In this, I showed how France has an
official secularization policy which protects the state from religion and not the other way around.
This official secularization policy is that of laïcité which I addressed next in this chapter.
I showed how this term developed and how people have interacted with it since its imagined
inception in the 1905 law; the term did not make its official constitutional debut until 1946.
Laïcité is often argued to entail religious freedom, but as I presented in this chapter, the
definition of religious freedom is often differently understood by various groups in France. To
understand the numerous kinds of laïcité possibly active in France I presented Fetzer and Soper’s
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strict and soft laïcité, and Bowen’s political and social laïcité. Within the criticisms of strict
laïcité I suggested that laïcité itself has become somewhat of a religion in France, and a central
orienting principle of French nationality.
Finally, because of the emphasis on French national identity, and a particular
understanding of that identity, Muslims in France may need to make more concerted efforts to
show that they too are “French” and all that that entails. These efforts often include the outward
manifestations of one’s identity, of which food is essential. I closed the chapter by exploring
what it means to “be French” and who has access to this national identity. After briefly outlining
Thomas’ five models of citizenship, and consequently nationality, I suggested that food may be a
particularly important aspect of the unified culture that is essential to the Republican national
tradition. In this effort, I explored wine drinking as an crucial aspect of French national identity.
I asked the question in this section: If drinking wine is one of the many, and some would argue
essential, ways to demonstrate one’s “Frenchness,” what happens for those individuals who do
not consume wine, or even worse, view it as haram, sinful, problematic, in their efforts to claim
French national identity? What effect might this have on the Muslim immigrant living in the
wine-soaked French nation? Can he/she be both French and Muslim?
To conclude, I investigated the concept of “French Islam.” Tto understand what might
make up any European form of Islam, or French Islam in particular, I outlined Tariq Ramadan’s
four elements of European Muslim identity. I showed that the first two characteristics of
European Muslim identity according to Ramadan are in line with French notions of laïcité,
namely (1) faith, practice and spirituality and (2) understanding of texts and context. These
characteristics can arguably be pursued in private, thus not threatening the strict separation of
religion and public life that is essential to the French national self-understanding. On the other
hand, the second two characteristics of European Muslim identity as outlined by Ramadan are
more in conflict with French understandings of French national identity as secular and
universalistic, namely (3) the education and transmission of religious identity and (4) action and
participation. I argued that how one educates one’s children and lives out one’s identity in other
public spaces, perhaps by what they do or do not eat, are the key issues in the negotiation process
between Muslims and their European host countries and between the consequent two sides of
their transnational identity. Whether one can live out these four characteristics in France or not,
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according to the literature, many Muslims in France would argue that there needs to be an “Islam
de France” and not just an “Islam en France.”
I presented the idea that ultimately having a “French Islam” leads to hyphenated
identities for those who claim membership in this group. Conflict often arises out of the pressure
from both sides of this hyphenated identity to prioritize one side over the other. One is expected
to be both French first and Muslim first. Furthermore, with the common conflation of identities
that is present in France, there is a problem in determining what exactly is meant by both
“French” and “Islam” in this context. Generally, notions of conflated identities and religious and
ethnic identities that are seen as in conflict with modern Western notions of the secular state
make the idea of “French Islam” seem more like an ideal than a reality.
Overall, in this chapter I have tried to show how the colonial, immigration, secularist and
nationalistic histories and context of France have a unique effect on the daily lives of the
Maghrébine Muslims of my study. This effect will be made evident throughout the next three
chapters as I present the findings from my ethnographic case study of Maghrébine Muslims in
Paris.
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Introduction to the Paris Case Study: Food in Identity, Transnationalism and Religious
Practice
There I was, perched in the park outside of the Grande Mosquée de Paris on one of my first
Friday afternoons in the city, watching as people filed into the mosque for prayer, young and old,
men and women, from a variety of backgrounds. As I looked on the mosque filled to capacity
and latecomers started to flow out of the large wooden front doors onto the stone steps, and then
onto the concrete sidewalk in front of the mosque. Prayer mats were placed in front of them,
turning the secular Parisian sidewalk into sacred space. I watched four police officers looking on,
seemingly keeping things “in check.” I felt slightly uncomfortable by the police presence and
wondered how this might make those people in attendance feel as well. I wondered how many
churches had four police officers standing out front on a Sunday during their service. As the
hundreds of people left the mosque that day, I wondered if I had gotten in over my head.
The arguments made in the next three chapters are based on the data I collected during
my six-month fieldwork trip to Paris, France in 2012. The themes that emerged from my data
analysis of the foodways of my informants speak to three aspects of the Maghrébine Muslim
experience in France: identity, transnationalism and practice. In Chapter 3 I explore how
Maghrébine Muslims view themselves, and others in their French context. I address the spectrum
of approaches to identity consolidation taken by this community, as is made evident by my data,
and the role that food plays in these negotiations. I then investigate the presence and influence of
transnationalism on the Maghrébine Muslim community in France in Chapter 4. To this end, I
show how food functions as a tool for the transnational immigrant to maintain connection with
the homeland, as well as “integrate” into the host land. Finally, in Chapter 5 I explore how both
these issues, as well as others, affect the everyday food practice of North African Muslims in
Paris. I address how the way one self-identifies can have a concrete effect on how one lives one’s
life on the ground. I also consider how group identity, specifically a transnational one, can
change one’s religious and cultural food practice outside of the homeland.
In these three chapters I provide a glimpse into the varied and complex approaches to
daily life that are present in the Maghrébine community in Paris and how their approach to their
food practices changes or remains consistent with what they did in the homeland. I demonstrate
how the individuals of my study address the potentially complicated process of religious identity
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negotiation and integration in the seemingly unwelcoming context of Republican France by
using food as a tool and symbol of these processes.
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Chapter 3: “Et vous, comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie?”333: The Role of Food in
Identity Negotiation and Presentation amongst Maghrébine Muslims in Paris
3.1 Introduction
Identity is complex and multivalent. We all claim various identities in our lives, some more
strongly than others, and some more varied than others. While one individual may see himself as
holding only one identity, another individual may see herself as holding many. Identities are
claimed and constructed, acted upon and assumed, and every individual will engage with his/her
own identities in unique ways. What this flexibility leads to is a wide range of identity
consolidation processes and expressions in any given individual, let alone any community. It is
impossible to speak of a single Maghrébine Muslim identity in Paris or of a single way that
Maghrébine Muslims interact with, change or adapt their identities in their immigrant location.
When dealing with human subjects, perfect typologies are impossible to present.
While perfect typologies may not be within the realm of possibility, some categorization
of the data can be useful. All typologies have flaws, but some are a helpful means through which
to view various phenomena. For this reason, further on in this chapter I use Salman Akhtar’s
typology of immigrant identity consolidation, which I adjust and expand, to understand the
identity processes of the Maghrébine community that I studied in France.334 While none of my
informants were a perfect fit to Akhtar’s four consolidation processes, good examples can be
found of all. Specifically, I show how food and food practice play a significant role in these
identity consolidation processes for the informants in my study. Through this analysis, I show
how some Maghrébine Muslims in France claim a hyper-assimilated, ethnocentric, alienated or
bi-cultural (what my informants would call a double cultural, and what I would call a
transnational) identity.335
Before I address these specific identity consolidation processes, I present some general
themes that emerged in relation to identity out of my interviews. Information about the identity
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of my informants was gathered through specific interview questions related to identity, as well as
in statements made by my informants to questions not specifically related to identity. What
became clear, in fact, was that identity was a central concern for my 33 informants. Most
conversations came back to this issue, to how one identifies oneself and is identified by others.
One’s practice was influenced by one’s identity, and vice versa. One’s beliefs were influenced by
one’s identity, and vice versa. One’s interaction with people who hold a similar identity or a
different identity was influenced by one’s identity, and vice versa. Identity was a central concern
for the Maghrébine Muslims I interviewed in Paris.
3.2 Multiple Identity Claims: Primary Identity and the Influence of Context
Considering what is known about the French approach to identity, this centrality is not
surprising. To begin it is important to note some simple statistics on how people identify
themselves when asked a straightforward question about their identity. When asked, “comment
voulez-vous que je vous identifie?”336 a person’s first response is often telling of the primary
identity that he/she holds. In the case of my informants in Paris, primary identity claims were
quite varied. Of my 33 informants 15 claimed national identity first (46 percent), whether French
(five informants) or nation of origin (ten informants), seven claimed gender identity as their
primary identity (21 percent), five claimed Muslim identity first (15 percent), three identified
their name as their principal identity (9 percent), two listed “world citizen” as their primary
identity (6 percent), and one claimed his occupation first (3 percent).337 Because of the variation
in first identities given there were no real patterns of identity claims based on country of origin
or gender. Of the ten informants who claimed nation of origin as their first identity, nine were
from Algeria, and one from Tunisia. None of the Moroccans in my study claimed nation of
origin as their first identity. This does not mean that they did not mention this identity at all; it
just was not the first identity that they professed. The other minor trend that I found was in
relation to gender. Of those who claimed their gender identity first, six out of seven were female.
Interestingly, not everyone who claimed French first were French-born (two were French born,
336
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two were Algerian and one was Tunisian). Overall, the most significant first identity to be
mentioned was a national one with almost half of all informants (with an even split between male
and female) stating this identity claim first.
In a country where one’s national identity is seen as holding utmost importance, it is
understandable why one’s perception of oneself in relation to that identity, and others, is such a
vital topic. The emphasis on national identity can be seen in the responses to my direct question
about identity. In 31 of my interviews, the informants highlighted national identity as one of the
most important identities they held. Moreover, as I just stated, in half of these interviews the
informants gave either French or one of the Maghrébine national identities as their first identity,
and if it was not the first identity mentioned it quickly followed the first. National identity was in
the forefront of all these informants’ minds. One informant explained that this emphasis on
national identity was the French approach to the question of identity:
En fait ce que tu dis là, ce n’est pas une approche française de l’identité. Si [c’était]
l’approche française, je te dirais que je suis Française, que j’ai la double nationalité et que
je suis tunisienne. Je suis sur le territoire français, donc c’est la primo en France [la
nationalité française est mise en avant]. Quand je suis en Tunisie, c’est ma nationalité
tunisienne qui est avant ma nationalité française. Tu vois c’est inversé. Ensuite je te dirais
que…mon identité s’arrête là.338
National identity is seen as the most important, the only worthwhile identity to mention in the
French context. It was only in two interviews where this emphasis on some form of national
identity was not present. In these two cases, the informants referred to themselves as “citoyens
du monde”339 and refused to label themselves with any strong nationalistic identity.
In the above quotation, we can also see another theme that emerged in peoples’ responses
to the question of which identities they presented, namely, that the context would affect how they
would respond to such a question. I had informants who expressed that they felt more French in
France and more Maghrébine340 in the Maghreb (i.e. more Algerian in Algeria, more Moroccan
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in Morocco, more Tunisian in Tunisia), or that they would emphasize these identities in these
locales more strongly.341 On the other hand, I had informants who expressed the exact opposite
and stated that they felt more Maghrébine in France and more French in the Maghreb.342 When
one’s identity is the minority, it is often highlighted. Elsewhere, I refer to this as the minority
status effect; that is, “when one’s identity changes from being one that is shared with the
majority to one that is representative of a minority, symbols of that identity start to play a more
significant role for the migrant,” and food is one such symbol.343
The influence of context on identity could also be seen in relation to religious identity for
many of my informants. Like the need to emphasize one’s national identity where it is not the
majority identity, the need to emphasize one’s religious identity when it is not the majority was
also felt by my informants. One informant explained that, because of the lack of polemic in the
Maghreb toward Islam, there is no need there to emphasize one’s Muslim identity. Islam is seen
as “for everyone” and as a result it was not a distinct identity to be held and stated.344
Furthermore, these informants argued that, in the Maghreb, “on s’identifie pas comme musulman
car tout le monde l’est.”345 Regardless of polemics, the Muslim identity is presumed to be an
inevitability and not worth mentioning in the Maghreb. On the other hand, where religious
identity is not inevitable, i.e. in France, one may feel the need to hold and profess this identity
more strongly. This falls in line with Steven Vertovec’s suggestion that one’s minority status
leads to a great deal of self-consciousness, often leading immigrants to become more aware of
their religion in the migrant context.346
3.2.1 Born Muslim: “même si on ne le veut pas” 347
The idea that everyone is born Muslim if they are born in the Maghreb presents another thorny
aspect of the identity negotiations happening for North African Muslims in their immigrant

the above. While regional identity is important to my informants, as I argued in Chapter 1, that is not the purpose
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locations. This raises the question of where the separation between innate and chosen identity
lies. Once one claims an innate identity, an identity that one is “born with,” does that influence to
what degree that identity is adaptable? Does one’s affinity with the identity grow or weaken
based on the understanding of it being a “born identity?” Can innate identity be left behind?
From examining my data, this notion of being “born Muslim” was a prominent idea expressed by
my informants.
Before exploring exactly how my informants spoke of this native identity it is important
to note that there seems to be some conflation of the term Muslim and Maghrébine presented
here. Peggy Levitt states that when migrants come from contexts where there is little separation
between church and state, religion and nationality reinforce once another in the migrant
context.348 This argument was presented by some of my informants, stating that because one is
Maghrébine, coming from one of the countries of the Maghreb, or seeing oneself as holding this
regional identity, one is inevitably Muslim as well. This conflation of national, regional and
religious identities, then, is not merely something that comes from the outside and is projected
onto members of those communities, but it is something that comes from within the community
itself. One of my informants expressed that “Muslim” and “Arab” are being conflated in the
West, yet went on to say that if you are born in the Maghreb, you are born Muslim, buying into
the very conflation against which she was speaking.349
This informant was not the only one to express the inherent characteristic of the
Maghrébine Muslim identity. When speaking about their Muslim identity, 10 of my 33
informants stated that because they were born in one of the countries of the Maghreb they were
“born Muslim.” For example, when addressing her Muslim identity and explaining why she
called herself Muslim in spite of her stating that “Je ne suis pas vraiment pratiquante,” one of my
informants laughed and said “oui je le suis, mais en fait, à partir du moment où en Algérie on est
née Algérienne, donc on est systématiquement musulmane même si on ne le veut pas. Voilà. On
l’est.”350 The idea that one could hold an identity even if one does not want to hold said identity
is an important aspect of the immigrant’s experience to take into account. Much of the conflict
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that arises around religious identity, and often religious practice, comes from the idea that one
can choose one’s religious identity and resultant practice. What happens to this idea when
religious identity is viewed as an innate identity, much like gender or race or even nationality—
and, for that matter, what happens to a Maghrébine immigrant to France when a secular identity
is viewed as the national innate identity? If one cannot help but claim female, or white or
Canadian identity based off of the circumstances of her birth how does this change her
interaction with the world around her? From looking at the response from many of my
informants that Islam is an inborn identity, could this help us to understand how some may view
it as difficult to change? Just as it is incredibly difficult to change one’s gender identity in the
eyes of those around you, could religious identity be just as tough to leave behind, even if one
desires to leave it? Could this lead to the re-labelling of religious identity as something else,
namely a cultural identity?
3.2.2 Who Can Claim a Particular Identity?
This was a significant point made by some of my informants as well, the notion that even if you
wanted to claim a particular identity, certain contexts, or characteristics may prevent you from
doing so. Just as much as certain facts would automatically include someone in an identity
group, i.e. being “born Muslim,” some of my informants spoke of the fact that certain
characteristics would preclude them from claiming particular identities as well. Something as
simple as facial hair may trigger this response, as one of my informants explained:
si quelqu’un, par exemple, il me voit avec la barbe, il dit: pas un Français. Il dit:
un musulman. Donc moi, je dis musulman, donc je sais dans ma tête, et lui il
me regarde comme un arabe, ou un musulman. Donc moi, je me sens musulman
Arabe. 351
He explained to me that because other people see a characteristic or trait, such as a beard, and
immediately place him into a specific identity group, that he does the same. He does not even try
to claim another identity because he argues that he would not be allowed to claim that identity
anyway by most non-bearded French around him. Another of my informants reiterated this point
when he said “Ça sert à rien de dire qu’on est Français, parce que ça se voit immédiatement sur
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nous. Puisque les médias nous ont catalogués depuis x-temps, ça se voit immédiatement sur
nous.”352 This informant explained that there is no point in claiming French identity when “it is
seen on” him, i.e. it is clear from his appearance that he is not what is considered “French.” This
informant went on to explain that he considered himself both, but at the same time explained
how he did not “feel French” and thus was “not French.”353 While other informants mentioned
their physical characteristics as limiting them from claiming French identity, some gave other
examples of traits that precluded them from calling themselves French. For example, one
informant mentioned their “façon d’être” (way of being) as a reason why “je passerai jamais
pour quelqu’une qui est née en France. Quelqu’une qui est Française, jamais.”354 For many of my
informants, food practice was one “façon d’être” which excluded them from being accepted as
“French.” As one young, second generation Maghrébine woman expressed to me, “la France
c’est vin, fromage et baguette. Je mange que la baguette. Donc voilà. Je ne suis pas vraiment
Française, Française.”355
Another informant claimed, alongside her physique that gave away her identity, that her
name would not allow her to be viewed as French by the society. She explained that the majority
non-Muslim French society “me renvoie en permanence le fait que je ne suis pas, de par mon
physique, de par mon prénom, de par mon nom, Française.”356 Some of the members of the
community told me of taking on more “French sounding” names in an attempt to avoid
discrimination and/or to claim French identity more easily. Any symbol or sign of difference
seemed to lead these informants to believe that there were excluded from the French identity,
highlighting the idea that to “be French” is to be a part of a “nation one and indivisible.”357
What is crucial to note about many of my informants who spoke of the inability to claim
French identity is the fact that most of them have French citizenship. In fact, 20 of my 33
informants actually had French citizenship. It seemed that whether or not my informants had a
“right” to claim the French identity had little to do with their actual approach to this identity in
352
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particular. Instead it was mostly based on perceived or real notions of who is allowed to claim
this identity.
While there were many of my informants who felt they could not claim French identity
for a variety of reasons, there were others who held this national identity strongly, some who had
citizenship as a reason and others who did not. For example, one informant expressed to me:
Moi, par exemple, je me sens Français, je ne suis pas Français. Je n’ai pas la nationalité
française mais je me sens Français. J’ai connu des Maghrébins qui sont Français de
nationalité mais qui ne se sentent pas Français. Donc c’est vraiment une question difficile
à répondre. C’est quoi être Français?358
Unlike those informants mentioned above, who could claim French identity based on nationality
but chose not to for various reasons, this young woman could not claim French identity based on
nationality but wanted to claim it regardless. Unlike this one informant who could not claim
French identity based on nationality or citizenship, there were a few of my informants who
claimed French identity based solely on this fact. Others would claim it because of something as
simple as time spent in France. One man explained to me that because he had lived in France
longer than Algeria, and because he had done most of his schooling in France, he felt more
French than Algerian.359 He had French citizenship, but his main argument behind claiming
French identity was one based on what he felt rather than what was written on paper. Here we
can see variations of Thomas’ five models of political membership that I discussed in Chapter 2.
For some, “being French” was a matter of descent, for others it was a culture, and for others still,
a contract.360
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3.2.3 Informants’ Definition of French Identity
Considering the multiple responses to French identity that I just outlined, the question becomes:
What is French identity according to this group of Maghrébine Muslims in Paris? I have
presented the fact that this identity is often seen as inaccessible to Maghrébine Muslims in
France. If it is in fact accessible, I have shown how it is viewed as desirable by some, and
undesirable by others. But is there consensus on what constitutes this identity? While no perfect
consensus can be reached as to what French identity means, there are some characteristics
presented by my informants that they view as evidence for “French” identity. One of the
strongest pieces of evidence that one can present is citizenship/nationality. It was argued that if
you were French on paper, it was an identity that you could hold. But, as seen above, sometimes
this paper definition was not enough either for the Maghrébine Muslim trying to claim it, or for
the non-Maghrébine, non-Muslim, majority French population.
One common thread that was presented by my informants who spoke about French
identity was the primacy of this identity in the majority French population’s eyes. In line with the
universalistic approach to nationalism that Scott outlines in her work,361 my informants argued
that French identity is viewed as the most important identity one can hold, and is in fact the only
identity one should hold in France. All other identities that one may hold are relegated to the
realm of “culture” or “origins” and even then, are meant to be kept private.362 For example, one
informant told me that she was not French because she did not have French citizenship, but if
one day she were to get French citizenship, she would then label herself “Française d’origine
algérienne.”363 Although she proudly stated her Algerian identity at that moment, where she had
not yet claimed French identity, she described the process of relegating her Algerian identity to
one of simple “origins” if she were to claim the French identity.
So the French identity, in this case, is seen as superseding all other identities, but what is
this French identity? How is it understood by those North African Muslims who are trying to
claim it? Although the terms were used interchangeably by my informants, there appears to be a
difference between French citizenship and French nationality.364 This distinction can be seen
361
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especially in those informants who have French citizenship and yet do not feel as if they have
what is required to claim French nationality and thus French identity.365 In these cases, the
informants would describe French citizenship as a simple legalistic or tactical aspect of their
experience of living in France.366 For example, one young woman explained to me that she had
French citizenship but would never call herself French. For her, because she was not born in
France, it was not an identity but simply a bureaucratic fact of life; hers was a contractual
understanding of French nationality.367 Similarly, another informant explained that he obtained
French citizenship simply to help with gaining employment, not for “le patriotisme français.”368
French citizenship can be a necessity rather than a cherished identity. This is distinct
from French nationality, which is something that one is either born with or claims for oneself
based on common culture. In the cases of those informants who are born in France, this identity
is unquestioned. That being said, there are some circumstances where my informants did not
have French nationality but did have French citizenship and saw it as much more than just a
necessity; they saw it as an important identity. One of these informants, who claimed French
identity based on the time he spent living in France and his lack of connection to the homeland,
expressed the following about French national identity,
c’est la notion de ce qu’on appelle l’identité nationale, qu’est-ce que être Français, c’est
plutôt la question de qu’est-ce que être Français. Est-ce que être Français c’est boire du
vin, manger de la charcuterie, avoir un béret, la baguette, etcetera? Non, est-ce qu’être
Français c’est parler français, vivre en France, croire en certaines démocraties, en
certaines, je dirai oui, en certaines idées, en certaines visions. C’est plutôt ça.
Personnellement.369

label “nationality” as “citizenship.” The point is to show how this identity can be constructed and understood in
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For this informant being “French” was so much more than simply a matter of where one was
born, or what one ate; it was about sharing ideas and cultures. Perhaps this is also why some of
my informants who had French citizenship could not or would not choose to identify as
nationalistically French, because they did not see themselves as holding the same culture. For my
informants who professed Maghrébine identity as their primary identity this choice was
particularly evident. These informants emphasized the fact that they were Algerian, Moroccan or
Tunisian, and that it was an identity of which they were very proud and which clearly
distinguished them from native-born French identifiers. These informants were happy to be
excluded from the “French” identity and be called a “blédard.” This is a term used by the
majority French population and by those whom they are labeling as such, to refer to someone
who comes from the Maghreb. It can be seen as having a condescending connotation to it,
attaching some notion of “country bumpkin” to those who are labeled with it. While the majority
French population sees it as a negative label, there are those from the Maghreb who see it as a
compliment, as evidence that they have not lost their culture from their homeland and as
evidence that their Maghrébine identity remains strong.370 These informants emphasized that
they were NOT French, and were proudly from “au bled” and this led to a confidence of identity
that those who hold a “double culture” could not possibly have. Or so they would argue.
3.3 Double Culture: The Benefits and Downfalls of Two National Identities
The idea of “double culture” frequently arose in my fieldwork.371 Ten of my 33 informants spoke
about the idea of “double culture” and its effects on either themselves or others in their
communities. The basic notion presented by my informants was that someone who holds a
“double culture,” who has a double identity, is someone who holds both French and Maghrébine
identity.372 Commonly this “double culture” was seen as being held by second or third generation
Maghrébines born in France. What was noteworthy from my data was that, in fact, my
informants who were born in France did not outright mention this “double culture.” Four of my
370
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five French born informants did not see themselves as holding a Maghrébine identity at all.
Instead this part of their lives was relegated to either “origins”373 or “l’identité de mes
parents.”374 The traditions that these “origins” provided were clearly important to these second
generation Maghrébines and would even become focal points of much of their daily lives, but
according to them did not influence how they identify themselves. The one French-born
informant who did claim both French and Maghrébine identity stressed all sides of her identity.
She began by saying “je suis Française mais je suis Tunisienne, d’origine tunisienne.”375 If she
had stopped at this identity statement, one may have been able to place her with her cohort of
second generation Maghrébines mentioned above who relegate their Maghrébine identity to that
of origins. Instead, she continued, calling herself “Française, musulmane, Tunisienne” and then,
after emphasizing the centrality of her Muslim identity, “musulmane, Tunisienne, Française.”376
All three identities were mentioned to varying degrees but all three were important. What is
fascinating to note is that this informant’s sister stressed that she did not hold a Tunisian identity
at all. This is just one of many examples that shows how identity is highly individual and
influenced by a variety of factors.
While my French-born informants did not speak of a ‘double culture,” many of my firstgeneration Maghrébine immigrant informants did. It seems that the idea of a “double culture” is
one that is imposed from outside the French context. It is what is used by Maghrébine
immigrants to illustrate what identity they, or they assume others, hold. My informants who were
born in the Maghreb, who claimed a “double culture” identity, often saw themselves as having
some level of “French” identity before they even moved to the French mainland. For example,
one informant explained to me:
J’ai la nationalité française, tout à fait. Je me sens un peu franco-algérien, les deux. Je
préfère prendre les deux cultures. La culture que mes parents m’ont donnée et la culture
française que j’ai acquise ici, mais qu’aussi mes parents m’ont donnée. Mes parents, déjà,
ils avaient cette culture française. Mon père était dans la marine française, il était
canonnier; donc il nous a éduqué avec cette double culture avant que je vienne en France.
Donc, les deux se mélangent.377
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Although this person was not born with this “double culture” in the strictest understanding of it,
he believed it to be a significant aspect of his identity. For this informant, and many others, this
“double culture” identity was a beneficial thing, a thing of beauty, and one that they were proud
to hold.
Those informants who professed a “double culture” for themselves tended to argue that it
was a positive thing. One informant stated that they saw the “double culture” as positive because
it allowed the person who proclaimed it access to multiple cultures.378
Similarly, speaking specifically as it relates to food, one informant suggested that the
beauty of the “double culture” was that one could tap into either side when needed and had
access to two of the richest and most varied food cultures in the world. Instead of being
American and “eating hamburgers” all the time, she saw her “double culture” as giving her
access to richness and variation, in diet but also in life.379
While those who professed a “double culture” saw it as beneficial, those who refused this
identity saw it as problematic. Again, it is important to note that these informants, who spoke of
“double culture” and its downfalls did not hold the identity themselves. Instead they projected
the problems with holding a “double cultural” identity on second and third generation
Maghrébine Muslims in France. Although they projected it onto these “others,” my interviews
with second generation Maghrébines in Paris did not reveal that a “double cultural” identity was
something with which these second generation Maghrébines struggled. Moreover, they were not
even speaking about such an issue. It was, in fact, first generation Maghrébines who held both
sides of the “double cultural” identity. Regardless, because my sample size of second generation
Maghrébines was so small, I cannot state that the characteristics and struggles that my
informants spoke of for those holding a “double culture” did not exist. My data merely reveals
that generalisations should not be made about all second generation Maghrébines by the
mainstream French culture, nor the first generation Maghrébines in the larger community.

parents gave me. My parents already, they had this French culture. My father was in the French Marines, he was a
“canonnier”, so he educated us with this double culture before I came to France. So the two mix.”
378
121205_001.
379
121203_006.

113

3.3.1 Characteristics of Double Culture
So what were the characteristics and struggles of the so-called “double cultural” identity? First,
according to my informants, the issue was seen as one of inner turmoil. Identity negotiation can
be a tough task in the best circumstances. When one is faced with two seemingly competing and
strong identities, this can lead to much confusion within oneself. In fact, one informant expressed
the issue as one of disruption. By not knowing which part of your identity is your true identity,
you are left with a disruptive thought process that makes everything else in your life difficult or
disengaged. In fact, this informant suggested that “en finale, de faire partie de deux choses c’est
faire partie de rien.”380 This “double culture” was seen as a “sad” thing, sad to not know who you
are, and it was a reason why many of my informants were glad to “not have this problem.”381
This desire to avoid the problem of not knowing who you are often led these informants
to profess an even stronger Maghrébine identity. Another informant, the only one who claimed a
“double culture” and saw it as problematic, expressed that this “double culture” was something
that needed to be resolved. There was a notion of unrest, or uneasiness with holding to both
sides.
Évidemment, j’ai un problème d’identité à résoudre; enfin que j’arrive à le résoudre…J’ai
accepté de couper la poire en deux. J’ai accepté d’avoir une identité française en France
et une identité tunisienne en Tunisie. Et je n’exporte pas l’une à l’autre.382
Ultimately, this informant argues that it is impossible to hold both sides of the “double cultural”
identity at the same time. While one can hold one side at a particular moment and the other at
another moment, they are seen as foundationally incompatible, impossible to project equally in
the same moment. This is reflected in Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth when he states that the
person “who is Arab and French…if he wants to be sincere with himself, chooses the negation of
one of these two determinations.”383 Another informant suggested that even if one may wish to
hold both sides of this “double culture” identity that person would be viewed by those who hold
strictly to one or the other as not holding either. Like the informant mentioned above who

380

121123_001—“In the end, to be a part of two things is to be a part of nothing.”
121128_001.
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121209_001—“Evidently I have an identity problem to resolve; I finally managed to solve it…I accepted to cut
the pear in two. I accepted to have the French identity in France and a Tunisian identity in Tunisia. And I do not
export one to the other.”
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suggested that to be a part of two things is to be a part of neither, this informant explained to me
that those who hold a “double culture” are viewed as immigrants in both contexts.
Tous les étrangers en France sont nulle part chez eux. Quand on est en France, on est des
étrangers; quand on retourne chez nous, on est des étrangers. On n’est nulle part chez
nous, on est au milieu. Vous voyez? Lorsqu’on arrive par exemple au Maroc, “les
immigré(e)s sont là, ah les immigré(e)s,’’ et quand on arrive en France, “Ah, les
immigré(e)s sont là”....On est tout le temps traités comme immigré(e)s, donc on n’a pas
une place où c’est chez nous.384
This conflict of being labeled an “immigrant” in both contexts, of being stripped of both sides of
the “double culture” identity, is seen as problematic for the informants who spoke of it.
This notion of not being able to find oneself in either side of the “double culture” leads to
the idea that one cannot possibly know who we are when we have two competing identities.
Because of our innate drive to identify ourselves, this process would lead second and third
generation Maghrébines to identify instead with another identity, the only one that clearly made
sense, according to my informants, and that was often Islam. The idea presented here was that
one had such a strong need to identify, but was told from all angles, both interior and exterior,
that one could not identify with either or both national identities. The result? Strong
identification with another identity, usually a religious one.
This was one argument presented to me for why radicalization may be a reality for some
Muslim youth in the banlieues in Paris. According to this argument, the youth are “told” by the
majority French population that they are not French, and yet at the same time are “told” by the
majority Maghrébine population that they are not Maghrébine. The one identity that they are told
they can hold, that they feel an un-negotiated connection to, is their religious identity. In
speaking about the second and third generation Maghrébines in the banlieues of Paris, one
informant explained to me the following:
Après il y a les extrémistes…tu sais comment ils arrivent à les avoir [à leur convaincre de
les joindre]? En fait, ils viennent, ils s’occupent d’eux, ils leurs donnent du travail, ils
leurs promettent des choses. Et bien eux, ils ont trouvé tout simplement: je viens en
France et la France m’a rejeté, elle n’a rien fait pour moi. Pourquoi je n’irais pas vers
eux?385
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121130_001—“All foreigners in France are nowhere at home. When we are in France, we are foreigners, when
we return home we are foreigners. We are nowhere at home, we are in the middle. You see? When we arrive in
for example Morocco, “the immigrants are here, ah the immigrants”, and when we arrive in France, “ah, the
immigrants are here”…We are always treated like immigrants, so we do not have a place that is our home.”
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121201_002—“After there are the extremists…do you know how they manage to have them [to convince the
youth to join them]? In fact, they come, they take care of them, they give them work, they promise them things.
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They claim Muslim identity to be part of something.386 The need to identify, to understand
oneself in relation to others is essential, especially in one’s youth, and this conflict of not
knowing one side of a “double culture” but trying to hold to both may lead to a potentially
stronger religious identity. In fact, one informant explained that extreme religious factions, like
the Muslim brotherhood, will take advantage of this need for identity in many of these newer
generation youth, and will draw them in, solely because they can offer a clear identity, a clear
community, and a clear understanding of one’s role amidst the majority population that
surrounds them.387
It is because of the potential fragility of a “double culture” that many of my informants
hold one or the other identity, French or Maghrébine. While some argued for the potential of
conflicted identities leading to more extreme expressions of religiosity, most of my informants
would not claim this type of religious identity but would profess something that I am calling
“cultural Muslim” identity. It is to that topic that I turn next.
3.4 “J’ai une culture musulmane”388: Cultural Muslims in Paris
One of the main parameters of my study was that my informants would hold some notion of
Muslim identity. They had to claim Maghrébine identity in some way, but they also had to claim
Muslim identity to some degree. As I presented in Chapter 1, how one claimed this religious
identity varied drastically across my data set, but all stated at some point in their interview that
they were “Muslim” in some way. While other scholars, or even individuals within the
community, may argue that there are specific characteristics or actions that one must have to be
labeled as Muslim, my only restriction was that the informants saw themselves as Muslim to
some degree. As I explained in Chapter 1, Ahmed in his work What is Islam takes issue with this
“Whatever-Muslims-Say-It-Is” definition of Islam.389 While I agree with Ahmed, that suggesting
that “whatever-Muslims-say-it-is” leads to problems in terms of defining Islam, I was not
And well, in the end they find themselves simply, “I come to France and France rejects me, she does nothing for
me, why wouldn’t I go toward them?”
386
121123_001—“A bit to say ‘I am part of something.’”
387
121202_004.
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121128_001—“I have a Muslim culture.”
389
Ahmed, What is Islam, 266-270.
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seeking a definition of Islam from my informants. Instead I was allowing them to define
themselves as Muslim, in whatever way was meaningful to them. In agreement with Ahmed, I
argue that “whatever and however differently Islam may mean to Muslims, to all Muslims Islam
is meaningful.”390 That being Muslim, whatever that may denote, was a meaningful identity to
my informants was my only requirement for inclusion in my study. This requirement led to an
intriguing self-understanding held by some of my informants: that of “cultural Muslim identity.”
In fact, 12 of my 33 informants (over one third) classified their Muslim identity as a “cultural”
one.
3.4.1 Cultural Islam: Definition
Before exploring what these 12 informants said about their Muslim identity, I present what it is
that I mean by “cultural Muslims,” and how someone fits into this category. First, it is vital to
address the problematic nature of categorization, and the separation of “cultural Muslim” identity
from “religious Muslim” identity. Again, I turn to Ahmed’s What is Islam to address the
criticism of this approach. Ahmed suggests that breaking apart religion and culture into separate
categories, as Hodgson does in his The Venture of Islam,391 is problematic because it assumes
that there is a thing that is “true” Islam, the religion, while other, usually understood cultural
manifestations are somehow less authentically ‘Islam.’392 He also suggests that by organizing
phenomena in binary ways such as this we miss out on the “human and historical phenomenon of
Islam.”393 I argue that by choosing to try to separate out this category, and showing the incredible
variation within all categories that we may as scholars try to impose on our informants, it is my
intention in fact to draw attention to the “human and historical phenomenon of Islam.”394
Furthermore, by focussing on these “cultural manifestations” or “cultural identities” I show how
these informants’ enactment of Islam is no less authentic than those who label themselves as
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Ibid., 249.
Hodgson uses three separate terms where Ahmed uses one. Broadly speaking, for Hodgson, Islam = religion,
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“religious” Muslims. I do acknowledge that in any attempt to categorize, to place people within a
particular understanding of a given phenomenon, that I am guilty of trying to determine the
bounds of the concentrate of Islam present in my informants’ experience.395
My understanding of who is a “cultural Muslim” or what it means to be “culturally
Muslim” comes largely from my informants who labeled themselves as such. For example, one
informant, in response to my question about identity, responded:
Je suis une femme, je suis Algérienne et je suis de culture musulmane. Je ne me considère
pas comme croyante religieuse, mais inévitablement j’ai une culture musulmane, vu que
j’ai grandi dans un milieu complètement religieux.396
This informant went on to explain that while she identified much more closely with her Muslim
identity as a religious one in Algeria, once she came to France and had distance from her family
and the religious milieu, she saw it more as a cultural identity. This Muslim culture for her was
often dependent on one’s traditions. In the words of another informant: “Oui, je suis musulman,
oui. Je le sens, mais c’est plus par mimétisme, par tradition, par habitude.”397 From these
examples it became clear to me that there was a specific identity at work that I needed to explore.
At first glance I thought that this identity might have something to do with the oftenmade distinction between “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslims; no matter how
complicated this distinction may be considering the various definitions of practice and nonpractice. I questioned whether the label of “cultural Muslim” was something someone used to
replace the label of “non-practicing Muslim.” By examining the responses of my informants,
particularly in relationship to their practice, it became clear that these were in fact two separate
aspects of their identities. One could be a “practicing” cultural Muslim or a “non-practicing”
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cultural Muslim; so practicing versus non-practicing could be a subset of this overarching
identity of “cultural Islam.” Non-practice was not the hinge on which this identity rested.
In fact, for most of my “cultural Muslims” it was practice that was the evidence of their
Muslim identity, in place of creed or belief or belonging. Those informants who had some
“religious” practice in which they would continue to engage did so because of cultural reasons,
not religious ones, where religious refers to a sense of personal piety.398 For example, they did so
because they wanted to maintain tradition or connection to homeland, because it was habit,
etcetera. The evidence of their “cultural Islamic” identity was often a specific action that they
took. For example, the informant above, who expressed being Muslim by tradition, explained to
me that he was not practicing and yet he did practice Ramadan. It was basically based on this
practice alone that his Muslim identity rested. He explained:
Je fais le ramadan par exemple. En même temps, je ne fais pas la prière, je bois de
l’alcool, je mange du porc, etcetera. Mais je me sens quand même musulman. Même si je
ne pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman. C’est dans une notion un peu
culturelle et aussi d’un point de vue de religion et aussi d’un point de vue culturel, mais
culturellement musulman.399
Ramadan was seemingly the only distinguishing thing about this informant’s practice or
behaviour that made him “Muslim.”
What distinguished the “cultural Muslims” from “religious Muslims” seemed to be the
intention behind the action. If the intention behind the action or identity was because of tradition
or culture, and not because of some deep-seated conviction, belief or religious understanding,
then it was often a good example of cultural commitment rather than religious commitment for
my informants. These informants still feel Muslim, but they simply have a different intention
behind this identity than someone who feels Muslim because of personal piety reasons. One
informant described this as follows:
En fait, je suis musulmane, mais pas dans le fond de la religion…C’est-à-dire que,
comment expliquer ça? C’est, je me sens musulmane dans les sens où, dans ma culture,
dans mon entourage, dans ma façon aussi de pratiquer, [en]fin, de pratiquer les fêtes par
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exemple, je peux fêter une fête musulmane. Donc, je peux [me] sentir [musulmane], mais
après, je peux passer de l’autre côté sans aucun problème.400
This woman celebrates Muslim festivals and holidays because of a cultural identification with
these things, not a traditionally understood religious one. As she explains, it is because it is
cultural and not religious that she can easily move to the other side (understood as the nonMuslim way of life/identity) with ease.
These kinds of engagements with Islam reveal how complicated it can be to define what
is religion and what is culture. For these 12 informants who considered themselves “cultural
Muslims” they still very much functioned within common understandings of “religion.”401 In
fact, I am not trying here to suggest that these informants were not “pure” Muslims, or
“authentic” Muslims, or not fully engaged with Islam as such, and only Islamicate.402 I am
simply trying to present the self-understanding that was presented to me in the field by these 12
people.403
Ultimately, because religious conviction was not behind these informants’ identity, this
way of imagining oneself in the world allowed for a greater flexibility in practice and processes
of identity for them. There was a greater degree of picking and choosing which aspects of one’s
identity to live out for these cultural Muslims than for more, traditionally understood, religious
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Muslims.404 Partaking in Ramadan was the most consistent, “cultural” practice engaged in by
“cultural Muslims,” but even that would be absent for some. Basically, the cultural Muslim
would rely on whatever practice, belief, or behaviour that represented their culture the most to
them; that meaningfully represented their own understanding of Islam. For most of these socalled cultural Muslims it was a food practice or set of food practices that was the clearest
representation of their Muslim identity.
3.5 The Role of Food in Identity Negotiations for Maghrébine Muslims in Paris405
Food plays a significant role in identity formation. It aides in solidarity and separation and thus
clearly defines the in group from the out group. In fact, “anthropological work has produced a
broad consensus that food is about commensality—eating to make friends—and competition—
eating to make enemies.”406 Eugene Anderson in his work Everyone Eats, notes that the word
companion comes from the Latin word for “bread sharer”; those with whom we eat are those
with whom we are close.407 Furthermore, Mary Douglas presents a hierarchy of food experience
and intimacy,408 showing that it is foundationally through food practice that boundaries are
constructed within and between groups.409 If this is the case, in an immigrant context this may
lead certain groups to invite or exclude others to eat with them in a statement about who is “in”
and who is “out” of the realm of intimacy. Douglas suggests that the various ways that we
interact with one another around food reveals a great deal about our social relationships. It is in
the distinction between meals and drinks where this becomes evident. She states that
drinks are for strangers, acquaintances, workmen, and family. Meals are for family, close
friends, honoured guests. The grand operator of the system is the line between intimacy
404
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and distance. Those we know at meals we also know at drinks. The meal expresses close
friendship. Those we only know at drinks we know less intimately.410
Similarly, Miller, Rozin and Fiske suggest that food sharing indicates a relationship that is
personal rather than professional.411 Markedly, 19 of my Paris 33 interviews (58 percent) were
conducted over drinks (coffee, tea, wine, etc.), nine had no consumption involved at all (27
percent), two were over drinks and sweets (six percent), two over a meal at a restaurant (6
percent), and only one over a meal at the informant’s home (3 percent). This general lack of
invitation to partake in a meal with my informants often felt like a message, along the lines of
Douglas’ distinction above, that I was not included in the intimate group. As time went on, and I
gained some level of bread-sharer status, I began to receive dinner invitations, but these were
still mostly limited to meals located outside of the informant’s home. By the end of my
fieldwork, I had eaten in the homes of only five of my informants - a dramatic difference from
my experience in Montréal which I address in the Montréal case study chapters.
3.5.1 Food and Muslim Identity
Beyond stating that I was not a member of the in-group through the kinds of consumption
experiences I was invited to be a part of, my informants also clearly stated what made them a
part of that group through what or how they ate. Beyond the simple statement about one’s
predilection for pork or not, the informants in my study would speak about alcohol, halal meat
and the fast of Ramadan when addressing what makes them Muslim. In response to the interview
question about Muslim identity, about what practices and/or beliefs are indicative of Muslim
religion or culture,412 every single one of my 33 informants made some mention of food or a
food practice as indicative and foundational to their Muslim identity. While not everyone spoke
about daily prayer, alms giving, or even a basic belief in God and Muhammad, every single
informant either spoke about fasting, halal, pork or alcohol and often all four. For example, one

410

Douglas, “Deciphering,” 66.
Lisa Miller, Paul Rozin, and Alan Page Fiske, “Food Sharing and Feeding Another Person Suggest Intimacy: Two
Studies of American College Students,” European Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 28, no. 3 (1998): 423-236.
412
The question that I asked was “Je suppose que vous êtes musulman/e. Est-ce correct? [Yes; if No, the interview
possibly ends, but sometimes a “No” can really mean “I’m not a good Muslim,” so a few other questions can be
asked to tease out a proper response]. Pourriez-vous me parler du type d'Islam que vous pratiquez? Qu’est-ce que
ça veut dire d’être musulman(e)?” (I suppose that you are Muslim. Is that correct? Could you speak to me about
the kind of Islam that you practice? What does it mean to be Muslim?).
411

122

young woman said to me “je suis musulmane, je suis née musulmane, je fais le ramadan, oui,
mais pas la prière.”413 Similarly, another informant answered the question of what it means to be
Muslim, or how she shows that she is Muslim, with the following response: “je ne suis pas
pratiquante. Je ne fais pas la prière. Je fais le carême mais c’est plus par tradition. Je fais ma
religion. Je ne mange pas du porc. Je bois de l’alcool.”414 When I asked another informant if she
felt Muslim, in spite of not practicing, she responded as follows:
Oui, oui, parce que je fais, par exemple, le ramadan. Ça je le fais parce que, pour moi,
c’est important. Je ne conçois pas de ne pas le faire. Par contre, faire les prières tous les
jours, non, parce que je ne [les] connais pas et je ne cherche pas trop. Mais ce que je peux
faire, je le fais: le ramadan et je ne mange pas de porc.415
A food practice, often Ramadan, is the base on which their Muslim identities rested.
Consumption practices seem to act as an important means of self-identification for many
immigrants.
Ethnic/religious identity hinges on a food practice. The problem arises that, if the nonMuslim French population see a representation of religious identity in the food that Muslims in
France eat, this could cause a potentially difficult setback for Muslims who are also trying to
claim French identities. The notion of being French first and not having visible identities other
than French identity are foundational for the French understanding of who can and cannot be
French.416 If Muslims are eating halal meat, which is inevitably seen as a religious food practice,
this may be seen as an affront to secular understandings of how to live one’s life in France. Food
as a religious or ethnic identity marker can hinder the integration process into French identity.417
It may hinder it because if Muslim immigrants in France refuse to consume food that is seen as
central to French identity, i.e. wine and pork, it may be questioned how they can possibly
integrate fully into that identity. One informant expressed the centrality of food to French
413
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do not eat pork. I drink alcohol.”
415
121129_001—“Yes, yes, because I do, for example, Ramadan. That I do because, for me, it’s important. I cannot
conceive to not do it. On the other hand, do the prayers every day? No, because I do not know them and I don’t
look too far to. But what I can do, I do. So, Ramadan, and I don’t eat pork.”
416
For discussions about French notions of identity and laïcité, especially in relation to Muslims in France, see
Bowen, Why the French don’t like Headscarves; Bowen “Does French Islam Have Borders?”; Fetzer and Soper,
Muslims and the State.
417
It can also aid integration. One only needs to think of the many Maghrébine dishes which French people
incorporate into their own culinary preferences. By consuming couscous, tajine, Moroccan mint tea, etcetera, the
French may be prompted to view these “foreigners” as French.
414
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identity when she expressed to me that “la France c’est vin, fromage et baguette. Je mange que la
baguette. Donc voilà. Je ne suis pas vraiment Française, Française.”418 As I argued in Chapter 2
of this work, Marion Demossier in her work Wine Drinking Culture in France suggests that wine
is so intertwined with French identity that to not drink wine firmly places one as an outsider.419
Another of my informants expressed this very feeling to me:
En France, l’alcool c’est une mode de vie. Il fait partie de la culture. Quand on va chez
quelqu’un on emmène une bouteille de vin que l’on va choisir. On n’emmène pas de pot
de fleurs, on emmène du vin; on n’emmène pas de gâteau, pas de chocolat sauf si la
femme est enceinte. On emmène une bouteille de vin que l’on va ouvrir, que l’on va
partager…quand on ne boit pas d’alcool, on n’a pas accès à certain plaisirs purement
français.420
How can Muslims, then, at least those who do not drink wine, the product of the French ground
and culture, claim this identity?
3.5.2 Akhtar’s Four Categories of Identity Negotiation
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in order to explore the various responses to
identity negotiation that were present for my informants I use the fourfold typology presented by
Salman Akhtar in his 2011 work Immigration and Acculturation as a framing tool.421 The four
immigrant identities that he presents are the (1) ethnocentric identity, (2) hyperassimilated
identity, (3) alienated identity, and (4) bicultural identity.422 Like any typology there are no
418

120905_001—“France is wine, cheese and baguette. I eat only the baguette. So there you go. I am not really
French, French.”
419
Demossier, Wine Drinking Culture in France, 27-29.
420
121206_001—“In France, alcohol is a way of life. It is part of the culture. When we go to someone’s house we
bring a bottle of wine that we will choose. We do not bring a pot of flowers, we bring wine; we do not bring a cake,
no chocolate, unless the woman is pregnant. We bring a bottle of wine that we will open, and that we will
share…When we do not drink alcohol, we do not have access to certain purely French pleasures.”
421
Akhtar, Immigration and Acculturation.
422
We find similar categories for the experience of migrants in Peggy Levitt, God Needs No Passport, Immigrants
and the Changing American Religious Landscape (New York: The New Press, 2007). While Levitt posits six national
responses that religious migrants can take (American, Homeland, Ethnic National, Dual National, Cosmopolitan,
Religious Global Citizens) in the host context only a couple overlap with Akhtar’s categories here. For example,
Levitt’s “American,” what I will in the conclusion call “hostland” identity, overlaps with Akhtar’s hyperassimilated
identity. Her “Homeland” identity equates to Akhtar’s “ethnocentric” and her “Dual National” equates to Akhtar’s
“Bi-cultural” identity negotiation. Levitt does not present a category that fits with Akhtar’s alienated identity.
Derek S. Hicks, “An Unusual Feast: Gumbo and the Complex Brew of Black Religion,” in Religion, Food & Eating in
North America, eds. Benjamin E. Zeller, Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson and Nora L. Rubel (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2014), 134-153, also presents the ways that foodways communicate messages about cultural
identity in three ways: the migrant can 1) focus on the host context identity and reject the home; (2) aggressively
maintain traditional foodways; (3) blend the two (Hicks, “Unusual Feast,” 145). These reflect three of the four
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perfect examples of any of these identity types and most of my informants would have
characteristics of all four of these categories. Most of the informants did generally fall in line
with at least one of the four categories, most often Akhtar’s second and fourth categories. I now
present each of his categories in turn and show how food plays a foundational role in identity
negotiations for my informants.
3.5.2.1 Akhtar’s Ethnocentric Identity
Akhtar’s first category is that of “ethnocentric identity.” This term encapsulates people who
emphasize their ethnic/religious identity in their immigrant location, often more so than they did
“au bled” (in the homeland). When one finds oneself in an unfamiliar context it is not unusual to
hold to the familiar more strongly. Religious and ethnic practices may be emphasized in the
beginning as a way to maintain feelings of connection to the homeland, and if continued can lead
to communalistic trends. What may start as a simple search for the familiar can lead to separate
communities formed by people who speak only with other Maghrébines, only in Arabic, who
shop only at halal butcher shops and who eat only traditional North African food.
In relation to food, then, ethnocentric identities are represented by heightened
ethnic/religious food practices. Here the immigrant would cook mostly food from the home
location, in religiously prescribed ways. As Akhtar states, in restaurants “things that were
familiar and beloved are nowhere to be found while tabooed items dance proudly on the menu’s
floor. Waking up from such culinary nightmare, the immigrant rushes to an ethnic restaurant that
serves food familiar to him.”423
While many of my informants spoke about this sort of identity consolidation process
happening for others, specifically those Muslims who live in communities in the banlieues, my
data set itself did not provide many examples of this sort of extreme ethnic maintenance
response; nevertheless, many of the informants would eat at ethnically-run restaurants when they
were feeling homesick and were looking for transnational connection. For example, one
informant stated that eating at an ethnically-run restaurant allowed him to maintain “repères”424

identity consolidation processes presented by Akhtar here. (1) is the hyperassimilated identity, (2) is the
ethnocentric identity, (3) is the bicultural identity. Again, there is no equivalent to Akhtar’s “alienated” identity in
Hicks’ work.
423
Akhtar, Immigration, 96.
424
121205_002—“Moorings.”
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with which he could understand himself. Using this word in particular reveals how food grounds
an ethnocentric identity.
Many of my informants expressed an increase in religious and ethnic food practices in the
host location—that is, ethnocentric food practice became more prominent in France than in the
Maghreb in some cases. This was evident in relation to the practice of eating halal food. A few
informants expressed that it was in France that they learned what halal food was, and as a result
it was in France that this practice became even more important than in the Maghreb. Although
this practice was unknown to the informants back home in the Maghreb, it still became affiliated
with Maghrébine/Muslim practice and one’s engagement in that practice, becoming an example
of an “ethnocentric” practice and identity.
While many of the informants in my study had subtle moments of emphasis on
ethnocentric identity, it was more in my interactions with people at the mosque where this sort of
identity consolidation process was evident. In speaking with some of the community members
there, as well as with some of the leadership, emphasis was placed on eating only halal and only
North African dishes. The notion of eating pork or drinking wine was seen as an example of
French people’s general character of excess and immorality, and maintaining religious food
practices was thus essential in showing how they were different from the indulgent French. It
was crucial in creating boundaries that marked Maghrébine identity as separate.
3.5.2.2 Akhtar’s Hyperassimilated Identity
Akhtar’s second category of “hyperassimilated identity” was clearly represented in my
interviews. While the notion of assimilation or integration carries a great deal of negative
connotation for many of the people in the communities which I study, the idea of adapting one’s
identity and practice in the host location, to become more French, is common. Scholars of
Muslim communities in France such as John R. Bowen and Jocelyne Cesari suggest that in many
instances assimilation is judged by the degree to which immigrants lose their culturally-specific
behaviours and blend into the French model.425 Whether being categorized as “practicing versus
believing” or “good versus bad” Muslim, Maghrébine immigrants are often judged by the host
society and by themselves based on which practices they leave behind.

425

Bowen, Why the French don’t like Headscarves; Cesari and McLoughlin, European Muslims.
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In the French context where food and drink are central to national identity, these elements
are one avenue that immigrants can use to show their assimilated, integrated identity. Hence,
“hyperassimilated” immigrants would reject their home food and would take up eating the host
nation’s food. In comparison to ethnocentric identity types who may eat 85 percent Maghrébine
food and maintain religious food practices, these “hyperassimilated” immigrants would eat 85
percent French food and often leave religious food practices behind. For example, in an
interview with one young woman she expressed the following opinion to me: “En Tunisie, je ne
recherche pas à manger de porc, de foie gras, je mange ce qu’il y a; je m’adapte. Mais en France,
c’est vrai, j’ai un comportement, des habitudes françaises, on va dire.”426 In this she suggested
that adaptation to the cultural setting on all levels was important; one assimilates to either side
when one finds oneself in a context with a particular culinary approach. She went on to explain
that she prepares mostly French fare when in France. Another woman whom I interviewed drank
alcohol (champagne specifically), ate pork, did not necessarily eat halal meat and generally
cooked European dishes at home. In this she was able to show that she was just like everyone
else, even though she stated that “la société française me renvoie l’idée que je ne suis pas
Française.”427 While the “hyperassimilated” immigrant may emphasize French modes of eating,
some cultural/religious food practices are still kept, usually depending on the situation and
community one finds oneself in.
3.5.2.3 Akhtar’s Alienated Identity
The third category of identity consolidation in Akhtar’s typology is that of the “alienated
identity.” This type of immigrant neither identifies with the home or host identity.428 They feel
lost in between. One may find the “alienated” identity in the experience of very recent
immigrants: those immigrants who have just arrived in the host land and are trying to negotiate
on what end of the spectrum of assimilation and ethnocentrism they are going to fall on.
Furthermore, this “alienated” identity negotiation may be found in those individuals who do not
want to be identified with their home culture because of experiences of prejudice against those
cultures, and yet cannot, or do not want to, identify with the host culture.
426

121209_001—“In Tunisia, I do not look to eat pork, foie gras, I eat what there is; I adapt. But in France, it’s true I
have a behaviour, shall we call it, French habits.”
427
121203_006—“The French society sends me the idea that I am not French.”
428
Akhtar, Immigration, 192.
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One young woman whom I interviewed was a good example of this identity negotiation.
On the one hand, she could not imagine eating pork, or leaving many of her religious and
cultural food practices aside; she could not identify as fully French. On the other hand, she was
also hesitant about putting extreme emphasis on the Maghrébine Muslim food practice and this
expression of identity because she saw many of her compatriots as “too extreme”429 and
consequently feeding into the prejudicial approach to this community in France. She felt like she
could not identify with her home or host culture and as a result was left in what Akhtar would
call an “alienated” space, not sure what or how to identify herself.
While this young woman personally expressed a desire to not identify with either
Akhtar’s “ethnocentric” or “hyperassimilated” identities, this “alienated identity” was often one
placed on other members of the Maghrébine Muslim community in Paris by my informants.
Informants would express that while it is not an identity that they held, they did see many socalled alienated people in the community. This identity was often placed on second and third
generation Maghrébine Muslims, who could not really claim French identity because of being
othered by non-Muslim French, and yet at the same time could not really claim Maghrébine
identity because of being othered by Maghrébines in the Maghreb.
A few of the informants in the study noted that because these (other) people were stuck
between two identities, they would struggle with which practices to engage in. Tension would
arise in debates regarding the consumption of halal products and drinking alcohol most
prominently. The “double culture” identifiers would try to find a place in both the French and the
Maghrébine cultures that surrounded them, often making them feel unable to claim either.
While some people remained in this “alienated identity” state for long periods of time,
many people in this circumstance latched more strongly onto the Muslim identity; the only
identity which these second and third generation Maghrébines felt that they could undoubtedly
claim. This would then lead to large groups who would find themselves in the “ethnocentric
identity” category, but specifically as it relates to their Muslim identity. Food practices such as
keeping halal, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and fasting for Ramadan, become important
for these previously “alienated” identifiers, even more so than those who hold the “ethnocentric
identity” from the beginning.

429

120905_001.
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3.5.2.4 Akhtar’s Bicultural Identity
Immigrants who embrace both sides of a possible hyphenated identity represent Akhbar’s fourth
category: “bicultural identity.” They embrace beliefs and practices of both home and host
country. While the alienated immigrant is one who is conflicted by their bi- or double cultural
identity, the bicultural immigrant according to Akhtar is one who is comfortable on both sides of
their identity.430 For these informants, they were both fully French and fully
Muslim/Maghrébine, again acknowledging that for them these terms were often interchangeable.
Even for those of my informants who saw themselves as only Maghrébine, the food
practices in which these immigrants engage represent an admixture of loyalties to two cultures. I
interviewed Maghrébine Muslims who called themselves Muslims, who practiced the Ramadan
fast, but who would also eat pork and drink alcohol. I interviewed Maghrébine Muslims who
would state that they are not really Muslim but at the same time would not eat pork and not drink
alcohol amidst friends and colleagues who would. A multifaceted case was presented by a man
who stated: “je consomme uniquement et exclusivement de la viande halal,”431 and yet, in the
same breath, emphasized his desire to eat French fare. In fact, he opened a restaurant that makes
high end, traditional French food. He explained that he opened the restaurant because of
les frustrations que j’ai eues autant que musulman qui mange halal: ne pas pouvoir manger
français, la cuisine française, alors que j’ai grandi en France, je m’ai baigné en France, j’ai
une culture française. Le fait de ne pas pouvoir manger français c’était la frustration, ce
que j’appelais gastronomique. La discrimination gastronomique…maintenant on n’est plus
discriminé. On peut manger français, on peut manger du foie, on peut manger du magret
de canard, tout le temps respectant sa religion.432
While this “bi-cultural” Muslim maintained his practice of eating halal, but halal French food,
for most of the immigrants with whom I spoke who fit in this category, the idea of keeping halal
seemed to be the most flexible of food practices; it was the most easily left behind. Many would
buy halal meat for their homes, but not restrain themselves to only eating halal meat when they
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For this chapter, I use Akhtar’s “bicultural” label although I prefer to call this identity negotiation process
“transnational” and discuss my use of this term in Chapter 7.
431
121031_001—“I eat uniquely and exclusively halal meat.”
432
121031_001—“The frustrations that I had as a Muslim who eats halal who was not able to eat French, French
cuisine, even though I grew up in France, I bathed in France, I have a French culture, but the fact to not be able to
eat French, that was the frustration. I call that gastronomical discrimination. But now we are not discriminated
[against]. We can eat French. We can eat liver pâté. We can eat duck cutlet, all the while respecting one’s religion.”
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were at school or work or out for dinner with friends. For example, one woman I interviewed
expressed the following:
On ne mange pas le porc. Voilà. Nous ne mangeons pas le porc. Voilà, c’est tout. Si non,
mais… uh … en général on mange de la viande halal. Mais des fois, par exemple, surtout
au travail, des fois ça m’arrive d’aller manger au Macdo [McDonald’s]. Macdo…la
viande… ce n’est pas halal. Voilà.433
Others would reject halal completely, suggesting that it did not matter to them in their new
immigrant location at all. For example, one woman said to me, “alors, je m’en fous de la viande
halal…peut être que j’ai plus de respect pour ma dernière paire de chaussettes misent en panier
de linge sale; non, je m’en fous, mais royalement.”434
These adjustments in ethnic/religious food practice are evident for people who label
themselves, in one form or another, cultural Muslims. One of these Muslims expressed to me
that he did not believe in God necessarily but still saw himself as a culturally Muslim Algerian
French man. When explaining some of his practices to me he stated that, to not shock certain
family members or friends he would practice the fast for the month of Ramadan. He expressed
that,
traditionnellement, je ne mange pas du porc, par exemple. Uh, l’alcool, je bois de l’alcool.
Pas de porc, pas de, les vrais interdits c’est ça, c’est le porc, c’est les viandes qui n’ont pas
été, comment dire? Si j’ai le choix entre la viande halal et pas de viande halal, je prendrais
la viande halal. Malheureusement, on n’a pas toujours le choix.435
The complexity of practice and understanding of identity is made clear in the aforementioned
example. Furthermore, the woman who cared less about halal than she did about her dirty socks
told me that she generally bought halal food and would prepare traditional Maghrébine dishes at
home, but would also eat pork even if she did not like it. She expressed some of her double
culture in the following way:
Je n’aime pas le porc. J’aime pas la charcuterie. Mais je mange du porc…. Ça me
dérange pas. Pour moi c’est comme, uh, les épinards. Je mange pas les épinards parce que
j’aime pas les épinards, mais si je suis bloqué sur une île déserte avec une boîte
d’épinards, je vais manger des épinards. C’est pareil pour le porc. Quand je suis invitée
433

121006_002—“We don’t eat pork. There you go, that’s it. But um, in general we eat halal meat. But there are
times, for example mostly at work, there have been times where I went to eat at McDonald’s. McDonald’s … the
meat is not halal. There you go.”
434
121203_006—“I don’t care at all about halal meat, it’s possible that I have more respect for my last pair of socks
that I put in the dirty laundry basket. No, really, I don’t care at all.”
435
121202_004—“Traditionally I do not eat pork, for example. Alcohol, I drink alcohol (...) if I have the choice
between halal meat and non-halal meat I take the halal meat, but unfortunately we don’t always have the choice.”
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chez les gens qui ne savent pas que je suis musulmane, et qui pensent qui vont m’offrir à
manger, qui m’offrent un plat avec du porc, je vais pas leurs dire « non, non, je mange
pas [ça]. » Non, je le mange, mais j’aime pas trop ça, mais je le mange.436
To not differentiate herself from those around her, to not cause offense, even if she genuinely did
not like the meat, she would eat it all the same.
These last two examples may be seen as concrete examples of what Mohammed ElBachouti calls “bounded creativity.”437 El-Bachouti explains that the immigrant is “truly free to
choose their actions, but they select one action versus another to mitigate conflict in the host
country.”438 Another informant demonstrated this notion of bounded creativity when he
explained to me that he eats halal at home but not at work as he does not want to cause a
problem. He explained: “Je mange ce qu’il y à manger, je l’accepte, et voilà.”439 Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants in France may choose particular food actions that help to mitigate the
conflict of identity that they themselves are experiencing, or to mitigate the conflict that those
within the larger French culture may suggest is inevitable if the Maghrébine immigrant does not
eat “French food.” The so-called bi-cultural Maghrébine Muslim immigrant may be especially
suited to engage in these selections, having some creativity in action but with some boundaries of
identity in place.
What became clear from many of the interviews with individuals, who felt like they had a
double culture, was that they would emphasize certain practices with certain people and other
practices with other people. When with practicing Muslim friends or family, and often when
home in the Maghreb, they would keep halal, not eat pork, not consume alcohol, fast during
Ramadan, etcetera. But when they were with non-Muslim French friends they might leave their
more traditional practices aside to drink “un verre avec des amis”440 or to taste “une bonne
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121203_006—“I don’t like pork. I don’t like cured meats, but I eat pork, if I have access to eat it, I eat pork. It
doesn’t bother me. For me it is like spinach. I don’t eat spinach because I don’t like spinach but if I was on a desert
island with a box of spinach I am going to eat spinach. It’s the same for pork. When I am invited to people’s houses
who do not know that I am Muslim and they are going to offer me something to eat, who offer me a dish with
pork, I am not going to say to them ‘no, no I don’t eat that.’ No, I eat it, but I don’t like it very much, but I eat it.”
437
Mohammed El-Bachouti, “Individualization of Muslim Religious Practices: Contextual Creativity of SecondGeneration Moroccans in Spain,” in Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe: Consumption and Aesthetics, ed.
Erkan Toguslu (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015), 98, 108.
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El-Bachouti, “Individualization,” 108.
439
121130_001—“I eat what there is to eat, I accept it and, there you go!”
440
Drink a glass [understood of some form of alcohol] with friends.

131

choucroute”441 (typically mixed with sausages). It becomes clear that food practice and
consumption can act as another lens with which to examine immigrant identity negotiation and
maintenance.442
3.6 Conclusion
It is impossible to speak of a single Maghrébine Muslim identity that emerged in Paris. Every
individual expressed their identity in a unique way, emphasizing certain aspects over others, and
reflective of each informant’s distinctive history and context. In this chapter I explored the
various identity categories that emerged for my informants in Paris. First, I presented an
overview of the various identity claims that my informants made in Paris. In this I showed how
the kinds of identity claims that my informants made either instinctively or after some
exploration were incredibly varied.
I then addressed some of the identities present for the informants of my study. In this, I
looked at the idea of a “born Muslim” identity. Here my informants explained how someone
could hold an identity based purely on the circumstances of his/her birth. One was “born
Muslim” because one was born in one of the countries of the Maghreb and into Muslim cultures
and contexts from which one could not escape. I suggested that if religious identity could be
argued to be a “born” identity, much like race, or ethnicity, it might be seen as more difficult to
change than is generally argued for religious identity. This led into a discussion of who is
actually able to claim any given identity. In this my informants suggested that even if one wanted
to claim a particular identity, usually French, because of various factors, including one’s

441

Taste a good sauerkraut—which, in France, can come “garnished” with sausages.
While Akhtar’s categories were helpful for thinking through the various ways that my Parisian informants
negotiated their identities in Paris, there are a few critiques that I have of his typology. First, his work is principally
focused on youth, whereas I argue that these kinds of identity negotiations are happening for all ages of
immigrants. This is not just a matter of regular identity processes that any youth might undergo, but about the set
of challenges to and experiences of identity for the immigrant individual, no matter their age. Second, Akhtar’s
four categories do not quite cover the range of experience that immigrants have in relation to identity negotiation.
Here I believe that Peggy Levitt’s six categories are closer to covering the wide array of perspectives and
approaches taken by immigrants in their identity negotiation and presentation (Levitt, God Needs no Passport, 7083). I find this to be especially the case in relationship to her “Cosmopolitan” category. I had two informants who
expressed this kind of identity and others whose food practices would have been reflective of it as well, that I
could not present here with Akhtar’s typology.
442
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appearance or name, that identity may not be open to that individual. Not just anyone could “be
French.”
An exploration of what it meant to “be French” according to my informants followed. For
many of my informants, the primary way of understanding what it meant to “be French” was to
distinguish between French citizenship and French nationality. One who had French citizenship
could not immediately claim French identity according to my informants. Instead French ethnic
nationality, which was seen as encompassing more than just legal citizenship, was the base of
“French” identity.
Next, I explored the idea of “double culture”; that people see themselves as holding both
French and Maghrébine (Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian) identity. Informants who held this
“double cultural” identity seemed to use it as a means of understanding their transnational
identity experiences, or to justify the actions of other transnational identifiers that may act in
strange ways. Those who held the identity for themselves tended to see it as a positive thing,
offering a great deal of culture to one’s life, and flavour since one would have access to both
food cultures. Those who refused this double culture and placed it on others, usually second and
third generation Maghrébine youth, saw it as a problematic identity to hold, arguing that it would
lead to confusion of identity and thus could possibly lead to more extreme religious
identification.
The next subsection concentrated on the category of “cultural Muslims” that arose in my
data in Paris. This identity label was not just a new way of addressing the often-imposed
categories of “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslims, as this identity often relied on practice
of one form or another to illustrate that it was present. Instead, the defining characteristic of a
“cultural Muslim” identity seemed to be one of intention. If the intention behind the action or
identity was because of tradition or culture, and not because of some deep-seated conviction,
belief or religious understanding, then it was often a good example of cultural commitment
rather than religious commitment. These informants still feel Muslim, but they simply have a
different intention behind this identity than someone who feels Muslim because of clearly
“religious” reasons. In this section I showed how religious food practice was often the clearest
evidence of this identity for my informants.
This led me into a discussion of the role of food in identity in general for my informants
in Paris. I showed how food practice was an essential representation of my informants’ various
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identities. First, I explored the role of food in Muslim identity in general for my informants and
found that food was often the crux on which their religious identities lay. It was the most
important and most often practiced religious tradition that my informants engaged in.
I have stressed the importance of one kind of everyday practice, namely food, in one’s
daily experience and consequent identity over and over in this work. This chapter shows just how
essential food is to the identity negotiations and integration processes of a group of Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants in Paris. Food serves as a foundational representation of my informants’
identities, both communal and individual, in the City of Lights. What and how one eats firmly
place an individual within a particular identity group and helps that person come to some clear
understanding of his/herself in light of conflicting identity groups.
Through an exploration of Salman Akhtar’s fourfold typology of immigrant identity
negotiation, I showed how members of my informant group placed themselves within this
typology based on what they did or did not consume. In this I discussed the role that food plays
for (1) ethnocentric, (2) hyperassimilated, (3) alienated, and (4) bicultural immigrants. While I
had informants who fell into each of Akhtar’s categories, most fit best in the hyperassimilated or
bicultural categories, showing that my informants made serious efforts to leave their ethnocentric
identities and consequently practices behind. I gave examples of Maghrébine Muslims who do
not feel French and yet prepare traditional three course French meals with wine for friends and
colleagues. There are also examples of French Maghrébines who do not feel particularly Muslim
and yet will not eat pork or drink alcohol, or of Maghrébine French Muslims who do not eat pork
at home, but will grab a Jambon Beurre (the traditional French sandwich of ham on a baguette)
with colleagues when they are at a conference. The list of diverse responses to identity
presentation can go on and on. While every person reacts slightly differently to the immigrant
experience and how food practice is consequently worked out for him or her, it is clear from my
data that for many immigrants, or at least for a small group of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in
Paris, food plays an essential role, in negotiating and presenting old and new identities.
What is evident from the vast array of responses that I received to identity claims is that
my research challenges simplistic notions of Muslim identity formation in France. The
immigrants’ food practices reveal that categories of “good and bad Muslim,” “practicing or
believing/non-practicing,” simply do not cover the diverse identities present in this immigrant
location. Instead it becomes clear that scholars must add nuance and diversity to the typologies
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present to reflect the reality on the ground, in the everyday life experiences of Muslims in Paris.
This everyday experience sheds light on the complex and multivalent approaches to living within
a transnational context, a reality which underlies my informants’ daily lives and is the focus of
the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: “Le meilleur brassage culturel”443: Food, Transnationalism and Integration in
Paris
4.1 Introduction
Identity negotiations are central to the immigrant experience. In Chapter 3 I suggested that how
one views oneself and is viewed by others is a constant consideration for members of the
Maghrébine Muslim community in France. The working out of identity most often takes place
within a context of interaction between different groups, between “us” and “them.” Without an
“other” to compare oneself to, questions of identity tend to remain unstated or not reflected upon.
In relation to food, it is often when a practice, belief or approach is placed beside a conflicting
practice, belief or approach that it becomes a statement of identity. Pork consumption, or the lack
thereof, takes a more significant role in identity, when one is surrounded by a clear “other”: those
who do/do not eat pork. The separation of communities into “us” and “them” is essential in
addressing who is a part of the “us,” in this case French national identifiers, and who is part of
the “them,” in this case, Maghrébine transnational identifiers.
In this chapter I address the kind of binary thinking that lays the groundwork for the
integration efforts as well as the negotiation of transnational identity for the Maghrébine
Muslims of my study. I begin with a presentation of this “us” and “them” dichotomy as a means
of showing why transnational connection is seen as important for my informants. I then explore
the seven understandings of “integration” that my informants presented to me, and the role that
food can play in expressing one’s integration, or lack thereof. In this section I argue that food can
serve as the symbol par excellence of both similarity, and difference, between “us” and “them,”
and can consequently be used by the immigrant to aid in or detract from their “integration” into
the French culture, a potentially essential process for those individuals wishing to hold to a
transnational identity. The final section of the chapter addresses the topic of transnationalism,
exploring how one’s interaction with the mundane subject of food and eating aids in my
informants’ mediation of their transnational identity, where transnational refers to comfort in two
nation-state homes. Unlike diaspora identity, where the diasporic individual’s centre of gravity is
443

“The best cultural mix”—this comes from a quotation from one of my informants who spoke about the fact that
mixing traditions, and cultures, whether represented by food or people, was a beautiful thing.
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firmly located in the homeland, the transnational identity is claimed by those who see themselves
at home in both the host and the home context, and make efforts towards maintaining connection
to and claiming identity in both.444 What and how they eat, and the kinds of food practices in
which they engage, leads them to place themselves in varying places along the spectrum of
diasporic/transnational identification. Furthermore, I show how food can act as a bridge between
the two sides of transnational identity, whether within or between individuals, and therefore can
be used as a powerful tool for my informants.
4.2 The Effect of “Us” and “Them” Distinctions on Transnationalism
It did not take long in the field to feel the palpable idea that there is an “us” and there is a “them”
in France, and that my informants fit firmly within the “them” category. Even for those
informants who were born and raised in France, those informants who barely identified with
their culture of origin, those informants who claimed French national identity, they still felt as
though there were significant differences between them and the rest of the French population. In
fact, this mentality of clear distinctions between “us” and “them” was propagated on both sides.
The non-Muslim, multi-generation, European French saw Maghrébine Muslims as “them” and
the Maghrébine Muslims saw the non-Muslim, multi-generation European French as “them.”
One informant suggested that this distinction between “us” and “them” was based on the fact that
“on ne voit pas les choses pareille.”445 Dichotomies were set up between “the West” and “the
Maghreb.”446 The “othering” process of Muslims by majority, non-Muslim French communities
is widely known and generally discussed in other sections of this work, so the focus of this
section is on the dichotomies created and maintained by the Maghrébine Muslim community of
my study. Ultimately, if my informants view themselves as inherently separate from the
European French “them” this will have a significant impact on their feelings toward and seeming
ability to claim the French side of their transnational identity.
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I will define my use of “transnationalism” further in section 4.4 below as well as in Chapter 7 when I address my
Montréal data.
445
120822_001—“We do not see things in the same way.”
446
“The West” as understood by my informants to be either secular or minimally Christian. “The Maghreb” as
understood by my informants to be Muslim. Thus, conflation of the religious understanding, approach and practice
with cultural ones were frequent.
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These dichotomies between cultures, between “us” and “them,” can be seen in two
different realms: general culture and food practices. In interest of space I cannot address all the
general cultural differences that my informants spoke about. I focus primarily on those practices
that relate directly or indirectly to food.447
In that light, an important distinction that was made between the Western and
Maghrébine cultures was the approach to hospitality in both. Informants would mention the
importance of hospitality to Maghrébine culture, noting that there seemed to be a great deal of
this hospitality missing with people who were a part of the West. Informants would stress how
this was a difference between “their” culture and “our” culture. One informant for example
expressed the following. She said,
il y a des choses en France qui s’opposent à ma culture ... d’hospitalité…on n’est pas
obligé de téléphoner aux gens avant d’aller chez eux, on n’est pas obligé de prendre
rendez-vous trois semaines avant pour un dîner; on peut arriver, et y a de la place, on
n’est pas obligé d’aller à l’hôtel alors qu’il y a une chambre d’amis. Tu vois ce genre de
choses?448
She gave examples of how the Maghrébine culture or hospitality worked, as a seeming contrast
to what one might find in the majority French friendship and family circles. While the French
have a reputation for being cold and distant, even with their inner circle contacts, the Maghrébine
culture is presented as being one of warmth and closeness, of hospitality.
While hospitality is generally a characteristic of Maghrébine culture, as became clear in
my Québec data, this hospitality seemed to be altered in the French context—Frenchified, if you
will. This seemingly important approach of hospitality was not present unless you were already
inside the “us.” I return to this argument in the conclusion when I compare the French and
Québécois contexts, but it is merely important to note here the role that hospitality plays in the
minds of Maghrébine Muslims in France as a distinguishing mark between “us” (the more
hospitable ones) and “them” (the colder, more distant ones).
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My informants highlighted differences between themselves and the French community surrounding them in
how the French treat animals, how they view life and the afterlife, in that the French shut religion out while they
orient their lives by it, and that the French were viewed as hypocritical and fake.
448
121209_001—“There are things in France which are opposed to my culture…of hospitality…we are not obliged
to call people before going to their house. We are not obligated to set an appointment three weeks in advance for
a lunch; we can arrive and there is space. We are not obligated to go to a hotel when there is a guest room. You
see, that sort of thing.”
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4.2.1 Food as Distinguishing Mark Between “Us” and “Them”
While there were basic characteristics, attitudes and practices that my informants argued were
indicative of the difference between the “West” and the Maghreb the most frequent examples my
informants gave were related to food practices. The dichotomies in food practice were found in
three realms: what one ate, how one ate and where one ate. Because food is foundational to
identity, as argued above, its use as a symbol of distinction between “us” and “them” is
noteworthy here. If what, how and where one eats are all foundational to who one is, and if these
ways of being are seen as dichotomous with others, certain food practices may solidify these
binary mentalities, making a fluid transnationalism difficult to hold.
For example, in regards to what one eats, one informant told me a story about a move by
a far right political association that emphasized this “us” and “them” distinction through a
particular food practice. Because of the significance of this story to the current argument I will
quote it at length. My informant told me that,
dans le sens inverse, il y a eu une association qui faisait la soupe populaire pour les
pauvres pour exclure les non chrétiens…. Ils ont mis des lardons dans la nourriture qu’ils
servaient aux gens. Donc les juifs et les musulmans ne mangeaient pas. C’est une
pratique barbare à mon sens quand on parle de 2012. Et ça c’était une association du
Front National qui servait soi-disant de la nourriture aux pauvres. Sauf que lorsqu’il y a
du porc, on sait très bien que le porc qu’il soit juif ou bouddhiste ou musulman, il ne
mangera pas. C’était une anecdote mais ils pensaient exclure les autres religions.449
This “anecdote,” as my informant labels it, was prevalent in popular media between 2004 and
2006. The extreme right, French political group, Bloc Identitaire and some of its affiliate groups
organized soup kitchens to provide soup for homeless individuals in France (sans domicile fixe:
SDF) but they made these “soupes identitaires” (identity soups) with pork. Many understood
these actions as a purposeful act of racism towards and exclusion of Jewish and Muslim
individuals in the community, even leading officials in Strasbourg to ban such soup and Paris
police to close down the soup kitchens that served them.450 This example shows that not only are
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121205_001—“In the opposite sense, there was an association that ran soup kitchens for the poor to exclude
the non-Christians. …They put bacon in the food that they served to people. So Jews and Muslims would not eat it.
It’s a barbaric practice in my opinion when we are speaking of 2012. And that was an association of the National
Front that supposedly served food to the poor. Except, because there was pork, we know full well that pork,
whether Jew or Buddhist of Muslim, he will not eat it. It was an anecdote but they thought to exclude the other
religions.”
450
“French Crackdown on Racist Soup,” BBC News, accessed 29 June 2016,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4644766.stm; “Pork Soup and Muslims: Recipe for Racism?,” NBC News,
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these distinctions felt between and among cultural groups, but they can be used by some groups
and individuals to further the notion of dichotomous cultures for political purposes.
Beyond the common differences in what my informants eat versus the “them” to which
they were comparing themselves, i.e. not eating pork, more simply, my informants gave
examples such as the fact that they buy and consume food with fewer pesticides, which is more
“natural” than the food that the majority French culture eats.451 One informant stressed the
difference in relation to meat and meat products.
Par exemple, la viande, les Français achètent directement dans les supermarchés tout fait.
Ça [il] n’y a pas chez nous. Même si on travaille, on a toujours la tradition de manger
frais, de pas manger de la nourriture dans les boîtes, les conserves. Vous ne trouvez pas
ça chez les Maghrébins, ou rarement.452
Food practices are generalized across cultures. In this statement, the informant is suggesting that
all majority non-Maghrébine French people buy their meat from supermarkets or butchers who
do not give them fresh meat, and that all Maghrébines buy their meat from butchers who provide
them with fresh meat. Whether that is the case, the discourse is present and has an affect on
notions of difference and/or similarity—as well as what is better, or not.
The distinctions are also present in how one eats and prepares food. First, how much food
a person consumes is an important example of the differing values present in the two groups. The
amount of food consumed by each culture is seen as a dichotomy between abundance versus
necessity.
For example, while in France I attended and acted as the witness for a wedding for one of
my informants. While both her family and the groom’s family were both Maghrébine, the bride
and groom decided to have a more traditional French meal at their reception. The entire meal,
which lasted four hours, consisted of halal foie gras, followed by a course of fish, then meat, then
a cheese course, dessert and fruit, finished with platters and platters of Maghrébine pastries. The
abundance of food at the meal seemed to conflict with the notion that in Islam people are not

accessed 29 June 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11010604/ns/world_news-europe/t/pork-soup-muslimsrecipe-racism/; “Polemique autour d’une soupe au porc à Nice,” TFI News, accessed 29 June 2016,
http://lci.tf1.fr/france/2005-12/polemique-autour-soupe-porc-nice-4861011.html.
451
121008_001; 121202_003.
452
121102_001—“For example, meat, the French buy directly in the supermarkets all ready. That, we do not have
where we are from. Even if we work, we have the tradition of eating fresh, of not eating canned food, conserved
food. You will not find that at Maghrébine homes, or rarely.”
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supposed to eat too much, they are not to overindulge, according to my informants.453 The sister
of the bride commented on this at the end of the meal when I was talking to her. She mentioned
that there was too much food and that it was wasteful and unnecessary. While I was very full by
the end of the night, and feeling like the meal was probably one course too long, I do not know
that any French person would have agreed. In fact, most of the people I spoke to about the meal
expressed that it was normal for French weddings to have that much food.
Furthermore, while the French mode of cooking is often viewed as complex and time
intensive, many of my informants suggested that Maghrébine cooking is even more so. In fact,
they suggested that because workdays are so long in France, there is simply no time to make
traditional Maghrébine dishes.454 These require too much work and too many hours, which the
non-Maghrébine French culture simply does not understand or support. Family meals in the
Maghreb are long events, staying at the table for hours, enjoying the meal together. The
European mode of eating is viewed as fast. Not only that, but the kind of plate used is also seen
as distinct in the two cultures. While in the Maghrébine context a communal plate is used, in
France separate plates are the norm. Not only are separate plates the norm, but eating from one
dish is seen as less cultured or refined—not really “French.”
Where the meals happen is also an important distinction between Maghrébine and nonMaghrébine French, according to my informants. Many informants stated that it was essential
that Maghrébine food be consumed with others. In fact, for many it was not possible to eat a
Maghrébine dish alone. One woman explained to me that “la différence c’est que notre bœuf à
nous ne se mange pas seule. C’est triste de faire un couscous et de manger toute seule… les plats
pour une personne, ça n’existe pas.”455 This informant explained to me that not only were there
no recipes for one-person couscous, but you were to always make enough for extra people that
may happen to show up. Furthermore, the centrality of eating as a family was built into the daily
structure of the culture in the Maghreb and was lacking in the French context. One informant
explained to me that, while it was almost impossible to eat with one’s family at lunch in France,
it was an everyday occurrence in Morocco. She explained that, “à midi, on rentre pour manger,
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I address the arguments for not over eating in Chapter 7.
121123_001; 121206_001; 121207_001.
455
121123_001 - “The difference is that our food is not eaten alone. It’s sad to make a couscous and to eat it
alone…dishes for one person, that does not exist.”
454
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on est en famille. Là-bas on a deux heures de pause déjeuner entre midi et deux.”456 She went on
to say that “Ce sont des rituels qui sont dans le sang. On essaie de les garder.”457 These
differences in practice and approach are not only important but are bred in the bone. As a result,
the distinction between “us” and “them” may be hard to remove.
4.2.2 The other “them”: Othering as a Defensive Strategy
Many of my informants would use other groups to show how their own community, namely the
Maghrébine Muslim community, was not as problematic as some of the others out there. Natasha
Bakht suggests that minority individuals often feel the need to create “stranger strangers” in
order “to construct a flattering image of ourselves, rather than doing the work of asking harder
questions about who we are as a society.”458 The most prominent group that was brought up as
an example of a “stranger stranger” by my informants was the Jewish community in France. My
informants expressed that, while they had different practices from the dominant French “us,”
they were not as bad as “them,” i.e. the Jewish community. This became clear in relation to food
practice. My informants, when speaking about the food practices that might be used as examples
of how they did not fit in with the “us,” would bring up Jews as an example of people who limit
what they eat, in order to show how they are not that different: they are not the only ones who
limit what they eat and they are not the only strange “them” in the midst of the dominant French
“us.” For example, one informant explained to me:
On [nous] oblige en France à entrer tous dans la même boîte…les musulmans, mais ce
qui est en contradiction, c’est que les juifs mangent le même, comme nous, quoi? Oui,
donc en France on a la tendance [de] vouloir unifier tout. A faire que soit, on est tous
pareille. Sauf que c’est impossible.459
This informant was explaining that, while it was part of the French approach to put everyone in
one box and to put one’s back up about any practice that showed distinction, it was actually an
456

121216_001—“At lunch time, we go home to eat, we are with family. There we have a two-hour lunch break
between noon and two.”
457
121216_001—“These are the rituals that are in the blood, we try to keep them.”
458
This quotation is from Lori G. Beaman, “Introduction, Exploring Reasonable Accommodation,” in Reasonable
Accommodation: Managing Religious Diversity, ed. Lori Beaman (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 8, in reference to
Bakht’s chapter in the edited volume. Bakht herself states “our need for these ‘stranger strangers’ who refuse to
comply with our rules help us to better comprehend who we are” (Bakht, “Veiled Objections, 99).
459
121203_006—“In France, they put us all in the same box…Muslims, but it is in contradiction, because the Jews
eat the same, like us. What? Yes, in France we have the tendency to want to unify everything/everyone, to make it
as though we are all the same. Except it is impossible.”
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impossible feat. She was using the Jewish community as an example of another community that
“eats the same” as Muslims, that restricts certain food consumption, thus distinguishing itself
from the larger mainstream, “unified” French community. Another informant when defending
the Muslim restriction on pork, highlighted how it is not a distinct practice that should place the
Muslim community on the outside because “dans la religion juive, je crois que c’est aussi interdit
de manger du porc.”460 This statement was an effort to say, “you see, we aren’t the only ones.
We can still be a part of the ‘us.’”
While some of my informants used the Jewish community as an example of another
group with restrictive food practices as a means of highlighting the fact that Muslims were
themselves not so different from the mainstream culture, others pushed this further and suggest
that the Jews were more difficult, had more restrictive food laws and could be seen as more
“different” than Muslims to the dominant French culture. It was a trope that was used to show
that there were worse “thems,” “stranger strangers,” out there. For example, one informant talked
about the fact that they could go to Jewish butcher shops to buy their meat, that it was halal for
them to do so, but the reverse was not true.461 When I asked others about the links between
religion and food in Islam, some responded that there were not really any links, unlike in
Judaism. One informant quickly cut me off to say “Non, non. Ce n’est pas comme le judaïsme où
tu ne mélanges pas la viande et le lait. Non, on a aucune restriction”462 This informant went on to
explain that there were of course a couple of restrictions on Muslims, such as not eating pork and
eating halal, but her main focus was to show that there were “others” who were more
complicated. Instead of just stating that Islam had a flexible, non-restrictive relationship to food,
she first presented the idea that there was worse out there. Others would also describe how Jews
have specific religious food obligations, but they, as Muslims, did not really have the same sort
of thing. For example,
c’est vrai que dans les religions comme le judaïsme, ils ont certaines nourritures qui sont
liées directement à la religion. Nous non. Peut-être la seule chose que l’on a c’est le jour
de l’Aïd on doit égorger un mouton. On n’est pas obligé d’égorger un mouton, on peut
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121207_001—“In the Jewish religion, I believe that it is also forbidden to eat pork.”
121130_001; Another informant also brought up the fact that Muslims could go to Jewish butchers because “les
juifs vont plus loin que les musulmans” (121202_004).
462
121201_001—“No, no, it is not like in Judaism where you cannot mix meat and milk. No, we have no
restrictions.”
461
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égorger une chèvre, quelque chose comme ça. On n’a pas de rapport direct entre la
religion et la nourriture.463
This informant emphasized that while other religions have restrictions, Islam does not, and it is
consequently more flexible in the cultural outworking of the tradition. Relatedly, another
informant drew the distinction between Islam and Judaism as follows:
des juifs, pour le coup, eux ils ont des restrictions alimentaires. Par exemple, ils
n’utilisent pas les mêmes casseroles pour faire cuire tel ou tel aliment. Ils ne trempent pas
et ne mettent pas la cuisse dans la casserole dans laquelle on a déjà fait cuire du lait. Dans
l’Islam la seule restriction c’est de ne pas manger du porc. Même si dans la même
casserole on peut faire rien. Oui on ne mange pas de porc, mais si je préparais dans une
casserole, j’ai l’habitude de faire cuire du porc, et bien la casserole est lavée, et bien, je
peux cuisiner autre chose. Du point de vue de la boisson, le seul truc interdit c’est
l’alcool. Faut pas le boire, faut pas cuisiner avec, faut pas le vendre, faut pas le porter etc.
Ce sont les deux seules restrictions. Après, dans l’Islam, on mange tout, on boit tout.464
In this quotation, we can see the justification for the relatively simple restrictions that are in
place in Islam, according to my informants. Unlike the Jews who “cannot even cook in certain
dishes,” Muslim food restrictions, the argument goes, are easily adaptable to the French context.
One can imagine a sub-context to this conversation that indicates that this informant would be
able to go to a non-Muslim French person’s home and use their dishes to cook their meals, while
a Jew could not.
While my informants used the Jewish food restrictions to show how the Muslim
community was not the only one to engage in different practices, or to show how the Muslim
way of practice was not as difficult or problematic as some may think, the consensus from my
informants was that the Jewish community, despite having stricter food restrictions, was a much
less threatening “them” in the eyes of the dominant French community than the Muslim
community. Many of my informants would bring up the fact that even though kosher is just as
463

121201_002—“It’s true that in religions like Judaism they have certain foods that are directly linked to the
religion. Us, no. Maybe the only thing we have is the day of the Eid we have to slaughter a sheep. We are not
obligated to slaughter a sheep, we can slaughter a goat, or something like that. We do not have a direct link
between religion and food.”
464
121206_001—“The Jews, for example, they have food restrictions. For example, they do not use the same
dishes to cook this or that ingredient. They do not place the leg in the dish in which we already cooked milk. In
Islam the only restriction is to not eat pork. Even if it was made in the same dish, we can do nothing. Yes, we do
not eat pork, but if I make it in a dish, where I have the habit of making pork, and of course the dish is washed, and
well, I can cook something else. In the point of view of drinks, the only restricted thing is alcohol. You cannot drink
it, cannot cook with it, cannot sell it, cannot carry it, etc. Those are the only two restrictions, after in Islam we eat
everything and we drink everything.”
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strict, if not more so, than halal, it does not seem to pose a problem to the dominant culture in
France. This was reflective of Scott’s suggestion that “the Jews from the Maghreb pose many of
the same challenges to French universalism that Arabs/Muslims do, and yet the animus of those
who worry about the fracturing of the nation is directed at Muslims, not at Jews.”465 One
informant suggested that this was another realm within which one could see discrimination
against the Muslim community in France. He stated that “il y a de la viande kascher et très peu
de viande halal, et ils en font tout un plat par rapport à la viande halal; là, ça rentre dans le cadre
de la discrimination.”466 Some would argue that this was based on the fact that the situation on
the ground does not seem to matter, but simply the perception of and obsession with all things
Muslim in France. Others argued that the more positive, or at least less problematic, view of the
Jewish community derived from the fact that the Jewish community seems to have more power
in effecting change in France than the Muslim community. One informant stated that it was
religion that was the problem, specifically the Muslim religion. She said that the only reason why
the Jewish religion was not an issue was because “en France la société juive est très influente;
donc, le débat ‘kascher ou pas’ ne se pose pas.”467 Even though Jews are also engaging in
practices that may separate them from the larger French collective, the perception from my
informants was that it did not matter because this other, more normalized, group was not the
focus of Western media attention.
Because the notion of “us” and “them” is so thoroughly felt by my informants, it often
leads to a much stronger desire to maintain and profess transnational connections than it may in
other more nationally inclusive locations, such as Canada.468 Trying to erase borders between the
homeland and host land may become important for people who struggle with being a part of the
“them.” Before I address directly the important role of transnationalism for my informants, it is
essential to explore how the topic of integration is experienced by and affects these groups. The
focus on the “integration of them” influences transnational practice and identity as well.
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Scott, Politics of the Veil, 78.
121126_001—“There is kosher meat and very little halal meat and they make a big deal about halal meat, so
that enters into the category of discrimination.”
467
120905_001—“In France the Jewish society is very influential, so the debate about kosher or no kosher is not
had.”
468
This will become clear in chapters 7 and 8, which look at Maghrébine Muslim experience in Montréal, Canada.
While there is still a strong presence of transnational practice and identity in Montréal, there is not the same
emphasis on how essentially different this identity is for the Maghrébine Muslims who profess it.
466
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4.3 “On intègre quelque chose mais pas quelqu’un”469: The Role of Integration in
Transnationalism
The discourse on integration has a significant impact on immigrants in a variety of contexts. This
discourse is prevalent in the French immigrant context, where integration is a daily topic of
conversation and media focus. In a context such as France where a national, unified identity is
the professed ideal, the integration of newcomers into that identity is a focus of politics, and of
daily interaction. People who do not visibly or ideologically fit into the majority, secular French
population are faced with questions about their integration on a frequent basis. Whether they
claim or have French national identity often does not matter. They are viewed as a “them” and as
people who need to be integrated, whatever that may mean. In this section I explore how my
informants respond to the topic of integration. I present some of the various responses to the
question that I posed directly about integration, as well as responses that came up throughout our
interviews. I address definitional issues as expressed by my informants and present the various
ways that Maghrébine Muslims think about integration in France. Finally, I survey the role of
food in integration. While I touched on this briefly in the section on food and identity, I show
how some “others” are using food as a means to integrate into French culture and or act against
integration.
After working through questions about food practice and daily life in my interviews, I
would end each one by saying I had two questions left, the first of which was a big one and the
second of which was a fun and easy question to end the interview on an enjoyable note. I would
then ask my informants the second last question of the interview, which was: “lorsque vous
entendez le mot ‘intégration’ de quoi pensez-vous? Est-ce que vous vous voyez ‘intégré’ dans la
société française? Vous souciez-vous de celà?”470 This question elicited many different answers
and generated clear emotional responses in some of my informants.
Most responded to the question as if it were an inevitable question, one they had
addressed many times before. There were people who answered with what seemed like a cookie
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121106_001—“We integrate something, but not someone.”
“When you hear the word ‘integration’ what do you think of? Do you see yourself as ‘integrated’ in the French
culture? Do you care?”
470
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cutter answer that they had rehearsed and presented as their official stance on integration. Others
struggled to express their response, either out of anger that such a question was being asked, or
out of pure disinterest in the topic. Having already spent an hour with me, talking about generally
pleasant topics, though, all my informants, even the “integrationally frustrated” ones, gave me
extensive answers on this topic. While in Québec this was one of the questions that was quickly
asked and answered, in France, the depth of knowledge, experience and interaction with this
topic was much bigger and thus resulted in much more complex and nuanced responses.
Informants tended to fall within a handful of definitional understandings of what
integration was. They argued that integration was 1) not assimilation, and yet 2) about being just
like everyone else (assimilation). Others argued that it was 3) about being a good citizen, 4) or
about being good in general. Finally, there were those who stressed that integration inevitably
implicated 5) respect, 6) racism and 7) language issues. Before I address each of these seven
responses, a few preliminary comments must be made about the process of defining the word
“integration” for my informants, as well as whether they viewed the term positively or
negatively.
When I asked the integration question, many people would respond immediately, not
with their actual response but with a variation of a set of other questions. They would ask, “What
does it actually mean?” “According to whose standards?” “To whom does it apply? To those
who want, versus those who don't want, French identity? First generation versus second and third
generation? Just immigrants or French born people as well? Only Muslims?” For many of the
informants who expressed such questions, the term “integration” was one that incited passionate,
negative responses within them. These informants would emphasize that they did not like the
term,471 or that it was reductionist.472 One informant went as far as to say that “Moi ça me révolte
quand j’entends ça.”473 While this informant had a visceral response to the word, there were
others who suggested that it was simply a useless term. For example, when I asked one informant
what he thought when he heard terms such as integration and assimilation, he said “je pense à la
débilité profonde d’être humaine. Voilà…l’assimilation, l’intégration, je suis très honnêtement ni
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pour, ni contre. Je trouve c’est juste un terme qui n’a pas lieu d’être.”474 For this informant,
integration is a topic that does not deserve the attention that it has been given. While people may
adjust to particular settings, his thought was that it was not something to be overly dissected, and
especially not something to be set up as a distinction placed on others.
Similarly, another of my informants, who just so happens to be the former informant’s
sister, gave an example for why integration does not work on a human level. She said, “le terme
intégré pour moi c’est tout à fait débile pour les personnes. Fin, on intègre je ne sais pas, des
chiffres dans un intervalle, on intègre quelque chose mais pas quelqu’un.”475 Like many of my
informants, she argued that the term was simply not applicable to the situations to which people
try to apply it. It is a hijacked word, a word that is a political term and nothing else.476 It is
“uniquement un terme politique autour duquel on va rassembler des gens. Parce que, qu’est-ce
que ça veut dire intégrer?”477 These informants in general tried to argue that integration is given
too much weight in current discussions on immigrant experience in Europe, and because the
term, according to their arguments, holds no weight in discussions of human interaction. It
should be dropped altogether.
Other informants allowed for the use of the term but struggled to determine to whom
integration applies and who gets to determine to whom it applies. One informant stated “C’est
quoi être intégré? Tout dépend. D’après certains Français, je suis intégré. Pour d’autres, je ne le
suis pas; et d’autres ne se posent même pas la question.”478 If certain people see her as
integrated, and others do not, who is determining what it is to be integrated? Who determines to
whom the term applies?
Some of my informants did have suggestions concerning to whom the term applies. For
example, one person expressed to me that it was a question of socio-economic status. He
suggested that integration was only an issue for the poor and it was also not for all “étrangers”
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(foreigners) but for French Muslims.479 Similarly, another informant suggested that integration
should not be applied to immigrants, but to French nationals.
Je suis une pure étrangère qui vit en France. Je n’ai pas de souci par rapport à
l’intégration car je suis étrangère. Ça ne me pose pas de problème. Je n’ai pas de souci du
tout. C’est un peu abstrait pour moi, s’intégrer…Je travaille dans le Social. Si on pouvait
déjà intégrer tous les Français d’ici, ça serait bien. Je parle le français de souche. Si on
arrivait à les intégrer, eux, ça serait bien.480
For this informant, integration is not a term that should be applied to foreigners, who knew their
place within French society, but to those within French society itself. One informant suggested
that it was a term not meant for immigrants in general, but in fact only for Arabs living, and born
in France. She expressed that “moi, quand j’entends intégration je me sens pas concernée. J’ai
l’impression que c’est les Arabes nés en France qui ont besoin de s’intégrer, mais pas les
immigré(e)s.”481 She went on to explain that immigrants do not need to integrate since they know
their position in the host society clearly. They know how and why they came, and as a result they
do not need to integrate.
On the other hand, many informants suggested that it was not a fair term to apply to third
and fourth generation Muslims living in France. One informant suggested that it was a term that
applied to French-born people, but somehow drew the line between generations. He expressed
that it was a bit unjust to speak of integration of young people who have been French for three or
four generations because “ces gens-là ne connaissent pas leur pays d’origine.”482 The question of
to whom the term could be applied was cloudy, and besides, even if one could figure out to
whom to apply it and how, the result may not even matter given underlying biases. One
informant asked:
Et ceux qui ont essayé, sont-ils considérés comme des Français? Un Mouloud Ben
Achour ou un Shlomo Bengourion, est-il considéré tellement Français même s’il s’est
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intégré totalement? Non, on le sait très bien. Il est question de physique, couleur et de
nom.483
Those who are seen as outside of the majority French cultural group would not be seen as
integrated anyway, this informant argues, so the debate around integration is not worthwhile.
4.3.1 Definitions/Understandings of Integration
Despite the arguments that integration is a term that is difficult to understand and apply, my
informants did try to grasp what it was and what it meant for them and those around them. The
first understanding of integration that I am going to explore is that integration is not assimilation.
It is not to be equated with assimilation, according to many of my informants. These informants
would argue that integration is not about being exactly like the “French” (understood as the
mainstream, non-Maghrébine, non-Muslim French majority), even though many “French” think
that this is the way to understand integration. What was important for these informants was the
idea that one can be integrated, but still maintain elements of their cultural, religious or ethnic
identity that may not be viewed as “French.”
Ce que je n’accepte pas dans le terme intégration, c’est le sous-entendu
d’assimilation…L’assimilation, le reniement de la culture d’origine, je suis contre. Car ça
veut dire qu’il faut que je fasse une croix sur une partie de mon identité. Ça peut induire
de graves dérèglements psychologiques. Encore une fois, l’intégration peut se faire sans
nier la religion et la culture d’origine. En France, il est possible de vivre avec sa culture et
ce que l’on apporte.484
This informant was seemingly fine with integration as long as it did not cross the line into
assimilation, resulting in an expectation that she would renounce parts of her identity. Another
informant explained that adaptation was inevitable in the integration process but not assimilation.
For this informant, one of course adapts to the host culture, or else they would have stayed in
their home country, but this does not mean that one loses or gives up their convictions.485 A third
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informant explained that assimilation and integration are two separate things and need to be
viewed in that way to not marginalize certain communities for no reason.
Ce n’est pas que les gens ne veulent pas s’intégrer à la société française mais ils ne
veulent pas quitter leur identité. Il y a deux choses différentes. Nous voulons être en
France tels que nous sommes. Ce n’est pas un refus d’intégration. De l’autre côté, c’est
une façon de marginaliser, en disant “si vous n’abandonnez pas votre identité, vous n’êtes
pas intégré.” C’est là le problème.486
By equating assimilation and integration, many immigrants may be labeled “not integrated,”
which would be an unfair representation of those communities according to this informant.
When integration is viewed as separate from assimilation, many are happy to claim
integration into French society. When it is equated with assimilation it is seen as one of the most
problematic aspects of the immigrant experience. For example, the informant who spoke of
psychological disorder from the emphasis on assimilation above expressed to me that if for some
reason assimilation became a forced reality, a necessity in one’s integration into France, that
would be the day he would leave France.487 Even though this informant did not believe that
assimilation was an essential part of integration in France, there were others who argued that
assimilation is exactly the way that integration should be understood. The two terms were
interchangeable.
While many would stress the importance of viewing integration as something totally
different from assimilation, and see it as not yet an essential part of official integration, others
suggested that it was often exactly that. The equation of assimilation and integration was already
well established, and expected of those who needed to integrate.488 Because of this, many of my
informants claimed that they were not integrated and did not need to. They would never
assimilate with majority “French” society/culture and accordingly would always remain
unintegrated.
For these informants, integration meant being “the same” as everyone else. One young,
French-born informant explained that integration meant “être pareille avec les autres…de ne pas
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être différent, de vivre pareille.”489 She explained to me that she saw herself as integrated, as
living the same as others, even though the majority French society would still reject her. In this
we can see the apparent emphasis on assimilation, on being the same and being the same in a
particular way. It was not enough for this informant “to live the same” as those around her,
because she was still viewed as not “living the same,” according to other people’s definitions of
what “living the same” means. Assimilation is equated with integration. After a long explanation
about how people who try to live separately and differently than the mainstream French society
have problems with integration, one informant stated: “l’intégration, ça n’existait pas pour moi.
Je vis ici comme tout le monde, tout simplement.”490 Here he shows how if one lives, like him,
as a doctor, not in the banlieues, engaged in friendship with other French citizens in a French
manner, then one has no problem with integration; if one is willing to assimilate, then one does
not need to worry about integration, as it will inevitably follow.
The third way that my informants understood integration was related to civil engagement.
For these informants, one was integrated if one was a good citizen, and this was often expressed
through respecting laws, working, and paying taxes. The same informant who expressed that he
would leave France if assimilation were expected for integration gave the following definition of
integration:
Intégration, pour moi, ça veut dire respecter les lois du pays dans lequel je vis; sachant
que ce n’est pas mon pays d’origine. Je me considère comme une personne intégrée. Je
fête Noël à ma façon, je fête Pâques à ma façon, et je respecte les lois françaises.491
He saw himself as integrated because he “respects the laws of the country” and acts as an
engaged citizen, which apparently, for this informant, includes celebrating the religious festivals
of the majority religious population. Another informant explained that it was specifically the
paying of taxes that made someone a good citizen and an integrated citizen in France. She saw
herself as integrated because of this fact. For her,
à partir du moment où je paye mes impôts, je considère que je suis intégrée. Si
maintenant mon argent est différent de celui d’un Français, et que le fait que je suis
Arabe peut-être me permettra de payer moins d’impôts parce que je n’suis pas une
citoyenne normale, je n’suis pas une citoyenne, il n’y a pas de souci…À partir du
489
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moment où je participe économiquement à l’évolution d’une société, je considère que je
suis intégrée. Après maintenant, si c’est pas ça, être intégrée, je ne sais pas ce que
c’est.492
The paying of taxes is an equal experience shared by all good citizens and acts as the base of
evidence for one’s integration, according to this informant. Of course, there are those who do not
pay taxes, Arab or French, and according to this informant these people are not good citizens and
as a result are not integrated in France.493
While these informants argued that integration was about being a good citizen, others
viewed it as being good in general. One informant stated that, for her, “mon intégration c’est
d’être bien, d’avoir mon petit chéri, de faire ma vie.”494 She believed that integration was simply
about being a good person and living what she viewed as a “normal life.” Another informant
explained that it was not just about being good, but about being better than she was before. She
explained that the term integration was “reductionist” (as mentioned above) and should not be
used. Instead, for her the most important thing was what “integration” pointed to, namely,
whether or not one lived well in society and was better than before.495
The next two ways that informants viewed integration, or the evidence of integration can
be dealt with together. These informants viewed integration as implying either respect or, if
respect was lacking, then the concept implied racism. On the one hand, for those who saw
respect as central, they argued that one could not integrate oneself or others without respecting
difference. One informant stated that, in fact,
le mot intégration c’est respecter la tradition de l’autre, se respecter mutuellement.
S’intégrer, ça veut pas dire prendre la culture des Français, s’identifier aux Français; ça,
ce n’est pas s’intégrer, pour moi ce n’est pas une intégration. Pour moi, s’intégrer c’est
respecter son prochain.496
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For this informant, one was integrated not if one expected assimilation but if one respected
difference.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some informants indicated that the term integration
was inevitably linked to racism. One person suggested that integration, to whom it applies and of
whom it is expected, is based solely on skin colour and outward appearances.497 Another
informant expressed the idea that the term integration is used by racist people to present the idea
that there are people who have undesirable cultures and identities. For this informant,
“l’intégration c’est la grosse arnaque des racistes” and it is only “des racistes qui parlent
d’intégration.”498
The final issue that my informants brought up when answering my question about
integration was language. For these informants, language was the ultimate evidence of
integration, as well as the foundation for it. Shared language was seen as absolutely essential to
the integration process: “if you cannot communicate, you cannot integrate.” One informant
explained that “quand on prend tous les Algériens qui sont venus d’Algérie, ils parlent le bon
français, et bizarrement les Algériens qui sont nés ici, la France n’a pas su leur apprendre le
français. C’est bizarre, non?”499 If language is essential to integration and those Maghrébines
who are born in France have a difficult time learning and speaking French, this may be some
clear evidence of the fact mentioned previously, that French-born Maghrébines are seen as the
target of integration.
Integration turned out to be not as straightforward of a term as I had imagined it might be
when I started my fieldwork. My informants interacted with this term in drastically different
ways, some seeing it as totally insignificant, while others being moved to tears because of the
feelings it brought up for them. While some stressed the importance that integration did not mean
assimilation, there were others who saw it exactly as that. Surprisingly, for many of my
informants who saw integration as assimilation, rather than feeling as though they needed to
assimilate to integrate, they simply chose to claim an unintegrated identity. For those who saw
integration as evidenced by civic engagement, integration was not a problematic process or term
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at all. One simply paid their taxes, respected laws, worked, etcetera, or one did not. While being
a good citizen was evidence of integration for some, being “good” in general was what
integration was about for others. For these informants one had to be better than one was before if
one was to be integrated. Other informants saw integration as relating directly to respect or
racism: one was integrated if one respected those around him, or on the other hand, one did not
respect the “other” and thus required integration, usually understood as “assimilation” of that
“other.” Finally, I had informants suggest that integration was primarily based on one’s ability to
converse in the language of the land.

4.3.2 The Role of Food in Integration
Whether the issue of integration revolves around its relationship to assimilation, citizenship,
morality, respect, racism or language, it is undoubtedly a central topic for the people who belong
to the communities that I study. It is a notion imposed from the outside and felt from the inside.
It is a term and topic that elicits strong emotional responses and is generally a topic that members
of minority communities do not want to talk about. That being said, there are ways of gaining
insight into one’s integration practices, or lack thereof through other practices, namely food.
What people eat and how they eat it can reveal a great deal about how they interact with and
understand the world around them. For example, Michel and Ellen Desjardins propose that food
practice can provide insight into someone’s perceptions of the divine, or their own ethnicity, of
community building, and of charity, of the challenges of religious diversity and the impact of
immigration on relations between individuals of differing worldviews.500 People’s worldviews
become evident when examining food. It is for this reason that most of my informants brought
up food and food practice when discussing various topics related to integration, whether their
own or the perceived integration of others. My informants expressed the centrality of this topic to
integration, not only in their responses to my direct question about integration, but also
throughout their interview.501 One informant used food as a metaphor for the process of

500

Desjardins and Desjardins, “The Role of Food in Canadian Forms of Christianity,” 70-82.
As I mentioned in the section on integration above, the question that I asked about integration was as follows:
“lorsque vous entendez le mot ‘intégration’ de quoi pensez-vous? Est-ce que vous vous voyez ‘intégré dans la
société française’? Vous souciez-vous de cela?” (When you hear the word ‘integration’ what do you think of? Do
you see yourself as ‘integrated’ in the French culture? Do you care?). While I did not directly ask about food in this
question, the question did come at the end of an interview where I asked a great deal about food and food
501

155

integration itself. After describing how people integrate different ingredients from different food
traditions to make a new dish that pleases everyone he expressed how this practice is
le meilleur brassage culturel. On mélange la touche à la française avec les choses
marocaines et on fait quelque chose, un plat qui plaît à tout le monde. Et ça, c’est ce qui
devrait être en fait avec les gens qui vivent dans le même pays. On devrait pouvoir tous
les faire aimer les uns les autres avec ce brassage culturel. On arrive à [le] faire avec la
cuisine, on n’arrive pas encore à le faire avec les êtres humains.502
In this section I address specific food practices that reveal a commitment to integrate, or a
commitment not to integrate, as well as the ability of food and eating to be an access point to
understanding and/or encounter with “the other” (an essential element in integration).
As discussed above, some of my informants would argue that one did not have to leave
cultural convictions aside to integrate; integration does not equal assimilation. For these
informants, food was another example of cultural, religious or ethnic practice that could be
maintained in one’s integration process.503 One informant explained that just because there are
inevitable adjustments that one makes when one lives in a context that is different from one’s
homeland, “ça ne nous empêche pas de laisser nos convictions de côté … que ce soit religieux ou
culinaire ou autre, il n’y a pas de problèmes.”504 Food is seen as a conviction, and an important
one to maintain. While many of my informants would argue that integration is not about eating
distinct foods, what one eats still plays a significant role in influencing one’s own perception of
one’s integration, as well as the perception of others. For example, one of my informants, who
opened a halal fine dining French restaurant, noted that integration should not be about eating

practices. It is therefore possible that food was a central part of my informants’ responses to this question because
they were primed to think/talk about food.
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pork or drinking alcohol, yet went on to talk about the fact that his restaurant could be viewed as
an effort to show integration. He stated that,
maintenant, après ce qui est paradoxal, c’est que moi je fais mon restaurant parce que j’ai
évolué en France. Donc, c’est une manière de dire “oui, regarde, nous sommes intégrés,
puisque nous mangeons français maintenant, mais c’est halal.” Ça reste toujours halal.505
As much as this informant and others may want to argue that particular foods do not illustrate
integration, just as much as they may want to argue that integration is not equated with
assimilation, there is still a clear understanding that integration is just that. There is an
understanding from outside and within these communities that what one eats is in fact a sign of
the degree to which one is integrated. Furthermore, if integration is seen as assimilation to
French culture, specific food practices would be more indicative of integration than others.
For people in the Maghrébine Muslim community it may be hard to feel fully able to
integrate into a society where the majority culture revolves around food practices that are
forbidden in one’s own culture/religion. This may keep people on the margins, feeling unable to
integrate, or being told they cannot do so. One young woman explained to me that if you are a
practicing Muslim integration practices are inevitably affected because what you eat and drink,
or do not eat and drink, will limit where you can go, and will limit your social group. When
describing a situation where she felt she could not go out for drinks with colleagues at school she
said, “donc oui ça sélectionne quand on est pratiquant. Ça réduit un peu. Tu sélectionnes ton
entourage, avec qui tu restes, avec qui tu ne restes pas. C’est naturel, c’est comme ça.”506 While
pork and non-halal meat may be easy enough to avoid (one can eat fish), consuming alcohol can
be a much more difficult situation to negotiate.
Another example came from an informant who explained to me that if you refuse alcohol
it is seen as an insult to French culture. He expressed that
j’ai aussi beaucoup d’amis français. Et au niveau individuel, tu sens à chaque fois qu’il
veut t’intégrer. Pour lui l’intégration c’est de boire du vin, de l’accompagner à boire du
vin et à manger des lardons. Tu le sens. Il ne te le dit pas clairement mais il te le fait
sentir. J’ai été plusieurs fois dans des dîners mondains; que ce soit dans des châteaux,
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quand tu refuses un verre de vin, ils le prennent mal. C’est comme si tu les avais
insultés.507
He also explained to me that this sort of insistence on food evidence for integration or
identification is only relevant for the Muslim in the situation. He suggested that while it is
normal and frequent for non-Muslim French to ask Muslims why they do not eat pork, or drink
alcohol, it is not normal or frequent for the Muslim to ask the non-Muslim why he does. The
place of alcohol in French culture and identity that I described in Chapter 2 is felt strongly by my
informants and often makes it difficult to feel fully integrated if one does not share that practice.
One informant presented an example of the prevalence of alcohol in the French context
and the reasoning behind why one’s drinking habits can be indicative of integration or the lack
thereof:
Y a des cabinets ou l’on va boire dans le bureau pour fêter quelque chose à midi. On va
ouvrir une bouteille de vin, de champagne. Quand on va déjeuner avec son patron, on va
boire de l’alcool. En France, entre midi et deux quand on sort pour manger on boit de
l’alcool. C’est quand on ne boit pas, du coup on n’est pas dans le même modo que tous
les gens qui sont en train de boire et faire la fête etc. On a beau dire, on peut faire la fête
sans alcool, avec le coca c’est un peu plus difficile. C’est un peu plus difficile car tout le
monde se met dans un état recherché. On va tous communier autour d’une bouteille, ou
plusieurs. Quand tu ne bois pas d’alcool tu es en retrait car à un moment quand les gens
ont pris quatre ou cinq verres… et bien tu n’es plus au même niveau. Ils sont en train de
voler, toi tu marches encore alors que les autres sont beaucoup plus libres, plus ouverts, et
tu deviens observateur. C’est ce qui peut faire changer… ce ne sont pas des pressions,
mais ça peut être un frein pour intégrer un groupe.508
While it is not an explicit expectation that one would engage in these activities with those around
them, there is an implicit expectation of these sorts of practices. In a country such as France,
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where food and drink are foundational to national identity (as I discussed in Chapter 2), how and
what one eats and drinks can be a powerful symbol of integration.
4.3.2.1 Food as access to the “other”
This brings me to the other aspect of food and food practice that is relevant to integration,
namely, the ability of food to be an access point rather than a hindrance to understanding the
“other.” Without the presence of some “other,” integration would not exist. It is only when there
are “others” to integrate or “others” to integrate toward that integration matters. Unlike those
who argue that what one eats or does not eat leads to separation of groups, there are those who
argue that food brings people together in ways that can lead to mutual understanding and respect.
Desjardins and Desjardins describe how food can be a means of building community and
understanding of an “other” that used to seem foreign.509 For my informants as well, rather than
acting as a means of displaying one’s lack of integration and resulting separation from the
mainstream French society, food can be seen “plus comme un élément de rassemblement, de
ralliement. Ce n’est pas un élément de séparation ni de coupure entre les gens.”510 The table acts
as an access point to interaction amongst groups. In a context such as France where the dining
table is a central part of daily experience and family structure,511 it is not surprising to think that
it is around the table where one learns about those present.
The table as access point is not only significant to French culture. This same
understanding is central to Maghrébine Muslim culture. One informant stated that the moment of
the meal was central to the Muslim culture: “c’est là où on se rencontre, c’est là où on parle,
c’est là où on rit, c’est le moment de partage et c’est le moment le plus important, je pense, pour
les musulmans.”512 Another informant explained that eating a meal together was something
traditional in the Maghreb, something brought from “back home,” which allows one to share
one’s origins and desires and to have a discussion with the other person.513 The centrality of the

509

Desjardins and Desjardins, “Role of Food,” 72.
121207_001—“More like an element of gathering, of rallying [together]. It is not an element of separation or of
rupture between people.”
511
See Anne Chemin’s article, “France Remains Faithful to Food as Meals Continue to be a Collective Affair,” The
Guardian, 4 April 2014. Accessed 2 May 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/apr/07/francefood-ritual-meal-tradition.
512
121203_006—“It’s there that we meet, it is there that we talk, it is there where we laugh, it is the moment of
sharing and it is the most important moment I think for Muslims.”
513
121106_001.
510

159

eating experience, then, is a joint cultural conviction for the immigrant Muslim community and
the majority, non-Muslim community in France. If some shared cultural practices are essential to
integration, then highlighting this similarity may be useful for those communities trying to prove
their integration, or the reason why integration is irrelevant to them. These shared cultural
practices go beyond the eating experience itself and encapsulate the kinds of foods consumed as
well. When French non-Muslim, non-Maghrébines eat Muslim/Maghrébine food they inevitably
make the “other” seem less foreign, more a part of “us.” Reflective of Fischler’s comment that
“if eating a food makes one become more like that food, then those sharing the same food
become more like each other,”514 the French non-Maghrébine who not only enjoys couscous but
claims couscous as part of his/her own “French” food practices envelops the “other” into “our”
self-understanding. Just as disgust in the face of “their” food can feed disgust regarding “their”
foreign-ness, so too can acceptance of “their” food feed acceptance of “their” likeness.
Ultimately, the process of defining and then interacting with integration is essential to the
immigrant experience in France. Whether integration equals assimilation or not, or whether one
engages in distinct practices, food or otherwise, to illustrate one’s integration into a particular
culture, there is an overarching importance placed on this subject for Maghrébine Muslim
communities in France. How deeply one is integrated or how shallow has an affect on how one
engages with one’s culture of origin. If, as some informants suggested, no matter how hard one
tries to integrate that person will never be seen as integrated by the majority French culture, what
does that do to that person’s sense of self and sense of belonging? If one cannot possibly “fit in”
in France, will connection to one’s homeland take on a more significant role? It seems as though
how one defines and engages with integration can affect how that person defines and engages
with transnationalism.515
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4.4 Fence Straddling and Unstable Ground: Transnational Efforts by Maghrébine Muslims
in Paris
With notions of “us” versus “them” rampant in the experience of Maghrébine Muslim
immigrants in France, and with forced understandings of integration, one may argue that there
cannot possibly be an “Islam de France.”516 As argued by my informants, there are no “types” of
Islam,517 and consequently no such thing as “Islam de France.” In response to former President
Nicolas Sarkozy’s comments about wanting an “Islam de France” and not an “Islam en France”
one of my informants said: “l’Islam—qui sois en France ou en Égypte ou aux États Unis—c’est
l’Islam. Il y a un seul livre saint, ça s’appelle le Coran. Il n’y a pas un livre saint en France, un
livre saint au Canada.”518 For this informant, and many others, the whole discussion of an “Islam
de France” was not worthwhile, not only because there could not be a separate Islam for one
country, because that would indicate that Islam is fragmented, but also because Islam, from their
experience was not accepted as part of the mainstream French culture (as is made evident by the
discussion that precedes this section). If immigrants from the Maghreb are constantly being sent
the message that they cannot possibly be a part of the collective “we” in France, inevitably this
has an affect on the community’s emphasis on and desire to maintain transnational identity; to be
firmly rooted in France, but reliant on the Maghreb for cultural, social, emotional and even
economic sustenance.
As I mentioned above, and will discuss further in Chapter 7, I use the term transnational
to refer to the process of feeling “at home” in two or more places, and specifically, in two or
more nation-states. Dirk Hoerder in his chapter ““Transnational – transregional – translocal:
transcultural” dissects these various, related and yet distinct terms. In his exploration of
“transnational” one of his principal criticisms of the use of the term is that it posits national
cultures that are identifiable and unique, which he argues cannot hold true since “most states
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are—at least to some degree—composed of many cultural groups.”519 Furthermore, and using
other scholars’ research as support, he proposes that “migrants arrive in complex societies rather
than in mono-cultural nations,” and “no society or state offered only one single model of
adjustment to newly arriving migrants.”520 While this may generally be the case, given what I
have described about French nationalism and its approach to immigration and integration, I argue
that, in fact, France does attempt to present a mono-cultural nation to which all (im)migrants
must adjust. Because of this, my use of the term “transnational” falls in line with the definition
that Hoerder provides in his work, namely that transnationalism refers “to processes by which
‘immigrants’ or ‘transmigrants’ build ‘social fields’ or multi-layered relations linking their
countries of origin with those of settlement, they establish networks in two or more nation-states
and ‘maintain activities, identities and statuses in several’ locations.”521 More simply, the
definition of transnationalism that I engage throughout this work is that of Steven Vertovec
which he describes as “sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations
and social formations spanning nation-states.”522 As I see it, food is an essential instrument in the
transnational immigrant’s tool belt to sustain relationships, affiliations, social formations, and
exchange between the host and home land. In agreement with Miriam Abu Salem, I argue that
“food, as well as language, preserves culture and especially during periods of migration it
becomes essential in providing and sustaining self-representation in the public space as well as
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maintaining firm roots in the motherland.”523 It helps to situate the migrant on both sides of the
transnational fence.
In this section I present the evidence for transnational religion and identity amongst the
Maghrébine Muslims of my study in Paris. As argued by Anderson, immigrants inevitably
straddle cultures, between homeland and host-land.524 For many immigrants, their feet are firmly
on both sides of the fence that they are straddling, trying to find their place in the host-land while
still feeling firmly placed within the homeland. The dynamic of which foot is more firmly
planted than the other vacillates and often changes over the generations. For example, Ebaugh
and Chafetz suggest that “transnational networks are likely to weaken substantially as the
immigrant generation passes from community and congregational leadership and ultimately from
life.”525 In this they suggest that one’s foot would become more firmly planted on the host-land
side of the fence as generations pass and one may simply keep one’s toe on the homeland side—
for example, speaking the home language at holiday events with extended family, and eating the
home food once in a blue moon for nostalgic purposes. If this argument is true, the question
becomes whether there will come a point where transnational connections no longer matter and
what will come after transnationalism for those who formerly held transnational identities. Does
the trans- simply get dropped for a pure, one-sided nationalism? Regardless, it is clear from this,
and from the former discussion on transnationalism, that the transnational immigrant is in a
constant dance with the fence, invisible or not, leaning over to one side on certain occasions and
falling toward the opposite side on others.
For the Maghrébine Muslims whom I interviewed, this straddling dance was complex and
difficult. For members of groups experiencing prejudice in France, the host-land side of the fence
is often protected with sharp barbed wire, sometimes visible and other times not. What is made
clear from my data is that one may feel as though she has her foot firmly in France, but she
inevitably feels how hostile the ground beneath her is. When the ground beneath your left foot is
not firm, you will certainly put more weight on the right foot to balance and protect yourself.
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This rebalancing can be seen as what is happening for many of the Maghrébine Muslims
of my study. The ground under their French foot is not quite sturdy, often leading to experiences
of pain. The ground under the Maghrébine foot, on the other hand, is stable, familiar and
ultimately comforting. As humans who seek safety and belonging it is not surprising, then, that
Maghrébine immigrants’ emphasis on re-creating the homeland in the host-land to some degree
would be strongly present in this community. The goal of transnational identity and practice is to
make this straddling dance a less clumsy and more elegant representation of self; the goal is to
remove the fence completely so that one can move comfortably between the two sides of the
field.
4.4.1 To be a Proud “Blédard(e)”: The Idealized Homeland
The Maghreb is idealized for many of my informants. Nostalgia for the homeland is strong,
whether the person is recently immigrated or a French-born second generation Maghrébine. In
fact, for many of my informants the homeland, what they would refer to as “au bled,” is central
in their thoughts and interactions with the world around them. I’ve already touched on the term
“blédard.” “Au bled” can simply be a way to refer to a foreign country which was someone’s
homeland, but in the French context often refers to rural, isolated portions of the Maghreb.
People who came from “au bled” were often seen as less educated, integrated, etc. Although the
term “blédard(e),” one who comes from “au bled,” on the whole is seen as a negative appellation
by the mainstream majority non-Maghrébine French community, it was held up as a point of
pride by many of my informants. One woman explained it to me as follows:
Beaucoup de Français pensent que, parce que tu viens du bled tu as une tendance [uses an
accent] à parler comme ça, être un peu ce qu’on dit “blédarde.” Je suis une blédarde qui
maîtrise. C’est différent. Mais ça ne me dérange pas d’être une blédarde, si une blédarde
veux dire que je viens du bled. Oui, je viens du bled.526
Instead of being offended by being called someone who comes from North Africa (perceived to
be culturally backwards), this term is appropriated by those very communities it was meant to
insult and is used as a point of pride, in ways reflective of Frantz Fanon’s emphasis on
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reclaiming the things which the colonizer distorts.527 Like the veil, which at the time of
decolonization acted as “the means by which the abjection of colonial subjects could be
transformed into a proud and independent national and personal identity,”528 so too the very
identity of “blédard(e)” could be a subversive symbol taken up by members of former colonies.
Another informant considered being called a “blédard(e)” the ultimate compliment.
Quand on dit “tu viens du bled” c’est le plus beau compliment que l’on me fait, car je
n’aimerai pas perdre cette identité pour rien au monde. Je suis Algérienne, je le resterais
toute ma vie. C’est ce qui m’a fait, c’est ce qui m’a construit, c’est ce qui me donne mes
idées, mon point de vue, ma façon d’être. Après, j’adore vivre en France.529
This informant’s explanation shows the two sides of the transnational fence. She is proud to be
firmly planted in her Maghrébine identity and yet loves having her other foot planted on French
ground. Both these informants use a negative term in the majority French context to express a
proud transnational identity.
Most of my informants envision a return “au bled” for their retirement. Even those
informants who were born in France have an idealized vision of the homeland that encourages a
desire to maintain connection with the homeland while in the host-land. In fact, transnational
identity and practice allows the immigrant to take the good from both sides of their transnational
identity. For example, as one woman explained,
j’ai la chance, moi, contrairement à ceux qui sont nées en France et qui sont uniquement
Français, j’ai la chance de pouvoir me protéger par ma première identité et ma culture
maternelle de naissance, qui est la culture algérienne.530
Unlike those uni-national people, who can rely only on one-sided identity, transnational
identifiers have a complex, rich context from which to draw. When necessary they can
emphasize their “Frenchness” and when necessary they can emphasize their “Maghrébineness.”
This emphasis on one side or the other can come from a variety of sources. I have already
addressed the importance of projecting identities when trying to claim identities, but here I
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address the need to emphasize transnational identity because of inward forces. Immigrants have a
need to build, project and protect transnational activities in order to feel connected to their past
and understand their present. For my informants, maintaining connection to the homeland is an
essential part of their everyday experience in France, more essential for some than for others.
Because of the political and social context in France, members of immigrant communities are
constantly sent the message that they are not “fully French.” Hence, transnational identity is seen
as inevitable for these communities, whether they choose it or not, at least as imposed from the
outside. On the other hand, again because of the context in France, which is often hostile toward
immigrant communities (the majority of which are Maghrébine Muslims) transnationalism
provides these communities with some level of acceptance, comfort and self-understanding.
While the French side of their identity may be contested, the Maghrébine side often is not.531
To maintain connection to the homeland, to break down the real or imagined borders
between host- and homeland, and to feed one’s transnational identity, accessibility to the
homeland is key. This accessibility comes in the form of trips back home, or frequent phone calls
and interaction over the Internet.532 Thomas Tweed emphasizes the importance of artifacts,
tropes, rituals, etcetera, in the processes of crossing and dwelling.533 Ebaugh and Chafetz’ work,
Religion Across Borders, posits that modern technology has made transnational connections
easier to maintain.534 The question then becomes, has modern technology made the need for
rituals, artifacts and tropes less necessary in the process of boundary making and boundary
531
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crossing? If one can simply go on the Internet and see Algeria, is it necessary to recreate Algeria
in France? If one can maintain connection to the past and the religiously significant locations of
one’s religious identity is it necessary to emphasize metaphors, and artifacts? That being said,
technology itself appears to be just another mechanism for dwelling and crossing.
What became clear from my research is that even with increased computer and
communications technology, which brings the homeland closer, trips back to the homeland still
play a significant role (boundary crossing is aided here by a different kind of technological
advancement: air travel). Not only are trips by those living in France to the Maghreb common,
but trips by family members who still live in the Maghreb to visit those living in France are also
common. Vertovec suggests that there are varying degrees of mobility found among the
transnational migrant community in any given place. For example, there are those “(a) who
travel regularly between specific sites, (b) who mainly stay in one place of immigration but
engage people and resources in place of origin, and (c) who have never moved but whose
locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad.”535 Many of my first
generation informants would fall into the first category as they would go once a year to the
Maghreb, while others, including second generation Maghrébines who fall into the second
category, would go every few years. For example, one informant expressed the importance of
going back to Tunisia for the Eid because “ma famille est en Tunisie, quand je peux y aller j’y
vais, mais sinon j’y vais [au moins] chaque année.”536 This informant tried to go back home for
the major religious celebrations and also simply to visit her family. Another informant explained
to me the importance of his transnational identity. He noted that, while he grew up in Algeria, he
has lived for most of his adult life in France and he nourishes both these sides of himself. He
explained the way that he maintains connection with Algeria as follows:
Ma vie d’adulte, je l’ai vécu en France, avec bien sûr des allers-retours parce que je partais
souvent en Algérie. J’ai gardé le lien avec l’Algérie. Entre parenthèse, je suis également
Français.537
Frequent trips home allow this Algerian to “keep the tie with Algeria” that is essential to his
knowledge of himself as equally French and Algerian. When speaking with another informant
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about the celebration of Eid Al-Adha, she expressed that it was ideal to celebrate “back home”
with the family, where the rituals could be celebrated to their fullest extent.538 She informed me
that, as long as people have the means, she believed that they would go back to the Maghreb for
the celebration of the Eid. Even for those without high paying jobs, i.e., without a great deal of
disposable income, trips back home are important. Many of the women with whom I worked in
the kitchen at the mosque went back to the Maghreb for long visits after the month of Ramadan
was complete.539 In particular, the woman who ran the operations of the mosque kitchen
conveyed to me how important it was to her to return home once a year to re-connect with family
and reinvigorate herself and her identity as a Moroccan living in France.540 Many of the people I
spoke with at the mosque would talk about saving money all year in order to go “home” once a
year. These trips home are made possible by the fact that the distance between France and the
Maghreb is manageable. The flights are frequent, short, and depending on the time of year, not
horribly expensive. Even when the flights are expensive, these trips are given importance and
money is spent regardless.
4.4.2 “Elles arrivent avec les légumes”541: Food and Transnationalism
Beyond just connecting with family, and one’s past, these trips back home are used strategically
as well, mostly to bring food back from the homeland to host-land. To help create a small piece
of the homeland in France, to help ease the transition, to “dwell” as Thomas Tweed would say,
informants feel a need to bring back food and other objects from “au bled,” or have family
members bring them for them. The three most frequent items brought back from the Maghreb to
France are: couscous, spices and oils, and vegetables. Even though it is forbidden to bring some
538
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food across the border, many of my informants and their family and friends would engage in
such behaviour in an effort to feel like the borders between homeland and host-land were not so
high. While many of my informants expressed the importance of living by rules, whether of
society or Islam, they were willing to break rules to feed their transnational identities. One
informant told me about her mother bringing food for her from the Maghreb:
Ma mère, quand elle vient me voir d’Algérie, elle m’achète des tomates. Elle m’achète
des poivrons, des courgettes, des navets. Elle ramène d’huile d’olive. Et parfois, ma mère
ramène de la viande. Donc, ma mère fait passer clandestinement dans les valises, et ma
mère n’est pas la seul, eh? Elles sont toutes comme ça. Elles arrivent avec des légumes.542
This story was one of many that I was told about people bringing allowed and forbidden things
back in their suitcases with them. Some would even travel to the Maghreb with an empty
suitcase to specifically fill it up with food products that they could not get in France, or ones that
simply did not have the same taste (goût) as they do “au bled.” Like these women who would
arrive with vegetables, David E. Sutton in his work, Remembrance of Repasts: An Anthropology
of Food and Memory, also found that his informants would bring back food from the homeland,
mostly feta, in their suitcases. He suggests that they do this as a means of evoking wholeness;
“the food event evokes a whole world of family, agricultural associations, place names and other
“local knowledge.””543 By bringing back ingredients from “au bled” my informants, like other
immigrants all over the world, engage in this evocation.
The fact that many people bring food products back from the Maghreb to Paris is
indicative of the central role that food plays in transnational connection. When analyzing my
transnationalism code, of the eight most frequently occurring words, half of them were food
words. Words such as taste, vegetables, meat and couscous were prevalent in almost every single
interview. Technology, no matter how impressive, did not seem to take away the need to
continue to buy and consume Maghrébine food products. According to Kalcik’s chapter in
Brown and Mussell’s 1984 work, Ethnic and Regional Foodways in the United States, foodways
are notably resistant to change because they are part of the earliest formed layers of culture, and
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those layers are the last to erode.544 When everything else is changing for the immigrant, these
layers of identity that are resistant to change become important. We find an example of the
centrality of food in transnational identity in Sussman’s chapter in Gafaiti et al.’s work
Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World. There she argues that “cooking
Algerian Jewish cuisine offered the Algerian Jews an active way of preserving the past for future
generations.”545 In fact one of her informants stated:
Wherever we are, in France, Montréal, or elsewhere, as long as we prepare our cuisine,
we still exist as a specific people with a long history behind us. Our cuisine represents
our culture that we try to pass on to the children.546
Food is representative of culture and is a means of connection to that culture. One of my
informants similarly expressed: “quand je goûte à une cuisine, je retrouve le pays d’origine.”547
Food and transnationalism are inevitably linked because food is inevitably linked to nationalism,
to memory and to identity.
For my informants eating and food preparation were important aspects of their efforts to
maintain connection with the homeland while in the host-land. In fact, for many, it was the most
important and most easily accessible doorway to their home identity. Because when you “taste a
cuisine, you find the country of origin,” eating that cuisine can allow the homesick immigrant a
moment of comfort. Food acts as way to remember, to access memories, and to cross invisible
boundaries. Sutton similarly posits that sensory objects and experiences are important “in
reconnecting and remembering experiences and places one has left behind for short- or long-term
migration…objects can shift levels of identity when experienced in new contexts, becoming a
symbol not just of home or local place, but of countries or perhaps regions.”548 Food is one of
these objects that becomes essential for reconnecting the migrant to home, for crossing
boundaries of time and place, and consequently for re-creating home in the host land.
To maintain transnational connections through food one must have access to
transnational ingredients. It is easier to create a “petit Maghreb” when one can purchase
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ingredients that one may find in the Maghreb. One informant explained to me the importance of
cooking food from the homeland as a means to present a transnational identity. He explained that
such a practice was differently motivated whether he was cooking for himself or for others. He
expressed that “si je fais un plat de couscous, ce n’est pas tout le temps. C’est si j’invite des amis
c’est pour leur donner quelque chose. Si je le fais pour moi, c’est pour retrouver quelque
chose.”549 For this informant food is a means of finding something missing. One does not need to
find something that is out in plain sight, but one “finds something” that is hidden, that is
understood to be present and yet often not clearly located.
À la recherche du temps perdu, to use the words of Proust (“In search of lost time”), in
the process of trying to find something that is missing from one’s transnational identity, memory
plays a significant role in gaining access to the missing thing. As already argued, food is
inherently tied to memory. Meredith McGuire argues that “memory resides in the whole
body…[;] that means that memory can be closely connected with our senses and bodily states,
including experiences of which we are not even conscious.”550 Our sense of taste, then, and the
bodily experience of eating are powerful means of accessing those memories resident in the
body. If food is tied to memory and memory is an access point for something that one cannot
access physically, then food can be seen as playing a significant role in accessing and presenting
connection to distant homelands and identities. Like the students in Desjardins and Desjardins’
work, food practices can become essential for people who are living away from “home,” because
it “connects them with the smells and tastes of home.”551 One informant said that food practices
acted as “repères” (benchmarks or landmarks) for his memories.552 Food is the trigger, the
ground for the memory. One woman explained to me that when she went to a Moroccan
restaurant, even though she was Algerian, she found the flavours of her childhood reminded her
of that.553 Another informant said the tie of memory and food when he described to me how he
thought of his mother and grandmother. When describing what it was like to grow up in a
traditional family and imagining his mother and grandmother, he said “j’en ai encore le goût en
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pensant à elle.”554 For this informant, who was a man in his sixties, his taste memories were what
came to mind when thinking of growing up in Algeria.
Not only was food memory a result of accessing memories of the homeland, it was also a
deliberate action taken to evoke those memories. As Sutton says, we “eat in order to remember.”555
It was not simply that people thought of the homeland and as a result thought of the food that
related to those moments, but food was used to evoke memories, and to evoke mental access to
those memories and the related spaces. For example, one informant stated: “si j’ai envie de me
rappeler du pays, forcément je vais faire de la chorba.”556 For this informant, a kind of soup was a
tool to access a memory about his country. Another informant expressed a similar tactic. He told
me that he ate, and many other Maghrébines, even those born in France, eat as though they are
back “au bled,” in order to gain access to the homeland, to the flavours and to the connection.557
For other informants it is simply a matter of nostalgia for one’s childhood, which is inevitably tied
to food.558
One may seek out food from the homeland, not necessarily for the transnational
connection, but simply for the nostalgia for one’s childhood, which one just happened to spend
in that particular locale. Regardless, when one eats the home food, one feels at home. As one
informant expressed, when describing a dinner that she had at a Moroccan restaurant, “je me suis
senti au Maroc; la décoration, le manger, le goût.”559 Sutton explains this as a means of
connecting with the imagined community of the homeland. Eating a particular thing, in a
particular way, creates “the embodied knowledge that others are eating the same food.”560 Food
transports us to the homeland and the homeland to us.561
To recreate the homeland in the host-land and to cook the home food one must have
access to the necessary ingredients. I addressed this issue by asking my informants if it was
difficult to find the necessary ingredients to maintain religious and cultural food practices from
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the Maghreb in France. Every single informant suggested that it was relatively easy to find the
necessary elements, whether they needed them for their own personal food practices or not. This
is a newer development for the community, though.
One informant explained to me that while it is easy to find halal meat, and everything
else one may need to recreate cultural and religious food practice in France, that was not always
the case. In fact,
la première génération, quand ils sont arrivés en France, ils n’avaient pas des boucheries
halal. Donc, ils ont acheté leur viande dans les boucheries non-halal. Sinon, ils sont
condamnés par leur parents de manger de la viande.562
For those first generations, before a solid market had started for North African and halal
products, immigrants would have difficulty recreating home in France. Hence the emphasis on
trips back home to bring products back to France. That is no longer the case, though.
My informants spoke about how easy it was to find everything they needed to cook
Maghrébine dishes in France and how this led to feeling like they were “chez nous, au bled.”563
In fact, one informant suggested that,
aujourd’hui, on peut tout faire. Je n’ai aucune difficulté à préparer les plats que ma mère
faisait, et d’autres que je trouve sur internet ou dans les bouquins de recette; il n’y a
vraiment aucune difficulté. Aussi bien, en termes de viande qu’en termes d’épices, très
important dans la préparation aux Maghreb. Les épices sont très importants. Tout est
disponible. Je n’ai aucune difficulté à trouver la matière première pour faire les plats
traditionnels…Quasiment tout est accessible. 99% de ce que l’on peut faire en Algérie,
on peut le faire ici.564
This ease of accessibility of ingredients can be attributed to the former colonial relationship
between France and the Maghreb, the close distance between the two locations, and the
increasing demand for these products in France. Not only does this allow for ease of access for
people to bring ingredients back with them when they visit the homeland, as discussed above,
but also to allow the ease of commerce between the two locations.565
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While most of my informants would suggest that you could find almost everything (99
percent) in France and make 99 percent of the dishes, and maintain 99 percent of one’s
transnational identity, others suggested that the situation in France was even better than that in
the Maghreb. It may be even easier in France than in the Maghreb to maintain the Maghrébine
part of one’s transnational identity because, according to these informants, you can get even
more ingredients in France than you could get back home. One informant explained it as follows:
Il y a des produits ici en France que l’on ne retrouve plus dans les pays du Maghreb.
Comme spécialités, les épices dans les pays du Maghreb on trouve de moins en moins de
bonnes épices. Alors qu’en France de bonnes épices on en trouve partout. On peut faire la
cuisine que l’on fait au Maghreb.566
Because France is a country that views food as essential, the market for speciality goods and
spices is large, and consequently one can find practically everything one needs. Not only that,
but if one is in the Maghreb, one often only has access to the spices and ingredients of the region
in which one is located. One cannot necessarily get spices from another region in the Maghreb.
In France, on the other hand, one has access to all spices of all regions in one place. One
informant painted the picture as follows:
On trouve tout, même on trouve mieux. Parce qu’en Algérie, on n’a pas les ingrédients du
Maroc, de la Tunisie, mais à Paris on a tout ce que l’on veut. Et quand je vais faire mes
courses au marché de Saint-Ouen ou au marché de Nanterre, je trouve même la menthe
qui vient du Maroc, les courgettes qui viennent du Maroc, pas les courgettes françaises.
Et les radis ou le navet venant du Maroc, qui n’existent pas en Algérie.567
For this informant, Maghrébine identity was potentially maintained even more easily in France
than in the Maghreb because of the access to pan-Maghrébine ingredients.
The question arises: if one can find practically all of the necessary ingredients in France,
or perhaps even more, why do people continue to bring food back from the Maghreb with them?
Also, if the ingredients are exactly the same, and one can get the spices and products one needs
to make traditional Maghrébine dishes, does that mean that the food is exactly the same in
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France as it is in the Maghreb? Does one have an easier time feeling at home with one’s food
practice in France than in the Maghreb? While one may imagine that this is the case, considering
the fact that some of my informants suggested that you could get everything necessary to
recreate traditional Maghrébine food in France, most of my informants suggested otherwise.
While the dishes were all the same, while one could get harissa and zucchini and halal meat, my
informants expressed that there was still a significant difference in taste (goût).
4.4.2.1 Difference in “Goût”: The Social Construction of Taste
The idea of there being a difference in taste between Maghrébine dishes prepared in France and
those prepared in the Maghreb was a significant theme that arose in my interviews. In fact, all
but one of my 33 interviewees mentioned something about this difference in “goût.” From the
first interview to the last, informants described how one could prepare all of one’s favourite
traditional dishes, and practice all of one’s religious food practices in France, but that something
was different, something was missing. That something was a particular taste: the taste of home. I
remember sitting in the park by the mosque conducting my first interview with a first-generation
Algerian man, who casually brought up this difference in taste and brushed it off as “quelque
chose [de] normal.”568 Because it was my first interview, and because I was not looking for this
response, I did not engage the topic further, but it did not matter, because later in the interview
he brought it up again. He noted that even if someone takes the exact same ingredient in France
and in the Maghreb, it will not be the same because the taste would be different. This was not
just something he read, or heard, but something he directly experienced. When describing this
difference in “taste” to me with various examples, he said: “je parle avec l’expérience, parce que
j’ai goûté ici, et j’ai goûté là-bas, donc je sais comment ça se passe. Là-bas c’est différent par
rapport à ici. Même l’huile d’olive, par exemple, c’est pas pareil.”569 When I left that interview
that day, I noted that it was curious that he had brought up this difference in taste, but did not
think much of it. I did not imagine that practically every single one of my informants would
highlight this difference. It became clear that there was something going on with the idea of
“taste” that I needed to address. This phenomenon is not unusual. Desjardins and Desjardins
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similarly speak about this difference in taste of the same ingredient in two different locations.570
Instead of the home food tasting better than the same food in the host land, Desjardins and
Desjardins speak of this phenomenon in relation to transformed langar food tasting “better” than
home food even when the same ingredients are used.571
Although two of my informants suggested that there was no difference between the taste
of the dishes or ingredients in France versus in the Maghreb, the other 30 suggest that there were
clear differences. For one reason or another, these informants saw the ingredients that come from
the Maghreb as more full of flavour, as having a better taste, and as generally leading to more
delicious dishes. When exploring the different responses that people gave me, three explanations
for why there was a difference in taste became apparent. The arguments were made that it was
because of 1) the organic nature of Maghreb products, 2) the different ambiance, or 3) pure
psychology.
The most prevalent reasoning for the difference in taste that my informants gave relates
to the nature of the ingredient itself. For these informants, Maghrébine products provided
superior taste because they were inevitably organic. These informants would explain that even if
one could find all of the necessary ingredients in France, the taste would still be different
because the vegetables and the meat in the Maghreb are raised without additives, in the sunshine,
and in artisanal572 rather than industrial ways.573 One informant explained to me the difference
between the vegetables in France and those in the Maghreb as follows:
Les légumes français ne sont pas terribles. Nos légumes sont plein de terre, ils sont pas
très bons à regarder mais en fait ils sont très, très goûteux. Ici, ils sont tous beaux, tous
grands, tous mâchants, mais le goût … n’y pas trop. En fait, je crois que notre agriculture
en Algérie c’est l’agriculture bio ici. Ce qu’ils appellent le bio ici. Pour nous c’est de la
normale en Algérie.574
For this informant, and for others, organic vegetables are thought to be the norm in the Maghreb
and accordingly provided better taste. Many informants highlighted the abundance of sunlight that
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the vegetables would get in the Maghreb as the reason for this difference.575 Another theme that
arose throughout people’s responses about the difference in taste was the physical comparison
between vegetables in France and those in the Maghreb. I had informants express how there are
“de très bons légumes” (very good vegetables) in France and yet are far from being “bons” (tasty),
while in the Maghreb the vegetables are “tout pourris…pas beaux physiquement”576 but have an
amazing, true flavour. Another informant described it as follows:
Quand je croque dans une tomate chez moi, c’est une redécouverte de la tomate. Ici, j’ai
l’impression que les légumes sont fades. C’est une réalité, ils sont beaux, chez moi ils ne
sont pas beaux. Ils sont toujours petits, tout écrabouillés, la carotte elle est tordue. Mais
quand on cuisine … on sent les légumes, on sent le goût.577
In this response we see the comparison between French and Maghrébine ingredients yet again. It
is notable that these informants claim that the French vegetables are beautiful on the outside but
bland on the inside while the opposite is true of Maghrébine vegetables. If food represents
identity and can act as a metaphor for people, this may be a way of saying that “sure they may
look nice, but they are bland and lacking on the inside. Whereas we may not be pretty but we are
of the earth, natural, and full of flavour.” Not only that, but setting up the difference in taste as
one based on “our” ingredients versus “their” ingredients is just one more example of ways that
the paradigm of “us” versus “them” can be worked out on the ground. This informant also
suggested that when she eats the “home” ingredients she rediscovers the vegetable itself. There is
purity to the experience, a truth to the experience of eating these organic, from the earth
vegetables, that one cannot possibly get in the host-land.
While many of my informants suggested that it was impossible to get the same sort of
taste from ingredients in France, there were a couple of people who suggested that it was
possible. When I asked one informant about the difference in taste she responded differently than
most. She said:
Alors je vous fais la réponse des Algériens, qui est, “non c’est pas le même goût parce
que les légumes ils sont pas pareilles, parce que la viande il est pas pareille, parce
que….” C’est vrai que là-bas certains aliments comme les fruits et les légumes ont un peu
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plus de goût. Ils sont moins insectisés qu’en France. C’est vrai. Mais quand on a une
bonne primeur, les légumes ils sont très bons.578
The difference in this case is not so much between French and Maghrébine vegetables, but
between organic and industrial vegetables. Another informant suggested that it was possible to
find good quality vegetables in France but the problem was that they were incredibly expensive.
He explained, “les légumes, il faut vraiment acheter le plus cher pour avoir du goût. Or là-bas, le
moins cher est déjà bon.”579 In sum, the general belief is that everyone has access to the taste-full
vegetables of the Maghreb, whereas in France only those with lots of money do.
Whether one could buy organic vegetables in Paris and closely recreate the taste of the
traditional home food, or use the vegetables that one brought home from the home land, some
informants argued that this was not enough to erase the difference in taste. One informant
explained to me that the difference in taste that was so evident was not so much about the
ingredients, but about the ambiance of the eating experience.
Le dîner, ça va être la même chose, le couscous on le fait à Paris ou Alger, ça va être
exactement le même. Y aura aucune différence. Mais c’est vrai que l’ambiance donne un
goût différent au plat que l’on va manger. Il ne sera pas dégusté de la même façon.580
Other informants explained to me that eating back home in the Maghreb offered a better, truer,
experience because the ambiance was totally different and this changed everything, even the
tastes of the moment. Trying to recreate this ambiance was an important effort put forward by
people in the community that I was studying, but many argued that it would be almost
impossible to fully recreate because of the French approach to eating and to work. Just as much
as a French person may look at a North American and argue that the North American culture is
not conducive to slow eating, long lunches, and three hour meals, many of my Maghrébine
informants argued that the French culture was not conducive to really slow eating, extra-long
lunches, and eight-hour food preparation, not to mention the importance of eating as a family and
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larger community. These are the factors that affect the ambiance of the eating experience, and as
a result, at least according to this one informant, affect the taste of the dish one is eating. Here we
see an example of what Paulette Kershenovich Schuster suggests, that is, that the difference in
taste arises from the fact that taste is culturally and socially influenced.581
Another informant, who also suggested that the difference in taste comes from a
difference in ambiance, explained that this difference was one that happens not in reality but only
“dans la tête.”582 She explained that one could have the exact same ingredients, the exact same
person who prepares the meal, but because of the difference in ambiance, one will think that
there is a different taste. The argument that the difference in taste was merely a psychologicallybased difference is the final argument that I address here. For these informants, the difference in
taste was evident, but they did not try to argue that it was a physical difference, or one that
necessarily actually manifested in a legitimate difference in taste; rather, they said, it was one
that was simply created in the minds of the person eating the food. In one of my interviews this
idea was presented as follows.
Autre: Psychologiquement, ce n’est pas la même chose.
Rachel: Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire?
Autre: C’est-à-dire, c’est dans ta tête que ça se passe. En réalité c’est la même chose mais
c’est meilleur si tu le fais chez toi en Algérie. C’est comme ton plat: le pancake. Quand tu
le fais avec ta maman, le goût est meilleur au Canada. Pour moi, c’est pareil. C’est la
même chose.583
This informant claimed that there was no real difference the ingredients are the same, but it still
tastes different. Another informant, in reflecting on what could possibly give this different taste,
suggested that “c’est peut-être psychologique.”584 She explained that she had searched for so
long for what the difference could possibly be, and eventually realized that she had no good
reason for it to be different and wondered if it may just be something that she created in her
mind.
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As much as my informants clearly noticed these differences, the taste was not noticeably
different for a non-Maghrébine like myself. One afternoon I was visiting with some of my
informants, one of whom had just arrived back to France from a trip to Algeria. He asked if I
wanted dates. I said, “no thank you” and was even able to justify my refusal by saying “I have
lots of dates at home.” My friend responded “Oh you do, do you? Where do you come from?
Who are you?” insinuating that only Maghrébines/Arabs have dates at home. I responded “I’m a
Maghrébine now.” This got a laugh. He then assured me that I still had to take some dates
because these dates came from Algeria and therefore tasted better than the dates that I had at
home. When I got home that evening I snacked on a couple of them, and they tasted exactly like
all the other dates I had eaten since arriving in France. I reflected and determined that either I
had been eating dates fresh from Algeria the whole time (which I knew was not true), or my
palate did not pick up on the differences, perhaps because my palate was not refined enough, or
perhaps because these obvious differences in taste were not so obvious for an outsider.
Similarly, while these differences in taste were obvious for my informants, some
informants suggested that this difference in taste went away the longer you are away from the
homeland. That is to say, while the difference in taste was painfully evident in the first years
someone spent in France, with time that difference faded. For example, one informant expressed
the effect of time on this issue with the following story.
Par exemple, quand je suis arrivé, j’ai trouvé que le goût de la viande, des légumes, ne
sont pas les mêmes. Moi je trouve que les légumes en Algérie et la viande sont beaucoup
plus bons, on va dire. Parce que, on va dire qu’en Algérie il n’y a pas de… ils utilisent
pas beaucoup… c’est bio pratiquement. Donc, forcément le goût c’est, uh, mais avec le
temps ça veut dire que, quand on s’habitue, quand on commence à vivre vraiment
longtemps ici, moi je fais plus la différence.585
Another informant expressed this decline in noticeable difference as a process of becoming
anaesthetised. He stated:
Je suis anesthésié de la bouche. Mais quand je suis arrivé c’était clair. Et tous mes amis
en France diraient la même chose. Les aliments en France ont moins de goût qu’en
Algérie.586
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120917_001—“For example when I arrived, I found that the taste of the meat, of vegetables was not the same.
I found that the vegetables from Algeria and the meat was, shall we say, much better. Because, shall we say that in
Algeria there is not, they do not use much, it is practically organic. So, naturally the taste is uh, but with time, that
means, when one gets used to it and lives a long, long time here, now, I myself do not notice the difference.”
586
121129_002—“I am anesthetized in my mouth. But when I arrived it was clear. And all my friends in France said
the same thing. The ingredients in France have less taste than in Algeria.”
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For both these informants, the difference in taste was evident to them in the beginning but with
time disappeared.
Whatever the argument is for why the taste was different, often meaning “better” in the
Maghreb than in France, it became clear from my interviews that it was important to try to get to
as close as possible to the full “taste” of the homeland. One informant seemed to suggest that one
could not feel fully at home in France because of this difference in taste. She expressed that the
difference leads to a great sense of disappointment, so much so that she would rather not even try
to recreate the home food because it just could not be the same. She stated, “parfois c’est
déprimant. Ah oui, c’est dur, c’est dur. Je préfère de ne pas manger que de manger quelque chose
qui a une imitation de quelque chose que j’ai aimé.”587 For this informant it was better to eat
something totally different than to try and recreate a loved dish that looked the same, and was
prepared the same, but did not taste the same. For her, and for many others like her, her cultural
food practice would change because of her connection to her homeland and the continuing
influence of memory and experience of “how things should be” based on “how things were” in
her homeland.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I explored how my informants negotiate their transnational identities through food
practice. First, I addressed the process of “othering” that happens between the Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants of my study and the non-Muslim, multi-generation European French that
surround them. I presented how my informants see a clear distinction between “us” and “them”
based on dichotomies between the two cultures, specifically as represented in food practices. My
informants suggested that one could see the difference between “us” and “them” based on
approaches to hospitality, and more specifically in what, how and where one eats.
While my informants spent a significant amount of time explaining how they saw
themselves as distinct from the non-Muslim French community, they also tried to remove these
boundaries between “us” and “them” by pointing out other “thems” for the majority French
culture to focus on. In this I showed how my informants would speak about Judaism as the real
587

121123_001—“Sometimes it’s depressing. Ah yes, it’s hard, it’s hard. I prefer to not eat than to eat something
that is an imitation of something that I love.”
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“them” and how food was often the example given for why Jewish people in France were a more
problematic group than Muslims. At minimum, I had informants show how Muslim and Jewish
food practices were similar, arguing that since Jewish food practices were generally accepted in
France so too should Muslim ones; if Jewish people in France were not being labelled as a
“them” because of their food practices then neither should Muslims.
When considering relations between two separate groups the question of integration
becomes important. In this section I addressed the various ways that my informants defined this
controversial term. Through this I discovered seven different definitions and consequent
understandings of integration. For my informants, integration was 1) not assimilation, and yet 2)
about being just like everyone else (assimilation); it was 3) about being a good citizen, 4) or
about being good in general; integration inevitably implicated 5) respect, 6) racism and 7)
language issues.
Because integration can be a difficult topic to address for many members of immigrant
communities in a country such as France, I attempted to gain access to the ways people were
engaging with integration on the ground through their food practice. People might not want to
talk about integration, but they were willing to talk about ingestion. The ways that my informants
interacted with their religious and cultural food practices in fact revealed a great deal about how
they felt about their integration processes, or lack thereof. In this section I showed how specific
food practices reveal a commitment to integration, or a commitment to not integrate, as well as
the ability of food and eating to be an access point to understanding and/or encounter with “the
other” (an essential element in integration). For some, maintaining religiously and culturally
accurate foodways was in line with their definition of integration; hence they saw themselves as
being able to maintain those foodways while still claiming an integrated identity. Others felt a
need to change their foodways in an effort to show how they had integrated into the French
culture, e.g. by drinking with colleagues. On the other hand, my informants presented the idea
that food could also be an access point to understanding the “other.”
After this exploration of integration, I then addressed the efforts that my informants made
to maintain their transnational identities in Paris. I showed how my informants interacted with
both sides of their transnational identities, often idealizing the homeland, and yet transforming
the home practice in the host land. Whatever the case may be, my informants felt a need to
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maintain connections to the homeland to some extent, and this often happened through their
interaction with the home food.
If food is tied to memory and memory is an access point for something that one cannot
necessarily access physically, then food can be seen as playing a significant role in accessing and
presenting connections to distant homelands and identities. My informants maintained
transnational connection by cooking “home food” frequently and in culturally and religiously
accurate ways. In order for this to be a reality, my informants needed to have access to the home
ingredients, often bringing them back with them from trips “au bled.”
While my informants were able to get their hands on all of the necessary ingredients and
were able to make all of their home-food in Paris, there was still something missing according to
most of my informants, and that was the taste of the homeland. 32 of my 33 informants
mentioned the fact that there was a difference in taste in the home and host ingredients. I
explored the various reasons that my informants gave for this difference in taste and suggested
that this process of reasoning may be a psychological means of addressing one’s transnational
experience. For many of my informants, food is one of the most beautiful aspects of their
homeland identity and thus it is an essential means of maintaining this identity in their immigrant
location.
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Chapter 5: “Même si je ne pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman”588:
Food Practice as a Lens into Religion and Culture
5.1 Introduction
This discussion of changing practice brings us to the final chapter in the Paris case study and of
the exploration of the Maghrébine immigrant experience in Paris. Having explored the
negotiations of identity and transnationalism for my informants, I can now address the actual
practices of the individuals that I interviewed. I begin with an exploration of the relationship
between religion and culture. Using food practice as a lens, I discuss the various ways that
members of these communities understand their practice and consequently their engagement
with religion and culture. Within this discussion, I present some of the religious food obligations
that my informants spoke about and the hierarchy of practice that seems to be evident. This
hierarchy allowed me to create a fourfold typology of religious and cultural food practices that I
explore in this chapter. Throughout I present the three main arguments that my informants gave
for their practice, namely, that 1) it was based in the Quran, 2) there was some scientific or
health reason for the practice, and/or 3) it was a way of life. I then finish this chapter by giving
an overview of the general trends in these individuals’ cultural and religious food practice. In this
I explore the times, and examples of, when my informants increased their cultural and religious
food practices, decreased them, or generally maintained the same level of practice as they did in
the homeland.
5.2 “Un peu les deux: culturelle et religieuse”589: Culture Versus Religion in Paris
The distinction between, or relationship of, culture and religion has been a pervasive theme
throughout this research. When discussing a topic such as food practice, this question is
prevalent. Although Ahmed suggests that breaking anything down into binary categories such as
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121206_001—“Even if I don’t practice at all, I still feel Muslim.” This quotation comes from a respondent who
practices the Ramadan fast, but does not practice the daily prayers, drinks alcohol, eats pork, etc., and went on to
say that the practice of Ramadan was both cultural and religious for him.
589
121129_001—“A bit of both: cultural and religious.”

184

this is problematic,590 I argue that the definition of a practice as cultural or religious has
multivalent effects. I found, through examining the food practices of my informants, that how
one categorizes a practice can affect how the practitioner feels about her practice, as well as how
the outside viewer feels about it. It can affect how flexible, essential or valid both parties
consider the practice. Simply labelling the same practice as cultural by some and religious by
others reveals the complexity of the issue. How does one determine what is cultural and what is
religious? Who is the authority? What is authentic practice? All these questions are difficult to
answer in any authoritative way, and this is the reason that Ahmed suggests that breaking things
into categories of “religion” and “culture” is so problematic. He argues that
the human and historical phenomenon of Islam is a field of meaning where truth is
constituted, arranged, and lived in terms not of categories constituted by mutual
exclusion, but rather by categories of mutual intersorption and inter-locution that run
athwart and conceptually frustrate the religious/secular binary or religion/culture
division.591
By engaging the question of “culture” versus “religion,” by examining how my informants
understood these terms and their practices that were representative of them, by revealing the
diversity of interaction with these categories, I too will conceptually frustrate this binary.
Instead of defining culture and religion and imposing that definition on my informants, I
allowed them to define what was cultural or religious for them.592 My informants clearly
engaged these binaries and implemented them in different ways in relationship to their food
practices. For example, one informant stressed to me the importance of drawing the line between
culture (what he called tradition) and religion. He expressed to me that
il y a quelque chose vraiment fondamental qu’il faut absolument que les gens
comprennent, c’est qu’il y a une religion et une tradition, et ça, c’est pas le même chose,
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Ahmed, What is Islam, 116.
Ahmed, What is Islam, 116.
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These definitions often came out in response to a couple of the questions that I asked my informants during our
interviews. First, after asking the question: “Je suppose que vous êtes musulman/e. Est-ce correct?” I would ask my
informants to clarify what it meant to them to be Muslim, did they have specific practices that were in line with
that understanding of what it meant to be Muslim, etc. Within this they would often separate out religious and
cultural elements of their understanding of what is Islam. Furthermore, when I asked my informants about the
various food practices that came to mind when they thought about their religious lives and food in those contexts
they would list a great deal of food practices. Afterwards I would often enquire of each individual practice,
whether or not they saw that practice as religious or cultural.
591
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parce que les traditions divergent selon le pays d’où tu viens, mais la religion, elle est
sacrée et elle est unique à tout le monde.593
While my informants had differing understandings of what these two realms were, many did
make a distinction between culture and religion. While there is some blurring of the lines
between religious and cultural practices, most of my informants did argue for a foundational set
of Muslim practices, namely the five pillars of Islam.594
What was included in the five pillars sometimes varied, and there were some informants
who did not know exactly what the five pillars were. They would state that the five pillars were
the foundational Muslim practice, but then would either not list all the pillars or would confuse
other Muslim practices with the pillars. For example, one informant, a young, second generation
Algerian woman, listed the five pillars of Islam to me as follows. “D’une part, c’est faire la
prière, ne pas manger de porc, faire l’aumône, fêter le mois du ramadan, et si un jour Dieu me
l’accorde, inshallah, comme on dit chez nous, aller à la Mecque au pèlerinage.”595 She expressed
that her practice was simply the five pillars of Islam, as if this was the most basic and wellunderstood way of practicing and yet she forgot the shahada (declaring belief in the oneness of
God and the unique status of Muhammad as God’s Prophet), and replaced it with the interdiction
against eating pork. Like the groups which Kate Holbrook examines in her work, the Nation of
Islam and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,596 my informants highlight what some
may see as secondary religious values and practices over the more commonly understood central
tenets and practices of the faith.
While there are many realms in which to explore the difference and/or relationship of
culture and religion, I focus on the realm of food and food practice. As is made evident by the
previous example, food plays an essential role in religious and cultural practices for the members
of the community that I studied—so much so that one person forgot the most basic of the five
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121108_001—“There is something incredibly fundamental that people must understand, that is that there is a
religion and a tradition and they are not the same thing, because traditions diverge depending on the country from
which you come, depending on the culture, and the religion is sacred and unique for everyone.”
594
Reciting the shahada (profession that Allah is the one true God and that Mohammed is his Prophet), five times
daily prayer, fasting during Ramadan, almsgiving and the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).
595
121005_001—“First, it’s the prayer, [then] to not eat pork, to give alms, to celebrate the month of Ramadan
and if one day God accords me, God willing as we say, to go to Mecca for the pilgrimage.”
596
Kate Holbrook, “Good to Eat: Culinary Priorities in the Nation of Islam and the Church of Jesus-Christ of LatterDay Saints,” in Religion, Food & Eating in North America, eds. Benjamin E. Zeller, Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson
and Nora L. Rubel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 195-213.
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pillars of Islam and replaced it with a food practice. Food in fact is one of the most central areas
of Islamic practice for my informants. The most frequently occurring words in my “practice”
code were all food related terms. While this has much to do with the fact that the questions I
asked in my interviews were principally food related, I also inquired about all “religious”
practices and listened and coded for anything that might be considered a religious practice. The
most frequent words in my practice code were consequently “viande, halal, alcool, manger,
porc,”597 and other words commonly associated with Muslim religious practice, i.e. prayer, were
far down the list of frequently occurring words.598 Food practice was sometimes the sole
expression of one’s religious practice, and often one of the most essential expressions of one’s
religious practice and identity. I had informants who did not see themselves as practicing
Muslims and yet engaged in “Muslim” food practices. One informant explained to me that she
was not “trop pratiquante” and yet went on to explain that she felt Muslim because “je fais, par
exemple, le ramadan…et je ne mange pas de porc.”599 She listed off various food practices as the
reason why she claimed Muslim identity (Ramadan, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and
eating halal meat) and yet also labelled herself as non-practicing.600 When I asked her if these
practices were cultural or religious she responded, “un peu les deux: culturelle et religieuse.”601
She seemed to not see herself as “pratiquante” because her central practices could also be argued
as purely cultural practices.602 The complex relationship between culture and religion is clearly
evidenced in relationship to food. By examining my informants’ approach to food practice, I was
able to see the varied relationship between these two subjects and to further complicate the often
black and white labels that are placed on the practices of immigrant groups.
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“Meat, halal, alcohol, to eat, pork.”
Of course, this still could be a result of the framing of the interview. I presented myself as a researcher who was
interested in my informants’ food practices. Therefore, even if I asked about other practices, or what it meant to
be a practicing Muslim, most of my informants would have been aware of the focus of my research project and
could have very easily focused on the food examples in their lives as a means of responding to what they may have
assumed I was interested in hearing.
599
121129_001—“Very practicing”…“I do, for example, Ramadan…and I do not eat pork.”
600
Two other informants who stated similar arguments were 121126_002 and 121207_001.
601
121129_001—“A bit of both, cultural and religious.”
602
It seems as though there is an understanding of practice based on the Western Catholic understanding of who is
a practicing Christian and who is not. If one attends church on Sundays and engages in the sacraments, then one is
practicing. Many of my Muslim informants when they labeled themselves as non-practicing seemed to have this
vision in their heads of what practice referred to. It became clear that they were in fact practicing, but perhaps not
in a way that was recognized by mainstream society, and this influenced their own perception of where they lay on
the practicing versus non-practicing spectrum.
598

187

5.2.1 Fourfold Typology of Food Practice
In analyzing my data, a hierarchy of food practice seemed to emerge.603 In this, there were
practices that were seen as absolutely essential and obligatory and those that were seen as more
flexible. I argue that the spectrum was as follows: the more officially religious something was
viewed as, or the more something was labelled as religious, the more obligatory it was
understood to be. On the other end of the spectrum, the more cultural a practice was viewed as,
or labelled as, the more flexible and open to change and/or abandonment it was. This finding
accords with those of Samira Mehta, who suggests that labelling a food practice as
traditional/cultural/ethnic rather than religious can lead to that practice being seen as more
flexible or not as strict.604 This could also play out the other way, i.e. the desire to make
something less obligatory may lead an individual to define that practice as cultural rather than
religious. Furthermore, practices were labelled as religious versus cultural depending on whether
they were grounded in religious texts or tradition. So, the hierarchy of religious practice worked
out in this way.

Taking this into consideration I created a fourfold typology of food practice to understand
the ways that my informants understood and interacted with these practices. First, there is the
Quranically-documented and “prescribed” food practices. These practices include the abstention
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For an excellent overview of the various Quranic food taboos, see Mohammed H. Benkheira, “Alimentation,
altérité et socialité: Remarques sur les tabous alimentaires coraniques,” European Journal of Sociology, vol. 38, no.
2 (1997): 237-287.
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Samira Mehta, “‘I Chose Judaism but Christmas Cookies Chose Me’: Food, Identity, and Familial Religious
Practice in Christian/Jewish Blended Families,” in Religion, Food & Eating in North America, eds. Benjamin E. Zeller,
Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson and Nora L. Rubel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 156.
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from consuming pork and alcohol, practicing the fast of Ramadan and the obligation to eat
properly sacrificed animals (halal). The second category is the Quranically-documented but not
prescribed category. The lamb of the Eid Al-Adha was generally placed in this category. The
third category is Sunnah-inspired food practices. The best example from this category is the
practice of breaking the fast during the month of Ramadan by consuming dates and milk. The
fourth and final category is that of the cultural food practices not mentioned in any major
religious text. This category is where many of the cultural food practices reside, although some
of these practices have been given religious significance as well, such as the eating of couscous.
Regardless of their engagement in any of the four categories of practice outlined above,
each of my respondents gave some form of justification for their practice. There were three main
forms of argumentation that my respondents gave for their practice: 1) it was based in the Quran,
2) there was some scientific or health reason for the practice, and/or 3) it was a way of life. For
those who argued that they practiced certain things because they were written in the Quran, there
were two sub arguments made. The first was that anything that is written in the Quran has to be
obeyed simply by the fact that it was in the Quran. If God said, as is made evidenced by the
Quran, that one was not to eat pork, then one was not to eat pork, plain and simple. The
respondents who used this argument without any other real back up argument tended to label
themselves as practicing Muslims and were fairly conservative in their ideology and approach to
their religious lives. Others used the Quran as the justification for their action but took the
argument slightly further by suggesting not only that one must do what is written in the Quran
point blank, but also because there was a divine wisdom in the Quran.
Science and health reasons were the next ones given for various food practices. Many of
my respondents would start from a reason of faith for their practice, but then support that
argument with what they considered a scientific argument. In fact, respondents spoke to me
about the logic of Islam on a frequent basis. If other traditions or cultures did not seem “logical”
they were somewhat discounted, and many of my respondents took pride in the fact that they felt
as though Islam and its requirements were completely logical and in line with scientific
reasoning. It was almost as if they felt that they had to ground their reasoning for fasting during
Ramadan, not drinking alcohol, not eating pork, eating halal meat, etcetera, in something beyond
mere faith. While I cannot imagine many Catholics (from the dominant culture) would feel the
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pressure to explain why they ate fish on Fridays with scientific arguments, many of my
respondents seemed to feel such a pressure.
The everyday nature of food was the third argument that my informants used to explain
why they engaged in any of the practices below. My informants would suggest that these
practices were an inevitable outworking of belief, a part of one’s routine and things that were
“anchored” within one’s life and experience. “C’est ancré dans le comportement. Parfois on ne
fait pas attention, mais ça fait partie des comportements les plus banales de notre quotidien.”605
Another respondent also spoke to the daily, mundane and therefore ever-present practice of
Islam. When someone is engaged in something every day, they noted, as a part of his or her
everyday existence, it becomes difficult to avoid or break with that.
Très simplement, c’est une religion qui est très forte, qui a beaucoup de dogmes,
beaucoup de fonctionnements, qui intègre énormément le quotidien. C’est-à-dire que
même si tu n’es pas croyante en Dieu, même si à 10, 15, 20 ou 30 ans, tu décides que
Dieu n’existe pas et que c’est une réflexion personnelle, le fait est que c’est une religion
qui est tellement ancré au quotidien.606
Whether or not one believes in God, or practices the religion according to Christian or Western
understandings of what religious practice looks like, it does not matter, because Islam is
“anchored in the quotidian.” When examining something such as food practice, this argument
from daily, consistent practice is especially strong. Practices become habits, which become
mundane parts of one’s daily life that do not require special effort or reflection, but are simply
done because that is what one has always done.
Ultimately, some people used a combination of two of the above arguments, or even all
three, but often they would focus on one as their main argument for why they did any of the
practices I outline below. I include some of this argumentation as I present each category of
practice.
I start with the Quranically-documented, “prescribed” food practices. One informant
while explaining to me that there were no religious food obligations, stopped himself and added
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121207_001—“It’s anchored in behaviour. Sometimes we do not pay attention but it is part of the most banal
behaviours of our daily life.”
606
121209_001—“Very simply, it is a religion that is very strong, that has many dogmas, many functions; that is
incredibly integrated in daily life. That means that even if you are not a believer in God, even if at 10, 15, 20, or 30
years old you decide that God does not exist and it is a personal reflection, the fact remains that it is a religion that
is incredibly anchored in daily life.”
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that in fact there are some obligations and those are “tout qui est écrit.”607 He stated that if
something was written in the Quran, it was automatically a religious practice and the question
was not so much about what was obligatory, but how seriously someone took their religious
practice. If someone saw him/herself as a “practicing Muslim,” then these Quranicallydocumented and prescribed practices would be obligatory. Alternatively, for those who saw
themselves as “non-practicing Muslims,” whatever that may mean, these practices were viewed
as religious and obligatory, but they chose to not place the importance on being religiously
accurate, and may leave the obligatory practices aside. Another informant explained what she
meant by obligatory practice as follows:
Dans la religion, il y a des choses obligatoires, et d’autres [elle réfléchit] qui font partie
du comportement du Prophète; …Dieu a dit, il faut faire la prière, et donc il faut faire la
prière, c’est une obligation. Si on ne le fait pas c’est qu’il y a d’autres sanctions. Ça c’est
le sens d’obligation.608
For this informant, if God said something, as documented in the Quran, it was not only religious,
but also obligatory, whereas things said by human voices, such as the voice of Mohammed, as
documented in the Sunnah/Hadith, were also religious, but not obligatory.
When looking at the four explicit Quranically-based and prescribed food practices that I
listed above, my informants’ practices reveal a hierarchy of these practices as well. For example,
30 of my 33 informants fasted during the month of Ramadan, with only three informants not
fasting at all. While a few of those 30 informants had altered their practice of Ramadan slightly
since living in France, they all still practiced it to some level or another. The next most practiced
was the interdiction against pork. Twenty-four of my informants did not eat pork while nine did.
In relation to alcohol, 17 did not consume alcohol and 16 did. Finally, the most varied practice
was that of keeping halal. In this category nine people kept halal strictly, 15 ate halal when they
could but also ate non-halal when halal was not available, eight people were not particular about
halal at all and one informant only ate fish out of preference, so halal was not a concern for him.
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121202_004—“All that is written.”
121102_001—“In the religion there are obligatory things and others (she reflects) that are part of the
comportment of the Prophet; … God said that you must pray, you must pray, it’s an obligation. If we do not do it
there are other sanctions. That is the sense of obligation.”
608
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5.2.1.1 Ramadan Fast
The first of the four Quranically-documented and “prescribed” practices that I address was the
most fundamental and overarching practice for my informants: the fast during Ramadan.
Because of its explicit mention in the Quran (2:185)609 and its place within the five pillars of
Islam, this was the least disputed religious food practice of them all. In fact, it seemed to be the
most basic Muslim practice in general. What I mean by this is that even those who did not see
themselves as practicing or religious Muslims still fasted during Ramadan and often based their
identities as Muslim on this one practice. One informant explained it as follows:
Beaucoup de membres de ma famille n’étaient pas pratiquants, euh...sauf pour le carême,
pour le mois de ramadan, où tout le monde le fait. Tout le monde fait carême, en fait,
c’est surtout parce que, hmmm, on a peur du… même si on le fait pas, on le cache [des
autres]. On le cache vraiment bien, parce que ça reste un des piliers de la religion qui est
le plus important.610
Even if people were not practicing, it was expected that they would do this one practice. The
incomplete phrase, “on a peur de…,” in context implies that a person who does not fast opens
themselves to negative social repercussions. Most of my informants, especially those who
considered themselves “practicing Muslims,” argued for the centrality of this practice within
their religious devotion because of the clear-cut prescription to fast as is made evidenced by its
place in the five pillars of Islam. While the other food practices that make up this category are
also prescribed in the Quran, interpretation can allow for flexibility of practice.
The place of the fast in the five pillars makes it more difficult to argue for a cultural
interpretation. Yet for my informants who saw themselves as “non-practicing,” Ramadan was
still at base religious, but they would argue that their engagement with the practice was cultural.
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“The month of Ramadan is the month when the Quran was sent down as guidance for mankind with clear
proofs of guidance and the criterion by which to distinguish right from wrong. Therefore, whoever of you is
present in that month, let him fast; but he who is ill or on a journey shall fast a similar number of days later on.
God desires ease for you, not hardship. He desires you to fast the whole month, so that you may glorify Him for His
having guided you and so that you may be grateful to Him” (Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, trans., The Quran, ed.
Farida Khanam [New Delhi: Goodword Books, 2009], 2:185) The parameters of the fast are further explicated in
2:187 specifically: “eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct from the black. Then resume the
fast until nightfall.”
610
121126_002—“Many of my family members weren't practicing, except for the fast, for the month of Ramadan
where everyone did it (the fast). Everyone did the fast. It's basically because, hmm, we're afraid of, even if we
don't do it, we hide it. We hide it well because it remains one of the pillars of the religion, which is the most
important.”
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Although most would see it as religious, these informants generally expressed cultural arguments
for their continued practice of Ramadan, not religious ones. For example,
moi je ne suis pas pratiquant, je fais uniquement le ramadan, c’est par culture. Parce que
je suis né en Algérie, je suis venu à 25 ans, on a toujours fait ramadan, c’est comme Noël
pour toi, c’est un repas familial, c’est joyeux, c’est une fête en quelque sorte. C’est vrai
que c’est difficile de le faire quand on est à l’étranger, mais je vais garder ça en moi. Je
ne veux pas me déraciner de ce que mes parents m’ont transmis.611
For this informant, and others like him, even if Ramadan was arguably a religious practice, it
was more complicated than that. The fast linked him to his family roots. Another informant
revealed the complicated relationship between religion and culture that is represented by this
practice as follows:
Je fais le ramadan, par exemple. En même temps, je ne fais pas la prière, je bois de
l’alcool, je mange du porc, etc. Mais je me sens quand même musulman. Même si je ne
pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman. C’est dans une notion un peu
culturelle et aussi d’un point de vue de religion et aussi d’un point de vue culturel, mais
culturellement musulman.612
The border between culture and religion appears quite blurred and the terms are somewhat
interchangeable for many people. While this informant practiced Ramadan as his basic
religious/cultural practice, the other Quranically-documented and prescribed practices did not
play a part in his cultural practices and were left aside. What is remarkable in this extract is the
fundamental connection made by this person between the Ramadan fast and being a Muslim: to
fast during Ramada is to be a Muslim.
5.2.1.2 Pork
Going into my fieldwork I anticipated that the interdiction against pork would be the most
fundamental food practice that my informants engaged in due to its repeated presence in the
Quran.613 Instead of just one or two of my informants telling me that they ate pork, nine
611

121205_002—“Me, I am not practicing, I only do Ramadan, it’s by culture. Because I was born in Algeria, I came
at 25 years old, we always did Ramadan. It’s like Christmas for you; it’s a family dinner. It’s joyous, it’s a party in
some way. It’s true that it is difficult to do when we are in a foreign place but I am going to keep that in me. I do
not want to uproot myself from what my parents gave me.”
612
121206_001—“I do Ramadan for example. At the same time, I do not do the prayer, I drink alcohol, I eat pork,
etc. But I feel Muslim all the same. Even if I do not practice at all, I feel Muslim all the same. The idea is a bit cultural
and also religious, and also a cultural point of view but culturally Muslim.”
613
“He has forbidden you only carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine; also, any flesh that is consecrated other than
in the name of God. But for one who is driven by necessity, it is no sin. For God is forgiving and merciful” (The
Quran, 2:173); “You are forbidden carrion, blood and pork” (The Quran, 5:3); “Say [O Prophet], ‘In all that has been
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individuals admitted to eating pork. For some, it was just that: a guilty admission. For others,
they proclaimed their indulgences in pork-eating with absolutely no hesitation, and sometimes
with pride. In fact, there seemed to be three categories or reasons given for pork consumption by
those who ate pork. The first category encompassed those who ate pork from the time they were
children. For these informants, unlike most of my informant group, pork consumption was a part
of their customs growing up.614 They do not see the practice as problematic. The second group
included those who ate pork, but did not actually enjoy it that much or had problems digesting
it.615 These people seemed to eat it to fit in, or because they felt like they had no other choice. As
I mentioned in Chapter 2, pork plays an important role in French identity. Not only are some of
the most iconic French dishes essentially pork dishes—cassoulet, choucroute garni, tartiflette,
etcetera—but there have been many recent controversies that highlight the importance of pork as
an identity marker in France.616 As is made evident by my informants who eat pork, these
experiences can put pressure on those who eat outside the bounds of “French eating” to change
their practice. The final group encompassed those who ate pork because they wanted to, and
could come up with an argument why it was acceptable for them to do so.617 For example, one
informant suggested that because the reasons given in the Quran at the time of the Prophet were
no longer valid in today’s day and age, people can eat whatever they would like today.618
While these informants all had different reasons for their pork consumption, most would
drastically restrict what kind of pork they would consume. They may eat charcuterie but will not
eat a piece of plain pork meat, i.e. a pork chop or roast. While charcuterie can be understood as
not pork, or can take on an appearance that is not so obviously pork, pork chops or pork roast
cannot. Mohammed Benkheira states that for those few people who do transgress this

revealed to me, I do not find a ban on anything to eat, except for carrion, flowing blood and pork, all these being
unclean or profane, on which the name of someone other than God has been invoked.’ But if anyone is forced by
necessity, being neither disobedient nor exceeding the limit, then surely your Lord is most forgiving and merciful”
(The Quran, 6:145); “He has forbidden you only carrion, blood and the flesh of swine” (The Quran, 16:115).
614
121126_002; 121209_001.
615
121201_001; 121202_004; 121203_006.
616
For example, the identity soup controversy in 2006 that I mentioned in Chapter 4. Similarly, in 2015 a new
controversy arose over the place of pork in French life with the ban on pork-free options for students in public
schools in France. See Angelique Chrisafis, “Pork or Nothing: How School Dinners are Dividing France,” The
Guardian, 13 October 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/pork-school-dinners-francesecularism-children-religious-intolerance.
617
121124_001; 121128_001; 121205_001; 121206_001.
618
121205_001.
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prohibition, you will see that they do not eat pork stew, or choucroute, or even ham or “soft
sausage”; instead, they will eat charcuterie, i.e. cured meats, paté, etcetera, because “dans cette
charcuterie, on ne retrouve ni les couleurs caractéristiques du porc—le blanc et le rose—, ni
l’odeur.”619 One informant reflected this idea when she explained that
les musulmans non-pratiquants, mais vraiment non-pratiquants, mangent en général du
charcuterie mais pas du porc cuit, ça pourquoi, je ne sais pas. J’ai l’impression que le
porc cuit représente vraiment le porc, et la religion musulmane reste ancrée dans leur tête
quand même, et on a du mal [à le manger].620
As this informant explained, for many of my informants the interdiction against pork is a
foundational representation of Islam, both religiously and culturally.
For the 24 informants who maintained this practice of not eating pork, the reasons
differed as well. The three main types of arguments that were given were 1) based on the
Quran/religion, 2) scientific/medical in nature, and 3) cultural. Some informants expressed all
three types of arguments. For example, one informant explained that she did not eat pork because
at base “dans la religion c’est strictement interdit.”621 She expressed this twice, and in between
these two affirmations of religious reasoning for not consuming pork, she also presented the
arguments from science and culture. Scientifically, she argued for the “fact” that pork is dirty
because pigs eat dirty things, and she also argued that there was a study done which showed that
it was “dangereux pour la santé de manger du porc.”622 Finally, she also suggested that her
abstention from pork was also a cultural practice, stating that “principalement, je ne mange pas
de porc car dans ma famille on n’en mange pas; au Maroc, tu ne peux pas trouver du porc qui se
vend (elle rit), faut aller le chasser.623 Et je pense que c’est des habitudes culturelles.”624 This one
informant used all three arguments—religious, scientific and cultural—to argue for her practice.

619

“In this charcuterie, we do not find either the characteristic colours of pork – the white and the pink – nor the
odor” (Benkheira, “Alimentation,” 276).
620
121124_001—“Non-practicing, and I mean, really non-practicing Muslims in general eat charcuterie but not
cooked pork. Why is that? I don't know. I have the impression that cooked pork really represents pork and the
Muslim religion is anchored in their heads all the same, and we have difficulty [eating pork].”
621
121207_001—“It is strictly forbidden in the religion.”
622
121207_001—“Dangerous for one’s health to eat pork.”
623
Benkheira (“Alimentation,” 266) states that while pork consumption is generally avoided in the Maghreb, there
is a minority of people who do consume it, often those in rural areas, and most often in the form of wild boar
(sanglier).
624
121207_001—“Principally, I do not eat pork because in my family we did not eat it; in Morocco, you cannot find
pork that is sold (she laughs), you have to go hunt it. And I think it is about cultural habits.”
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Others use the Quran as the justification for their action but take the argument slightly
further by suggesting not only that one must do what is written in the Quran point blank, but also
because there is divine wisdom in the Quran. One young woman explained this to me. Starting
with the interdiction against pork she said:
Le porc déjà c’est dans le Coran. Tout qui est dans le Coran c’est des obligations. Donc
déjà, voilà, après chaque chose qui est stipulée dans le Coran c’est … il y a une sagesse
derrière. Pour chaque interdiction mentionnée dans le Coran, il y a une explication, une
sagesse divine. C’est pas juste dit pour nous ennuyer, entre guillemets.625
For this respondent it was not just enough to justify her practice on the grounds that the pork
prohibition was in the Quran and therefore must be done; her justification also related to the
wisdom that is present in the Quran. After all, if “le Coran dit que ce n’est pas bon, ça doit être
pour de bonnes raisons.”626
For many of these 24 informants, it was clear that they felt like they had to provide
reasoning beyond religiously-based arguments for their practices. Perhaps because I was a
Western researcher, and an outsider to the tradition, they felt a need to justify their practice,
which for many was a strictly religious one, by other means.627 Here is one example:
Oui dans notre religion, c’est strictement interdit de manger du porc. Mais je ne le mange
pas pour deux choses. La première, dans notre religion le Bon Dieu nous dit qu’il y a une
partie du porc qui est fortement déconseillée, qui peut provoquer des maladies, mais
seulement dans les pays très chaud. Par exemple, l’Arabie Saoudite, c’est là où le Coran
est descendu. Et par la suite, j’ai un gros problème culturel avec le porc. Mes parents n’en
ont jamais mangé. C’est plus héréditaire. Mais le fait de le voir, j’ai la nausée, donc ça je
ne pourrais jamais faire. J’ai un problème culturel avec le porc.628
For this informant, there were both religious and cultural reasons for her practice of abstention
from pork. While for some, the religious and cultural are blurred, she saw these two as distinct
reasons, but equally powerful in influencing her practice. What is important to note is that even
625

120905_001—“Pork, firstly it’s in the Quran. Everything that is in the Quran, those are obligations. So already,
there you go. After each thing that is stipulated in the Quran is, um, there is a wisdom behind it. For each
interdiction mentioned in the Quran, there is an explanation, a divine wisdom. It’s not just said to annoy us, in
quotations.”
626
121216_001—“The Quran says that it is not good, it has to be for good reasons.”
627
I return to this when I explore the three forms of arguments presented for practice below.
628
121202_003—“Yes, in our religion, it is strictly forbidden to eat pork. But I do not eat it for two reasons. The
first, in our religion, God told us that there is a part of the pork that is strongly discouraged, that can provoke
illnesses but only in very hot countries. For example, Saudi Arabia, that is where the Quran is from. And also, I have
a large cultural problem with pork. My parents never ate it. It’s more hereditary. But the mere fact of seeing it, I
get nauseated, so I could never do that. I have a cultural problem with pork.”
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in her religious argument, she argued from a basis of scientific reasoning. It was not just that
God said in the Quran that Muslims are not allowed to eat pork, but there is a further reason
related to health that is behind the interdiction. She provides scientific reasoning for God’s
injunction.
In regards to pork, many other respondents spoke about various scientific studies that
reveal that pork is bad on the human system, that it is proven to cause illnesses, that it is dirty,
etcetera. One young law student cited scientific studies and explained how science supports the
divine wisdom found in the Quran:
Le porc aussi, il y a des études. Concernant le porc, des études scientifiques ont révélés
que dans le porc il y a une partie qui est pas bon et on sait pas où; donc, on commence à
douter de tout, tout. Les scientifiques disent que le porc est pas très sain. Moi je les crois.
Il y a une substance pas recommandée pour les humains, car sa teneur en acide urique est
forte. En plus, chaque principe stipulé dans le Coran a été analysé, étayé, afin de
connaître la véracité. De ces derniers jusqu’au présent aucun scientifique n’a pu
contredire le Coran. Et je ne me doute absolument pas ce qui est dans le Coran.629
This young student held strongly to the belief that science and the divine wisdom in the Quran
went hand in hand. She therefore had a clear reason to not consume pork in her mind.
Many of my informants when arguing a cultural reason for not eating pork would suggest
that they do not have “l’habitude” (the habit) of eating pork. They would present the reasoning
that one does not have the habit of doing something/consuming something and as a result they
will not do/consume said thing. Even when the reasoning behind the original interdiction does
not appear to be present in their current life experience, they will still not do/consume said thing.
This cultural influence on one’s practice can be powerful and enduring. One young woman
explained to me that pork “disgusted” her.630 No matter how many people told her that pork was
delicious and that she should try it, using various reasons and explanations why it was not
problematic, she still could not bring herself to try it. Because she had been “educated” to not eat
pork, because culturally she was told that it was dirty and forbidden, she simply could not let go

629

120905_001—“Pork as well there are studies. Concerning pork, there are scientific studies that revealed that
there is a part of the pork that is not good and we do not know where, therefore we begin to doubt everything,
everything. Scientists say that pork is not very healthy, me I believe that. There is a substance that is not
recommended for humans because its uric acid content is high. Moreover, every principle that is stated in the
Quran was analyzed, to substantiate, to know the truth of these claims, of these so far, no scientist can contradict
the Quran. And I absolutely do not doubt what is in the Quran.”
630
121105_001.
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of that practice. She let go of other religious/cultural food practices, such as eating halal,631 but
the practice of not eating pork was firmly engrained. We can see with this example how disgust
is a deeply rooted response.
5.2.1.3 Alcohol
The third Quranically-documented and prescribed practice is the interdiction against consuming
alcohol.632 This practice was maintained by 17 of my informants and broken by 16; essentially a
50-50 split.
If I were to write a paper strictly on this religious/cultural practice in the Muslim
tradition, based exclusively on my sample, I would title it “Alcohol: An obligation in variation.”
These two terms, obligation and variation, are essential here. I had some informants who would
emphasize the obligatory nature of this practice and would argue strongly that it could not be
altered. One young woman explained it to me as follows: “Dans le Coran, certaines choses
nécessitent d’être mises dans un contexte, doivent être interpréter, sauf que pour l’alcool. C’est
écrit noir sur blanc que l’alcool est interdit. Il n’a pas besoin de contexte.”633 She most likely
made this argument in light of the many arguments presented by other Muslims, real or
imagined, that were clearly present in my data set. It seemed as though she assumed that I had
heard some of these arguments before and she felt like she needed to correct the wrong
understanding. In relation to alcohol, the argument was also made that, scientifically speaking,
addiction is unhealthy and one can do regrettable things when under the influence of alcohol.634
Many of my informants would speak about the fact that it was a religious obligation to not
consume alcohol, and yet at the same time would explain why it was acceptable to do so. As the
631

Perhaps this is because the discussion of halal in the Maghreb was not as prevalent as that of the interdiction
against pork. All meat was halal in Tunisia so this informant was not faced with the same sort of strong emphasis
on consuming halal meat as she was on not consuming pork.
632
For the Quranic verses that address “khamr” (intoxicants)/wine/drunkenness: “They ask you [Prophet] about
intoxicants and gambling. Say, ‘There is great sin in both, although they have some benefit for people: but the
harm is greater than their benefit’” (The Quran, 2:219); “Believers, do not approach your prayers when you are
drunk, until you understand what you say” (The Quran, 4:43); “Believers, intoxicants and gambling and [occult
dedication of] stones and divining arrows are abominations devised by Satan. Avoid them, so that you may
prosper. Satan seeks to sow enmity and hatred among you by means of wine and gambling, and to keep you from
the remembrance of God and from your prayers. Will you not then abstain?” (The Quran, 5:90-91).
633
120905_001—“In the Quran, certain things necessitate to be placed in context, they must be interpreted except
in regards to alcohol; it is written black on white that alcohol is forbidden. It does not need context.”
634
120726_001—“On peut pas boire l’alcool, parce que c’est mauvais, c’est pas bon pour la santé, et voilà, il y a
beaucoup, beaucoup de choses qui sont interdit parce que c’est pas bien pour l’être humaine. C’est ça le but,
pourquoi Dieu il a interdit tout ça.”
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young woman above alluded to, they would argue a specific context for the creation of the
obligation in the Quran, and would argue why it was not the same sort of obligation as other
practices listed. For example, many of the 16 informants who drank alcohol gave the explanation
that the proscription against alcohol came to be in stages and they also argued that it was
problematic only for people who did not know their limits. When justifying her consumption of
alcohol, one informant defended her view in this manner:
Parce qu’à la base dans la religion musulmane le Bon Dieu n’a pas interdit l’alcool tout
de suite. Il nous disait, dans un de ses versets: n’approchez pas de la prière en étant saoul.
Et bien sûr, il y a toujours des gens qui déconnent et qui le faisaient encore. Ils se
bourraient la gueule et s’approchaient de la prière. C’est à partir de ce moment-là que le
Bon Dieu l’a interdit catégoriquement. Mais il ne l’a jamais interdit de facto. C’est venu
progressivement. À la base, c’était: n’approchez pas la prière en étant saoul. C’est pour ça
que je ne m’interdis pas l’alcool… mais pas d’abus!635
Another informant explained that she used to abstain from alcohol, but then one day she asked
herself why it was forbidden and began to explore the reasoning behind it. When she realized
that it had been forbidden because people were coming to prayer drunk, or forgetting to come to
prayer at all, she realized that it was not in itself forbidden, but the excessive use of it was
forbidden. With this realization, and because she “knew her limit,” she began drinking.636
Another informant expressed something similar, suggesting that he contradicted the religion in
relation to alcohol. He expressed that alcohol consumption was not allowed, that there was one
rule for all, and yet because he “knew his limit” it was ok for him to consume it.637
While most of my informants would either argue why it was acceptable to drink alcohol
or why it was not, one informant argued that it was acceptable for some and not acceptable for
others. For this informant, the interdiction against alcohol changed based on whether one was a
“practicing” or “non-practicing” Muslim. She, a non-practicing Muslim herself, argued that,
je trouve qu’il y a des musulmans, je parle pas des Maghrébins, je parle de musulmans,
qui vont se dire très pratiquants qui vont boire de l’alcool. Je trouve ça pas normale. Ce
n’est pas normal. Je trouve que c’est un peu facile. C’est souvent les hommes, mais par
635

121202_003—“Because at the base of the Muslim religion, God did not forbid alcohol right away. He told us, in
one of his verses: do not come to the prayer in a drunken state. And obviously, there are always people who said
silly things and who continued to do it, they got drunk and they approached the prayer. It was from that moment
that God categorically forbade it. But he never forbade it de facto. It came progressively. At its base it was to not
come to prayer in a drunken state. It is for that reason that I do not forbid myself of alcohol, but I do not abuse it.”
Here the informant is referring to the Quranic verse 4:43.
636
121201_001.
637
121205_002.
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contre tu vois ils sont dur—donc non, ça c’est pas normale. Après, quand tu n’es pas très
pratiquant et bois l’alcool, et surtout que tu demandes rien aux autres, tu pratiques ta
religion pour toi à la limite ce qu’il veut. Voilà.638
For this informant, it is not normal for a practicing Muslim to drink, it is hypocritical. But a nonpracticing Muslim can do as they please.
If logical reasoning could be provided for the consumption of a product, there seemed to
be more flexibility in that practice. This was further evidenced to me when some of my
informants were trying to convince me to convert to Islam. I had given them many arguments
over the months, mostly in relation to my commitment to my own religious tradition, but one day
decided to use the food argument as a reason for my lack of conversion. I explained to them that
I could never become a Muslim because I like bacon and wine too much. Thinking that this
would be a sufficient excuse, I was surprised at one of my informant’s answers. Instead of saying
“yes, you have to give up pork and alcohol, because that is what the Quran says,” he went on to
give me logical reasons why I only need to give up one of those things to become a Muslim. He
explained that pork was not necessary for me to continue eating. There were other meats that I
could eat that were much better for one’s health, and that I simply would not miss it. On the
other hand, alcohol was not so easily replaced by another substance and so he could understand
why I would not give that up right away, but hoped that with time I would give that up as well.639
While this informant suggested that there was some flexibility in the application of the
two interdictions based on logic, another argued that both were strictly forbidden for logical
reasons as well. After becoming friends with an imam in the community, he offered
scientific/health reasons for me to stop eating pork and drinking alcohol. When I was feeling
sick, he would ask if I was still eating pork and drinking alcohol. When I would respond in the
affirmative, he would look at me with great concern and say “Rachel, if you would just stop
eating pork and drinking alcohol, your health would be perfect.” Instead of telling me that it was
forbidden to do so in the religion, he argued that it was in fact for health reasons that everyone
should give up these two substances. He could clearly see that a religious argument would not be
638

121124_001—“I find that there are Muslims, I am not talking about Maghrébines, I am talking about Muslims,
who will say that they are very practicing who will drink alcohol. That I do not find normal. It is not normal. I find
that it is a bit easy. It is usually men. On the other hand you see that they are hard, so no, that is not normal. After,
when you are not really practicing and drink alcohol and especially when you do not demand anything from others,
you practice your religion for yourself to the limit that you want. And that’s it.”
639
Personal communication, November 2012.

200

effective for me, and therefore supported his own clearly religiously based argumentation with
scientific ones.
This leads me to an important addendum to this first category of practices. While this first
category was generally the clearest as to what was religious and what was cultural, and relatedly,
what was obligatory and what was flexible, there were some practices that complicated this
typology, quite clearly. For example, even though both the interdiction against pork and alcohol
were generally placed in this “religion” category, the difference in application of these two
interdictions by many of my informants reveals the powerful effect of culture on religion and the
confusing nature of the question of what is religion and what is culture. For many of my
informants there seemed to be different levels of interdiction in relation to pork and alcohol.
Alcohol was forbidden, but at a seemingly different level than pork.640 While the interdiction
against alcohol could be argued away, the consumption of pork was much more difficult to argue
and often because the cultural arguments against consumption of pork were much stronger than
the cultural arguments against drinking alcohol. In the Maghreb, alcohol was present and was
consumed more frequently than many would assume. Informants would explain how alcohol was
forbidden, both religiously and culturally, and yet it was for sale and people would drink it in the
Maghreb.641 I had informants tell me of going to bars in Algeria and drinking with friends,
although they would rarely drink at home.642 When I asked one informant if he thought people
drink more once they have come to France, he explained that, in fact, most of the Muslims that
he knew who drank alcohol were in Morocco, not in France.643 These various examples show
how alcohol, even though it is generally understood as forbidden for Muslims, is still available
for consumption in the Maghreb. This was in large part due to the colonial presence of France in
the Maghreb in the 20th century, which led to an impressive and productive wine industry in
Algeria and Morocco. So even if alcohol is forbidden in the Quran, it is not only present, but
continues to be a significant economic industry in the countries of the Maghreb, not only in the
first part of the 20th century, but also today.644
640

121202_004.
121203_006.
642
121126_001.
643
121108_001.
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Giulia Meloni and Johan Swinnen, “The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Wine Exporter—and its Institutional
Legacy,” Journal of Wine Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (2014): 3-33. In fact, according to Meloni and Swinnen, Algeria
was, until 50 years ago, the world’s largest wine exporter and was “the fourth largest producer of wine in the
641
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Pork is a different situation. Only two of my informants had tried pork before coming to
France, and the two who had consumed it had done so only because their parents had brought it
to the Maghreb either from France or because they owned a restaurant for tourists. In general
pork is not available in the Maghreb, and thus the interdiction against it is consequently much
more culturally charged. I had many more informants suggesting that they refrained from eating
pork for cultural reasons than those who would argue for not drinking alcohol because of their
culture. If they did not consume alcohol, it appeared to be because of clearly religious reasons
and even if they did consume alcohol it was often because of a lack of religiosity, not a lack of
culture.
Although alcohol consumption was more prevalent in the Maghreb than in France for
some of my informants, for others who drank alcohol it was directly related to their immigrant
experience in France. What I mean by this is that, while many of them did not drink in the
Maghreb, they began drinking in France. I had informants explain to me that they tried alcohol
for the first time in France “parce qu’il n’y a pas de jugement,”645 which was not the situation in
the Maghreb. When asked if she thought there were more Muslims who drank in the Maghreb or
in France, one informant expressed that there were more in France saying that “parce qu’il y a
plus d’occasions, disons, de sortir, plus de liberté. Euh, la plupart du temps quand ils immigrent,
ils sont sans leurs parents, donc ils se sentent un peu plus libres. Oui, donc je pense un peu plus
[en France].”646 For these informants, the French context allowed for more flexibility in practice
because alcohol is an accepted substance. Not only is it accepted, though, it is an important
social practice. One informant explained that the consumption of alcohol was an important part
of his life in France because it was a “mode de vie”647 in France. The importance of wine to the
French national identity, which I addressed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2, influences the
practice of those immigrating to France from traditionally non-alcohol consuming cultures.

world” (3). In Morocco, in spite of a restriction on selling alcohol to Muslims, wine production abounds as well,
where “annual output stands at about 400,000 hectolitres, or more than 40m bottles of wine, industry sources say,
making the former French protectorate the second biggest producer in the Arab world. By comparison,
neighbouring Algeria, whose vineyards were cultivated for a much longer period during French colonial rule,
produces 500,000 hectolitres on average” (“Wine: Morocco,” Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and
Technical Series, vol. 50, no. 6 [August 2013]: 20032A-20032C).
645
121123_001—“Because there is no judgement.”
646
121126_002—“Because there are more occasions, shall we say, to go out, more liberty. Most of the time when
they immigrate, they are without their parents, so they feel a bit freer, yes, I think a bit more [in France].”
647
121206_001.
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While they may have maintained their non-alcohol consumption practices if they had stayed in
the Maghreb, the immigrant context allows for new cultural practices to challenge the old ones.
5.2.1.4 Halal Meat
The final practice in the Quranically-documented and prescribed category is the practice of
consuming halal meat. While “halal” refers to all things that are “permissible,” it is used most
often by my informants as a term that applies principally to “properly” slaughtered meat.648 In
this section, when my informants speak about keeping, or not keeping, halal they are referring to
consuming halal meat specifically. This practice was the most contested and most talked about
practice in France, by both the Maghrébine Muslim community as well as the non-Muslim
majority French population. My informants felt the need to address the topic of halal because it
was a highly-politicized topic.
Unlike the prohibition against pork and alcohol, which had very few political polemics
against them at the time, the industry of halal was a major focus of political and social debate.
Beyond the issues around pork consumption in France, which I have already highlighted, the
polemics around halal were strong. Scholars such as Michaela DeSoucey, Wynne Wright and
Alexis Annes suggest that particular foods and foodways can be enrolled in political projects,
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While there are many ways of understanding this, the verses in the Quran on which this practice is based have
to do with not eating animals that are already dead (carrion) and the interdiction on blood. The idea of ridding an
animal of all its blood to act in line with this prohibition is what most of my informants refer to as “halal meat.”
The Quranic verses that are most commonly cited then are the same ones that prohibit pork: “He has forbidden
you only carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine; also any flesh that is consecrated other than in the name of God.
But for one who is driven by necessity, it is no sin. For God is forgiving and merciful” (The Quran, 2:173); “Say [O
Prophet], ‘In all that has been revealed to me, I do not find a ban on anything to eat, except for carrion, flowing
blood and pork, all these being unclean or profane, on which the name of someone other than God has been
invoked.’ But if anyone is forced by necessity, being neither disobedient nor exceeding the limit, then surely your
Lord is most forgiving and merciful” (The Quran, 6:145); “He has forbidden you only carrion, blood and the flesh of
swine; also any [flesh] consecrated in the name of any but God. But if anyone is forced by dire necessity, not
desiring it or exceeding his immediate need, God is forgiving and merciful towards him” (The Quran, 16:115). The
most extensive verse in the Quran that addresses the various points behind halal slaughter is: “You are forbidden
carrion, blood and pork; and any flesh over which the name of any other than God is invoked; and any creature
which has been strangled, or killed by a blow or in a fall, or has been gored to death or half-eaten by a wild animal,
saving that which you make lawful [by slaughtering properly while it was still alive] and what has been slaughtered
at an altar. You are forbidden to make the division of [meat] by means of divining arrows; that is sinful
conduct…But if anyone is forced by hunger to eat something which is forbidden, not intending to commit a sin, he
will find God forgiving and merciful. If they ask you what has been made lawful for them, say, ‘All good things have
been made lawful for you;’ and what you have taught your birds and beasts of prey to catch, training them as God
has taught you. So eat what they catch for you, but first pronounce God’s name over it. Fear God, for God is swift
in taking account” (The Quran, 5:3-4).
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especially in a place like France where food is such an essential element to national identity.649
Furthermore, Marie Dallam proposes that “because food is both a commodity and a necessity for
living, it can potentially be used as a tool by either side in a disagreement, regardless of whether
the tension is in any way related to food itself.”650
One of the most famous controversies around this sort of political use of food occurred
around the introduction of a halal burger on the menu of one of France’s largest fast-food chains,
Quick, in 2009-2010.651 As described by Wright and Annes, the fact that media and politicians
used this situation as a tool to perpetuate “the myth of the ‘Islamization of France’” is evidence
that “gastronationalism can be used as a political weapon laden with nativist and defensive
tendencies that intentionally erect boundaries to distinguish ‘in’ from ‘out’ groups.”652 I had
informants explain to me that the debate around halal was just one other scandal that the
government could use to show that a particular group was problematic, or to avoid “les vrais
problèmes de la France.”653 This informant went on to explain the problem with the politicization
of the topic of halal.
Le problème c’est que la France se précarise. Les politiques, au lieu de nous parler de ces
vrais problèmes nous parle du halal. Les gens sont dans la merde. Voilà, le vrai problème
dans la France ce n’est pas l’Islam. Franchement, il y a des personnes, ils ont envie de
manger halal, ils mangeraient bien halal. Le problème c’est pas ça. Le problème c’est
vraiment le fait qu’on est dans une situation de précarisation et que les politiques, au lieu
de s’intéresser ou nous dire ce qui est, vraiment, nous dire les vrais problèmes de la
France, ils trouvent d’autres stratégies.654
Halal, by this account, becomes a focus of political polemics that puts pressure on the members
of the communities that practice it in a real and tangible way. Many of my informants felt the
need to respond to the topic of halal simply because of the place it has been given in political
discourse. Not only do they feel the need to talk about it, but also some feel the pressure to give
649

DeSoucey, “Gastronationalism,” 432-455; Wynne Wright and Alexis Annes, “Halal on the Menu: Contested Food
Politics and French Identity in Fast-food,” Journal of Rural Studies, vol. 32 (2013): 388-399.
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Dallam, “Introduction,” xxv.
651
For many, Quick violated “the secular principles underlying republican universalism through their introduction
of religious distinctions into the public sphere” (Wright and Annes, “Halal on the Menu,” 397).
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Wright and Annes, “Halal on the Menu,” 397.
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120905_001—“The real problems of France.”
654
120905_001—“The problem in France is jobs. Instead of talking to us about the real problems, politicians talk to
us about halal. People are in trouble. There, the real problem in France, it’s not Islam. Really there are people, they
want to eat halal, well they eat halal. The problem is not that. The problem is really the fact that we are in a
situation of job insecurity, and the politicians, instead of being interested in, or telling us what is real, the real
problems in France, they find other strategies.”
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up the practice in totality because of the polemics around it. Many informants spoke about the
fact that in the Maghreb there are no polemics around Islam and therefore no polemics around
the practice of keeping halal, whereas in France there are so many different communities present
and so many polemics around the things related to Islam that one feels pressured to change one’s
practice.
Beyond politicians using halal as a means of showing how some communities are
problematic, my informants spoke about other highly influential public figures who will use the
topic of halal as a means of presenting an argument about the Muslim community in general.
One informant spoke of the famous actress Brigitte Bardot and her presentation of Islam. Bardot,
along with other public figures, highlighted the way of slaughtering the animals in halal practice
as an example of what is wrong with the Muslim community in general; she was engaging in
defensive gastronationalism.655 For this informant, this sort of action was a means for racist
people to gain the attention of many and try and deal with other crises that are present in France
by blaming a scapegoat. When speaking to me about Bardot he suggested that “avec la crise
économique en ce moment les gens sont de plus en plus racistes. Ils rejettent de plus en plus tout
qui est étrange.”656 Halal becomes another realm within which the politics of “Islam versus the
West” gets worked out.657
This polemic inevitably affected how my informants engaged this practice as one of the
Quranically-documented and prescribed practices. According to a few of my informants, eating
halal was a basic obligation,658 the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of Islam and
food,659 and the only thing that is really a “Muslim food practice.”660 All that considered, for my
informants the practice of eating halal meat was the most diverse of the four practices in this
category. It was seen as flexible by some, essential by others, but generally there was no real
consensus on how or why one should follow this practice. As much as it was seen as prescribed
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Wright and Annes, “Halal on the Menu.”
121202_004—“With the economic crisis at the moment people are more and more racist. They reject more and
more everything that is foreign.”
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For another example of this see Adam Withnall, “Denmark bans kosher and halal slaughter as minister says
‘animal rights come before religion,’” Independent, February 18, 2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-bans-halal-and-kosher-slaughter-as-minister-saysanimal-rights-come-before-religion-9135580.html.
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because of Quranic documentation of the practice, there was greater interpretation of exactly
how one was to engage this process. Like the Jewish informants in Aldea Mulhern’s study who
do not keep kosher and yet still consider themselves Jewish, many of my informants did not keep
halal and yet still claimed Muslim identity.661 Here we can see an example of how the very
categories that we construct as scholars can become complicated and messy when exploring the
things of the everyday.662
Unlike the injunction to fast during Ramadan, or to refrain from consuming pork or
alcohol, the rules around halal meat are varied within the Quran itself and can consequently lead
to more varied interpretations and varied practice. As mentioned above, there were four different
approaches generally taken by my informants in relation to halal meat: they ate strictly halal,
they ate halal when they could and non-halal when they could not, they did not care at all about
halal, or they were pescatarians.663
Even if “la viande halal c’est dans le Coran,”664 there are multiple rules and exceptions
around this practice located therein, and many of my informants would use this fact as reason for
their lack of practice in this regard. For example, many of my informants referred to the rule in
relation to halal meat that states that one can eat any meat if one cannot find properly-sacrificed
meat.665 Many of my informants would use this idea and say that because France is not a Muslim
country, one is not obliged to keep halal there. They would argue that one might break from halal
practice when one “doesn’t have the choice.” This was sometimes literal666 and sometimes
imagined.667 Often the breaking of the practice of eating halal meat had to do with being in
school/work and having “no choice” but to eat non-halal.668 One young woman explained this
type of choice as follows:
Dieu ne [le] prohibe pas totalement. Il nous dit d’essayer de manger halal, mais si vous
n’avez pas le choix, il faut bien se nourrir. Donc je mangerais du non halal. C’est pas un
661
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Someone who does not eat meat but does eat fish.
664
121129_002—“halal meat is in the Quran.”
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Specifically, the verses that I presented in footnote 616 above: 2:173, 5:3-4, 6:145, 16:115.
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120905_001.
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121130_001; 121216_001.
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interdit strict, c’est quelque chose qui peut dépendre du contexte. C’est comme dans tout:
dans la vie on a le libre arbitre. Et donc, si je suis dans un petit village pendant une
longue période, à mon avis je mangerai peut-être pas halal au bout d’un moment. Je ne le
ferai pas toute suite. J’attendrai. J’essayerai de me retenir, etc., mais si je vois que c’est
pas possible de pas trouver de la viande halal, à moment donner il faudrait que je mange
quelque chose. Et la viande c’est quand même important. Ça fait partie des choses qui
sont importantes pour le corps humain: manger de la viande.669
For this informant, and many like her, the context dictates practice.
Beyond just the context and one’s ability to find halal meat, another concern was that if
one could find halal meat one could not always be guaranteed that it was in fact “authentic” halal
meat; questions over certification were prevalent.670 When speaking with my informants about
the topic of halal, inevitably one issue that came up was the question of certification. One of the
biggest concerns in relation to the question of the certification of halal was not necessarily
whether or not a certification existed but whether or not that certification could be trusted. I had
informants stress that there were controls for halal that were universal and trustworthy,671 and
other informants who would suggest that one could never be guaranteed of the validity of
certification.672 There was clearly a desire for a better certifying agency that could offer less
room for error and more accountability for the farmers and the butchers who were engaged in the
business of halal.673
Most informants argued that because of the lack of real, trusted, universal certification,
the issue of whether one could find halal, or would keep halal, was ultimately a matter of
individual trust.674 If the individual trusted that his/her butcher was providing them with real
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120905_001—“God did not prohibit totally. He told us to try to eat halal but if you do not have the choice, well,
one must nourish oneself well. So I would eat non-halal. It is not a strict interdiction; it is something that can
depend on context. It’s like in anything; in life we have free will. And so, if I am in a small village for a long time in
my opinion I will maybe eat non-halal after some time. I would not do it right away. I would wait. I would try to
hold off, etc. But if I see that it is not possible to find halal meat, bah, at a point it is necessary that I eat something.
And meat is still important. It is part of the things that are important for the human body, to eat meat.”
670
Florence Bergeaud-Blackler explains the process of meat becoming halal in the French market and the issue of
“fake halal” in her “Social Definitions of halal Quality: The Case of Maghrebi Muslims in France,” in Qualities of
Food, eds. Mark Harvey, Andrew McMeekin, and Alan Warde (Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 2004), 95, 98. She also explains how because of the “plurality of social definitions of halal products” one can
see “why there are several halal certifications and why all attempts to reduce them to one have thus far failed”
(103).
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halal meat, they would most likely continue the practice. If they doubted, or felt like the label in
general was dishonest, then they could use that as a reason to stop the practice. One informant,
for example, explained to me that she kept halal in Algeria but not in France because she trusted
the label in Algeria, but does not trust it in France.675 Others would stop keeping halal because
they felt as though it was strictly a business issue in France. One young man explained to me that
while he did his prayers, and fasted during Ramadan, he did not keep halal because “pour moi
[l’halal] c’est que de business.”676 For this informant, and others like him, the fact that halal had
become such a strong business in France led to hesitation about the purity of the practice, and as
a result they felt like finding “real halal” meat was not a possibility in France.677
While many of my informants would argue that the context of France was not conducive
to keeping halal, that it was difficult to find halal meat or to find guaranteed halal meat, others
would argue that France was a context within which keeping halal was easy. One informant
explained further how context may change one’s practice, and also how the French context, or at
least the Parisian context, is now one that allows for continued/increased practice of keeping halal.
When explaining about his practice of Islam in France, he focused on halal and said:
il y a des années en arrière où on n’avait pas le choix [et] on était tenté. Une fois, j’ai
mangé de la viande qui n’était pas halal. Mais aujourd’hui, là c’est multiple, on trouve un
peu partout, aujourd’hui il y a Quick [a French fast food restaurant chain which now
carries halal meat products], il y a des grandes chaines qui font du halal. Donc pour moi
c’est simple: je ne me pose pas réellement des questions de liens entre la religion et la
nourriture; c’est, parce que ça coule de source pour moi. Il n’y a aucune complication. Il
n’y a aucun frein, aucun obstacle…Non, aujourd’hui on trouve tous les produits halals et
c’est pour ça qu’il y en a qui disent: la dernière génération respecte plus les principes que
les anciennes. Oui, parce que la première génération, quand ils sont arrivés en France, il
n’avait pas des boucheries halals. Donc, ils ont acheté leur viande dans les boucheries non
halals, sinon ils sont condamnés par leur parents de manger de la viande, et alors voilà,
certaines s’autorisent cette situation. Mais aujourd’hui je pense que, pour moi, il n’y a
plus d’obstacles.678
675
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121108_001—“For me [halal] is just business.”
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See Bergeaud-Blackler, “Social Definitions of Halal Quality,” especially her overview of the development of the
halal market in France (96-99).
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121031_001—“there were years in the past where we did not have the choice, where we were tempted. One
time I ate meat that was not halal. But today, it’s multiplied, we find [it] a bit everywhere, today there is Quick,
there are major chains that do halal. So for me it is simple: I do not pose questions really of the link between
religion and food; it’s because it flows from the source for me. There is no complication. There are no brakes, no
obstacles…No, today we find all of the halal products and that is why there are those who say, the last generation
respects more the principles than the older [generation]. Yes, because the first generation when they arrived in
France did not have halal butcher shops. So, they bought their meat in non-halal butcher shops, or if not, they
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Not only was the French context conducive to maintaining halal practice for Maghrébine Muslim
immigrants, it was the context in which some members of this community learned about halal in
the first place.
I had informants tell me that they learned about halal in France, not “au bled.” There were
different explanations for this as well. One informant explained his discovery of the concept of
halal as follows:
Moi, j’ai découvert ça quand je suis arrivé en France. Puisqu’en Algérie, ça n’existe pas
la viande halal, le halal non plus. Les gens, quand ils viennent en France, j’ai remarqué
que de plus en plus, c’est assez récent, ils cherchent à manger de la viande halal. Ça veut
dire que la bête a été tué sous certains rites. [Il réfléchit.] Pour moi c’est complètement,
c’est une innovation, je ne vois pas l’intérêt des gens qui sont très strictes là-dessus. À
mon avis, n’y a pas de description exacte sur la viande halal. On ne mange pas de porc:
point barre. Le reste de la viande … c’est vraiment une innovation très, très récente, la
viande halal. Je ne [le] connaissais pas. Je ne mangeais pas de viande halal. J’en mange,
mais je ne vais pas chercher à acheter de la viande halal quand je fais mes courses.679
This informant believed halal to be a completely constructed Western concept, and consequently
did not consider it necessary to engage in as a religious practice.
On the other hand, I had informants who explained that they learned about halal in France
because in the Maghreb everything is halal and does not require reflection or consideration of
what that term means.
J’ai découvert la viande halal quand j’avais 20 ans, quand je suis arrivé en France. On
m’a dit, ‘Tu ne manges pas halal?’ ‘Mais c’est quoi halal?’ Alors que j’ai vécu 19 ans en
Tunisie. Je n’avais pas compris. Donc j’ai compris qu’il y avait deux façons de tuer un
animal: l’électrocution ou l’égorger. Mais je n’avais jamais fait gaffe. Mais quand tu vis
dans un pays musulman, tu ne te sens pas oppressé par quelque chose, tu ne te sens
pas…moi j’ai jamais senti que le porc me manquait. Je n’ai jamais senti qu’il fallait que
je fasse attention à la viande que je mangeais, si elle était halal ou pas.680
were forced by their parents to eat meat and therefore some allow themselves this situation, but today I think
that, for me there are no more obstacles.”
679
121206_001—“Me, I discovered [halal] when I arrived in France. Because in Algeria, that doesn’t exist, halal
meat, halal either. People when they come to France, I noticed that more and more, it’s quite recent, they look to
eat halal meat. The means that it is an animal has been killed under certain rites. (he thinks) For me it is totally an
innovation, I don’t see the interest of the people who are really strict about it. In my opinion there is not an exact
description of halal meat. We do not eat pork, period. The rest of the meat… it is really a very, very recent
innovation, halal meat. I do not know it. I do not eat halal meat. I eat it but I do not go and search to buy halal
meat when I do my shopping.”
680
121209_001—“I discovered halal meat when I was 20 years old, when I arrived in France. They told me, ‘Do you
do not eat halal?’ ‘But what is halal?’ While I had lived 19 years in Tunisia, I did not understand the question. I
understood that there were two ways to kill an animal. Electrocution and to slaughter it. But I never paid attention
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For this informant, the practice of halal was taken for granted in the Maghreb because it was a
part of everyday, non-contested life practice. It is only when
il y a besoin d’avoir une identité, d’appartenir à une communauté, de s’identifier à
certaines choses. Et du coup on s’accroche à des choses connues, à des éléments
communs qui font qu’on appartient à un groupe.681
Halal becomes a “known thing,” a “common element” that helps a community to identity itself
when in a context where their identity is challenged or in question. This is why, for some, halal
became a more important practice in France than in the Maghreb.
5.2.1.5 Eid Al-Adha Lamb
The second category of religious/cultural food practice for the members of the community I was
studying was the Quranically-documented but not prescribed practices. The clearest example of
this was the sacrifice and consumption of the lamb for the Eid Al-Adha. This practice occurs
during the celebration of the Eid Al-Adha, at the end of the time of the hajj, as a symbolic
reflection on the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son Ishmael in obedience to God.682 The
remarkable thing about this practice was that even though it was not considered a prescribed
practice it was almost universally considered a religious practice.683 My informants would
explain to me that it was in the Quran and while it was not obligatory to engage in the slaughter
and consumption of a lamb for the Eid, it was essentially a “Muslim” practice, or a Muslim food.
For example, one informant suggested that there was a Muslim way of eating but not “Muslim
food,” except for the lamb for the Eid.
On n’a pas de nourriture qui est proprement religieuse. On a une façon de manger qui est
religieuse, c’est-à-dire on a une conduite à tenir par rapport à ce que l’on mange. Mais on
n’a pas de nourriture directement reliée à la religion. On n’a pas. C’est vrai que dans les
to it. But when you live in a Muslim country, you do not feel oppressed by something, you do not feel… me, I never
felt that I was missing pork. I never felt that I had to pay attention to the meat that I ate, if it was halal or not.”
681
121209_001—“There is a need to have an identity, to belong to a community, to identify with certain things.
And then we cling to known things, to common elements that make us belong to a group.”
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The verses of the Quran that describe the story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael are found
in 37:99-109 and the common verse that people refer to in support of the sacrifice of an animal at the end of the
pilgrimage is as follows: “Call mankind to the Pilgrimage. They will come to you, on foot, and on every kind of lean
camel, by every distant track so that they may witness its benefit for them and, on the appointed days may utter
the name of God over the cattle He has provided for them. Then eat their flesh, and feed the distressed and the
needy—then let the pilgrims purify themselves and fulfill their vows and perform the circumambulation of the
Ancient House” (The Quran, 22:27-29). Finally, the Quranic verse which addresses the Hajj, to which the sacrifice is
related, is found in 2:196.
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religions comme le judaïsme, ils ont certaines nourritures qui sont liées directement à la
religion. Nous, non. Peut-être la seule chose que l’on a c’est que le jour de l’Eid on doit
égorger un mouton.684
This was the only “Muslim food.” In fact, another informant expressed that the lamb for the Eid
was one of the absolute, definite religious food practices and this “certainty” was based on the
fact that it was a cross-cultural practice. It did not matter if you were a Muslim in China,
Pakistan or the Maghreb, the sacrifice of a lamb for the Eid was practiced everywhere.685 It did
not matter if the informant knew the correct story behind the sacrifice or not, where in the
religion it was based, or why exactly they engaged in this practice, but they knew that it was a
religious thing.
A couple of informants argued that, even though the lamb for the Eid was essentially
religious, it had taken on a cultural implication as well. One informant explained that at base it
was religious practice because it referred to the sacrifice of Abraham, but then he went on to
explain that
aujourd’hui ça a pris une autre tournure, c’est plus culturel...on est obligé d’avoir chaque
année le mouton, même pour les familles qui normalement ne devraient pas le faire, parce
qu’ils n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter un mouton, donc ça devient un truc très culturel.686
Another informant expressed a similar understanding of the lamb and the Eid. After having a
hard time remembering the actual story of the Eid and which Eid was which, she presented her
understanding of whether it was a religious or cultural practice. She expressed that at its base it
was religious but today it was much more of a cultural practice. For this informant, it was a way
to maintain transnational connection, and to remember being back home.687 Another informant
suggested that God had given certain injunctions in the Quran because he had a divine wisdom
that humanity would need in the future. For example, she explained that God created the two
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121201_002—“We do not have food that is properly religious. We have a way of eating that is religious, that is
to say, we have a way to behave with respect to what we eat. But we do not have food directly connected to the
religion. We don’t have it. It’s true that in the religions like Judaism, they have certain foods that are directly linked
to the religion. Us, no. Maybe the only thing that we have is, the day of the Eid, we have to slaughter a sheep.”
685
121216_001. In fact, sheep are not universally slaughtered by Muslims for Eid; other animals are also chosen
(goats, cows, buffalo, camels), and those without means, or access to butchers and animals, are not obligated to
purchase animals.
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121130_002—“Today it has taken on another twist, it is more cultural. We are obliged each year to have the
sheep, even for the families that normally would not have to do it, because they do not have the means to buy a
sheep, so it becomes something very cultural.”
687
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Eids and placed them in the Quran so that people would be obligated, in this day and age where
it was not the norm, to spend time with their families.688
5.2.1.6 Dates
The third category of food practice that my informants spoke about were the Sunnah-inspired
food practices. In this section I address the most commonly cited example of this type of
practice, the breaking of the Ramadan fasts with dates (and milk). While both dates and milk are
mentioned in the Quran, there is not injunction to consume them found there. Instead, the
practice of breaking the fast with dates comes from specific hadith which address the “way of the
Prophet” or Sunnah.689 Although many of my informants also suggested that milk was an
important element of the iftar, I could not find a specific hadith that addresses the breaking of the
fast with milk. This category, and specifically this example, is an excellent example and
illustration of the complicated relationship between religion and culture and the difficulty of
labelling any practice one or the other.
Because this practice was not in the Quran it was not considered an “obligation” by any
of my informants. While some considered it a religious practice, the lack of Quranic validation
immediately made it not obligatory, but instead, just “preferred.” One informant explained to me
that, “en première position, c’est le Coran, en deuxième le Prophète, car c’est le messager de
Dieu.”690 She then went on to explain that, in regards to the dates and the milk, people would
engage in this practice because the Prophet did. She explained that “si on ne le fait pas ce n’est
pas grave. Si tu manges autre chose ça n’a aucune valeur. Pour les gens qui ont un certain amour
envers le Prophète, et bien, il suit ses traces. C’est la simple raison.”691 In this we can see that the
practice of consuming dates and milk to break the Ramadan fast is not obligatory, but there is
still some religious value in it. While eating something else to break the fast is fine, there is no
benefit to it. By saying this, the informant suggests that, given that it was something that
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121202_003.
One of the common hadith in this regard is: “The Messenger of God used to break his fast with some fresh
dates, before he prayed; if there were none, then with dried dates (tamarat). If there were none of these he would
take a drink of water” (Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, III.164) as found in Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, Medicine of the Prophet,
trans. See Penelope Johnstone (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1998), 224.
690
121102_001—“In first position is the Quran, in second is the Prophet, because he is the messenger of God.”
691
121102_001—“If we do not do it, it’s not a problem. If you eat something else there is no value in it. For people
who have a certain love toward the Prophet, well, they follow his tracks. That’s the simple reason.”
689
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Muhammad is reputed to have done, there is some sort of religious value in engaging in the
practice, something that separates this food practice from any “regular, mundane” practice.
About 28 percent of my informants labeled the practice of consuming dates and milk a
religious one. One informant argued that it was “un peu la religion” because of the desire to
follow the Prophet in his actions.692 Another simply stated that it was religious because the
Prophet did it.693 One informant explained that the dates and milk are a bit more than just a
cultural tradition, and that people give “une raison religieuse” for the practice.694 One of the most
common reasons that I was given for why it was religious and not just cultural was its
universality. For these informants, cultural practices varied depending on the context, whereas
religious practices would be generally practiced by all Muslims no matter what the context. One
young woman, after explaining to me that because the Prophet did it, they also do it, told me that
the practice was religious because “tous les musulmans font ça.”695 This notion of the
universality of the practice was important for other informants as well. They argued that, even if
people might not eat dates, it is still a universal practice.696 Dates and milk are “recommandés
dans l’Islam,” and “toutes tables musulmanes vont avoir du lait et des dattes” during
Ramadan.697 One young man explained the reason why it was a universal practice by stating that
“c’est une chose universelle et religieuse en tant que spirituel parce que c’est une des seules
pratiques, avec évidemment la prière, qu’on peut assimiler à une des pratiques du Prophète.”698
Like the Quran, which is universally regarded, these informants argued that the life of the
Prophet is universally regarded as well and so any of his practices can be seen as religious
practices that are worthwhile engaging in.
While this group argued that it was strictly a religious practice, there were others who
argued that the dates and milk were “entre croyance et tradition.”699 Even more informants
argued that it was strictly traditional or cultural. In comparison to the clearly “religious” food
practices of not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and eating halal, the consumption of dates and
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121006_002—“A little religious.”
121207_001.
694
121212_001—“Give a religious reason.”
695
121105_001—“All Muslims do that.”
696
121130_001.
697
121128_001—“Recommended in Islam…all Muslim tables will have milk and dates.”
698
121108_001—“It is a universal thing and religious in a spiritual way because it is one of the only practices, along
with the prayers, that we can assimilate to one of the practices of the Prophet.”
699
121123_001—“Between belief and tradition.”
693
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milk during Ramadan was simply something one tried to follow out of a desire to imitate the
Prophet, according to one of my informants.700 For her this was an important practice, based in
the Sunnah, but it did not evoke “Muslim” for her. What is unusual is that for many of those
informants who argued for a strictly cultural interpretation of this practice, they all mentioned the
Sunnah specifically. It was almost as a way of saying, “it is not the Quran, it is the Sunnah, and
so it is not at that level.” It was because the practice was not imposed by the religion that it could
only be argued as cultural and not religious.701 Even if the practice was recommended, it did not
seem to hold the same sort of weight for these informants as other practices.
Universality came up for these informants as well, but they used this argument in exactly
the opposite way from the group I mentioned above. For these informants, it was exactly the fact
that not everyone engages in this practice, that it was not a universal practice, that meant that it
was a cultural and not religious practice. One informant told me that she was not aware of the
practice in the Maghreb and only learned of it after she had moved to France.
Les dattes et le petit lait, ou du lait. Chaque rupture du jeûne. Mais ça, je crois qu’on ne le
voit pas chez tout le monde. Je ne crois pas. Moi, de mes souvenirs je n’ai jamais vu chez
moi la rupture avec des dattes et du lait. Moi, j’ai découvert ça ici.702
This informant was suggesting that not only was it not universal across cultures across the world,
but it also was not even universal across the Maghreb. Most people would argue that it was a
fairly universal practice across the Maghreb, but would bring up experiences of fasting in
different locations across the world as evidence of the lack of over-arching universality in this
practice. For example, one informant told me of her experience in Syria during Ramadan and
how this differed from the fast in the Maghreb:
Au Moyen-Orient ils n’ont pas ça… certains pays du Moyen-Orient, la Syrie par
exemple, ils n’ont pas ça. L’endroit où j’étais, ils ne comprenaient pas pourquoi on prend
du lait et des dattes. Alors on essaie de comprendre pourquoi, après q’on s’est dit que les
dattes étaient vraiment le symbole du désert, donc de la culture musulmane, parce qu’elle
est née dans la péninsule arabique. Et le lait on se dit que peut-être c’est le lait de la
chamelle, mais on ne sait pas trop. On ne sait pas trop. Je ne sais pas quelle est l’origine
vraiment, mais je sais que c’est pas partout.703
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120905_001.
121202_004.
702
120917_001—“Dates and whey or milk. Every breaking of the fast. But that I think that you do not see that at
everyone’s home. I don’t think so. Me, in my memories, I never saw in my home the breaking of the fast with dates
and milk. I learned that here.”
703
121203_006—“In the Middle East they don’t have that, … in certain countries in the Middle East, Syria for
example, they don’t have that. The place where I was, they did not understand why we take milk and dates. So we
701
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According to this informant, the consumption of dates and milk was not universal, and in view of
that was not a religious practice. Unlike the abstention from pork, which can be found across
cultures and traditions, the consumption of dates and milk was more culturally specific.
Whether the consumption of dates was seen as religious or cultural for my informants,
many gave scientific, logical reasons for engaging in this practice as well. When talking about
the practice of eating dates to break the fast during the month of Ramadan, many of my
respondents would talk about the kind of sugars and vitamins704 that are present in dates and how
they are a super food for boosting one’s sugars after fasting because they are rich in “healthy
sugars” and give nutrients where are absorbed quickly by the body.
Les dattes, c’est au-delà ça, parce que certaines vont rester buter sur le fait que c’était en
assimilation au Prophète—et pas uniquement ça parce qu’il faut savoir que c’était aussi
un homme assez intelligent pour savoir que huit dattes pouvaient avoir un apport
énergétique très important. Il est évident que quand on jeûne pendant toute la journée on
a une certaine faiblesse, et les dattes permettent de rapporter l’énergie.705
While it was mostly out of imitation of the Prophet that people engaged in the practice, it was
also argued to be a significant health benefit to follow the Prophet’s lead in this case.
5.2.1.7 Couscous
As is made clear by the various ways that people responded to the questions about what is a
religious and what is a cultural practice, it seems that what is culture and what is religion is a
highly individual thing; even those practices that may be understood to be strictly religious by
some are presented as strictly cultural by others, and those practices that are understood as
strictly cultural are presented as strictly religious by others. The final group of practices that I
outline are the cultural food practices. These are practices that are not located in any specific
religious text or tradition, but sometimes take on a religious value in the everyday practice of

try to understand why, and after we said that dates are the symbol of the desert and therefore of the Muslim
culture because it was born in the Arabian Peninsula. And the milk, we told ourselves that maybe it was camel’s
milk but we don’t know really. We don’t know too much. We don’t know, I don’t know what is the origin of it
really, but I know that it isn’t [practiced] everywhere.”
704
121128_001; 121129_001; 121212_001.
705
121108_001—“Dates are a good case in point, because certain people will remain fixed on the fact that it was
to follow the example of the Prophet, and not simply that because one must also know that he was an intelligent
man to know that eight dates were able to have an important energizing effect. It is evident that when we fast
during the whole day we have a certain weakness and dates are used to bring energy.”
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individuals. The specific cultural food practice I present as an example of this category is the
eating of couscous.
While couscous is generally argued as a strictly cultural practice, it has taken on religious
significance for some. For example, one informant presented a pithy statement about what a
“Muslim needs.” He said “L’eau, la semoule [couscous] et la respiration. On a besoin que de ça
en l’Islam.”706 Couscous is given a significant role in the religion by this informant, and yet later
in the interview he goes on to explain that couscous is traditional, cultural, and not on the same
level as dates and milk which are in the Sunnah, or even further from the interdiction against
pork which is in the Quran.
Another informant, a fairly conservative young woman, also gave couscous some
religious significance. When telling me about religious food practices she explained that
pour les mariages c’est une tradition…c’est par rapport à la religion parce qu’en temps du
Prophète (salalahu alayhi wa salam), ils faisaient pour les mariages… du couscous…. Je
ne sais pas comment trop expliquer. C’est parce que, quand ils se mariaient, ils faisaient
du couscous. Ils avaient un repas de couscous.707
Although there was not necessarily a story of the Prophet eating couscous in the Sunnah, this
informant had learned that Muhammad made couscous for his own weddings and so, for her, it
was a religious tradition to make couscous for all weddings.708
Her sister had a bit of a different understanding of why couscous was important in her
cultural and religious practice. While she also mentioned the story that the Prophet Muhammad
ate couscous, for her it was not the actual couscous that mattered but the kind of meal that was
represented by the couscous.
Le couscous est utilisé dans les cérémonies religieuses justement parce que c’est un plat
de partage. Aujourd’hui dans la société occidentale, avec l’individualisme qui prime, les
gens ont tendance à manger le couscous dans des plats et des couverts séparés. Mais les
pays d’Afrique ont gardé cette idée de partage autour d’un même plat. Au Mali on appelle
ça un mafé, en Tunisie couscous, mais l’idée de partage reste la même. Les musulmans
[Maghrébiens] font ça, ils font un grand plat de semoule et puis, voilà, c’est quelque
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121008_001—“Water, couscous and breath. We only need that in Islam.”
120822_001—“For weddings it is a tradition…it’s related to the religion because at the time of the Prophet
(Peace be upon him), they made it for weddings, they made couscous…I don’t know how to explain it really. It’s
because when they got married, they made couscous. They had a meal of couscous.”
708
I attended the wedding celebration of this informant’s sister. While her family made a couscous for the day
before the wedding, her sister did not serve couscous for her wedding meal. Instead she served a high end, five
course French meal. Her family seemed confused and unimpressed by this meal choice, perhaps because it was
against religious tradition as they understood it.
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chose qu’on peut manger avec les mains. On donne aux petits, etc., et c’est quelque chose
qui est beaucoup plus lier au partage que lier à l’aliment lui-même.709
For this informant, couscous is the representation of the religious tradition of sharing, and
although she argues that it is a traditional thing, what it represents is religious. Many other
informants also spoke of the necessity to eat couscous for certain religious holidays—whether it
is for “la nuit du destin” (the night of destiny) where “il faut que je mange un couscous,”710 or
“c’est vraiment le plat traditionnel de fêtes,”711 “le plat central c’est le couscous”712 and thus it
plays an important role in many of my informants’ religious festival lives.
For most of my informants, couscous is clearly a cultural food. It is not found in the
Quran, or the Sunnah, and while it may take on significance in one’s religious life because it is
used in religious ceremonies, it is not at its base religious. One woman was emphatic that
couscous was traditional and not religious. She exclaimed:
non, ce n’est pas religieux, non, non, ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion! C’est une
tradition chez nous. Voilà. On va dire tradition. Ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion. Il n’y a
pas [de place] dans le Coran [où] c’est marqué “le jour de l’Eid il faut … préparer le
couscous,” non, c’est une tradition, voilà, chez nous.713
When I asked another woman, what came to mind when she thought of couscous, she responded:
“je pense en Algérie que ça fait partie de mon patrimoine. Mais pas parce que je suis musulmane,
pas du tout.”714 It was her cultural identity that was linked to couscous, not her religious identity.
Another informant spoke of the differences between Muslim cultures to argue that the
consumption of couscous was strictly traditional.
Il y a le Maghreb, mais la religion musulmane, elle est beaucoup [plus répandue] dans les
pays asiatiques. C’est là qu’il y a plus de musulmans, et eux, ils ont peut-être une autre
alimentation. Ils n’ont pas de couscous…L’Afghanistan, le Pakistan, l’Inde, ils ont une
709

120905_001—“Couscous is used in religious ceremonies just because it is a dish that is shared. Today in
Western society, with individualism that prevails, people have a tendency to eat couscous from separate dishes
with separate utensils. But in African countries we keep this idea of sharing around the same plate. In Mali it is
called a “mafé,” in Tunisia “couscous” but the idea of sharing remains the same. Muslims do that, they make a big
plate of semoule and, presto, it is something that we can eat with our hands. We give it to the little ones, etc., and
it is something that is more linked with sharing than with the ingredient itself.”
710
121106_001—“I must eat a couscous.”
711
121124_001—“It is really the traditional dish for holidays.”
712
121212_001—“The central dish is a couscous.”
713
121006_002—“No, it’s not religious, no, no, it has nothing to do with religion, it is a tradition for us. Period. We
would say tradition. It has nothing to do with religion. It is not indicated in the Quran that “the day of the Eid you
must put, you must prepare couscous,” No, it is a tradition for us.”
714
120917_001—“I think of Algeria, that that is part of my heritage. But not because I am a Muslim. Not at all.”
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alimentation qui est un peu différente. Et ils utilisent beaucoup d’épices. On le voit bien,
l’alimentation indienne, c’est plus à base de riz. Nous, c’est plus la semoule, mais sinon,
oui elle est différente suivant le pays où on vit. Mais c’est vrai qu’au Maghreb, c’est
beaucoup le couscous.715
Couscous is clearly a cultural tradition for this informant because it is not typically found in
other parts of the world where Muslims live. This quotation also shows awareness of how, just
like rice is a base of food culture for South Asian cultures, couscous is a base of food culture for
those who come from the Maghreb. With Muslims spread across the world, in especially large
numbers in South and South East Asia, the Maghrebian focus is perforce limited.
Regardless of whether couscous is viewed as a cultural or a religious practice, it is
ultimately argued to be a representative dish of a particular community, namely the Maghrébine
community. Couscous may be taking on a symbolic role for French national identity as well. For
example, when I asked one informant whether it was difficult to find the necessary ingredients to
make a couscous dish her response was, “pour le couscous, non. Parce que c’est un plat national
français maintenant.”716 Other informants were quick to point out that one of the favourite (in
fact the third favourite, and one of the most consumed) dishes of the French was couscous.717
Because of the large population of Maghrébines in France, couscous has taken on a major role in
French eating habits.718 One informant also explained that the love of couscous by the French
was
aussi lié au passé entre la France et le Maghreb, avec les colonies… [et] ça m’étonne pas
que le plat préféré des Français c’est le couscous—mais que ç’était pendant 20 ans, 15
ans, le plat préféré des Français, des Français pure souche, uh, qui n’ont rien à voir avec
le couscous.719
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121129_001—“There is the Maghreb, but the Muslim religion is in many Asian countries. That’s where there
are the most Muslims, and they, they maybe have a different food. They don’t have couscous…Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, they have a diet that is a bit different. And they use a lot of spices. We see that easily, [e.g.] Indian
food, it’s more a base of rice. For us it’s more semolina, but otherwise, yes it’s different depending on the country
where we live. But it’s true that in the Maghreb, it is a lot of couscous.”
716
121126_002—“For couscous, no [it is not difficult]. Because it is a French national dish now.”
717
120917_001; 121006_002; 121031_001; 121124_001; 121126_001; 121128_001; 121201_002; 121202_004;
121203_006; 121205_001; 121206_001.
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In fact, a polling agency in France found that in 2011 couscous was the third favourite food of the French; falling
behind Moules-frites (mussels and French fries) in second place and magret de canard (duck breast) in first. “Les
plats préférés des Français (2011),” 21 October 2011, http://www.tns-sofres.com/publications/les-plats-preferesdes-francais-2011.
719
121203_006—“Also linked to the past between France and the Maghreb, with the colonies…. That doesn’t
surprise me that the favourite dish of the French is, but it has been 20 years, 15 years, the favourite dish of the
French, the purebred French, uh, who have nothing to do with it, was couscous?”
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Not only do the French love couscous, but they make it themselves and even sometimes serve it
back to Maghrébines. “Par exemple, le couscous, mes amis français m’invitent chez eux pour
manger un couscous, mais ce n’est pas du tout le couscous que je connais. Le couscous français
est différent du couscous du Maghreb.”720 So even if the French may appropriate and make
couscous, there is still a (non-Maghrébine) French flare to it. Other informants also spoke about
the “couscous français”: something that at its base was Maghrébine, but was changed by the
French to suit French tastes and approaches to food, usually consisting of a mix of meats.721
If the French also hold couscous in high regard, there is the possibility that couscous
might play a role in relations between the Maghrébine Muslim immigrant community and the
majority non-Muslim French population in France. When talking about the possible tension
between non-Muslim and Maghrébine Muslim communities in France one of my informants
clearly spoke about the role that some foods could play in easing those tensions.
C’est qu’il y ait de la place pour tout le monde sans stigmatiser l’un ou l’autre. Justement
l’unification ou le rassemblement peut se faire via la nourriture, et d’ailleurs on a un bon
début avec le couscous, plat préféré des Français. On pourrait continuer avec d’autres
plats qui viennent d’autres contrées qui soient aussi répandu, tous aussi appréciés et par
tout le monde.722
For this informant, couscous is the representation of cultural sharing, and the representation of
the appreciation of the “other.” It is considered a way to unify and to congregate people and is a
model that could be followed with other dishes and between other cultures. Food practices can
act as a bridge and means of understanding between varied groups.
Food is a strong tool for mutual understanding as it is a part of most people’s everyday
life and experience. These practices are a way of life. What happens when the context of one’s
daily life changes, though? Does the immigrant experience change one’s level of practice no
matter what the reasoning?
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121207_001—“For example, couscous, my French friends invite me to their place to eat a couscous, but it isn’t
the couscous that I know. The French couscous is different from Maghrébine couscous.”
721
121201_001, 121201_002; 121205_001; 121206_001.
722
121126_001—“It’s that there is room for everyone without stigmatizing one another. Rightly, the unification or
the congregating can happen through food and anyway we have a good start with couscous, the favourite dish of
the French. We can continue with other dishes that come from other countries which are also prevalent, equally
appreciated by everyone.”
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5.3 Consistency and Change in Religious and Cultural Food Practices in Paris
In this final section I tackle the changes, or lack thereof, in practice for the Maghrébine Muslim
immigrants of my study. I have divided this section into three categories of, or trends in,
experience for my informants. Two of the categories record whether this is a change by
decreasing a practice in the immigrant location or by increasing the practice. The third category
envelops those who maintain their practice in the immigrant location, not significantly increasing
or decreasing certain practices. Because second generation immigrants have no home context to
which to compare, those six informants will be left out of this discussion.
5.3.1 Increase in Practice
Based on the knowledge that I had of the scholarly presentation of immigrant religion before I
went into the field, I anticipated that most of my informants would fall into this category of
practice.723 I assumed that most of the people that I would interview would tell me that they had
increased their practice out of a means of trying to maintain transnational identity, or to
legitimize an identity when they were in a context that challenged their basic notions of identity.
I was surprised in fact to see that only two of my informants (out of the 27 firstgeneration informants) had any real increase in their practice in France. These two informants
increased their religious practices based on a renewed sense of religious conviction. It was not
necessarily because they had a type of identity that was in conflict that they needed to legitimize,
but simply that they used to be “non-practicing Muslims” and became “practicing Muslims” for
one reason or another. One man explained to me that when he lived in Algeria, and for the first
many years that he lived in France, he did not necessarily eat halal food and would drink alcohol
quite often with his friends. It was only “depuis que je suis pratiquant”724 that he stopped
drinking alcohol. The change had nothing explicitly to do with the immigrant experience (he had
been drinking in France for years after his immigration) but instead was a natural outworking of
a new commitment to a religious life. An older gentleman expressed something similar. It was an
encounter with a Sufi leader that led him to restart “ritual practice” again, not (explicitly) his
723

As I discussed in Chapter 3 in section 3.2, for immigrants who find themselves in a minority position, or claiming
a minority identity in their host context, symbols of that identity can become important, such that an increase in
practices related to that identity is common.
724
121126_001—“Since I was a practicing [Muslim].”
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immigrant experience.725 This informant did go on to explain that the access that he had to more
varied practices in France did play a role in his renewed interest in and increase in practice of
Islam, but as he tells it, it was more about an individual, personal decision than a result of the
context around him.
5.3.2 Consistency in Practice
Some of my informants maintained the same level and sort of practice that they did in the
homeland. Whether it was maintaining extensive practice, or no practice at all, for these
informants the practices went under no significant change from the Maghreb to France. For
example, one man explained to me that “certains Algériens qui viennent à l’étranger, ils rentrent
dans la religion vraiment à fond. Ce n’est pas arrivé comme ça [pour moi]. Quand je suis venu,
j’étais déjà comme ça. Ça n’a pas changé grand-chose à ma vie.”726 Many of these informants
would talk about the fact that in a superficial spiritual society such as France the maintenance of
traditions and practices gives some depth and stability to one’s existence.
My informants maintained cultural food practices to the largest extent. Considering the
fact that “cultural” practices were seen as flexible, and religious practices as obligatory, if one
could label their practice as cultural they almost gave themselves a “get out of jail free” card
when it came to leaving some practices aside. On the other hand, it also allowed those who
labelled their practice as cultural to get around the hesitation about religious practices in France
and allowed them to maintain these practices with greater ease; there was not as much pressure
to alter these cultural practices. Even for a self-proclaimed “non-practicing” Muslim, one
informant explained to me the importance of maintaining some traditions and practices. For
example, even though she was not insistent on eating halal meat, she still felt like she had to buy
halal meat for traditional Maghrébine dishes.727 Another informant expressed a similar
commitment to maintaining some practice, not necessarily because of conviction but simply
because one is used to doing something in a particular way.728
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121212_001.
121201_002—“Certain Algerians that come from abroad, they enter into the religion very deeply. It did not
happen like that [for me]. When I came, I was already that way. That did not change very much in my life.”
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121124_001.
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121128_001—“Je ne sais pas, c’est psychique. Je ne sais pas pourquoi mais c’est comme ça (elle sourit). Pour
moi, c’est meilleur. C’est la viande qu’il faut. (Elle rigole.) C’est pour ça que je dis, j’ai des séquelles mais je ne sais
pas pourquoi je continue à les faire. Et ce n’est pas par conviction, c’est l’habitude. Je n’arrive pas à passer outre.”
726
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5.3.3 Decrease in Practice
The third and final trend refers to those who decreased their practice in France from what they
engaged in in the Maghreb. This was by far the most common trend for my informants. Some
would only decrease some practices and maintain others, while others would stop practicing
altogether. When I began my research in France I was told about the verb “se méfier.”729 I noted
this earlier. I was told by non-Muslim French and Maghrébine Muslim French that this verb
often dictated how the Muslim community interacted with the non-Muslim community in France
and vice versa, i.e. that it reflected distrust. Because of this utter “méfiance” there was often fear
to practice traditions that may increase the tension or distance between the two communities.
Consequently, the French context made some of my informants feel as though they had to
decrease their religious practice that othered them in France. Whether they felt forced because of
the non-Maghrébine non-Muslim French around them,730 or because the context provided other
practices that were in conflict with their traditional home practices (i.e. eating non-halal foie gras
because halal foie gras was non-existent),731 many of my informants felt like they had to change
some of their practices in order to fully live an “integrated” life in France.
I had people tell me that life in France was not as conducive to traditional food practices
from the Maghreb because life in France was much more fast paced and did not provide the
necessary time to prepare dishes and engage in traditional food practices.732 I had other
informants tell me that it was simply because they would want to go out with friends, and that
was often in conflict with their religious practices, going to bars, etcetera.733 One man told me
that he tried to maintain his practice in the French context, particularly eating halal meat and not
drinking alcohol, but it became too difficult for him to resist and he left both practices behind.734
Another informant explained that her decrease in practice came because of a distance between
herself and her past, and this distance opened an opportunity for self-reflection not offered to her
in the Maghreb:
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To be wary of, or, to distrust.
121216_001.
731
121105_001.
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121201_001.
733
121202_002.
734
121129_002.
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Je ne suis pas pratiquante. Quand j’étais en Algérie, je m’intéressais beaucoup à la
religion, j’étais assez croyante. Mais le fait d’être sortie de l’environnement, du cocon
familial, ça m’a permis de prendre un peu de recul, et je me suis complètement détachée
de la religion. Je ne pratique plus. J’ai un rapport très distancié avec ma religion, qui est
l’Islam.735
The immigrant context allowed for a distancing from one’s religious practice that was not
possible, she felt, in the religiously-soaked Maghrébine context.
One of the biggest reasons given for decreasing one’s practice was that it was too
difficult to maintain the practice to the same level in France as it was in the Maghreb, whether in
ambiance or essential elements, and so they simply would not bother. If they could not do it
right, they did not want to do it at all. One woman explained to me that, in regards to halal, she
stopped consuming halal in France because she could not be sure that the meat was properly
butchered. Instead of trying to meet this practice in other ways, she simply decided that if she
could not do it right she would not do it at all.736 The practice was often still significant for these
informants; they simply decided that it had to be done in a particular way or else it was not worth
it, but they would restart the practice when they would visit the Maghreb. While Ramadan may
be too difficult to practice in France, it was something that everyone did, and did “properly” in
the Maghreb, and so could be re-instated in one’s practice when in the Maghreb.737 The context
clearly changes the practice.
It is important to note that even if my informants changed, decreased, or stopped their
religious food practices completely in Paris, this did not stop them from continuing to identify as
Muslim in some way. As I stated above, all my informants claimed Muslim identity to some
degree. While they may have altered their practice in their immigrant context, and often altered
the way they understood their Muslim identity as a result, this did not remove their identification
as “Muslim” completely. Specific practices were sometimes the hinge on which the identity
rested and sometimes they were not. In fact, food revealed how the terms and categories that we
attempt to place on people are incredibly tenuous. We can see that, in agreement with Michel
Desjardins, “in talking with people about the role that food plays in their religious lives it does
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not take long to appreciate that, even on a personal level, the categories developed by scholars
are fragile constructs.”738
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the specific food practices in which my informants engage, and their
changing relationships to them in Paris. First, I examined what food practice can reveal about my
informants’ definitions and understanding of culture and religion. In this part I explored how my
informants label a given food practice cultural or religious depending on whether they see that
practice as flexible or obligatory. I argue that where a practice lies on the spectrum of
obligatory/flexible tends to be grounded in the source of that practice. If it is found in the Quran
it is seen as obligatory, and consequently religious. If it is found only in traditional practices and
stories then it is often seen as flexible, and consequently cultural. If the practice is found in the
Sunnah, it lies somewhere in the middle of this flexible/obligatory, religious/cultural spectrum.
My informants also play with these relationships. By labelling a practice as cultural, which is
normally understood to be religious, my informants could justify the flexibility with which they
approached this practice. This was evident with those informants who ate pork, arguing that not
eating pork was only cultural and thus this practice did not need to be maintained.
Overall a fourfold typology of food practice emerged for my informants in Paris. The
four categories were: (1) Quranically-documented and “prescribed,” i.e. not eating pork, not
drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and eating properly sacrificed meat (halal); (2)
Quranically-documented but not prescribed, i.e. the lamb for the Eid Al-Adha; (3) Sunnahinspired, i.e. breaking the Ramadan fast with dates and milk; and (4) cultural food practices, i.e.
eating couscous. While these practices were generally understood to fall into these categories,
with category 1 food practices being the most religious/obligatory and category 4 food practices
being the most cultural/flexible, I had informants who labelled the food practices in each of these
categories in the opposite manner. My informants engaged with each of these practices
differently and had different understandings of the role that they played in their religious/cultural
lives.
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Of all the practices, the Ramadan fast was the most clear-cut religious food practice
according to my informants. Because of its place not only in the Quran but also within the five
pillars of Islam, this practice was the least disputed of all the religious food practices listed by
my informants. Even those who understood themselves to be cultural Muslims did not argue
away the religious significance of this practice. They may have seen their engagement with it as
cultural, but they saw it as religious at its base. On the other hand, the interaction with pork and
alcohol reveal a complex relationship between culture and religion as it is worked out in food
practice by my informants. While both were firmly placed within category 1 food practices, my
informants in France revealed that on the ground there were drastically different approaches to
these two practices.
Throughout I discussed some of the main forms of argumentation that my informants
gave for their engagement in these food practices. The first argument was that if something was
written in the Quran then it must be done. This argument was broken into two sub arguments,
namely that anything that is written in the Quran must be obeyed simply because it is in the
Quran, and secondly, because there is divine wisdom in everything presented therein. The second
argument that my informants gave me for their religious food practice was that beyond there
being religiously or culturally significant reasons to engage in such a practice, there were also
scientific or health reasons for it. My informants saw their food practices as logically sound, as
serving some purpose for their health, and as worthwhile engaging in. Finally, my informants
argued that they engaged in a given practice based on habit. It was something that they did in the
homeland and since childhood, and as a result it was something that they continued now.
Finally, I closed this chapter with an exploration of the ways in which my informants
remained consistent in their food practices and the ways in which they changed them in Paris, in
comparison to their practice in their home lands. In contrast to my expectations before entering
the field, only two of my informants revealed an increase in food practice in Paris. This increase
in practice had nothing explicitly to do with the immigrant experience and everything to do with
a new found religious conviction, often long after their move to Paris. For a larger proportion of
my informants, consistency was key. Cultural food practices tended to be easier to maintain and
were the most consistent practices kept. Overall, the most common trend for my informants in
Paris was to decrease their food practices once they were in Paris. Because of the Maghrébine
mistrust of the broader French society, many of my informants felt a need to leave some of the
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more apparent food practices aside out of fear of creating greater distances between themselves
and the non-Muslim, non-Maghrébine French with whom they interacted on a daily basis.
Furthermore, informants made the argument that life in France was not conducive to the
traditional and religious food practices that were the norm in Maghreb, based on the time it takes
to prepare a traditional dish or on the kinds of social food practices they felt were expected of
them in Paris. Whatever the case, my informants were changing their food practice in tangible
ways from what they lived in the Maghreb. Largely, I presented an overview of the ways that my
informants practice their religion in secular France, and addressed how they justify these
seemingly problematic practices in light of French laïcité.
Overall, the evidence presented in the last three chapters shows a vast and varied
experience of “Islam de France.” While some of my informants identified strongly with both
sides of that identity, others stressed one side over the other. While some felt firmly within the
French national “us,” others felt as though they would never be able to claim this side of their
transnational identity. While some felt comfortable living out the daily practices of their “French
Muslim” identity, others felt the need to leave the “Muslim” side behind and consequently
decrease, or re-label, their religious practice in the host-land, often labelling it as cultural in place
of religious.
The variety of practice and self-understanding that is present in this community, as I
experienced it, becomes telling when comparing it to the fairly homogeneous understanding and
approach to practice of the community in Montréal, to which I will now turn.
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PART 2: Maghrébine Muslim Experiences in Multicultural Montréal
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Chapter 6: Québec’s “Distinct in Canada” National Identity: Four Influential Factors in
the Montréal Context of Reception
6.1 Introduction
My first week of fieldwork in Montréal was drastically different from that in Paris. While I spent
my first week in France reeling from the overwhelming amount of data already at my fingertips,
my first week in Québec was quiet. No one was talking about Muslims. There were no signs in
the Metro to observe, no conversations about integration to be had, no politics around pork in the
school cafeterias, no blatant or subtle prejudice to be witnessed. At least not toward the Muslim
community at the time I was there. Since this is a chapter about context, it is important to note
that since the time of my fieldwork in Québec there has been a heightened awareness of the
Muslim community there and an increased, visible, palpable prejudice towards it. My fieldwork
is situated in a pre-Charter of Québec Values (2013).739
Since the time of my fieldwork, this proposed Charter for Québec Values, which many
viewed as a response by the PQ government to the “problem of the veil,” and Islam in Québec in
general, was only one example of increased awareness of and prejudice toward Islam in the
province. There has also been an increase in verbal and physical altercations between nonMuslim Québécois(es)740 and Muslims in Québec following various terrorist attacks in Canada
and around the world. It seems clear to me, when looking at the history of Québec, and the
history of Islam in Québec, that prejudice towards Muslims tends to ebb and flow in the
province. There are moments in history where Muslims in Québec feel very uncomfortable, and
discriminated against. On the other hand, there are moments in time where Muslims feel quite
comfortable living their lives in Québec; they feel as though they can be both
Québécois(e)/Canadian and Muslim and that experiences of prejudice are simply not the norm.
Unfortunately, at the current moment in time (2016) the situation in Québec, as in much of the
739
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rest of the Western world, is one of heightened prejudice toward Islam. At the time of my
research, there was an ebb in the prejudice felt by many Muslims living in the province. This fact
inevitably affects the data I collected and reveals a different view of the relationship between
Islam and Québec than what many might assume reading this research at this current historical
moment in time.
As I explained in Chapter 2, there are certain historical and contextual aspects of the host
society, independent of the ongoing ebb and flow, that inevitably influence an immigrant’s daily
life, and the food practices in which they engage. There are events, philosophies, policies, and
beliefs about self and other that are present in Québec that affect how the Maghrébine Muslim
immigrants in Québec, and in this case, in Montréal, not only interact with the non-Muslim
Québécois(es) around them, but also how they view, and present themselves. The experiences of
the Maghrébine Muslim in Montréal are quite different from that of the Maghrébine Muslim in
Paris. While there are always complicated reasons for differences between groups and
individuals, many of the unique aspects of an individual’s experience can be traced back to the
context within which that individual lives. Simply speaking, Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal
are different from Maghrébine Muslims anywhere else in the world because of some very
specific elements to Québec history and society that inevitably change anyone living in la Belle
Province.
To understand the ways that food plays a role in the working out of religious identity and
the integration processes of the individuals of my study I must set the Québec scene. After all, in
the province where “Je me souviens” (I remember) is the provincial slogan one must take history
seriously. Remarkably the same four historical and contextual factors that I explored in the last
chapter are significant here: colonialism, immigration, church/state relations and nationalism.
That being said, while there are some similarities between the French and Québec context, the
differences in each of these four realms are significant.
In relation to colonialism, France’s history as colonizer affects the interaction between
Muslim and non-Muslim French, while in Québec its history as colonized, first by the French
then by the English, impacts this relationship. The type, duration and quantity of Maghrébine
Muslim immigration to France and Québec also differs, which will impact how people respond
to the food practices and related identities of Muslim immigrants in Québec—not to mention the
effect that the identity of Canada as a “nation of immigrants” has on the way that new
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immigrants understand and present themselves. While both France and Québec have a
historically complicated relationship with religion, specifically the Catholic Church, the resulting
secular policies present in each context are distinct. Québec’s break with Catholicism occurred
only in the 1960s, and its intercultural form of laïcité differs from the often strict laïcité at work
in France. Finally, both contexts have different historical developments of nationalism, and
relatedly, national identity. While in both contexts secularism plays an essential role in the
national identity, in Québec, which finds itself in the midst of a larger, predominantly Englishspeaking country, language is also foundational to what it means to “be Québecois.”741
Also, while food and drink are often representative of French national identity, the
multicultural and intercultural742 nationalism present in Québec, and specifically in Montréal,
encapsulates the food traditions of all people from all backgrounds. Keeping these differences in
mind, I present Québec’s unique history as it relates to colonialism, immigration, secularism and
nationalism.
First, I explore the unique experience of colonialism in Québec and how this might
impact the Muslim community found therein. While Québec may not have its own colonial
relationship with the Maghreb, as France does, its own identity as a colonizer and colonized
nation imparts essential characteristics to the context in which my informants live.
Second, I outline the immigration history of Muslims to Canada, and specifically Québec,
with a focus on Maghrébine Muslim immigration. In this section I address the reasons that
Maghrébine Muslims have immigrated to Québec, alongside the immigration policies in the
province that have clear consequences for this community and its foodways. Within this section I
demonstrate what is distinct about the Québec approach to immigration compared to the rest of
Canada.

741

This is especially true in Montréal, where the province’s majority of English speakers reside. This tension
between English and French speaking Québécois(es) in Montréal was the more obvious tension at work when I was
in the field. I heard more about “those darn English” (of which I am one) than “those darn Muslims” during my
time in Montréal. I will discuss this tension further below.
742
Throughout this work, I, at times, use these two terms, multiculturalism and interculturalism, as seemingly
interchangeable. While the Québec government and the Québécois population at large tend to firmly reject
Canadian “multiculturalism,” many scholars have argued that making a distinction between these two concepts is
not always straightforward. I will unpack some of the arguments around how these terms differ or are similar in
this chapter, but for an excellent, brief overview of some of the main questions around the relationship of the two
concepts, see Gerard Bouchard’s “What is Interculturalism?” McGill Law Journal/Revue de Droit de McGill, vol. 56,
no. 2 (2011): 435-468—especially his discussion on pages 462-466.

230

Third, I provide an overview of the history of church and state relations in Québec and
how this history informs the noteworthy approach to secularism that is present in Québec. In this
section I explore the most significant events and policies that continue to have an impact on the
Maghrébine Muslim experience, including but not limited to, church/state relations before 1960,
the Quiet Revolution, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, rigid versus open secularism and
interculturalism versus multiculturalism.
Finally, I close the chapter with an examination of Québec nationalism. In this
endeavour, I consider questions such as: What does it mean to be Québécois(e)? What are the
orienting principles of that identity? Who can claim it? And especially, can Maghrébine Muslims
in Québec call themselves “Québécois Muslims” or Muslim Québecers? In fact, is there such
thing as an “Islam du Québec?” All these considerations help us to understand how my
informants live out their North African, Muslim and Québécois/Canadian lives in Montréal, and
the ways that they interact with the daily practices that shape those identities, namely food.
6.2 The Effect of Colonization on Québec self-understanding743
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the colonization of North America was a part of the first wave of
French colonization abroad. This wave and its effects on the Québec colony are the focus of this
section. I show how this history has an impact on the self-understanding of the province and will
therefore inevitably affect the ways that my informants negotiate their identities in this context of
reception; specifically, how they will engage and utilize food as a tool in these processes.
Québec had its beginnings as a colony of France, called New France, in the mid-sixteenth
century (1534). The “real beginning of French colonization in the St Lawrence Valley was in
1608, when Samuel de Champlain established a fort at Cap Diamant, the site of Québec City
today.”744 French colonization of New France then expanded quickly throughout the seventeenth
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century, but remained relatively constrained in comparison to the British colonization of the
period. By the eighteenth century, while the colonial rivalry between Britain and France was well
established, France focused mostly on the European continent while Britain expanded further
into other international realms.745
Not only did Britain focus its colonial efforts off of the European continent at that time,
but the kind of colonization and the settlers who were arriving were starkly different from that of
France’s settlement. While the British allowed for and even encouraged the settlement of
minority religious groups in British North America, the French were much more selective, only
allowing for French-born Catholics to settle in New France, significantly restricting their
numbers in the North American colony.746 This sets the stage from the beginning of the Canadian
colonial experience for difference between the part of the future nation that spoke French and
had a French background and that which spoke English and had a British background.
Furthermore, it establishes an ideal of “who belongs” as a part of the Canadian/Québécois
people. While British North America was being populated by immigrants from various minority
groups, New France was strictly populated by French, Catholic settlers.
Mann suggests that not only did France populate New France with Catholic settlers, but
these settlers were a particular type of Catholic. She explains that coming out of the religious
turmoil of sixteenth century France, these settlers were “the most extraordinary group of hardnosed religious zealots: mystics who knew how to run a business; wealthy nobles and bourgeois
with an intense longing to change the world for God,” and they saw New France as the place to
realize all of these dreams.747 These “mystics” brought money, power and determination with
them, which allowed them to “establish a network of clerically administered social institutions
that would not only outlive New France but be an enduring feature of Québec society until well
into the twentieth century.”748 Because of this type of settlement in New France, the Catholic
Church was established as a powerful force, not only because the majority settler population was
Catholic but because these Catholics strove to establish a role for the church outside of the
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building’s walls. They believed the church to have a role to play in the larger social structures of
their new society.
After the British conquest of New France between 1756 and 1760, Britain finally won
control of the French colony in 1763 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. While one might
expect that this change in power might lead to an Anglicization of the region of Québec, more
complicated politics were at work; not that the British colonial powers did not try to make
Québec a proper English colony for thirty years after the Conquest.749 Because church and
landowners stayed in the region after the Treaty of Paris, the British found themselves in an
awkward position when they ran into troubles with the American Colonies. To appease the
Francophone settlers, and attempt to keep them from joining the American Colonies, the Québec
Act of 1774 was passed. It was the “attempt by Britain to keep Québec British without making it
English.”750 According to Peter Beyer, this was the “first official act of Reasonable
Accommodation of religious diversity in Canada.”751 Not only did French civil law gain legal
recognition at this point, but the landowners and Catholic Church were given strong power in the
province, which dissuaded the Québécois(es) from joining the Americans in spite of their many
invitations.752 This also laid the foundation for the power of the Catholic Church to grow, which
becomes important for us to know when addressing the relations between church and state.
6.2.1 Québec as Distinct in Canada
This recognition of Québec, and those who lived in this area of the colony, as distinctive, as
having its own civil law, etcetera, led to the notion that there were two different
“nations/societies” in the Canadian colony:753 the English and the French. The problem in the
mid-nineteenth century was not one of the “people” against a government but a conflict between
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two opposing “peoples”: the French and the English.754 With confederation in 1867, economic
control remained mostly in the hands of English companies and thus the situation in Québec was
one where, as the popular saying went, “capital speaks English and labour speaks French.” The
only French speaking institution that seemed to have any real control in the Province was the
Catholic Church. It controlled education, social agencies, civil society, hospitals, etcetera. This
colonial history firmly establishes two key elements to the Québec self-understanding: language
and religion.755
What effect might this history have on Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in the twentyfirst century? France and Britain have a history of colonial conflict which uniquely affects
Québec and its related political policies. The Québec independence movement grew out of
frustration with Anglophone political and economic power in province, something firmly
established out of the English colonial presence in the country. They opposed the economic
backwardness of the province of Québec, where “capital speaks English,” and the socioeconomic inferiorization of French Canadians. As a result, language policy becomes important;
the official language of the market and state determines who has the clearest path to management
positions. This then can lead to a stronger emphasis on speaking French above anything else. It is
significant, then, that my informants come from French speaking countries of origin, and former
colonies of France at that. Both Québec and North Africa were the settings of French colonial
effort, and consequently have some shared historical experiences. Furthermore, because of the
dominance of the English language in most of the North American colony, any groups that can
add strength to the French language in Québec are potentially welcomed.756
Like the emphasis placed on language that arose out of the colonial battle between France
and Britain, Catholicism also gained an important place in the self-understanding of the
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inhabitants of New France. Unlike the Protestant majority, and a diverse Protestantism at that,
that surrounded them, the settlers of New France, as I’ve noted, were almost all Catholic. The
Québec Act of 1774 only solidified the position of Catholicism in the future province and added
to the unique identity of the inhabitants of the region. While the emphasis on Catholicism as an
essential part of the Québécois identity has all but disappeared today, a fact I discuss later in this
chapter, the colonial period sets up the Catholic religion and the province’s relationship to
religion as different from the rest of the country. Whether religion plays a significant role in
peoples’ lives, or in the definition of what it means to be Québécois(es), in Québec now one can
still see this influence in the numbers of Québécois(es) who personally identify as Roman
Catholic. According to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), 87.9 percent of the Québec
population declared a religious affiliation, compared to 76.1 percent of the Canadian population.
More specifically, 74.6 percent of the population of Québec identified as Roman Catholic.757
This relationship to Catholicism, which is firmly established in the colonial period, inevitably
has an affect on minority religious communities in the province. Maghrébine Muslims are just
one of many religious minorities in a heavily Catholic province.
Inevitably, with 74.6 percent of the population claiming one religious affiliation, anyone
who is a part of the 25.4 percent non-Catholic community may feel like an “other” in some
regard. While one’s religious affiliation tends to have more complicated implications for one’s
acceptance in Québec because of its relationship to secularism, this general Catholicism adds
another layer of possible tension for my informants.
French colonization of a different kind also influences the experience of North African
Muslims in Québec. The French colonial influence on Québec, as mentioned above, is a
significant factor in the reception of North African Muslims in that province. Sharify-Funk
points out that “the persistence of a common Francophone cultural and intellectual sphere
renders core constructs of French culture and history consequential (though by no means
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determinative) for Québec.”758 The negative colonial memory and its related perceptions of
Muslims in France, as I discussed in Chapter 2, inevitably leak into the French-Canadian
context.759 As a result, Muslims in French Canada may face colonial discrimination on two
fronts. They are French-speaking citizens fighting against the English in North America, but they
are also immigrants from lower status French colonies which are viewed negatively by the
country from which Québec takes many of its policy cues. All these things being considered,
Arab Canadians, in comparison to Arabs in France,760 “have never been historically caught up in
a colonialist/colonized relationship with their host society.”761 While Muslims in Québec may
have to fight against negative stereotypes and perceptions of their religious tradition, these
negative perceptions do not necessarily come from a direct colonial history but from more recent
interactions between Islam and the West, from immigration patterns/numbers, and from the
relationship between religion and the state in Québec.
6.3 Immigration Patterns and Demographics of (Maghrébine) Muslims to Canada/Québec
The history of Québec as a French colony, and its relationship to British colonial rule, has a
direct impact on the immigration patterns and policies that are present in the province today. The
emphasis on the uniqueness of Québec in Canada, and its French self-understanding, are
essential to the immigration history in the province. Before we can address the specific migration
of Maghrébine Muslims to Québec, though, it is important to understand the general patterns of
Muslim migration to Canada. Again, like my treatment of this theme in Chapter 2, my focus is
primarily on the immigration patterns and policies that are directly related to Muslim and
Maghrébine immigration to Canada, and more specifically Québec, rather than immigration
patterns and policies in Canada/Québec in general.
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6.3.1 Three Migratory Movements of Muslims to Canada
Like in France, three phases of Muslim immigration can be seen in Canada since the late
nineteenth century.762 Sharon McIrvin Abu-Laban breaks down the migration of Muslim families
to North America into three phases: the Pioneer Families, the Transitional Families and the
Differentiated Families.763 The first phase of Muslim immigration, the “Pioneer Families” as
Abu-Laban labels them, began in the late nineteenth century and lasted until the Second World
War. According to McDonough and Hoodfar, these first Muslims were mostly “traders from
Syria and Lebanon, who wandered selling goods in the newly developing Northwest.”764 These
traders would cross back and forth between Canada and the United States, and thus census
reports in 1871 report 13 Muslims in Canada, while the “1881 census does not report any.”765 By
1901 Canada’s Muslim community had “grown” to 47 members, mostly in Alberta and
Saskatchewan.766 Furthermore, with the implementation of “two restrictive Orders-in-Council
enacted in 1908 by the Canadian government” there was a significant slowing of Arab
immigration to Canada at that time.767 Moreover, Canada’s continuous passage law highly
restricted immigrants from “Asian and Arab lands.”768 Those immigrants who were still making
their way to Canada had a specific demographic profile. Like the early immigration patterns of
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Muslims in France, this first wave of immigration to Canada was made up mostly of young,
male, unskilled workers. They also believed that their migration was only temporary and they
wanted to accumulate as much money as possible and return to their home countries.769
Although there are some demographic similarities, there were some differences present in
the early North American Muslim immigrant experience from the immigrant experience in
Europe as we see represented in Cesari’s migratory movements in Chapter 2. First, they were
much fewer in number and had no real contact with family or others back in their homeland;
“ocean travel was expensive, arduous, and time consuming and letters took a very long time.”770
This made it difficult to set up and maintain communities in their host land. Further, while the
French had some interaction with Islam before the first wave of migration in the twentieth
century through their colonial efforts in Muslim-dominant nations, Canada’s first real interaction
with Islam came with these Syrian traders in the late nineteenth century. Islam at that time was a
generally unknown tradition, and Muslims were marked as distant outsiders.771 Because they
were viewed as outsiders, and because the maintenance of transnational linkages was difficult in
this early phase, the Muslim community began as a fairly unified, pan-ethnic and pan-national
tradition in Canada.
The second wave of migration that Abu-Laban outlines is what she calls the “Transitional
Families.” This phase took place between post-World War II and 1967.772 It is in this phase that
Muslim immigration to Canada increased dramatically. According to Eid, 97 percent of Arab
migrants who came to Canada between 1882 and 1997 came after 1950.773 In comparison to
1901 where there were only 47 members of the Muslim community, by 1951 there were three
thousand.774 While the second phase in France was merely an intensification of the first, with
unskilled labourers being brought into the country to fill a labour shortage, the situation was a bit
different in Canada. This second phase instead brought a large group of students and
professionals onto Canadian soil from Muslim countries.775 During this time, immigrants from
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North Africa, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent came to North America “to study and
advance professionally. Most of these newcomers were young, unmarried men from wellestablished families, potential elites in their countries of origin.”776 Instead of coming to Canada
to work and send money back home to their families, they were being sent by well-to-do families
to advance in education and career.777 Like in France, the economic setting was prosperous in
Canada at the time and there were abundant job and career opportunities to be had. Abu-Laban
suggests that this cohort of immigrants had much to do with introducing a “significant twist in
North America’s exposure to and understanding of Muslims.”778 Muslims were now seen not so
much as outsiders, but as business people, doctors and engineers. Although a large portion of
these immigrants were educated professionals, there was also a large portion of refugees coming
to Canada from countries torn apart by civil war.779
It is essential to take a moment and explore the impact of the 1967 Canadian Immigration
Act which highly influenced the type of immigrants coming to Canada before I address the third
and final phase of Muslim immigration to the country. Under the 1967 Act, immigrants were
now able to “apply for immigration on the basis of a point system based on education, training,
skills, status as a refugee based on humanitarian grounds or as sponsored applicants of existing
Canadian relatives.”780 This point system is a significant difference between immigration policies
in Canada and France, and the resultant Muslim communities in both locales.781 The most
significant difference between the two communities based on the point system of immigration is
that Muslim immigrants in Canada tend to be of a higher socio-economic status than those in
France.782 Beyer similarly expresses that
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the non-Christian religious populations of these countries [Canada and the US] are not
nearly as dominated by Muslims as is the case in many European countries, even though
in each case Muslims still constitute the single largest religious identity among immigrant
groups after Christianity. Above all, both North American countries have pursued
deliberate immigration policies that have had the effect of favouring more educated
people with a greater average amount of human capital on arrival.783
While the introduction of the point system had a clear and significant impact on the kind of
immigration that would follow in Canada, this change did not happen overnight and the second
phase, with a new influx of business people, doctors, and engineers, as I mentioned above, found
validation in this system. It was consequently not a hard stop transition between Abu-Laban’s
second and third phases of immigration. Furthermore, family reunification and refugee
immigration continued, and continue, to be important aspects of immigration to Canada after
1967; thus immigrants from all socio-economic statuses and education levels continue to
immigrate to Canada alongside those who would enter according to the point system.
The final stage of Muslim immigration began in 1968 and continues to the present day.
Abu-Laban labels this cohort the “Differentiated Families.” This phase is different in both host
and home characteristics. Not only do the Muslim immigrants in this wave come from countries
with “different geopolitical social characteristics from those of the previous immigrant eras” but
“the receiving societies have altered too.”784 The most important difference between this cohort
and early cohorts according to Abu-Laban is a greater sensitivity to normative Islam. Muslim
immigrants in this phase of immigration then are “more likely to emphasize the public
demonstration of religious beliefs.”785 Eid states that,
whereas most Arab migrants coming to Canada between 1945 and the early 1970s were
secular and highly educated, this new migratory wave included many semi-educated and
religious migrants who felt the need to institutionalize their faith through the
establishment of mosques and religious organizations.786
In France, the third wave of immigration highlighted by Cesari brought about visibility because
of an expanded community of Muslim immigrants, while in Canada this third wave ushered in a
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new public presence because the immigrants themselves “are more willing to stand out as
different.”787 Furthermore, in this phase, thanks partially to globalization and technological
development, these immigrants are able to maintain transnational connections with greater ease
than previous immigrants.788 As a result, what happens in home countries has a greater impact on
what happens in the Muslim communities in Canada because they can now be effected by them
in a way that was not possible before.789
6.3.1.1 Demographics of Muslims in Canada Today
Considering how recent of a phenomenon Muslim immigration to Canada is, these waves of
immigration have led to a significant population of Muslims in the country. Unlike France,
which does not document religion in its census information, Canada has a history of doing so.
There are some “wrinkles” to this data though, as Kazemipur points out. First,
the question on religion in the “long-form” census is administered only in every other
census (e.g. 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011). Second, starting with the 2011 census, filling
out the long-form was declared optional…This means that the 2001 census offers the last
reasonably reliable data available for the purpose of estimating the population of faith
groups. In the case of Muslims, an additional problem is that, in 1941, the category
“Muslim” was dropped from the Canadian census questionnaire, only to be reintroduced
forty years later.790
All three of these wrinkles mean that there are significant gaps in our knowledge of the actual
numbers of Muslims present in Canada now and in the past. There are none the less some good
estimates presented by various groups. Kazemipur states that there were roughly 579,640
Muslims in Canada in 2001 (based on the 2001 census data) and 940,000 in 2011 (according to
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Pew Research Center studies in 2011).791 He goes on to show that if projected estimates are
accurate, the Muslim population, which is currently about 2.8 percent of the total Canadian
population, will rise to approximately 6.6 percent by the year 2030.792 Immigration rates are
partially to thank for these large numbers of Canadian Muslims, with high fertility rates in the
community being the other. In terms of immigration, again, according to Kazemipur, the
proportion of Muslim immigrants in the overall immigrant population in Canada has risen from
approximately two percent in 1970 to approximately 20 percent in 2000.793
While one may imagine that 2.8 percent of the total population (if one considers the 2011
numbers) would not be felt in a country as geographically large as Canada, it is essential to note
that the Canadian Muslim population is unevenly distributed among the Canadian provinces.
Ontario houses the largest population of Muslims, at 61 percent (again, using the 2011 numbers,
this equates to approximately 573,400 Muslims living in Ontario), with Québec coming in
second at 19 percent (approximately 178,600 according to the 2011 numbers). Moreover, the
concentration in each of these provinces is largely restricted to the Greater Toronto Area (GTA)
and to Montréal.794
6.3.2 Maghrébine Muslim Immigration in Québec
The larger patterns of immigration that I described above are reflected in the situation in Québec,
with some important nuances.795 The immigration of Muslims to Québec followed the same
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waves: a small first wave made up of male, unskilled workers; a second, post-war wave of
students and professionals; and a third wave consisting of religiously visible differentiated
families, as Abu-Laban labels them. There were also two distinct waves of Muslim immigration
to Québec that overlapped with these general patterns found in the rest of the country. First, preQuiet Revolution Québec, not unlike the rest of the country at that time, was only interested in
certain kinds of immigrant groups taking up residence in the province. While in the rest of the
country immigration before the implementation of the point system was often influenced by
desires for certain ethnic groups, the Québécois government was not interested in any
immigration before the 1960s.796 As Joseph Carens argues, Pre-Quiet Revolution immigrants
were seen as threats to the closed communal identity that existed at the time in Québec, an
identity that was imagined as rural, French, and Catholic.797 With the implementation of the
point system of immigration in 1967, and the reimagining of communal identity in Post-Quiet
Revolution Québec, the immigration pattern to this province changed. Instead of seeing
immigrants as a threat to communal identity, these communities were now seen as full of
potential to aide in the nationalist endeavour; francophone immigrants were seen as a potential
support to the French-Québécois identity rather than a threat. So, there was a change in “type” of
immigrant to Québec post-1960. Like the rest of the country, the immigrants who were arriving
in Québec after 1967 were from a relatively high socio-economic status, they were able to gain
Canadian citizenship relatively quickly, and immigration was seen as central to nation
building.798 While there were similarities present at this time between Québec and the rest of
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Canada, there were some important distinctions that arose at this time, and were only solidified
by the Canada-Québec Accord on Immigration in 1991.
Because of the new way of viewing immigration after the 1960s, Québec became
interested in gaining control over the immigration to the province. Growing out of the concern to
make sure that the distinct society that was growing out of the fertile soil of the Quiet Revolution
was nourished and not trampled under foot, the Québec government focused on better selection
and integration of immigrants in the province. Not only would immigration strengthen the
developing Québécois economy but it had the potential to bolster the population of French
speakers in the province, thus enhancing the francophone nature of Québec society.799 To reach
these goals, though, Québec needed more say in the processes of selecting and integrating
immigrants—hence the establishment of the Canada-Québec Accord. As stated in the Accord
itself, “in order to meet the needs and the particular situation of Québec” the Accord covers
the selection of persons who wish to reside permanently or temporarily in Québec, their
admission into Canada, their integration into Québec society, and the determination of
levels of immigration to Québec.800
While the federal government maintains control over family reunification and refugee
immigration, Québec gains complete control over the selection within the economic immigration
category and hence can give high priority to French-speaking immigrants.801 Not only does
Québec gain control over the selection of immigrants but it also gains control of the programs
and policies in place to aid in the integration of immigrants to the province. Integration programs
can also be streamlined to support the acquisition and development of French.
6.3.2.1 Language
The stress placed on language is one of the two significant distinctions between Québec’s
approach to immigration and that of the rest of Canada, specifically as it relates to the “skilled
worker” category of immigration. While in the rest of Canada one gains equal points for
knowledge of French or English as a skilled worker,802 Québec gives the principal applicant 16
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points for oral and written knowledge of French and only 6 points for knowledge of English.803
Additionally, in Québec if the spouse of the applicant also knows French then an extra 6 points
are awarded, while there are no extra points given if the spouse has a knowledge of English.804
These factors make a clear statement about Québec’s self-understanding as a political
community: French is at the heart of its understanding of itself as a distinct society.805 Because
permanent residents have the ability, and right, to leave the province into which they initially
immigrate, there have to be specific policies in place that help in the retention of the immigrant
community. For Québec, emphasizing French language in the immigrant community makes
leaving the French-speaking province to resettle elsewhere in Canada a more difficult task for
those who only have knowledge of this official language and not English. This emphasis on
French helps to keep the immigrants that the province spent so much time and money on
bringing to Québec in the province. According to Carens, to make sure that immigrants in the
province add to the Francophone society and do not detract from it,
Québec should increase the proportion of French speakers among the immigrants, should
improve French-language training for others, should strengthen the position of French as
a common language and the language of public life, and should ensure that the
francophone community is open to the “full participation of people of different
origins.”806
So not only are the numbers of French speaking immigrants increased, but the kinds of language
training and support that exists in Québec for immigrants is completely geared toward the French
language.
According to Turgeon and Bilodeau, the historical tendency, especially before the 1960s,
was for immigrants in Québec to adopt English over French. This tendency occurred for two
reasons. First, English was seen as the language of upward mobility and business in North
America. So it was the smarter choice for immigrants socially and economically. Second, preQuiet Revolution nationalism in Québec was not welcoming of outsiders and thus immigrants
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were encouraged, specifically by the Catholic school system, to attend English schools.807
Thanks to the policies and practices in place in Québec since the Canada-Québec Accord that I
have outlined above, this trend is changing and the situation is now drastically different. Instead
of choosing English, “in 2006, for the first time in history, the majority of allophones (51
percent) in Québec tended to use French at home.”808 It would appear that the efforts to
encourage the French-speaking nature of Québec society through immigration policies and
procedures are working.
6.3.2.2 Immigrant Origins
This emphasis on French immigration and integration policies leads directly to the second major
distinction between Québec and the rest of Canada, namely, the origins of immigrants in the
province. While in the rest of Canada the linguistic and ethnic background of its immigrant
communities are vast and varied, in Québec the majority of immigrants come from Frenchspeaking countries. For example, in Québec between 2006 and 2011, as reported in the NHS, the
five most important national sources of recent immigration were Algeria (9 percent of all recent
immigrants), Morocco (8.2 percent), France (7.6 percent), Haiti (6.6 percent) and China (5.1
percent); Tunisia provided 1.9 percent of immigration during these years.809 When examining the
overall immigrant population in Québec, not just those “recent” immigrants who arrived between
2006 and 2011, this pattern is also evident. The five most significant countries of origin for all
immigrants in Québec according to the 2011 NHS are Haiti (7.1 percent), France (6.9 percent),
Italy (5.9 percent), Morocco (5 percent) and Algeria (4.9 percent).810 It is clear that immigrants
are being sought out and are in fact coming to Québec from French-speaking nations.811
This trend has a direct impact on the immigration of Muslims to Québec, as North Africa
serves as one of the most significant pools from which immigrants come to Québec. In the 1960s
as Québec was re-envisioning itself, Maghrébine immigration was sought after by Québec
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because it fulfilled all the check boxes for ideal immigrant groups, i.e. educated, professional,
urban, francophone, and familiar with Western life, thanks to the French colonial presence. In
fact, “le mariage entre les immigrants maghrébines et le Québec avait tout pour marcher.”812 It is
worthy of note that in the beginning of Maghrébine migration to Québec, Maghrébines were seen
as the ideal immigrant community; a situation that might be viewed differently today under new
feelings of Islamophobia in the West and the rise of militant forms of Islam around the globe.
While the countries of the Maghreb are not entirely made up of Muslims and, as a result, one
cannot argue that all Maghrébines migrating to Québec are Muslim, one can make a fairly strong
case that the majority would be. For example, Castel argues that if one simply looks at
immigrants coming from Algeria, 82 to 85 percent of Algerians in Québec are Muslim.813 One
can imagine similar percentages from Morocco and Tunisia.814 In fact, according to McAndrew
and Bakhshaei, North African Muslims make up 60 percent of all Muslim immigrants to
Québec.815 This in turn leads to a significant North African Muslim community in Québec, and
considering that most immigrants to Québec settle in the region of Montréal, this community is
mostly located there. According to Oakes and Warren, if we look at 2004 as an example, “nearly
86 percent of new arrivals settled in the greater metropolitan region of Montréal.”816 Castel’s
work on Algerian immigrants to Québec supports this by stating that out of 13,545
“Québécois(es) d’origines Algériennes” 12,615 (93 percent) live in the Montréal region.817
Furthermore, 80 percent of specifically North African Muslim immigrants live in Montréal
according to McAndrew and Bakhshaei.818 Finally, if one looks at the 2011 NHS, 9.6 percent of
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the population in Montréal reported Islam as their religious affiliation.819 All of these studies
taken together give the picture of a significant North African Muslim community concentrated
on and around the island of Montréal.
6.3.2.3 Maghrébine Immigration to Québec
It is clear why Québec wanted immigrants to come from the Maghreb, but it is important to
understand why immigrants from the Maghreb wanted to come to Québec. Looking at Algeria as
a case study we can see some of the clear reasons why immigrants from the Maghreb were
choosing to not only leave their country of origin but also why they were selecting Québec over
France. In his chapter in Louis Rousseau’s Le Québec après Bouchard-Taylor: Les identités
religieuses de l’immigration, Castel presents seven socio-historical conditions to take into
account for why Algerians have migrated to Québec over the years.820
First, the war of independence in Algeria in the 1960s, as I discussed in Chapter 2, leads
to complicated relations between Algeria and France. So those immigrants who wanted to leave
Algeria for a variety of reasons could choose Québec to stay in a French speaking location but
not have to move to the country from which they were trying to gain independence.
Second, the Algerian revolution that comes out of the war of independence leads to
nationalist fervour and an Arabization of Algeria. For those not interested in either of these
trends, migration to Québec becomes an attractive option. During these first two time frames, the
Algerians who were migrating to Québec were mostly workers who came to aid in the
construction of major projects like James Bay and the Olympic stadium.821
The third socio-historical condition was the Berber Spring and the social crisis of the
1980s. During this time frame the immigrant population was mostly university students,822
seeking a North American style education.
Fourth, and highly important, is the Black Decade, i.e. the 1990s. During this time a
massive civil war occurred in Algeria where, between 1992 and 1997, 100,000 to 150,000 lives
were lost.823 At this time, the type of immigration changes slightly, and while there are still
819
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workers and university students migrating from the Maghreb to Québec, large numbers of
refugees also migrate at this time. This coincides with the timing of the Canada-Québec Accord
and Québec generally gaining more control over immigration to the province. Thus, migration
from Algeria to Québec in the 1990s jumps from 1,130 immigrants between 1986 and 1991 to
8,385 between 1996 and 2001.824
The sixth and seventh socio-historical conditions that Castel highlights are the
educational revolution and the reimagining of family structure. These two reasons lead to a
greater desire by some Algerians to leave the country and attend school and build families in a
North American context. Ultimately, many of the Maghrébine immigrants that made their way to
Québec between the 1960s and 2001 were actively sought out by the Québec government and
came to Québec out of a desire to better their, and their families’ lives in a context that allowed
for the pursuit of what they saw as the American/Canadian dream.825
What awaits immigrants in the host context is often not perfectly aligned with the
expectations they have before their migration, and the migration process itself has large effects
on the way of life for these immigrants. For example, while many North African immigrants
were sought after by the Québec ministry of immigration because of their strength in French and
their educational levels, when they arrive in Québec they often found that these two factors did
not help them in gaining employment in their field. Unemployment among immigrant groups is
high,826 and this trend is reflected in the situation of Maghrébine immigrants in Québec. In fact,
unemployment among immigrants in Québec is higher than the Canadian average for
immigrants. According to McAndrew and Bakhshaei, “the unemployment rate for recent
immigrants (five to ten years) to Québec is almost double that of Canada overall.”827 They argue,
convincingly so, that this higher proportion of unemployment is directly linked to the fact that
immigrants in Québec are sought after for the knowledge of French, and yet the labour market in
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Québec, and in Montréal specifically, where we know most immigrants in Québec live, requires
bilingual skills.828
Beyond the struggle for employment, migration to the Québec/Montréal context can
colour the daily experience of immigrants in other ways. Unlike in France, where
communautarisme among the Maghrébine Muslim community is common based on the
immigration patterns and trends to the country, North African Muslim immigrants in Québec do
not live in ghettos. Although there is a “Petit Maghreb” in Montréal, this is not actually where
Maghrébines live in large numbers. Instead, Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live throughout the
region, with slightly higher concentrations (one out of ten people) living in the neighbourhoods
“d’Ahuntsic-Cartierville, de Villeray-Saint-Michel-Parc-Extension, de Côte-des-Neiges-NotreDame-de-Grace, et de Saint-Léonard.”829 As argued by Castel,
si la société d’accueil québécoise, dans le cadre de sa réalité métropolitaine, ne manifeste
pas de tendance à engendrer des ghettos (Manai et Richard, 2010, p.52), les arabomusulmans Québécois n’ont pas davantage tendance à former d’enclaves.830
Unlike the situation in Paris, Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal do not face real issues of physical
communautarisme.
This lack of geographic concentration often means that there is regular interaction with
“the other” on a daily basis, a tendency that my informants spoke about frequently. They tended
to live in apartment buildings or neighbourhoods that consisted of families of diverse identities,
including long-standing, or “pure laine” Québécois(es). While North African Muslim immigrants
in Québec are already dealing with the fact of moving from a Muslim milieu to a non-Muslim
milieu, the fact that there are no real concentrated communities in Montréal leads to a heightened
feeling of living outside of a Muslim context and perhaps to a heightened feeling of the need to
practice one’s tradition, as we’ll see. While in the Maghreb, practicing Islam is almost inevitable,
in Canada, and especially in Montréal where one lives outside of a religious enclave, practicing
Islam becomes intentional.831 All that being said, according to Milot and Venditti the Muslim
culture of the Maghreb is one of “Islam à la carte,” meaning that depending on the country, the
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region, the ethno-cultural group, etcetera, immigrants will privilege certain practices over
others.832 As a result, Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Montréal may be “more practicing,”
but what that “practicing” actually looks like may vary to quite a large extent. This flexibility of
“necessary practice” becomes all the more important in a post-Quiet Revolution Québec where
the relationship between church and state, and the resultant opinion of religion, is especially
complicated.
6.4 The History of Church/State Relations in Québec: Quiet Revolution, Laïcité,
Interculturalism and the Bouchard-Taylor Commission
Québec has a distinct approach to secularism and a unique understanding of (often labelled,
rejection of) Canadian multiculturalism that creates a distinctive setting within which
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live. To understand Québec’s version of laïcité and the
province’s unique policy of interculturalism, it is essential to explore the history of church and
state relations in the province. What is it about this history that leads to a strong rejection of
religion in the public sphere, albeit “softer” than in France, and to a general discomfort with
particular kinds of religious expression? Furthermore, how does this history influence Québec’s
approach to multiculturalism, namely, interculturalism? Specifically, how does the province’s
relationship to “the church” influence the Québec side of the intercultural coin?
The history of the relationship between church and state in Québec is similar to that of
France, but simply more recent.833 Eid states that, similar to France, the Catholic Church, before
the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, “exerted a profound influence over most institutions, both in
the private and public spheres.”834 Eid goes on to explain how, before the Quiet Revolution in
Québec, culture was deeply rooted in religion and it “was impossible to think of the French-
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Canadian and Catholic identities as separate entities.”835 Even the provincial party in control of
Québec between 1944 and 1960, the Union Nationale under the leadership of Maurice Duplessis,
was strongly aligned with the Catholic clergy.836 The government and the church supported one
another in their efforts and made it almost impossible to take control away from both powers
until Duplessis died in 1959. While Duplessis’ tenure as premier was seen as the “La Grande
Noirceur (The Great Darkness)”837 by liberals, similar to that of the Dark Ages before
Modernization, many also viewed it as a time of religious and cultural purity in Québec.
Duplessis’ efforts to suppress many modernizing forces in Québec throughout his years as
premier actually added fuel to the fire to modernize in Québec, and after a couple of new leaders
tried to take over the Union Nationale after Duplessis’ death, the Liberal party, under the
leadership of Jean Lesage, was elected, and thus began the Quiet Revolution—normally viewed
as the large push in the province to modernize and secularize. As Eid states, “within less than
twenty years, the close ties between Québec’s Roman Catholic Church and the state had largely,
if not completely, been severed.”838 This severing is normally viewed as being a direct result of
the Quiet Revolution, to which we now turn.
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6.4.1 Three Approaches to the Quiet Revolution839
While the majority of people view the Quiet Revolution as the moment when the province
removed education, health care and social services from the hands of the Catholic Church, there
are other factors that were at work and influence what we now label the Quiet Revolution. There
have been many works written on the Quiet Revolution and its many aspects; I focus on
Gauvreau’s categorization of the ways of viewing this event/process, as he provides a summary
of the various approaches that others have taken. He suggests that in general the Quiet
Revolution has been described by most historians as at base
a series of political reforms undertaken by the Liberal government of Premier Jean
Lesage between 1960-1966. In a larger sense, these historians apply the term to the
period extending from 1960-1980, an era which they maintain was characterized by “the
triumph of neo-liberalism and neo-nationalism.”840
While these are the simplest ways of describing what constitutes the Quiet Revolution, Gauvreau
goes on to suggest that there are two historiographical currents that dominate the understanding
of what actually happened during the Quiet Revolution. These two currents are (1) the orthodox
liberal, and (2) the revisionist. I add Gauvreau’s own work to this categorization and label his
approach as (3) the modern Catholic approach.841 Briefly, according to Gauvreau, the orthodox
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liberal view argues that the Quiet Revolution is a fight between modernization and
traditionalism. He argues that people who hold this view see the Quiet Revolution as being at its
base a war between a Catholic Duplessis State and the secular middle class, which ends up
winning the battle.842 A large component of this fight is economic in nature. Since Duplessis’
government “maintained that solutions to social and economic problems were private rather than
public issues,” Québec became placed on the peripheral of the North American economy.843 Add
to that “Québec’s cultural division of labour,” i.e. that Anglophones held a “disproportionately
large number of the province’s higher-status positions, while Francophones tended to be
clustered in lower-paying positions,” and you have the perfect breeding ground for revolution,
quiet or not.844 In this we see the “duopoly” that existed in the province before the Quiet
Revolution: “Anglos ruling commerce, the Church ruling the people, and the politicians
brokering between the two.”845 The importance of taking back the economy, from Anglophones
and the Church, and becoming “maîtres chez nous,”846 was consequently essential in the
revolutionary process according to many orthodox liberals.
The second current that Gauvreau outlines in his work is the Revisionist current. Instead
of seeing the Quiet Revolution as an abrupt break between Church and State and an abrupt
modernization of the province, Revisionists view Québec’s state and social structure as being
fully modern as early as the 1840s; the Quiet Revolution is only a gradual outworking of
processes already at play.847 While it may be gradual, it still ends up in the same place as the
orthodox liberal camp, that is, with the strict separation of church and state based on severe
anticlericalism.
Finally, debating against these two currents, which both firmly view Catholicism as an
object that is being acted upon, with no agency of its own in the modernization process,
Gauvreau suggests that there is another way to view what happened during the Quiet Revolution.
Instead of Catholicism being the “repository of tradition” and thus innately unable to be in line
with the modernization process at work in the province, Gauvreau suggests that for three decades
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there was a growing ideological diversity in the church that prepared it to modernize alongside
the other institutions in Québec.848 He argues that, in fact,
the Quiet Revolution was not, as both the “orthodox liberals” and “revisionists” have cast
it, about the evisceration of Catholicism from Québec society and state. Rather, it was an
attempt through a variety of institutional strategies to make Catholicism coterminous with
aspects of modernity, and in so doing, to anchor it more firmly in Québec public
culture.849
For Gauvreau, the anticlericalism that came out of the Quiet Revolution did not equate to
antireligious sentiment.850 One can see the possibility of a Gauvreauian view of the Quiet
Revolution at work in the province when looking at the numbers from the 2011 NHS. As I
mentioned above, in this survey 74.6 percent of the population of Québec identified as Roman
Catholic.851 So, in spite of what the orthodox liberals and revisionists may want to believe about
what happened during the Quiet Revolution, it is clear that Catholicism, as Gauvreau puts it, is
firmly anchored in Québec public culture even fifty years after the fact—a different, more
modern Catholicism, but Catholicism nevertheless.852
While we may be able to see the historical possibility of the third, modern Catholic
option, this does not remove the influence of the first two on the general public’s opinions and
understandings of history. While it might be well intentioned and argued that the Quiet
Revolution was not necessarily a stark break between traditional Catholicism and modern
society, and that Catholicism itself was not the paragon of tradition but was instead engaged in
the process of modernization on the level of lay belief and practice, the general understanding of
history by most Québécois(es) seems to reflect the opposite. The most prevalent idea in the
common imaginary is that of the orthodox liberal view: that the Quiet Revolution represents a
hard fought, and abrupt, battle between the secular state and the traditional church, which
ultimately resulted in the strict separation of church and state and the fear of any return to
clerical/religious power.
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The closeness of this past, of the overarching power of the Catholic Church and the fight
to gain independence from it, makes the notions of separation of church and state especially
prevalent in Québec. Because of this, any group that represents a challenge to this hard-fought
separation is viewed with great suspicion, and even, hostility. It is not difficult to see how
observant Muslims would be one such group that challenges this notion. In fact, they were
seen as an affront to the secular and hedonistic kingdom of post-Quiet Revolution
Québec, free at last from the iron grip of the Catholic Church. The kippa and the hijab
and the strict sexual code of some Jews and Muslims reminded Québecers of the
religiosity they had rejected decades ago.853
So, any ethnic or religious community that is seen as a possible threat to the separation of church
and state is seen as just that, a threat. Religious symbols, of which food can be one, in this
context can, as a result, become political.
The nearness of this history of battle between the church and the state in Québec is an
important element of which to take note. Unlike in France where the death knoll of the pervasive
power of the Catholic Church rang out over one hundred years ago,854 the end of this power in
Québec is much more recent. Québécois(es) who were a part of this fight are still alive and still
personally remember the power that the church once had. They remember the nuns on the street
and in the corridors, with their headcovers and eyes pointed to the ground. Thus, the response to
Muslim immigrants is perhaps differently motivated for Québécois(es) than for the French.
Québécois(es) remember what it was like to be under the power of the Catholic Church and any
group that threatens such a pervasive influence of religion over both public and private life is
seen as a risk to a return of such an existence in Québec. This history directly impacts the
province’s understanding of secularization and the integration of immigrants to this secular
society. I now turn to Québec’s unique approached to both secularization and immigrant
integration.
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6.4.2 Laïcité /Interculturalism in Québec
With a mix of influence from Canadian multiculturalism policies and France’s colonial and
secular past, Québec provides a unique case in the debates about secularization, immigration and
the consequent integration of immigrants. In this section I explore how Québec has interacted
with France’s notion of laïcité, resulting in its own “laïcité à la Québécoise.” I then briefly
address Québec’s view on Canada’s multiculturalism policy and how this too influences the
integration of immigrant communities in this province.855
Founded as a colony of France, the influences of French history and policy are evident in
Québec. As mentioned above, Sharify-Funk suggests that “close historic ties with France are an
additional influence on attitudes toward minority cultures in general, and toward Islam and
Muslims in particular.”856 These historic ties affect what Sharify-Funk calls the “unique
circumstances of Québec,” and she points out two factors as being particularly influential:
France’s colonial history in North Africa and laïcité.857 She suggests that while Québec generally
settled the secular/religious debate with the Quiet Revolution in favour of secularism, France has
had a much more and continued “tumultuous struggle for a secular state.”858
6.4.2.1 Open vs Rigid Secularism in Québec
While some see the secular/religious debate as settled in Québec post-Quiet Revolution, the
situation appears to be more fluid than many imagined. In fact, there seems to be a wavering, or
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even a conflict, between two different ways of being secular in the province. Adelman and Anctil
in their work Religion, Culture and the State break down these two forms of secularization in
Québec.859 They suggest that there is a difference between open and rigid secularism based on
how the state prioritizes a set of four key principles that are essential to any model of
secularization. These four principles are: (1) freedom of conscience and religion, (2) the right of
individuals to religious and moral equality, without discrimination (direct or indirect), based on
convictions of conscience or religious convictions, (3) separation of church and state and (4)
state neutrality towards religion.860 According to Adelman and Anctil rigid secularism prioritizes
the third and fourth principles over the first two and can lead to a “greater restriction of the
practice of religion in the name of neutrality.”861 This is the model that seems to be operative in
France. Open secularism, on the other hand, prioritizes the principles in the opposite direction
and is “based on the protection of freedom of religion, even if this calls for the relativization of
the principle of neutrality.”862 At the level of the state, this second, more open secularism is what
is active in Québec.
According to the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, which I discuss in detail
below, there are three important characteristics of open secularism. The first is that open
secularism is
an institutional arrangement that is aimed at protecting rights and freedoms. State
neutrality towards religion and separation of church and state are not seen as ends in
themselves, but as means to achieve the fundamental twofold objective: respect for
religious and moral equality, and freedom of conscience and religion.863
In this, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission is in line with the definition of open secularism as
outlined by Adelman and Anctil above, namely, that the first two principles of secularism are the
goal and the second two, the means to achieve that goal.
Second, unlike rigid secularism, which may erode religious belief in the population, open
secularism does not “serve to neutralize or erase religion as an identity marker.”864 This is an
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important characteristic of the form of laïcité that is present in Québec, that is only furthered by
the policy of interculturalism which I address below.
In an open secular state, one can maintain one’s religious identity publicly alongside
one’s other various identities. This is because of the third characteristic of open secularism as
found in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, namely, that “open secularism is directed at state
institutions but not at individuals who use these institutions or even work in them as
employees.”865 While this idea has been challenged many times in Québec, especially with the
proposal of Bill 60 (the Charter of Québec Values) by the Parti Québécois in 2013, Bouchard
and Taylor highlight the importance of applying secularism to institutions and not people. It is
these characteristics which highlight the difference between the secularism that is found in
France and that in Québec. While in Québec, individuals can maintain their religious identities in
public, even to the point of wearing symbols of those identities in various public institutions, in
France the importance of state neutrality over individual rights is stressed. We can see an
example of this in the ban on headscarves in public schools in France.
6.4.2.2 Québécois Interculturalism
Baubérot furthers the discussion of French versus Québécois laïcité and posits that the Québec
model of laïcité both deviates from and moves closer to the French model. It is the interaction of
laïcité with Québec’s interculturalism that makes it distinct and Baubérot suggests that
Québécois laïcité is “une laïcité interculturelle.”866 It is the crisis of reasonable accommodation
which will be looked back upon as the key moment in the constructions of such an intercultural
laïcité.867
Before exploring the intercultural side of this laïcité, it is important to briefly address the
multiculturalism against which it is pitted in the rest of Canada. While rigid laïcité encourages
the suppression of cultural diversity, multiculturalism in Canada has the exact opposite goal in
mind. In fact, according to Karim, Canada “is the only one (country) to have a law recognizing
the cultural diversity of its population.”868 The multicultural character of Canada allows ethnic,
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racial, religious identities to not only be recognized but to have an active role in the Canadian
public sphere. It follows that Canada’s multiculturalism policy prevents strict laïcité from being a
viable policy option.
Multiculturalism has some potential negative connotations for minorities. By allowing
different groups to maintain their unique identities, multiculturalism, according to Cesari and
McLoughlin, “reinforces the exceptionality of Muslim immigrants without providing them with a
means for real social advancement.”869 This is only one of the many potential drawbacks of
multiculturalism, outlined by critics of the policy.
According to Leroux, Québec has six reasons for rejecting multiculturalism.870 The
second half of these critiques is the most important for the purposes of this study.871 These
unique rejections come from the idea that (1) multiculturalism is a political strategy to neutralize
the Québécois identity, i.e. to put it on level playing field with all other ethnic identities in the
country, and consequently not recognize its place as a founding nation,872 (2) multiculturalism is
a “post-national ideology that challenges the relative hegemony of any national group,” and (3)
multiculturalism is alien to Québec’s own model of cultural pluralism.873
Whereas multiculturalism restricts the kind of secularization that is viable in most of
Canada, Québec’s approach to multiculturalism, different from the rest of the nation according to
many in Québec, results in a different working out of secularization and leaves open the door for
the possibility of a unique laïcité to be at work in the province. Eid in his work on Arabs in
Montréal elucidates this difference:
whereas Canadian multiculturalism pursues a politics of recognition of cultural
differences, Québec’s politics of immigration attempts to achieve a difficult balance
between two objectives: accommodating cultural diversity while integrating ethnic
minorities in the French-speaking community.874
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To achieve this balance the Québec government adopt a policy of interculturalism.
Sharify-Funk states that “multiculturalism has always been contested in the province of
Québec,” because of the fear of the “erosion and eventual erasure of Francophone identity and
culture.”875 Rather than a policy which protects various identities, the French view
multiculturalism as a policy which in facts endangers identity. To protect the Québécois identity
that is seen as possibly under threat by the multicultural model the policy of interculturalism
tends to be preferred in Québec. Sharify-Funk effectively lays out the differences between
multiculturalism and interculturalism in her article analyzing the Bouchard-Taylor report. She
states that,
while both ideals are founded in the ideal of pluralism, they differ in that multiculturalism
allows difference to exist side by side (which, in its worst form, may lead to
ghettoization), while interculturalism assumes that people of different cultures will
interact with, and be transformed by, encounters with each other while maintaining some
basic social values.876
Those who immigrate to Québec, or who are part of an ethnic or linguistic minority group, then
are expected to adopt a Québécois identity while at the same time maintaining their many and
various other identities which are respected in a country such as Canada. Interculturalism
respects differences and accommodates pluralism but expects a common culture to be promoted
and maintained in the province.877
What is the base of the promoted common culture? Language. According to Adelman and
Anctil, while multiculturalism is allegedly language blind, interculturalism is language bound.878
While language is often seen as the most significant characteristic of the common culture, Gérard
Bouchard presents seven components of Québec interculturalism as “integrative pluralism,” of
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which language is only one.879 Those seven components are: (1) “respect for rights, in a spirit of
democracy and pluralism”; (2) “promotion of French as the main language of civic life and
shared culture”; (3) consideration of the Québec nation as made up of (a) a francophone majority
and (b) ethnocultural minorities; (4) an emphasis on integration; (5) “promotion of interactions,
rapprochement and intercultural exchanges as means of integration”; (6) the development of a
shared culture with contributions from the majority culture and minority cultures; and (7) “the
promotion of a Québec identity, sense of belonging, and national culture” made up of the
majority culture, the minority cultures and the shared culture mentioned above.880
Interculturalism is at its foundation, tolerance and respect for differences within a French
language setting.881 What is noteworthy is that, although language is considered the crux of the
common culture in Québec, the crisis of reasonable accommodation which erupted in the mid2000s was not based primarily on language accommodations, but on religious ones.
6.4.2.3 The Bouchard-Taylor Commission
As Québec’s official policy with regard to cultural pluralism, interculturalism gets clarified and
made more specific through the reasonable accommodation debates and the Bouchard-Taylor
Commission.882 This commission was meant to clarify exactly what is reasonable
accommodation and how this process was being worked out in intercultural Québec. The call for
the commission, and the need for clarification of reasonable accommodation and
interculturalism, came out of a series of events that were reported in the media throughout 2006
and into early 2007. These included but were not limited to, a young girl wearing a hijab to play
soccer, requests for worship spaces in public facilities, a young Sikh man wearing a kirpan to
school, requests for separate swimming times in public pools to accommodate gender
segregation, and a YMCA in the Montréal neighbourhood of Outremont tinting its windows at
879

Bouchard, Interculturalism: View from Québec, 32.
Bouchard, Interculturalism: View from Québec, 32-33.
881
Leroux, “Québec Nationalism,” 107.
882
For further explorations of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission and its effect see: Adelman and Anctil, Religion,
Culture, and the State; Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Report
(Québec: Government of Québec, 2008); Patrice Brodeur, “La Commission Bouchard-Taylor et la perception des
rapports entre “Québécois” et “musulmans” au Québec,” Cahiers de recherche sociologique 46, (September 2008):
95-107; Leroux, “Québec Nationalism” 107-126; Nieguth and Lacassagne, “Contesting the Nation,” 1-16; Louis
Rousseau, “Découvrir le fil religieux de la conscience identitaire au Québec,” in Le Québec après Bouchard-Taylor:
Les identités religieuses de l’immigration, ed. Louis Rousseau (Québec, QC: Presses de l’Université du Québec,
2012), 1-32; and Sharify-Funk, “Muslims,” 535-553.
880

262

the request of the Hasidic Jewish community across the street.883 The final straw came with the
infamous town of Herouxville introducing its town charter. Despite being 100 percent French
speaking, 96 percent Catholic and with no Muslims, Jews or Sikhs living there at the time, the
town introduced a code of behaviour for immigrants that included forbidding women from being
stoned, carrying a weapon to school, and covering one’s face.884 The media representation and
public opinion around these events led people to believe that society had perhaps “gone too far”
in accommodating immigrant communities in the province.885
Although the accommodation crisis was mostly a crisis of perception,886 it none the less
led premier Jean Charest to appoint a two-man commission to investigate the issue of reasonable
accommodation in Québec; this would become known as the Bouchard-Taylor commission.887
After ten months, more than 900 briefs and more than 240 testimonies during 31 days of public
hearings, Bouchard and Taylor found that in general Québec was doing alright with the issue of
reasonable accommodation and that the perceived increase in accommodation cases was just
that, a perception.888 In fact, when considering the French definition of “accommodement,”
negotiations which use compromise and goodwill, the commission found that on the ground
“accommodements” were already happening, and that these “issues were easily resolved if left to
the good sense of the Québécois within civil society.”889
Curiously, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission itself may have led to an increase in anxiety
about, and resistance to, “other” cultures. A study conducted by Leger Marketing for the
Association of Canadian Studies one year after the Bouchard-Taylor commission showed that 40
percent of Francophones viewed non-Christian immigrants as a threat to Québec society,
compared to 32 percent in 2007.890 Furthermore, and especially relevant to this study, only 40
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percent of Francophones had a positive attitude toward Muslims (down from 57 percent before
the Bouchard-Taylor Commission).891 In light of these hesitations or perceptions, one may
expect an increase in negative behaviours towards members of minority groups, especially
Muslims, in Québec. But instead, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission found that one’s belief and
one’s practices are not always in line. In fact, “one might carry negative stereotypes about a
group as an abstraction that shapes your attitudes, but in day-to-day practice, those attitudes do
not affect behaviour.”892 So, although the majority Francophone culture may report some
negative perceptions of some minority immigrant groups, particularly Muslims, the situation on
the ground is often one of cordial relations between neighbours, especially if those neighbours
speak French.
Keeping all of these intricacies of the Québec setting in mind, Malak suggests that,
“despite its acknowledged imperfections, Canada remains the best space and environment for
Muslim culture and identity to flourish in a pluralist, secular state.”893 While Muslims, and other
immigrants, in Québec must integrate amidst some deeply held political and social policies, there
are also policies that are in place to allow these immigrants perhaps more of an opportunity than
in a country such as France, to create and live out a “Québécois Islam”—as long as “Islam du
Québec” strengthens, rather than weakens, the French-speaking national identity.
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6.5 Québécois Nationalism
Starting as a colony of France, an island in a sea of British colonies, Québec has a long history of
national identity politics and negotiations.894 The questions of “what does it mean to be
Québécois(e)?” and “who can claim this identity?” are always at the forefront of the discussion
in Québec. As a minority culture, trying to maintain its culture amidst the encroaching AngloCanadian and Americanized cultures that surround it, is a difficult and persistent aspect of life in
the province. While the Québec “nation” may be a minority within North America, the culture
itself is fairly homogeneous. For example,
in Québec, fully 70 percent of the population claim French ancestry, have French as their
mother tongue, and have family heritage in Québec stretching back three generations or
more. This is a province that, although diverse, has a dominant ethnic and linguistic
majority—a “nous.”895
When comparing this to the rest of Canada, which has no clear majority and is in fact made up of
multiple minorities, there arises a different understanding to what it means to be a part of the
“nous.” While in the rest of the country, what makes you different is what makes you part of
“us,” there is the potential for a different working out of the national “nous” in Québec.
According to Turgeon and Bilodeau, newcomers who speak a different language and profess a
894

For further reading on Québecois nationalism see: Cory Blad and Philippe Couton, “The Rise of an Intercultural
Nation: Immigration, Diversity and Nationhood in Québec,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 35, no. 4
(2009): 645-667; Joseph H. Carens, ed., Is Québec Nationalism Just? Perspectives from Anglophone Canada
(Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); Jean-Francois Caron, “The Exclusive Nature of Québec’s
Contemporary Nationalism: The Pitfalls of Civic Nationalism,” International Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 47
(2013): 221-238; Eid, Being Arab; Gilles Gougeon, A History of Québec Nationalism, trans. Louisa Blair, Robert
Chodos and Jane Ubertino (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1994)—presents the facts of Québec nationalism across four
historical periods through interview with historians. Part 4, exploring nationalism between the 1960s and 1990s is
especially useful here; Richard Jones, Community in Crisis: French-Canadian Nationalism in Perspective (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972)—while dated, still an excellent exploration of how “the French Canadian
looks at himself” which Jones argues is as a member of a colonized minority; Michael Keating, Nations Against the
nd
State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Québec, Catalonia and Scotland, 2 edition (New York: Palgrave, 2001)—
specifically Chapter 1, “Nation, Nationalism and the State,” and Chapter 4, “Québec”; Darryl Leroux, “Entrenching
Euro-Settlerism: Multiculturalism and the Politics of Nationalism in Québec,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. 46, no. 2
(2014): 133-140; Jocelyn Maclure and Alain G. Gagnon, eds., Repères en mutation: identité et citoyenneté dans le
Québec contemporain (Montréal: Québec-Amerique, 2001); Mann, The Dream of Nation; David Meren, With
Friends Like These: Entangled Nationalisms and the Canada-Québec-France Triangle, 1944-1970 (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2012); Nieguth and Lacassagne, “Contesting the Nation,” 1-16; Oakes and Warren, Language, Citizenship;
Jose Santiago, “Religion, secularisation and nationalism in Québec and the Basque Country: A Comparative
Approach,” Nations and Nationalism, vol. 21, no.1 (2015): 120-138; Garth Stevenson, Parallel Paths: The
Development of Nationalism in Ireland and Québec (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
895
Adams, Utopia, 125.

265

different culture may be viewed as a threat to the minority nation. If one adds to that the fact that
newcomers are more likely to express loyalty to the central state than the minority nation,896 one
can understand the potential hesitancy to include such newcomers in the national “nous.”897 But
what is this “nous” based on in Québec?
First, the very idea of a Québécois “nation” is something that must be addressed. There
are two different possible meanings to the word nation in Québec, according to Adelman and
Anctil. First, nation is simply the citizenry of a country of a state. One is a part of the nation if
one has citizenship in that locale and “citizenship in its classical sense refers to certain duties and
rights associated with one’s membership of the polity.”898 One is part of the Canadian nation
because one is a Canadian citizen. While some may argue that Québec is, or should be, a
separate country, with separate citizenship, most do not intend this meaning of “nation” when
referring to Québec. It is the second definition of nation which becomes the focus in Québec,
namely that nation can also refer to a “distinct people characterized by common descent and an
accrued shared history that includes a common language and culture.”899 Considering the
quotation describing the “ethnic and linguistic nous” above which clearly highlights ancestry,
language and culture, we can assume that this second understanding of nation is what is
generally at work in Québec.900 The Québécois people do not see themselves as citizens of a
separate country (though many would wish that to be the case), but instead as a distinct type-two
nation located within a type-one nation, a nation within Canada.901
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6.5.1 Characteristics: Language, Economy, Religion
While the idea of the Québécois nation was firmly rooted in both Catholicism and the French
language before the 1960s, the Quiet Revolution changed this root system as did the
establishment of the independentist movement and the Parti Québecois. The secularization and
consequent removal of the Catholic side of the national identity leads to a heightened emphasis
on French as the distinguishing factor of Québécois nationalism. As Adams states, with a poetic
flourish, “with the communion host now absent from the tongues of Québec Catholics, the
tongue itself became a preoccupation.”902 In fact, the “French Fact” becomes the absolute crux
on which Québec nationalism rests, post-Quiet Revolution. It is the defining characteristic, the
main form of attachment to the Québec nation and the “indispensable tool of integration.”903 As I
argued in the section on immigration above, in an effort to maintain the uniqueness of the
Québec nation, all new members of the nation must speak French. This “French Fact” was
highlighted with the introduction of The Charter of the French Language (famously known as
Bill 101) in 1977. This Charter not only made French the language of commerce and business in
the province, but it also restricted access to English schools to a small population of people,
namely those children who had a parent who received most of their education in an English
language school in Québec.904 This article on the Language of Instruction effectively removed
the right of immigrant children to attend English language schools and forced education in
French upon all immigrant communities.905
Carens argues that with French as the ultimate and sole focus of the nationalist agenda,
the door opens for a clear form of multiculturalism in the province, even if the Québécois people
choose to reject that term in favour of interculturalism. The fact remains that if the collective is
defined “with almost an exclusive emphasis on the French language as the shared cultural
commitment” and with a general de-prioritization of the specific culture, ethos, history and way
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of life that used to define “Francophone Québecer,” then Québec will begin “to look more and
more like a French-speaking version of English-speaking, multicultural Canada.”906 If the
“French Fact” is the only fact on which the nation is defined then one can see the possibility for
Carens’ thesis to play out on the ground in Québec.
The problem is that, as I outlined when discussing interculturalism and the BouchardTaylor Commission, the shared culture that minorities are expect to integrate into clearly has
more than language as its base. Language plays a key role in Québec nationalism, but it is not the
sole concern.907 One example is the significance of progressivism to Québécois nationalism.
Québécois pride themselves on being more progressive than the rest of Canada, especially
regarding social services, peace activism, feminism, human rights, labour rights,
environmentalism, etcetera, many of which really grew out of the Quiet Revolution.
Progressivism, as reflected in these realms is a large part of the Québécois national identity,
which is reflected in their willingness to pay extremely high taxes to support many of these
initiatives.908
While the push towards secularization, and the resultant emphasis on the French language
and progressivism in the national identity are some of the largest effects of the Quiet Revolution,
there were also significant reforms in the economic realm of the province at the time. With the
expansion of Hydro Québec by Québec Premier René Levesque, Québec’s economy grew
exponentially and was seen as a symbol of the strength and initiative of the provincial
government to complete ambitious projects. Furthermore, while Catholicism was removed from
the national identity, a secularism swept in to take its place. It was not enough to simply remove
Catholicism to the private sphere and redefine the Québécois nation based on economy and
language, but a secular, anti-clerical, character was adopted. These economic and social
innovations of the 1960s Quiet Revolution, which strengthened the Québec identity and society,
led to an increase in nationalistic fervor and began a push toward sovereignty. In fact, the neonationalists who arose out of the Quiet Revolution were committed to reformulating and
redefining “traditional French-Canadian nationalism so as to reflect their intense commitment to
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building a modern, secular, Québécois nation-state in the province of Québec.”909 It becomes
clear how the Quiet Revolution and the neo-nationalism that grew out of it provided fertile
ground for the development of the sovereignty movement and specifically the development of
the Parti Québécois (PQ).
The PQ was formed in 1968 under the leadership of René Levesque and in less than 10
years went from “registering less than 10 percent of the vote” to winning the provincial election
in 1976.910 While this first PQ government failed in its attempt to gain sovereignty for Québec, it
did advance many policies (economic, cultural and linguistic) that helped Québécois nationalism
to flourish. As Keating states, “given the electoral pendulum in Québec, it was only a matter of
time before the PQ returned to power, and this duly occurred in 1994.”911 This time around the
PQ government did not wait long before proposing another sovereignty vote and leaders of the
“yes” side used nationalist doctrine to support the drive for sovereignty and vice versa. Lucien
Bouchard, leader of the federal Bloc Québécois party, even called sovereignty the “magic wand”
for Québécois solidarity.912 For many in the province, then, the nationalist agenda was not only
linguistic, but also firmly economic, secular and political—a Catholic form of secularity, but
secular nevertheless. At the time, Québec became the most socially-progressive province in
Canada, including strong support for gender rights, among the many others I described above.
The influx of individuals/communities that threatened any aspect of this nation could be
seen as problematic for those who held a “not just about French” notion of what it means to be
Québécois(e). In this there is an important generational divide. Those who lived through the
Quiet Revolution and feel as though the battle for secular, socially-progressive Québec was
fought in their backyards tend to highlight the secular nature of Québec nationalism over their
children’s generation. This fear over the death of a national culture, whether linguistically or
otherwise based, can lead to a greater need for feeling secure and, as a result, to the potential for
what Jasmine Zine calls “paranoid nationalism” in parts of Québec.913 This type of nationalism
can lead to fear of any group that may be viewed as wishing to remain distinct. While the
majority of Muslim Canadians (57 percent) believe that most Muslims in Canada wish to adopt
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Canadian customs, non-Muslim Canadians tend to think (again 57 percent) that Muslims wish to
remain distinct from society at large.914 This makes the potential for a “Québécois Islam”
particularly difficult.
6.5.2 “Québécois Islam” Definitional Issues915
Unlike the situation in France where there is clear discussion of the possibility, or lack thereof, of
an “Islam de France,” the need to define a “Québécois Islam” or “Islam du Québec” is not a
pressing issue in the province. With the operative principle of interculturalism at work, the idea
that there would be an “Islam du Québec” would only highlight the principle itself, namely that
both one’s minority identity is respected while at the same time being fully integrated into the
common culture that I described above. For many Québécois(es), the presence of an “Islam du
Québec,” would be a triumph of the intercultural model. The question becomes, on the ground,
do Muslims in Québec feel as though they can claim the Québécois national identity that is
outlined above? Do they feel that they can live their Muslim identity to the fullest extent while at
the same time integrating into the “shared Québec cultural identity”? Do they feel as though they
can claim both the “Québécois” and the “Muslim” side of a possible “Islam du Québec?”
In Québec, the situation is often seen as being similar to that of France when it comes to
this “national” form of Islam. While for many being French-speaking is the key factor in the
process of becoming Québécois(e), Eid suggests that the
Frenchification process amounts to more than mere language acquisition; it also entails,
in keeping with a Republican ideology à la Francaise, that immigrants eventually blend
in, identify with, and participate in, Québec’s dominant French-speaking culture.916
This French-speaking culture is inevitably made up of more than just the language, no matter
how people may argue otherwise. Being French-speaking may be the most fundamental and
important characteristic of the Québec national identity, but it is not the only characteristic, as I
914
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argued above. To protect the shared culture of the “nation,” especially in Québec where it is seen
as under threat from outside forces, certain “foreign” cultural practices are expected to be kept
separate from the French or Québécois identity. This is why, although mostly French-speaking,
Muslim immigrants to Québec may still feel as though claiming both sides of the “Québécois
Muslim” identity is a difficult thing to do.
6.5.3 “Québécois Islam” Identity Issues
The Republican mindset can be seen in Québec’s policy of interculturalism which I discussed
above. Groups are not expected to ignore their unique identities,917 but they are expected to unite
around a common Québécois identity. In contrast to Canada’s policy of multiculturalism, which
critics in Québec suggest has been “the main contributor to the crystallization of fragmented
ethno-cultural communities undermining social cohesion,” interculturalism insists on some level
of assimilation, similar to the French Republican model.918 Immigrants are expected to “interact
with, and be transformed by, encounters with each other while maintaining some basic social
values (finding a middle ground between ‘mosaic’ and ‘melting pot’).”919 Sharify-Funk explains
that the perceived need to preserve the founding, official culture of Québec leads to this need for
and emphasis on interculturalism in Québec.920 After all, “how can the French-speaking majority
welcome others when it is uncertain about its own future and what its parameters have become
under pressure from mass culture, globalization, and the abandonment of traditional modes of
life?”921 This uncertainty not only leads to a strong forms of nationalism, but to heightened
pressure to leave aside possibly threatening identities to the “official culture” of Québec. The
question then arises, because of this emphasis on preserving the Québécois culture: Is it possible
for Muslims to be publicly both “Québécois(e)” and “Muslim”?
Because of the complicated dance between communautarisme and individual rights that
exists in all of Canada, especially in Québec, the awkward response to this question is “both yes
and no.” While Muslim immigrants in the province are expected to adapt to, and adopt, the
917
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French-speaking Québécois identity, their individual identities, whether religious or otherwise
are inherently respected based on the policy of pluralism that exists in the province. The fact that
Québec is understood to be a pluralist society, as clearly indicated in the policy statement made
by the Québec government in 1990 called Let’s Build Québec Together: Vision: A Policy
Statement on Immigration and Integration, means that any strong version of cultural assimilation
is not possible.922 So while French serves to bind those living in Québec in a common culture,
there are limits to this binding—at least according to the official democratic and pluralist policies
at work in the province.
Whether or not the official policy indicates that one can hold on to and live out one’s
various identities alongside the “Québécois” identity, public opinion on the matter can vary
dramatically. One may assume that as long as immigrants speak French and thus aid in the
continuation of the French-speaking culture they would be not be seen as a threat, and in fact
would be a benefit to the Québécois communal identity. There is an fascinating diversity of
opinion that arises when considering this idea. For example, as I discussed in the section on
immigration earlier in this chapter, the largest population of immigrants to Québec comes from
North Africa and is consequently both French-speaking and Muslim. In fact, “in 2010,
approximately 37% of immigrants admitted to Québec were from Africa (the majority being
from Maghreb).”923 Furthermore, unlike in other cases of immigration, where knowledge of
French is low, this is not the case for Maghrébine immigrants, especially Algerian immigrants, of
whom about 97.7 percent know French.924 According to the “French Fact” of Québec national
identity and the official policy that exists in the province, this immigration should be seen as
ideal. In fact, when the government proposed to restrict any one continent’s contribution to
immigration to 25 percent,925 the general population rejected this proposal wholeheartedly as this
would restrict the influx of French-speaking North African immigrants to Québec.926 This seems
like a clear preference for immigrants who speak French no matter what other identities they
hold. Yet, there is a “significant degree of anti-Muslim prejudice in Québec (as in other parts of

922

Carens, “Immigration,” 47.
“The Changing Face of Québec Immigration,” Canada Visa, accessed February 16, 2016,
http://www.canadavisa.com/the-changing-face-of-Québec-immigration.html.
924
Castel, “Mariage,” 219.
925
Some sources say 30%.
926
McAndrew and Bakhshaei, “Difficult Integration,” 943.
923

272

Canada and the West more generally).”927 Nieguth and Lacassagne explain that in spite of giving
priority to immigration from the Maghreb out of a desire for French-speaking immigrants, fear of
the Muslim “other” plays into “the notion of a “self” whose very identity is under threat and
therefore needs to be protected all the more vigorously.”928 For many in Québec, they did not
fight hard to defend their cultural identity against the English that surrounded them, or fight hard
to develop a socially-progressive culture, just, in their eyes, to have another threat come in and
not only take the Anglophones’ place but drive gender and sexual identity rights back a
century.929
This means that the Muslim side of a Muslim immigrant’s hyphenated identity may be
more restricted than one may imagine. In fact, “visible cultural difference” continues to be an
issue in Québec, as is made evident by the proposal of Bill 94.930 There is an understanding at
work in many Western locations, in Canada, and especially in Québec, that “if one holds Muslim
identity he/she is seen as immediately having divided loyalties, between which he/she must
choose.”931 The same does not necessarily apply to Catholic Québécois(e), which is telling.
As I suggested in Chapter 2, it is important to note the conflation of the term Islam, or
Muslim, with many other identity labels, usually ethnic or national. In Québec, “Arab” and
“Muslim” are sometimes seen as expressing the same thing.932 As noted by Eid, “because
prejudicial representations of Islam often fuel Western perceptions of Arabs, it becomes harder
for Canadian Muslims of Arab origin to dissociate their religious from their ethnic identity.”933
This fusing of ethnic and religious identity can lead to frustration. Zabel expresses the
frustration behind such a situation for someone whose religious/ethnic identity is seen as “other.”
She states: “I got tired of feeling that I could only be either Arab (and therefore foreign) or
Canadian (and therefore ‘normal’). I got tired of having to demonstrate that I could be both and
still be ‘normal.’”934 That being said, other studies have shown that there is a distinction to be
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made between ethnic and religious identity markers in Québec, with ethnic identities being more
respected and liked than religious ones.935 McAndrew and Bakhshaei show that language does in
fact matter in the perception of Québécois(es). According to McAndrew and Bakhshaei, a 2010
study showed that when the word Arab or Muslim was used, the response by Québécois(es) was
more favourable than when the word Islam was used. In fact, 41 percent of Québec informants
said they had a very unfavourable opinion of Islam, followed by 21 percent having an
unfavourable opinion of Judaism.936 The problem seems to be religion in general, rather than
ethnicity or even religious individuals937—but in the case of Islam, the antipathy to public
expressions of religion, which remind the older Québec population of the time when priests and
nuns walked the streets and met with political leaders behind closed doors, is aggravated by the
perceived socially regressive nature of Muslim immigrants.
One may wonder if this negative attitude toward religion in general, and Islam in
particular, has an impact on the practices of, and feeling of belonging of Muslims in the
province. I was surprised to learn that, according to a 2003 study, “Muslim immigrants in
Québec do not exhibit a high degree of religious identification, or practices—much less in fact
than their counterparts in the rest of Canada.”938 Specifically, this study showed that only 55
percent of Muslims in Québec considered religion important, compared to 64 percent in Canada
overall, and only 13 percent defined themselves as strong religious believers, compared to 31
percent in Canada overall.939 It is hard to know if this difference in religious identification and
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practice is a result of the cultural context in Québec compared to the rest of Canada, or if it is
attributed to the fact that the Islam of the Maghreb is an “Islam à la carte,” or if it is merely a
matter of reporting, but Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in the province potentially deemphasize this side of their hyphenated identities for any or all of these reasons. What might this
reveal about the general feeling of belonging in the province?
As Zine argues in her introduction to Islam in the Hinterlands, “far from being
isolationist, Muslims in Canada feel an allegiance to the nation and a sense of pride as
Canadians”940 This general feeling of belonging and allegiance to Canadian identity is reflected
in my data set as well, as I demonstrate in my Québec data chapter. While my informants did not
so much claim Québécois identity as they did Canadian identity, Baubérot shows that the same
feelings of belonging and identification with the national Québécois identity are present among
Muslim immigrants in Québec as well. According to his 2008 study,
les nombreux migrants que j’ai interviewés m’ont à peu près tous livré le même message:
jusqu’à présent, nous sommes bien au Québec (bien par comparaison avec d’autres
territoires, bien malgré les difficultés), nous nous sentons Québécois, nous ne demandons
pas mieux qu’être parmi les artisans du Québec de demain. Mais attention, si le Québec
dérape, si son “nous” n’est pas inclusif, nous irons ailleurs.941
For the Muslims in Baubérot’s study, and potentially others, Québec has an inclusive “nous” of
which they feel comfortable being a part. They feel comfortable being both “Québécois(e)” and
“Muslim” and as a result feel comfortable engaging in practices that reflect both of these
identities.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the four orienting principles active in Québec that may affect the
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant community in the province, namely, colonialism, immigration,
secularization and nationalism. I interrogated what restrictions or aides might be in place to
hinder, or to help, Muslim immigrants in Québec in their identity negotiations and integration
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processes. I examined these contextual particularities to set the stage, so to speak, for the
everyday experience of my informants in Québec, especially their interactions with food and
food practices.
In this endeavour, I asked the question: Can Muslims in Québec feel comfortable
claiming both sides of their “Québécois Muslim” identity? The answer that I provided
throughout this chapter is a complicated “both yes and no.” This is due in part to the colonial
history in the province, which I showed firmly establishes French and Catholicism as orienting
characteristics of the common Québec culture. I argued that this inevitably affects the
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study as they directly feed into one aspect of this culture
while in the same moment detract from, or remain on the outside of, the other. While their
culture and language are familiar, thanks in part to both Québec and North Africa being former
colonial enterprises of France, their religious traditions are seen as foreign and threatening to the
minority nation that was started as a French colony in a sea of English. It follows that any food
practices that highlight this difference, or that seem to threaten the self-understanding of the
minority nation, may be considered problematic. On the other hand, those food practices that
feed into this separation, this uniqueness, this common Québécois culture, may be lauded and
encouraged.
This common Québécois culture, which finds its beginnings in the colonial experience,
consequently affects the immigration policies of the province. In the second section of this
chapter I outlined the various migratory movements of Muslims to Canada and then the specific
immigration of Muslims to Québec. I showed that for the Québec government, who hold a large
degree of control over the immigration to the province with its own ministry of immigration,
maintaining French as the language of society is essential in its selection and integration of
immigrants in their province. These resultant immigration policies directly affect my informants
as they belong to the most prominent community of immigrants to the province, namely
Maghrébines. While in the rest of Canada immigrant linguistic and ethnic backgrounds are vast
and varied, I showed how in Québec, the largest immigrant communities to the province are
from French-speaking countries of origin. After discussing the reasons that Maghrébine
immigration has been historically attractive to the Québec government and society, I presented
Castel’s argument for why immigration to Québec might be attractive for the Maghrébine
immigrant him/herself. I then concluded this section of this chapter by showing how various
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immigration policies might affect immigrants on the ground level in Québec, namely through a
brief exploration of unemployment and the lack of ghettoization in Montréal. Overall, while one
may assume that the linguistic similarity and strength offered by the influx of Maghrébine
Muslim immigrants to Québec would provide a comfort for both sides, it becomes clear that this
is not always the case, due to the complicated relationship between religion and the state found
in the province.
Because of this fact, I then explored the history of secularization and its implications for
minority religious communities in Québec. In pre-Quiet Revolution Québec, Catholicism was
foundational to French Québécois self-understanding as a distinct nation within a nation, and the
affect of this religious culture can still be felt in the province today, making anyone who holds a
religious affiliation outside of Catholicism potentially feel on the outside. These feelings of
“otherness” are only increased with the arrival of the Quiet Revolution and the laïcité that sprung
from it. While on the policy level, differing religious identities would be welcome in the
collective culture post-Quiet Revolution, the situation on the ground is often different. I
presented the three possible approaches to the Quiet Revolution as found in Michael Gauvreau’s
work The Catholic Origins of Québec’s Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970. Gauvreau suggests that
alongside the orthodox liberal and the revisionist modes of understanding the Quiet Revolution,
which see the Quiet Revolution as ending in the evisceration of Catholicism from Québec
society, one may also see it as a means of making Catholicism coterminous with modernization
and therefore taking up an important place in Québec common culture. While it is possible to see
this continuation of Catholicism in Québec post-Quiet Revolution, the more common experience
is one of hostility toward religion in the public sphere. Those Québécois(es) who “fought the
good fight” to remove religion from the public sphere are as a result hesitant to allow for any
religious manifestation in public, leading to the possible restriction of public displays of one’s
religious identity in the province, including one’s engagement with distinct food practices, as we
will soon see. For many Muslims, who may not see the same degree of separation between their
public and private lives, this approach to religious life may inherently conflict with their selfunderstanding. On the flip side, the image of Islam as a religion which inevitably wants a say in
public life, including discussions concerning social policies, may lead post-Quiet Revolution
Québécois(es) to question the acceptability of Islam in the Québécois nation. For them, religious
practice is meant to be kept in the private sphere, and thus requests for halal food in public
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institutions, or any other expression of religious food practice in public, may be met with
hostility.
After addressing the Quiet Revolution in Québec, I continued by exploring the resultant
policies of secularization and interculturalism that emerged in the province. First, I presented
Adelman and Anctil’s open versus rigid secularism, of which they argue that open secularism is
what is active in Québec, in comparison to France which practices rigid secularism. Based on the
protection of “freedom of religion,” in comparison to “freedom from religion,” neutrality is not
necessarily the end goal of the laïcité that is active in Québec. I showed how this allows for
religion to remain as an identity marker for people in the province, as long as that identity is in
conversation with and transformed by, to some extent, the common Québecois culture. This is
the basis of the province’s policy of interculturalism, which I tackled next. In this section I show
how, according to Gérard Bouchard, interculturalism can be understood as integrative pluralism
within a French language setting. This intercultural self-understanding becomes important in the
development of Québecois nationalism.
The idea that there exists a unique Québec nation adds another contextual element within
which immigrants to the province must interact that is not present in other provinces of Canada.
While a Muslim immigrant to Ontario or Manitoba or British Columbia, or any other province or
territory, for that matter, may feel as though they are simply part of the multicultural mosaic that
makes up the Canadian nation, a Muslim immigrant to Québec must negotiate their identity
within a specific “national” understanding, not based on the multicultural mindset but an
intercultural one. The fact that there is a common “national” culture with which any immigrant is
expected to interact, and be changed by, makes the situation in Québec distinctive.
After exploring the characteristics of the common national culture in Québec, namely,
language, economy and religion, I examined the possibility of a “Québecois Islam.” I claimed
that with the operative principle of interculturalism at work, the idea that there would be an
“Islam du Québec” would only highlight the principle itself, namely that both one’s minority
identity is respected while at the same time being fully integrated into the common culture that I
described in this chapter. For many Québécois(es) the presence of an “Islam du Québec” would
be a triumph of the intercultural model. That being considered, I posited whether Muslims in
Québec felt as though they could actually claim both sides of a potential “Québécois Muslim”
identity. I showed that while Muslims in Québec, who are by and large French-speaking, thanks
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to the immigration policies I addressed above, feed into one aspect of the Québec common
culture, they are also seen as a threat to the secular, socially-progressive characteristics of that
common culture as well.
How might this affect minority immigrant communities’ food practices? In the rest of the
country, the immigrants’ distinct food practices are celebrated not only as evidence of Canada’s
multicultural mosaic, but as part of the very foundation of Canadian food culture. In Québec, the
one province that has some understanding of a “national” food culture, immigrants may feel
more pressure to adjust their food practices to fall in line with “common culture.” Overall,
considering that the common culture, and thus, “national” identity is based on the French
language and a secular self-understanding, the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study may
feel both part of and yet inherently separate from the “Québécois” identity and food practices
will often reflect this tension. The next two chapters address these questions and show how the
four factors I presented in this chapter affect the daily experiences of my informants in Montréal.
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Introduction to the Montréal Case Study: Food as Bridge for the Transnational Immigrant
I pulled my car into a snow bank that should have been a parking spot, cursing the Montréal
winter in which I found myself, while trying to maintain my researcher composure. I was outside
of an apartment building in the east end of Montréal, a neighbourhood I had never been to, but
appeared to be like many of the other neighbourhoods in the city. I had been in Montréal for a
couple of weeks and had been struggling with the snow, the narrow streets of my Plateau
neighbourhood, which only became narrower in the depths of winter, and the unfamiliar accents
all around me. After months away in France I was “at home” in my own country, but feeling
incredibly out of place, acutely aware of my outsider Anglophone Ontarian status in the heart of
a Francophone Québécois neighbourhood. As I turned off my car, I prayed that I could get to the
door without having to have a conversation with a Québécois-speaking local, an experience that
always left me devastated and unsure that I had actually learned any French at all in my six visits
to France. Luckily the snow was keeping most people at bay on this particularly wintery day and
I made a smooth transition from my car to my informant’s door.
As soon as my informant opened the door, welcomed me with French kisses and spoke a
simple sentence of greeting, I took a deep breath in, my shoulders relaxed and I felt at ease. This
drastic difference in feeling from the loneliness I had been experiencing, to immediate familiarity
and ease, revealed to me just how comfortable I had become in the Maghrébine community in
France. For the first time since arriving in Montréal I felt “at home.” Sitting in her living room,
drinking mint tea and talking French with a French/Maghrébine accent was so refreshing to me,
so familiar, so comfortable.942 As much as I was not fully an insider in the Maghrébine
community in Paris, I apparently became more integrated there than I could have anticipated.
Chatting with that Algerian woman in Montréal put me at ease. I felt safe and happy. I
loved talking about France and colonialism with her. I loved speaking about Islam and food. I
felt as though I could have been in Paris in one of my Maghrébine informants’ living room that
afternoon, other than the mounds of snow outside. It struck me as funny that my own research
seemed to apply to my own experience in the moment. I write about Maghrébine immigrants
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who use food to connect to homeland, to connect with their broader transnational community, to
feel at home—and that is exactly what food was doing for me on that day. By drinking mint tea,
I was transported to Paris, to the café at the Grande Mosquée, to a place of comfort and security.
I am not North African. I am not Muslim. But when I drink mint tea or eat a plate of couscous I
feel a part of that community, and at that moment, it felt like home to me, strangely enough,
much more so than the Canadian context I was living in.943 I wondered how similar that feeling
was for my potential informants in Montréal.
The arguments made in the next two chapters are based on the data I collected during my
six-month fieldwork in Montréal, Québec, in 2013. These chapters explore three important
themes that arose from my data analysis of my interviews and participant observation in the
Maghrébine Muslim community in Montréal, namely: identity, transnationalism, and practice.
Within each of these themes I explore the role that food and food practice play, and show how,
for the group of Maghrébine Muslims whom I studied in Montréal, food is an important field of
entry and understanding into more overarching areas of one’s lived experience as an immigrant.
Food, in fact, is one of the main realms within which my respondents negotiated their
transnational immigrant identities in the context of secular Québec.
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Chapter 7: “Tout le monde est chez soi ici”944: Food as a Lens into Identity Negotiations
and Transnational Efforts in Montréal
7.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in the introduction to these Montréal case study chapters, the ability of “familiar”
food, smells, and tastes, to transport, transform, and identify was evident from my first day in the
field in Montréal. The essential nature of food not only for myself, but also for my informants,
framed all my work in this community, from that first afternoon in that informant’s living room,
until the celebration of the Eid Al-Adha eight months later in another’s home.
As transnational Muslims in Québec, my informants experienced similar things to the
situation I describe above on a daily basis in their lives in Montréal. Throughout this next chapter
I reveal how food helped to identify them in the dominant non-Muslim Québec context. It served
as a means of distinction between “us” and “them,” which is essential in any identity negotiation.
For the informants in my study these differences were made evident in not only “what” but
“how” one ate. Not only did my informants see themselves as distinct from the non-Muslim
Québécois(es) because they did not eat pork, drink alcohol and only consumed halal meat, but
also because they were ingredient checkers, did not eat to excess, did not waste food, ate
communally and would not so easily eat at restaurants. These approaches to food were both
culturally and religiously important to many of my informants and were what they saw as
distinguishing marks between their identity group and the “others.”
While the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study in Montréal saw themselves as
distinct in many ways, for the most part they also saw themselves as similar to other Canadians;
they were comfortable in their transnational identities. For this reason, I spend the second half of
this chapter addressing the role that food plays in how my informants created and maintained
their transnational connections. I argue that not only did eating specific things in specific ways
allow them to cross the border between home and host-land, but it allowed them to create home
in host-land as well. For many of my informants, food was the access point to memories of the
homeland and thus to the home identity. Because of the large distance between Québec and the
Maghreb, these transnational actions were especially important for my Montréal informants since
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physically traversing the distance was difficult and expensive. What is critical to note here is that
by being free to express the Maghrébine and Muslim side of their transnational identity, these
informants were often more excited to make efforts toward claiming and presenting the
Canadian/Québécois side of their transnational identity as well. My Montréal informants were
adamant about maintaining traditional religious and cultural food practices from the Maghreb
and yet also engaged with and produced cultural food items and experiences from Québec.
Integration was not about assimilation; it was not necessary to leave one’s culturally and
religiously specific practices aside, but one could hold them alongside the Québécois common
culture.
7.2 The National, Transnational and the Religious: Identity Negotiations Among
Maghrébine Muslim Immigrants in Montréal
As I stressed in Chapter 3 on Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in France, identity negotiation and
consolidation are foundational to the immigrant experience. When trying to find one’s place in a
new setting, one must explore from where one has come and the kinds of identities that one
wishes to hold, or inevitably will hold. This applies in the Québec case as well. As it was for my
informants in France, identity negotiation is complex and multivalent for my Québécois(es)
informants, and therefore I cannot apply a perfect typology of identity negotiation to their
experience. While in the France case study, good examples of all four of Salman Akhtar’s
typology of identity negotiations were present. In Québec, the identity negotiation and
presentation process was fairly consistent, with most of my informants falling into a hybrid
category between Akhtar’s Ethnocentric and Bi-Cultural categories that I call “Transnational”
identity negotiation. I return to how this identity negotiation process is illustrated through my
informants’ food practices later in this chapter.
To begin, it is important to note some simple statistics on how people identify themselves
when asked a straightforward question about their identity. As I suggested in chapter 3, when
asked, “comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie,”945 a person’s first response is often telling
of the primary identity that they hold. In the case of my informants in Montréal, the group was
fairly evenly split between religious and national primary identity. Of my 32 informants, 12
945
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claimed Muslim identity first (38 percent of informants), 19 claimed national identity (59
percent), whether Canadian (nine informants) or nation of origin (ten informants), and finally,
one informant claimed gender as her primary/first identity (3 percent).946 There was no real
consistency in how people stressed primary identity based on country of origin. Whether
someone was born in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or Canada, the responses were spread across the
board between national and religious identifications, and between Canadian and Maghrébine.
Gender, on the other hand, did appear to have an affect on which identity is claimed first. For
women, 46 percent claim Muslim identity first whereas only 20 percent of the men interviewed
claimed Muslim identity as their first identity. Instead, 50 percent of male informants claimed
Canadian identity first and 18 percent of females did. For those claiming one of the Maghrébine
identities first, gender did not appear to play any significant role, with 32 percent of females
claiming this and 30 percent of males claiming Maghrébine identity first. Overall, while in Paris
there were a great variety of responses to the identity question, in Montréal there was much more
consistency, with people generally professing religious or national identity as their first, and
often primary, identity.947
7.2.1 “All Canadians are Immigrants”: National Identity Claims
When it comes to national identity only 11 of my informants in Montréal did not claim Canadian
identity to some extent. Only 11 people specifically stated that they were “not Canadian.” The
other 21 informants all gladly professed this national identity, or professed their desire to claim
it, even if not all of them actually held Canadian citizenship. There may be multiple explanations
for the ease with which my informants claimed this identity, in comparison to the French
situation that I described in Chapter 3 where national identity seemed to be a much more difficult
and often unclaimed identity for immigrants. First, the fact that there is no colonial history
between Canada and the Maghreb may be an underlying reason why Maghrébines in Canada
may have less inner conflict in claiming the national identity than they would in France. One
946

It’s important to note that none of my informants claimed “Québécois” identity as their primary identity. In
fact, only two of my informants claimed this identity at all. I address the idea of “Québécois” identity, and the way
that my informants interact with it, below in section 5.2.1.1.
947
It is possible that there are other identities that my informants may see as primary, which they did not profess
here. Or they may see one of the identities that they proclaimed later in their list as their primary identity.
Furthermore, how one identifies oneself may change dependent on what stage of the immigration trajectory they
are currently at, and/or what identity is contested or important to them at that moment in time.
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informant in Montréal explained to me that during colonization by the French in Algeria native
Algerians were given identity cards that said “Français(e) musulman(e).” They were not
considered Algerians and they were not considered just French.948 As I presented in Chapter 2,
Muslims in Algeria were labeled as “Français(e) musulman(e),” an act that may understandably
lead to the lack of desire of claiming “French Muslim” identity now. Canada does not have this
same history with the Maghreb so there may be less hesitation in claiming a “Canadian Muslim”
identity.949
Beyond the simple lack of a colonial history in Africa, the general openness to diversity
and to religious and cultural difference in Canada (or at least the perceived openness) is another
possible reason for people’s desire to profess a Canadian identity. One informant expressed to
me that he was proudly Canadian, and it was because of the diversity of Canada that he saw as
the “richesse du Canada—une diversité qui fait que c’est un pays qui est riche, et ça donne de
beaux mélanges, une mixité.”950 For many like him, this diversity of Canada, and more
importantly the acceptance of this diversity, as often represented by “open secularism,”951 is
what made them proud to hold this national identity. One woman explained to me at great length
about an anecdotal experience that she and her children had undergone that led to a greater pride
in Canadian identity. She explained how her son had gone to a school barbeque, and after
explaining why he could not eat the meat that was being prepared the teacher went and bought
him, and the other young Muslim students present, halal meat so they could enjoy the barbeque
with everyone else. She went on to express how this solidified not only her own Canadian
identity but also that of her son.
C’est un barbecue pour tout le monde, tu manges, tu manges, tu ne manges pas, allez-y.
Mais ce geste-là, ça lui fait une marque à l’intérieur jusqu’à maintenant. “Tu te rappelles
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Personal correspondence with the researcher, Feb 8, 2013. Also, Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 2.
I return to the comparison of historical backgrounds and their effect on the Maghrébine Muslim immigrant, in
the conclusion to this dissertation.
950
130727_001—“The richness of Canada. A Diversity that makes it a rich country and that gives beautiful blends,
a mix.”
951
The anecdotal experiences that I describe here are an excellent vignette into the “open secularism,” defined by
Adelman and Anctil, at work in Montréal. As I discussed in Chapter 6, in a context governed by open secularism,
one can hold religious identity publicly alongside other identities, as under this type of secularism the protection of
freedom of religion is primary “even if this calls for the relativization of the principle of neutrality” (Adelman and
Anctil, Religion, 87).
949
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l’année passée?” Donc maintenant, il cherche l’halal, il mange l’halal. Mais il sait qu’il
est canadien. Il défend son pays.952
For this woman, and her son, this proof of acceptance of difference is what made them feel like
there was nothing standing between them and claiming the Canadian identity. Throughout my
time in the field in Montréal, I heard many other examples like this one, of Québécois(es) going
out of their way to make sure that everyone in the group was accommodated, no matter their
cultural or religious background. For the informants who delivered these stories, it was clear that
these anecdotal experiences had a large effect on their own understanding of who they were and
how they could relate to the broader Canadian national identity.953 These experiences gave the
necessary evidence to my informants that Canadian identity was for all, no matter one’s origins
and practices.954
Unlike in France, where there seemed to be a difference between French citizenship and
French nationality in my informants’ approach to claiming that identity, in Québec the response
was much more straightforward. One simply claimed or did not claim Canadian identity
regardless of one’s actual citizenship. For example, of the 16 informants who had Canadian
citizenship, 13 claimed the identity, two did not, and one claimed Québécois identity.955 On the
other hand, of the 14 informants who did not hold Canadian citizenship, eight consequently did
952

130518_001—“It was a barbeque for everyone, you eat, you eat, you don’t eat, go on. But this gesture, that
made a mark in him up to this day. ‘You remember last year?’ So now, he looks for halal, he eats halal, but he
knows that he is Canadian. He defends his country.”
953
See Valerie Amiraux and Javiera Araya-Moreno, “Pluralism and Radicalization: Mind the Gap!,” in Religious
Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond, eds. Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2014), 92-119. Amiraux and Araya-Moreno suggest that anecdotal experiences have more
power to change perceptions than grand, overarching stereotypes. In this, not only might the Muslim immigrant
change his/her opinion of the “other” but the “other” may change his/her opinion about the Muslim immigrant
within these interactions. In order for these anecdotal experiences to happen, there must be interaction among
and between groups. A problem arises from the uneven distribution of Muslims in Canada. As I discussed in
Chapter 3, the majority of Muslim immigrants in Québec live in Montréal. For a study such as mine, which is
situated in Montréal proper, this is good news: there is plenty of opportunity for a Muslim immigrant to interact
with non-Muslim Québécois. These anecdotal experiences are simply less possible in other regions of Québec,
where Muslim populations are practically non-existent, allowing for the potential for overarching stereotypes to
remain unchallenged.
954
These findings directly contradict the findings by Margarita Mooney in her study of Haitian immigrants in
Miami, Montréal and Paris. She suggests that because of Québec secular nationalism “private religious belief and
practice are tolerated, yet public religious expressions and faith-based service institutions” are not, and therefore
the incorporation of immigrants is weakened there (Mooney, “Religion as a Context of Reception,” 100). Because
Québec nationalism was generally missing from my informants’ experience, and Canadian nationalism was more
prevalent, the data that I collected presents quite a different picture from Mooney’s of immigrant incorporation in
Québec.
955
I return to the difference between Canadian and Québécois identity below.
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not claim the identity, while four did and two suggested that they would like to. Finally, of the
two informants in the process of gaining Canadian citizenship, one already claimed the identity
and the other did not. Overall, people simply claimed the identity if they felt like it was one with
which they identified. There was no real extra thought put into whether one could claim this
identity or whether one would be accepted as Canadian or not, by the “non-immigrant”
Canadians that surround them. In fact, the idea of the accessibility of the Canadian identity to
anyone who wanted it was supported by the very fact that there is no such thing as “nonimmigrant” Canadians, according to many of my informants. For these informants, Canadian
identity was accessible and claimed easily because “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada. As
one informant suggested,
c’est vrai, on se sent chez nous. Je me sens chez moi. Et quand on discute avec des gens,
on dit, oui, tout le monde est chez soi ici.… Même pour un canadien de souche…il a des
ancêtres qui étaient immigrants. Donc nous avons les mêmes droits.956
This view that “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada leads to a stronger emphasis on the cultures
and identities of origin for many recent immigrants, but also for Canadians in general, according
to my informants.
Because everyone is Canadian, the need to express this identity is not as visceral as the
need to go back in family history and experience to explain how one came to the nation full of
immigrants. When explaining to me why one’s national identity of origin held such an important
place in one’s politics of identity, one young woman explained it to me as follows:
Parce qu’en général quand tu rencontres des gens ici, ce n’est pas important pour eux de
savoir si tu es canadienne ou pas, parce que tu finis par l’avoir, mais ils veulent plus
savoir: tu es de quelle origine? Jusqu’à date, avec la plupart des gens avec qui je parle, on
vient vraiment plus parler de ton origine. Les gens demandent plus ton origine. Parce
qu’on finit tous par être des canadiens, parce que dans le fond les canadiens, ce sont tous
des immigrés. Depuis 400 ans, c’est tout le monde qui a immigré. (Elles rigolent.) On
s’entend qu’y en a qui ont leurs grands-parents, ça fait 200 ans, 300 ans, mais l’origine, si
tu demandais à leurs arrières, arrières, grands-pères, ils vont te dire: on vient de… puis ils
vont donner un autre pays.957
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130727_001—“It’s true, we feel at home. I feel at home. And when we talk with people, we say ‘yes, everyone
is home here.’ We do not have the right to say, even for a Canadian born, even he was an immigrant once. He has
ancestors that were immigrants so we all have the same rights.” Note that in this quotation and the following one,
Aboriginal Canadians are excluded from the discussion, although, strictly speaking, even their ancestors were also
once immigrants, but the time clock is set further back.
957
130615_003—“Because in general when you meet people here, it is not important for them to know if you are
Canadian or not because you finish by having it [Canadian citizenship], but they want to know more what your
origins are. Up until now the majority of people that I speak with, we really just talk about your origins. People ask
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She and others viewed this as true for multi-generational Canada-born Canadians as well.958 For
my informants, this is a distinct difference between the Canadian situation and the French
situation. While in France the things that make you similar are the things that you must stress to
show your national identity, in Canada it is the origins that make you different that ultimately
make you fit with the national identity.
7.2.2 (Almost) Non-existent Québécois(e) Identity
Considering the complex history of Québec within Canada, a history that I explored in Chapter 6
of this dissertation, one may wonder how the context of Québec may influence the national
identity that immigrants to Québec may hold. While Québécois national identity is a prevalent
issue on the ground in Québec, it was largely missing from my informants’ answers to the
question of how they would identify themselves. In France, many of my informants would be
quick to explain the historical and cultural influences behind their desire and/or ability to claim
French national identity, but this was not the case in Québec.
I was quite surprised by this finding. Having become aware of the fact that there was a
different national identity expressed in Québec than in the other provinces in Canada that I had
visited, I expected that this would be a distinction that would be engrained in my informants as
well. I was uncomfortable on many occasions during my fieldwork in Québec, based on the fact
that I held Canadian and not Québécois identity. Based on this experience and what I knew about
the importance of professing a Québécois identity against a Canadian one, I predicted that,
instead of Canadian identity, my informants would claim Québécois identity as an effort to fit in

more about your origins. Because we all finish by being Canadians, because in the end Canadians are all
immigrants. For 400 years, everyone is an immigrant. [they laugh]. We agree that there are some, they have their
grandparents here for 200 years, 300 years, but their origins, if you ask their great, great, grandparents, they will
tell you ‘we come from…,’ and they will give you another country.” Another informant similarly expressed: “Et c’est
comme ça que ma procédure à commencer. Ici, on ne reconnait pas les vrais canadiens des autres. Parce que c’est
un monde qui est riche de toutes les cultures. Mais les gens disent, une fois que tu as la citoyenneté, ça y est, je
suis canadienne, mais quand on pose la question on voit que l’on est tous venu un peu de partout” (130703_004).
958
When the former informant was explaining her understanding of the situation of overarching Canadian
immigrant identity to me, I was taken back into my own history and experience with defining myself as a Canadian.
I remembered explaining to other Canadians when I was growing up in rural Ontario, not that I was Canadian, but
that I was German and English. My Canadian identity was a given, and innately in that identity my former
immigrant identity was also a given, so the interest immediately turned to what made me different from those
other immigrant Canadians around me and not what made me similar.
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with the culture that was immediately surrounding them. Instead, only two informants959 really
claimed a Québécois identity. One in particular explained his national identity to me as follows:
Et bien, puisqu’on est au Québec, le nationalisme canadien, on ne le sent pas vraiment. Je
pense qu’on ne voit pas beaucoup de drapeaux canadiens à Montréal. Donc, je ne veux
pas mentir en disant que je me sens pas Canadien parce que tous les Québécois, ben [et
bien], la plupart des Québécois ne se sentent pas Canadiens. …Ben, disons que je me
sens plus Montréalais, à la limite Québécois, que Canadien.960
What is important to note here is that this informant was my one and only second generation
Maghrébine in my Québec case study. It was clear from this response, and other conversations
between this informant and myself, that this “born-Québécois” identity had a significant effect
on how he viewed his national identity. He was acutely aware of the distinction between
Québécois and Canadian identity and consequently saw the need to state this difference.
First-generation Maghrébines, on the other hand, either did not acknowledge the
difference, or simply did not think it applied to them. For example, one young woman also
explained that there was a distinction between Québécois and Canadian identity. In response to
my question about identity she responded that after being Muslim and Tunisian she was
Canadian. In fact, she stated,
je dirais plutôt Canadienne. Je ne me vois pas avec la culture Québécoise, honnêtement.
J’ai toujours vécu au Québec, je n’ai jamais été ailleurs au Canada mais si quelqu’un me
demande si je suis plus Québécoise ou Canadienne, je dirais plus Canadienne.961
This young woman was, in fact, the only other informant to make a clear distinction between
Québécois and Canadian national identity in her interview.962 What is noteworthy about this is
that she had lived in Québec for most of her life. She was born in the Maghreb but came to
959

130806_004; 130807_001.
130807_001—“Well, since we are in Québec, Canadian nationalism, we don’t really feel it. I think we do not see
many Canadian flags in Montréal. So, I do not want to lie by saying that I don’t feel Canadian because all
Québécois(es), well the majority of Québécois(es) do not feel Canadian…Well, let’s say that I feel more like a
Montréaler, borderline Québécois, than Canadian.”
961
130517_001—“I would say more Canadian. I do not see myself with the Québec culture honestly. I have always
lived in Québec, I have never been elsewhere in Canada but if someone were to ask me if I was more Québécois(e)
or Canadian, I would say more Canadian.”
962
One other informant mentioned both the Canadian and Québécois identities as separate identities that one
could hold, but clearly distinguished them as national and provincial identities, not two separate national
identities: “Oui, j’ai déjà la nationalité. Y a deux ou trois jours ma fille ma posé la question: ‘Maman est-ce que je
suis Canadienne ou Marocaine ou Québécoise?’ Je lui ai dit: les 3. (Elles rigolent.) Elle a 6 ans et demi et elle m’a
posé cette question il y a deux ou trois jours. Maman je suis quoi? Je lui dis: les 3. Si on te pose la question tu vas
dire, je suis Canadienne, comme on habite au Canada, mais on habite la province du Québec, donc tu es
Québécoise, et tu es Marocaine d’origine. Donc, tu dois parler des 3” (130529_003).
960
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Canada while she was still a baby and all her siblings were born in Québec. While she is
technically a first-generation (some would call this the 1.5 generation) Maghrébine in Québec,
she was for all intents and purposes raised in Québec. This may explain her awareness that
“something must be said about the difference between Québécois and Canadian identity,” yet she
still saw herself as more Canadian than Québécoise.
7.2.2.1 Food as Symbol of Québécois Identity
Although most of my informants did not speak about a distinct Québécois identity, or a notion of
“Québécois(e)” being equal to “Canadien(ne)” in their responses about their own identities, they
did seem to acknowledge the Québécois identity in subtler ways, especially as it related to food
practice.963 For example, many informants would speak about Québécois food, often in
opposition to Maghrébine or Muslim food. Food was not only central to their understanding and
presentation of who they were as Maghrébines but also in their understanding of who and what
made someone Québécois(e). “I’m not sure what you Québécois(es) eat or consider Québécois
food, but if you are Algerian (or Moroccan, or Tunisian) you eat this” was a common perspective
that my informants offered to me. In fact, I had informants suggest that “people eat their own
food,” whether Chinese or Muslim or Québécois.964
Food is one way to present your identity to others, and many informants would tell me
stories of experiencing Québécois(es) presenting Québécois identity through food experiences.
For example, one woman told me an elaborate story of her cousin’s Québécois wife wanting to
make the family a “Québécois meal” in an effort to show them her traditions and who she was.
This informant explained how this young woman had put such an effort forward to demonstrate
Québécois food, but the Maghrébines at the table had a difficult time appreciating the sugary,
bland dishes placed in front of them. In spite of the relative disaster of converting the
Maghrébines to Québécois eating, it was a time of learning, a time of laughter, and a time of
appreciating the other. As my informant said, “C’est là où on a découvert d’ailleurs le
Québec…Et pour te dire que nous aussi on a découvert la cuisine Québécoise comme ça.”965 She
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The argument for the role of food in marking identity was made in the first chapter of this dissertation.
130401_001.
965
130401_001—“In fact, it’s there that we discovered Québec…and to tell you that we also discovered the
Québec cuisine in that manner.”
964
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stressed to me that it was in the process of sharing this meal that she discovered what Québec
was. It was not just about Québec cuisine, but Québec itself.966
7.2.3 Home Country (Nation of Origin) National Identification
The second major identity category that my informants claimed was their nation of origin:
Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian.967 Food played an essential role in defining this identity for my
informants. In fact, food was sometimes seen as the principal way of presenting oneself. For
some of my informants, the discussion about identity was a secondary process. The first process
was to present oneself, or meet the other, via food practice. Discussion of those identities then
followed. For example, one young woman expressed that,
en premier lieu, la première chose que l’on peut faire pour présenter notre pays, c’est
avec la nourriture, et avec nos habillements parce qu’on a des habits traditionnels. Et
après ça, c’est autour de la discussion que l’on peut se connaître. On est comme ça…, nos
traditions sont comme ça, on pense comme ça. C’est après le couscous et le tajine.968
Not only is food a primary means of presenting one’s home national identity, but it is also an
enduring means (even for those who are not born in the country with which they are trying to
identify). My second-generation Tunisian informant expressed this fact to me when he spoke
about maintaining traditional food practices of the “homeland” in the host land. He suggested
that “je crois que c’est important de garder la nourriture, qu’elle soit santé ou non, parce que ça

966

The possible role of food in Québécois identity became particularly poignant during my fieldwork with the
emergence of “Pastagate” in Québec (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/02/21/Québec-italian-banpasta_n_2733882.html). The importance of how we name food, the language of food for French Québécois
identity came into focus. Food almost became an outworking, a symbol of French language identity that plays such
a significant role in Québécois identity formation. The OQLF (Office Québécois de la langue francaise), in an
attempt to make sure that only French was found throughout the province, turned its focus to the food/restaurant
industry. Members of the OQLF investigated restaurants, particularly Italian restaurants, and demanded changes
to non-French names such as pasta, caffe, botteglia di vino, etc., to reflect the French words for these products.
The OQLF quickly reversed itself on this request, but the fact that they had made the request in the first place, with
support from the opposition political party, raised concerns.
967
One may, rightly, assume that the current politics of the home context have a significant effect on the identity
politics of immigrants from those locations. For example, one may assume that the events of the Arab Spring
would impact the ways that my informants understand themselves as individuals from the countries directly
involved in, and impacted by these events. What is remarkable is that none of my informants discussed these
events with me when addressing their home identities.
968
130615_002—“In the first place, the first thing that we can do to present our country, it’s with food and
clothing because we have traditional garments. And after that, it’s around discussion that we can get to know one
another. We are like that … our traditions are like that, we think like that. It’s [That discussion comes] after the
couscous and the tajine.”
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fait partie de l’identité d’un peuple.”969 Food is part of a communal identity that must be
protected.970
The focus on one’s nation of origins was evident in the engagement with the home
context national identity. In fact, 10 of my informants responded with this identity first, while all
32 informants claimed it to one degree or another. It was the most overarching identity in this
case study. For the 10 informants who claimed this identity first, it was fairly straightforward: a
simple statement of “I am Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian,” etcetera. For the rest of my
informants, this identity was relegated more to the realm of origins. In fact, 11 of my informants
used the words “d’origine algérienne,” “marocaine,” or “tunisienne.”971 What is worth noting is
that those who specifically used the words “d’origine…” all emphasized their Canadian identity
to a large extent. It was either the first identity they mentioned, or it was the one they stressed.
As I mentioned above, it seems as though many of my informants thought that to be Canadian is
to have “origins” elsewhere. It followed that those informants who wanted to highlight their
Canadian identity often claimed their Maghrébine identity in this “of origins” kind of way.
7.2.4 “Être musulman(e)”: Religious Identity Negotiations
The third and final identity that was significantly expressed972 was one’s religious identity,
namely the Muslim identity. Thirty of my 32 informants claimed Muslim identity with ease. For
these informants, no matter the manifestation of this identity, Islam was one of their central
orienting worldviews and self-understandings. For the other two informants, Islam was a minor
identity, a cultural identity, and one that was present in their lives but not one that they felt
particularly attached to as an identity per se. One spoke of it as a culturally inevitable identity,973
while the other viewed it as a religious identity and as such something that is private and not “un
critère d’identification pour moi.”974 This informant went on to explain to me that even if she did
not claim that identity herself, other people would inevitably label her as Muslim because she
969

130801_001—“I think that it is important to protect the food, whether it is healthy or not because it is part of
the identity of a people.”
970
My informants were engaging in what can be called “Gastronationalism” in relationship to their home national
identities. On this issue see DeSoucey, “Gastronationalism,” 432-455.
971
“Of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian origins.”
972
Gender was the only other identity claimed by my informants, and only one informant emphasized this type of
identity.
973
130731_003.
974
130706_001—“A criterion of identification for me.”
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was Algerian. The idea of being “born Muslim” came into play. One other informant also spoke
of this “born Muslim” identity, saying that “musulman, en fait c’est une appartenance à une
religion. Mais nous, on l’est par naissance.”975 He agrees with the previous informant that one’s
Muslim identity is not so much an identity as an affiliation, yet explains how one “is” a Muslim
simply by consequence of where one is born.
Unlike the situation in France where many informants spoke of a “born Muslim” identity,
in my Québec case study, this religious identity was much more of a chosen identity; it was not
something someone was simply born into but something someone chose. One young man
explained it to me as follows. He said, “Je suis musulman par naissance, donc je n’ai pas changé
quelque chose, je n’ai pas changé en fait. Mais, après, maintenant je le suis par choix. Plus
qu’avant.”976 For this informant, being Muslim was not just a simple matter of being from the
Maghreb and inevitably being Muslim. It was not a cultural identity that one could not escape,
but instead it was a religious identity that was chosen by and professed for oneself.
Ultimately, for many of my informants, being Muslim went beyond just being “born
Muslim” or just doing one’s prayers, or another variation of singular action that led to identity.
Instead, “being Muslim” was more than just prayer and the veil, it was also the things of
everyday. It is a mix of belief and practice, personal and practical connection, not just one or the
other.
Notre religion ne se limite pas seulement à la prière et au voile. C’est un tout: ce que l’on
mange, ce que l’on fait, notre relation avec le voisinage, avec notre environnement; c’està-dire, tenir un environnement propre, ça fait partie de notre religion. Ne pas faire mal
aux gens, ça fait partie de notre religion. Notre religion c’est notre vie. C’est-à-dire, du
lever du jour jusqu’au soir, c’est ça la religion. Ce n’est pas uniquement faire la prière et
porter le voile, c’est un tout. C’est ça la religion.977
Since religion is seen as the stuff of the everyday, food takes up an important place in the
Muslim identity for my informants.978 After explaining to me that to be a Muslim is to get
975

130806_005—“Muslim, in fact it’s a religious affiliation. But we, we are it [Muslim] by birth.”
130806_004—“I am Muslim by birth, therefore I did not change anything, I did not change in fact. But,
afterwards, now, I am [Muslim] by choice. More than before.”
977
130520_002—“Our religion is not limited to just prayer and the veil. It’s a totality: what we eat, what we do,
our relationship with our neighbours, with our environment; that’s to say, maintaining a clean environment is part
of our religion. To not harm others, that is part of our religion. Our religion is our life. That means from sunrise to
night, that is religion. It is not only to do the prayers and to wear the veil, it’s a totality. That is the religion.”
978
We can see McGuire’s definition of lived religion at work here. Again, McGuire argues that “lived religion is
constituted by the practices people use to remember, share, enact, adapt, create, and combine the stories out of
which live. And it comes into being through the often-mundane practices people use to transform these
976
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married, one young woman went on with her explanation of what it means to be a Muslim in the
following way:
Être musulmane aussi c’est: ne pas boire du vin et de l’alcool...C’est aussi faire le
carême, un minimum d’un mois par année. Mais il y a d’autres jours où l’on peut faire
ça...On ne mange pas bien le porc. Par exemple, on a une liste bien précise. On ne peut
pas manger des animaux qui sont morts avant que la personne les égorge. C’est très
important [qu’]on doit vider l’animal du sang qui n’est pas bon pour la santé. C’est dans
notre religion… Vous avez un autre point de vue que l’on respecte, bien sûr, mais c’est
dans notre religion.979
For this informant, and many like her, food is central to what makes someone “Muslim,”
including what distinguishes Muslims from others.
One of the distinctions that arose within the Muslim identity category related to one’s
outward religious practices. Although there were some who considered themselves “not great
practitioners,” it seemed as though there was a larger population of informants who engaged in a
significant number of religious and cultural Muslim practices in Montréal than I encountered in
Paris. Because of the immigrant experience in Canada, and the fact that Islam is not the majority
religious identity in the country, practice and the understanding of oneself as a practicing Muslim
increases for many of my informants. For example, one man explained to me how he saw
himself as more of a practicing Muslim in Canada than in the Maghreb.
J’ai remarqué q’ici au Canada, j’ai pratiqué ma religion plus qu’au Maroc. Bien sûr je
fais ma prière, je fais le ramadan, les fêtes, les deux fêtes que l’on a. La fête du ramadan
et la fête du mouton, le sacrifice. Je pratique ma religion quotidiennement parce que je
cherche les produits halal. Je dois me comporter comme un vrai musulman parce que je
trouve que c’est une responsabilité. Ce n’est pas comme au Maroc, parce que [où] la
plupart, puisque 99,99%, sont musulmans. Mais ici je dois pratiquer ma religion jour par
jour, heure par heure, par mon comportement, parce que je dois donner l’exemple aux
autres.980
meaningful interpretations into everyday action” (McGuire, Lived Religion, 98). Here my informants show how
food is one of the central mundane practices that they use to transform their stories into action.
979
130430_004—“To be Muslim is also to not drink wine and alcohol…it is also to do the fast, a minimum of one
month a year. But there are other days where we can do that as well…we do not eat pork. For example, we have a
very precise list. We cannot eat animals that were dead before a person slaughters them. That is very important.
We have to empty the animal of its blood, which is not good for one’s health. That is in our religion…You have
another point of view that we respect of course, but it is in our religion.”
980
130430_006—“I noticed that here in Canada I practiced my religion more than in Morocco. Of course I do my
prayers, I do Ramadan, the festivals, the two festivals that we have. The festival of Ramadan and the festival of the
lamb, [or] the sacrifice. I practice my religion daily because I look for halal products. I have to behave like a real
Muslim because I find that it is a responsibility. It is not like in Morocco because the majority there, almost 99.99%,
are Muslims. But here I have to practice my religion day by day, hour by hour by my behaviour because I have to
give an example to others.”
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For this informant, his identity as “practicing Muslim” was only highlighted in the Canadian
context; it would not have been an identity that he stressed in Morocco, as there would have been
no need to do so in that context.
In Jennifer Selby’s work on Muslim communities in the suburbs of Paris, in Petit
Nanterre, we can see that some of her informants reflected the same kind of pattern in their
experiences.981 Her informants express, like mine do, how in the Maghreb you do not need to
emphasize certain things, because there everyone does them, but in France you have to
emphasize these practices because they are what make you distinct.982 While for Selby’s
informants this trend is represented in prayer, dress, family values, etc., for my informants this
emphasis on religious identity is signified by food practice. This is again reflective of the
“minority status effect” that I discussed in Chapter 3. I argue elsewhere that “minority identity
status can lead to certain aspects of identity becoming more prevalent in the immigrant location
than they might be in one’s homeland” and that “food and food practice may be one area where
this minority status effect may be evident.”983 I explain there, like I do throughout this work, that
while not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, fasting for Ramadan, or one’s engagement with any
other commonly understood “religious” food practice, may not be essential to one’s Muslim
identity in a Muslim-majority context, in a context where one’s Muslim identity is the minority
these kinds of practices take on a more symbolically important role in identity presentation.
Not only was it a matter of “needing to practice” more in Canada than in the Maghreb,
but it was also a matter of ease. Comparatively, people in Canada seemed to feel freer to be a
practicing Muslim. Rubina Ramji similarly found that many of her informants felt freer to be
Muslim in Canada than they did in their “home” countries.984 For my Montréal informants, there
did not appear to be the same pressure to change one’s practices, especially food practices, as
there was in France. From what I gathered in talking with Maghrébines in Montréal, keeping a
strict practice seemed easier than it was for my informants in France; it was simply out of the
question for them to eat pork, drink alcohol and violate rules around halal meat.
981

Selby specifically addresses the expectation placed on young women, who migrate from the Maghreb to marry
men in Petit Nanterre, to be even more practicing than they were in the Maghreb.
982
Selby, Questioning French Secularism, 164-165.
983
Brown, “‘Tell me what you eat,” 45.
984
Rubina Ramji, “A Variable but Convergent Islam: Muslim Women,” in Growing up Canadian: Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, eds. Peter Beyer and Rubina Ramji (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), 115.
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For my Montréal informants, one is meant to maintain these traditions. My informants
would argue that they felt free to maintain their religious practice and as a result they did exactly
that. I wonder if the fact that Canadians in general put less emphasis on food might be a reason
for this. For example, here in Canada it is not often that lunch is provided in businesses and
schools. Instead people bring their own lunches to school and work and can bring what they want
to eat. In France, on the other hand, lunch is often provided both in the schools and in businesses.
Life revolves around food and consequently differences in food practices become more evident.
One of my informants mentioned to me that sometimes it is difficult when she is at school and
people want to eat all together and she has to ask whether or not something is halal or not.985
However these communal meals at work are not as common in Canada as they are in France.
Although the distinction between levels of practice existed and was commonly engaged
by my informants in Montréal, it seemed to be much more complicated than in Paris. On the one
hand, in Paris the differences often revealed complex and variant interactions between one’s self
understanding as a “cultural” and/or “religious” Muslim, and revealed the many ways in which
my informants in Paris lived out their Muslim identity through their practices. In Montréal, on
the other hand, many of my informants would call themselves “non-practicing,” and yet would
engage in most of the commonly understood “religious obligations,” from the five pillars, to
keeping halal, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, etcetera. There was a great deal of
consistency in practice among my Montréal informants.
Beyer and Ramji address these issues by presenting a ten-point scale on which they base
their three categorizations of Muslim identity among their respondents in their study. These three
categories are the “highly involved,” the “moderately to somewhat involved” and the “nonreligious.” Beyer in his chapter in their book suggests that while the “highly involved” adhere to
a consistent standard of Muslim orthodoxy, usually based on the five pillars, “the highly
involved Muslims showed great variation on virtually every one of the details that composed
their otherwise common ‘orthodox’ model of Islam.”986 The “moderately to somewhat involved”
Muslims “used the same standards [as the highly involved] but did not feel that they had to
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Personal communication, Field journal, April 24, 2013.
Beyer, “Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism,” 60.
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conform to them as strictly”; their religion was just one factor among many in their lives.987
Finally, the “non-religious” rejected identification with Islam in general, or as Muslims.988
While my informants in France would have fit into all categories across Beyer and
Ramji’s ten-point scale, my Montréal informants would be concentrated in the “highly involved”
category that Beyer describes. There was a great deal of consistency in practice, and Islam was a
central identity in their lives, but there was also a great deal of variation presented within that
understanding of orthodoxy. For example, “non-practicing,” or better yet “not a great
practitioner” in Montréal were often used as a self-identity label when one compared oneself to
exceptionally devout Muslims, or simply when one felt like there was always more that they
could do. One of these informants explained it to me as follows:
Je suis pratiquant, mais je ne suis pas un grand pratiquant. Mais je fais de mon mieux
pour faire notre rite…Je fais ma prière. Nous avons un rite de 5 fois par jour. Ça nous
permet aussi de nous laver chaque fois qu’on le fait. Le ramadan on fait un mois dans
l’année. On fait le jeûne une fois par année. C’est tout. Comme je vous l’ai dit, je suis
juste pratiquant—pas plus que ça.989
In the standards that were set out by many of my informants in Paris, this man would have been
considered a highly practicing Muslim without question or quantification, but in Montréal there
is a feeling that the idea of “practicing” must be qualified.
Even those who claim that they are fully practicing Muslims sometimes show a different
level of practice in their actions. For example, one of my informants in Montréal professed that
she only ate fish when she ate outside of her home, but one afternoon when we were out for
lunch she ordered a chicken curry dish. This experience made me wonder how many people tell
me that they keep strictly halal and yet eat differently in their everyday lives. What did it actually
mean to them to keep halal? To be practicing?990
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Beyer, “Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism,” 60.
Beyer, “Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism,” 60.
989
130517_002—“I am practicing but I am not a great practitioner but I do my best to perform our rites…I do my
prayers. We have a rite of five times a day. That permits us as well to wash ourselves each time that we do it.
Ramadan we do one month in the year. We do the fast once a year. That’s it, like I told you, I am just practicing,
not more than that.” This informant gave this answer in response to my question “Donc vous avez dit que vous
êtes musulmans. Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire pour vous? Et est-ce que vous avez des pratiques spécifiques que vous
faites?” (So, you said that you were Muslim/ What does that mean to you? Do you have specific practices that you
do?)
990
Here we can see the benefit of being in the field, seeing lived religion in action. As Orsi states, being in the field
“forces an acknowledgement of and engagement with something messier than the controlled marshalling of
988
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While for some of my informants “non-practicing” was an identity label that they would
give themselves, it also functioned as a tool used by others to make sense of those people who
claim Muslim identity but who “are not quite Muslim enough” by their standards. In fact, it was
an identity label used by some of my informants to help explain how someone could be a
Muslim and yet still engage in “non-Muslim” behaviours and practices, specifically as they
related to alcohol and pork.
Oui, il y a des musulmans. Ce n’est pas tous les musulmans qui sont pratiquants. Je ne
connais pas, mais je vois. Je vois des musulmans qui prennent de l’alcool, qui mangent le
porc. Peut-être, tu me dis, un pratiquant; je te dis oui, Rachel, il ne va pas prendre
l’alcool, il ne va pas prendre le porc. Mais un musulman, je te réponds: non.991
For this informant, a practicing Muslim would not consume alcohol, but a non-practicing
Muslim would be able to and still claim the identity of “Muslim.” After all, according to another
informant,
ce n’est pas tous les musulmans qui sont pratiquants parce qu’il y a des musulmans qui
boivent. Et peut-être, je ne sais pas, je n’en ai pas rencontré mais peut-être il y a des
musulmans qui mangent le porc, et pourtant ils sont musulmans et c’est des non
pratiquants.992
For this informant, a Muslim who drinks alcohol or even eats pork is still a Muslim, but by
his/her actions firmly places him/herself in the non-practicing camp. They would perhaps place
an individual such as this in Beyer’s “moderately to somewhat involved” category; not removing
their Muslim identity from them, but also making sense of how they, as a “highly involved”
Muslim, could claim this identity alongside someone who does not hold to the same orthodoxy.
Another informant explained how food practices, such as the consumption of alcohol, could be
clear illustrations into the debate over what it means to claim Muslim identity, to “be a Muslim.”

letters on a page, something less predictable, and demands a different kind of attentiveness. The world of the text
is really not the world” (Orsi, Between Heaven, 164).
991
130518_001—“Yes there are Muslims. It is not all Muslims who are practicing. I do not know them, but I see
[them]. I see Muslims who consume alcohol, who eat pork. Maybe, if you say to me, a practitioner, I would tell you
yes, Rachel, he would not consume alcohol, he will not take pork. But a Muslim, I would respond no.” Another
stated, “il y a des musulmans qui mangent même le porc. Avant d’être des musulmans ce sont des êtres humains.
Il y a des musulmans qui ne pratiquent pas. Il y a des non musulmans qui ne mangent pas le porc, qui ne boivent
pas l’alcool. Ce n’est pas la religion, ça dépend de la conscience de la personne. Est-ce qu’il est pratiquant, est ce
qu’il n’est pas pratiquant? C’est ça” (130430_006).
992
130612_001—“It’s not all Muslims who are practicing because there are Muslims who drink. And maybe, I don’t
know, I haven’t met any, but maybe there are Muslims who eat pork and yet they are Muslims and they are nonpracticing.”
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When responding to my inquiry whether there were Muslims who drank alcohol, he gave me the
following response:
On va dire oui, ils se disent musulmans parce que… là on va rentrer dans c’est quoi la
définition d’un musulman. Parce qu’un musulman, il ne devrait pas boire. Parce qu’un
musulman qui va boire, il ne peut pas faire la prière pendant 40 jours, tandis qu’un
musulman, il doit faire sa prière 5 fois par jour. Là, on doit se questionner: est-ce que
c’est vraiment un musulman, parce qu’il ne peut pas faire sa prière en ayant bu. Puis il ne
peut pas la faire pendant 40 jours. Dans les 40 jours, comment on peut le nommer? Est-ce
qu’il est toujours musulman? C’est ça, mais il y en a qui se disent musulmans, mais on va
dire que ce sont des pécheurs…Donc oui, on va dire musulman non pratiquant, pécheur.
Je ne sais pas exactement comment le nommer mais je mets un point d’interrogation sur
sa situation pendant la période.993
For this person we can see that one’s drink practice, or lack thereof, is foundational to the very
discussion of what it means to be a Muslim in the first place. Furthermore, “non-practicing
Muslim” can serve as an identity label that practicing Muslims can place on others whom they
feel are not fully able to claim the “authentic” Muslim identity.
Whatever the case, whether one claims this identity as religious or cultural, born or
chosen, imposed or implied, food and food practices play a significant role in what it means to
“be Muslim.” While the classic food practices that are representative of Muslim identity are
Ramadan, pork, alcohol, halal, these were not the only ones mentioned as being essential to
one’s identity as a Muslim in Canada.
In a context such as Canada where these relatively well known practices are not so
contested as in some other locations, other practices move to the forefront of practice and
identity. For example, the issue of gelatin came up for many of my informants when speaking
about Islam and food.994 For these informants, the avoidance of gelatin is a part of one’s religious
993

130615_003—“We will say yes, they call themselves Muslims because… there we are going to enter into what is
the definition of a Muslim. Because a Muslim should not drink. Because a Muslim who is going to drink, he cannot
do his prayers for 40 days, but a Muslim has to do his prayers 5 times a day. We have to ask, is he really a Muslim?
Because he cannot do his prayers having had a drink. As a result, he cannot do his prayers during 40 days. So in the
40 days, what can we call him? Is he still a Muslim? There it is, but there are some who call themselves Muslim but
we say that they are sinners…so, yes, we will say: non-practicing Muslim, sinners. I do not know exactly how to
label them but I put a question mark on that situation in place of a period.”
994
The avoidance of gelatin was important for many of my informants in Montréal because gelatin is often made
from pork; since one cannot consume pork, one cannot consumer gelatin, or so the argument goes. Note that not
all gelatin comes from pork: cows (and other animals) are also sourced. This fact would not remove the problem
for believers such as this person because the dead cows that are used to gather this collagen would typically not
have been slaughtered according to halal (or kosher) standards. There are vegan alternatives to gelatin such as
agar-agar, guar gum, and pectin. A related issue for Muslims in Canada is the rennet found in cheeses. That too has
traditionally been animal-based, though there are now lab-based and vegetable-based alternatives available.
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food practice, and a part of what makes them Muslim in Canada. In responding to my question
about the relationship between Islam and food many informants immediately brought up gelatin.
For example, here’s one answer that uses the slippery slope argument:
Oui, seulement de la viande halal, et on ne mange pas les yoghourts avec la gélatine. Il y
a des personnes qui disent, ok c’est un petit pourcentage. Mais même ça, ça vient du porc,
donc on ne mange pas la chose là où l’on trouve de la gélatine, par exemple. Parce que
cette fois, si c’est une petite quantité, l’autre fois on va dire: Ok, pour la gélatine il n’y a
pas de problème, pourquoi on n’essaie pas autre chose? Donc il vaut mieux acheter ce qui
est halal.995
For many informants, this mention of the avoidance of gelatin was one of the first, if not the first,
link between Islam and food that they would bring up.996 Furthermore, because of this focus on
taking the identity of practicing Muslim to the next level, many of my informants had become
obsessive ingredient verifiers, making sure that every single ingredient in every single product
they purchased was halal. They became the community of “ingredient checkers” in a world
surrounded by those laissez-faire shoppers who throw anything in their cart:
On a un problème de lire les ingrédients. Quand on est sur un rayon, on trouve des gens
qui prennent les produits et les jettent dans le chariot. Nous, il faut les lire. S’il y a de la
gélatine, s’il y a des produits qui sont péchés, alors c’est normal. Parce que la gélatine
c’est la peau du porc qui se transforme en forme gélatine pour donner cette forme aux ice
creams, aux yogourts pour lui donner cette forme, pour ne pas que ça se fende. Mais en
réalité, c’est très déconseillé pour la santé.997
Whereas in a place like France the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a
contested practice as to distinguish a specific identity, it was almost as if, in Canada, my
informants needed something even finer with which to identify themselves, something more
distinct to draw the line between “us” and “them.”998

995

130430_004—“Yes, only halal meat, and we do not eat yoghurt with gelatin. There are people who say, ok it’s
only a small percentage. But even that, that comes from pork, and so we do not eat things where we find gelatin
for example. Because this time it’s a small quantity, the next time we will say: O.k, for gelatin there is no problem,
why don’t we try something else. So it is better to buy what is halal.”
996
130430_005; 130505_001; 130519_001; 130520_001; 130529_003; 130615_003.
997
130615_001—“We have a problem of reading ingredients. When we are in an aisle, we find people who take
products and throw them in their shopping cart. For us, we must read. If there is gelatin, if there are products that
are forbidden, so it’s normal. Because gelatin is pig skin that they transform into gelatin to give this form to ice
cream, to yogurt to give it this form, so that it doesn’t split. But in reality it is highly discouraged for one’s health.”
998
This directly challenges Phillip Connor’s conclusions about the effect of welcoming versus less-welcoming
contexts of reception on the religious outcomes of Muslim immigrants in his work Immigrant Faith. I will return to
this in Chapter 9 when I address Connor’s findings in more depth.
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7.2.5 Classifying “Us” Against “Them” as a Means of Identity Construction
Ultimately, whether one claimed Canadian, Maghrébine or Muslim identity (and often all three),
food played a significant role in defining what it meant to be any of these given identities. This is
because the process of identity formation is grounded in a basic need to categorize oneself and
the people around oneself into groupings of “us” and “them.” As I have argued previously, this
form of othering often works itself out through food; food serves a dual function of solidarity and
separation.999 This was very obviously the case in Montréal. My informants spoke about the
differences between themselves and the non-Maghrébine/Muslim Québécois(es) who surrounded
them in food practice. They posited that barriers or boundaries between the groups were made
obvious in food preferences and practices. Finally, on the positive side of the spectrum, they
spoke about the ability of food to bridge the gap between “us” and “them” and allow for a deeper
level of connection and understanding between the various identity groups.
7.2.5.1 “We” eat differently than “they” do: Food as Distinguishing Symbol
As I discussed in the previous section, the kinds of foods that one eats often mark one off as a
member of a particular group and not another; they mark who is a part of the collective “we.”
My informants gave many examples of things that they did or did not consume as examples of
opposition to the things that non-Muslim Québécois(es) may eat. Furthermore, this process of
“othering” through food was also prevalent among the non-Muslim Québécois(es), at least
according to my informants.
One informant explained an anecdote to me that reveals this possible separation of “us”
and “them” via what people eat. He spoke about the fact that when the word “halal” is placed on
a storefront it pretty much automatically prevents non-Muslims from entering the store. He
suggested that Québécois(es) do not actually understand what halal refers to. They think that
they cannot eat halal meat, that it is “not for them.” He said that, moreover, when non-Muslim
Québécois(es) enter a halal butcher shop they feel out of place because the other people in the
store often let them go ahead of them and watch what they purchase, etcetera. Although they do

999

Anderson, Everyone Eats, 125; Fischler, “Commensality,” 529; Harvey, “Respectfully Eating,” 39-40; Sutton,
Remembrance of Repasts, 5.
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this out of hospitality and curiosity, it often leaves the non-Muslim customer feeling awkward
and out of place, and reinforces the notion that halal butcher shops are only for Muslims.1000
Alongside the consumption of “our meat,” the abstention from pork and alcohol are the
most commonly cited examples of the food practices that are appropriate for “us” but not
“them.” These examples are well documented above and will be further discussed below, but
what is significant here is that my informants went further than the question of “what do ‘we’
eat?” to the question of “how do ‘we’ eat?” in an effort to distinguish Maghrébine Muslim
identity from the majority non-Muslim Québécois identity surrounding them. In this effort, five
differences in “how” one eats were brought to the fore.
First, in comparison to “them” many of my informants spoke of the fact that “we” do not
eat to excess.
Ils nous conseillent de ne pas manger, sauf si on a faim, et quand on mange de ne pas
manger jusqu’à en avoir mal au ventre. C’est-à-dire, manger jusqu’à s’assouvir, donc
manger juste ce que l’on a devant nous et ne pas manger plus qu’il en faut. On ne mange
pas sauf si on a faim, et quand on mange il ne faut pas en abuser.1001
This was an important distinguishing factor mentioned by many of my informants that was
grounded in both cultural practice and religious conviction. I had multiple informants explain to
me that part of “being Muslim” was to not eat to excess, and in fact there was a formula to make
sure that one respected this distinguishing factor. That formula was that one should consider the
stomach as broken into three parts: one for liquid, one for food and one for air. One should never
overfill the part that is reserved for food because then one would be taking away from the
essential space for the other two.1002 This way of eating was not only a strictly cultural practice
but was given more weight by being tied to a saying of the Prophet.1003
Par exemple, le Prophète Muhammad, que la paix et le salut soient sur lui, a dit: Il y a pas
pire réservoir à remplir que l’estomac. Donc, il faut éviter de trop manger. Mais si
quelqu’un ne peut pas, au moins qu’il varie entre un tiers de nourriture, un tiers de l’air et
1000

Personal correspondence with researcher, Field Journal, Feb 22, 2013.
130517_002—“They counsel us to not eat unless we are hungry, and when we eat to not eat to the point
where we have stomach pain. That means, to eat just until one is satisfied, so to eat just what is in front of us and
to not eat more than we need. We do not eat unless we are hungry, and when we eat one must not abuse it.”
Other informants who also stressed “not eating too much”: 130520_001; 130529_003.
1002
130430_002; 130501_001; 130615_003.
1003
Specifically, there’s a hadith that states: “I heard the Messenger of Allah say: ‘A human being fills no worse
vessel than his stomach. It is sufficient for a human being to eat a few mouthfuls to keep his spine straight. But if
he must [fill it], then one third of food, one third for drink, and one third for air” (Ibn Majah, Book 29, 3349, as
found at http://sunnah.com/urn/1274570).
1001
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un tiers de liquide. Parce que ça remplit plus rapidement avec le liquide… des trucs
comme ça.1004
The formula for guaranteeing that one can maintain this vital practice is laid out by the Prophet
and thus is given great emphasis as a distinguishing mark for those who belong to this insider
group.
This was not the only way of eating that Muhammad emphasized, according to my
informants. Another prophetic injunction that many of my informants mentioned, and the second
difference in “ways of eating” that was mentioned by my informants, was the fact that, “unlike
‘they,’ who can eat with any hand they desire, ‘we’ should only eat with our right hand.”1005 For
example,
Oui, la façon de manger: vous, par exemple, vous mangez [et] vous n’avez pas de
problème à manger avec la main gauche. Nous, on mange avec la main droite. Même
avec les fourchettes on doit manger avec la main droite. (Il rit.) C’est très important pour
nous.1006
This informant, like many others, clearly uses the “we” and “they” language when speaking
about his food habits. He is quick to mention that these practices are “important for us,”
insinuating that there is a “them” for whom they are not important. Identity comes through
comparison.
A third distinguishing way of eating, which has grounding in the Quran, is an emphasis
on not wasting food.1007 The importance of “ne pas gaspiller” (to not waste) was mentioned
throughout the interviews. The practice of “not wasting” became prevalent for my informants in
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130807_001—“For example, the Prophet Muhammad, peace and salvation be upon him, said: there is no
worse tank to fill than the stomach. Thus, one must avoid eating too much, but if one cannot, at least he should
vary between one third of food, one third of air and one third of liquid. Because that fills more quickly with liquid,
stuff like that.”
1005
This may be related to hadith that state that Muhammad ate with the three fingers of his right hand, and
commanded others to do so as well. One of these hadith states: “When any of you intends to eat [meal], he should
eat with his right hand, and when he [intends] to drink he should drink with his right hand, for Satan eats with his
left hand and drinks with his left hand” (Sahih Muslim, 2020, as found at http://sunnah.com/muslim/36/139).
1006
130430_006—“Yes, the way of eating: you for example, when you eat you do not have an issue with eating
with the left hand. Us, we eat with the right hand. Even with forks we must eat with the right hand. [He laughs].
That’s very important for us.” This distinction was also clearly mentioned by 130731_002.
1007
Specifically, the verses which state: “It is He who has produced gardens, both trellised and untrellised, and date
palms and field crops, all varying in taste, and the olive and the pomegranate, both similar and dissimilar. Eat their
fruits when they bear fruit and give away what is due of them on the day of their harvest. Do not waste anything.
He does not love the wasteful” (6:141); “O Children of Adam, dress yourself properly whenever you are at worship:
and eat and drink but do not be wasteful: God does not like wasteful people” (The Quran, 7:31).
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the Canadian context where people waste food often and in large quantities, according to my
informants. The ease with which Canadians ignored the essential practice of avoiding waste was
sometimes attributed to the fact that in Canada there was not the same level of poverty as other
places in the world. One informant explained that, in Islam,
il est interdit de gaspiller. On tient à toujours avoir en tête qu’il y a des êtres humains qui
meurent de faim. Puisque l’on est dans cette abondance, surtout ici au Canada, on mange
mais on ne doit pas oublier qu’il y a d’autres gens, pour ne pas gaspiller.1008
In comparison to those who may, in the presence of abundance, ignore the fact that there are
those who do not have food, Muslims do not forget this fact. This relationship with food is such
an essential element of one’s food practice that one could be judged if one did not uphold it.1009
Even if there was not a specific prophetic injunction against wasting food, many of my
informants still saw this as an essential food practice that separated them, that marked them as
Muslim, in a context where “others” behave differently—or so they imagine. Note that the
comparison that is drawn here is not value neutral, i.e. it’s not “we do this and they do that,” but
“we are more careful with our food and they are less careful.” The “they” is generalized and the
“we” is idealized.
The next “way of eating”—the fourth in my sequence here—that was argued to be
different for my informants is the practice of eating communally. This could mean simply an
emphasis on eating as a community, on sharing food, but it could also mean specifically the kind
of plate on which a meal is served. Eating from communal plates is seen as essential to building
feelings of closeness and bonding within the group, and is a totally different approach than one
may find in the “modern world.” For example, one middle-aged man suggested that this practice
is an essential differentiating practice for his community. He said: “Il y a aussi comme des
normes—toujours en se référant à l’Islam. Par exemple, quand on mange dans un seul plat, [une]
chose que l’on trouve rarement ici avec la civilisation moderne [où] chacun mange dans son
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130430_002—“It is forbidden to waste. We have to try to always have in our minds that there are people who
die of hunger. Since we are in this abundance, especially here in Canada, we eat but we must not forget that there
are other people, so we do not waste.” The importance of not wasting food was also mentioned by 130430_004.
1009
130615_003—“Parce qu’on est vraiment jugé pour ça. Si toi tu manges et le restant tu le jettes dans la
poubelle et puis y a un autre, même s’il n’est pas à coté de toi mais y a un autre qui meurt de faim, tu es jugé pour
ça. Parce que c’est quand même la responsabilité de chaque personne de penser aux autres aussi. C’est vraiment
au niveau de l’Islam.”
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plat.”1010 This practice was not just a culturally specific practice in the mind of some of my
informants, but also one that was seen as essential in Islam.1011 I had other informants explain to
me the importance of communal eating, as most ideally represented by eating from one plate, in
the many meals that I shared with members of the community. The feeling of “partager”
(sharing) is given a visceral aspect around the communal plate.1012 Here we see a North African
cultural practice being universalized to Islam.
The final—and fifth—“way of eating” that my informants explained to me as
differentiating them from others was strictly modern and cultural, although often based on
religious obligations. The practice of eating at restaurants, or rather, not eating at restaurants, was
a significant marker of difference for the community that I was studying. The discourse of “for
‘you’ it is not an issue but for ‘us’ it is” was prevalent in this regard. For example, one informant
explained this difference as follows:
On se prive de plusieurs choses…pour vous c’est une activité d’aller au restaurant, d’aller
je ne sais pas, c’est normal pour vous de passer par la route et de passer par McDonald et
prendre un hamburger. Pour nous, on n’y pense même pas. Donc pour manger, soit on
prépare à la maison soit on doit chercher les restaurants qui font de la viande halal. Ça
fait un peu “mind working.”1013
The inability to go to a non-halal restaurant is just one of the reasons why “restaurant-going” was
used as a mark of distinction between my informants and the larger “you” of the non-Muslim
Québécois group that they envisioned around them. Another reason was simply that if one went
to a restaurant, specifically a non-halal restaurant, there would be things that one could not eat
and this would make one feel alienated from the group. Therefore, it was not a worthwhile
experience for them.1014 Whatever the case, this inability to eat at the same place as certain
“others” was another means of distinguishing those who were in the group from those who were
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130430_002—“There are also standards, as always, with reference to Islam. For example, when we eat from
one plate, something we find rarely here, with modern civilization, each person eats from his own plate.”
1011
Perhaps finding its significance in Hadith such as “The messenger of Allah said: ‘Eat together and do not eat
separately, for the blessing is in being together” (Ibn Majah, 3287, as found on http://sunnah.com/urn/1273950)
1012
Participant Observation, July 13, 2013.
1013
130615_002—“We deprive ourselves of many things…for you it’s an activity to go to a restaurant, to go, I don’t
know, it’s normal for you to go along the road and to pass by McDonald’s and to get a hamburger. For us, we don’t
even think about it. So, for eating, we either prepare at home or we have to search for the restaurants that use
halal meat. That makes a bit of ‘mind working.’”
1014
130807_001.
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outside of the group; it was one of the clear examples of barriers between “us” and “them” that
many of my informants felt.
These barriers, or boundaries, between “us” and “them” as evidenced not only by what,
but where and how, one eats were one clear realm where my informants professed some tension
between their identity group and those that surrounded them. Whether one could go to a
restaurant was just one example of these subtle boundaries that were in place. While a meal out
at a restaurant was easy enough to avoid for many of my informants, meals shared together at
school or at work made the difference more prominent.
C’est vrai. Des fois quand on est dans des, par exemples, dans les universités et il y a
comme un dîner communautaire, c’est vrai, des fois je sens une grande gêne. C’est pas
que je sens de la pression mais c’est une pression comme indirecte. C’est parce que tout
le monde est content, tout le monde a ramené un plat, et pour demander à l’autre “je
m’excuse, mais qu’est-ce que tu as mis dans le plat?”… c’est pas tout le monde qui
comprend ça. Alors ici, c’est vrai, ici … j’essaie d’éviter ce type de situation, sauf si la
personne elle est déjà consciente que nous, on [ne] mange pas [ça]…oui ça je vais
manger, mais si je ne suis pas sûr, non, je ne le mange pas. C’est parce qu’en même
temps j’ai peur de brimer la personne qui est avec moi, “Ah qu’est-ce que tu as
fait?”…j’aimerais pas poser ce genre de question, mais ça c’est difficile.1015
One’s food practices may affect the kinds of social interactions one has and affect one’s group
involvement and identification. “They” are the ones who can go to a potluck at school or work,
whereas “we” are the ones who cannot. “They” are the ones who can eat at anyone’s house, “we”
are the ones who cannot. Another informant explained,
par exemple, le fait que je ne peux pas manger de porc, le fait que je ne peux pas manger
de viande qui n’est pas certifiée halal, ça me bloque. Je ne peux pas m’inviter, je ne peux
pas manger chez eux...je n’irais pas manger, c’est sûr.1016
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130424_001—“It’s true. There are times where we are, for example, at a university and there is like a
communal dinner, it’s true, sometimes I feel a great discomfort, and it’s not that I feel pressure but it’s an indirect
pressure. It’s because everyone is happy, everyone brings a dish. Then to ask the other: ‘Pardon me, but what did
you put in the dish?’ … because not everyone understands that. So here, it’s true, … I try to avoid that kind of
situation unless the person is already aware that we do not eat [certain foods]…yes then I will eat but if I am not
sure, no, I will not eat. It’s because, at the same time I am afraid of insulting the person who is with me, ‘What did
you do?’…I would prefer not to pose this kind of question but it is difficult.”
1016
130430_005—“For example, the fact that I cannot eat pork, the fact that I cannot eat meat that isn’t certified
halal, that blocks me. I cannot be invited, I cannot go eat at their house…I will not go eat that is certain.”
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While my informants would invite me in to their homes for meals,1017 helping me to bridge the
boundary between “us” and “them,” the fact that they felt that they could not go and eat at a nonMuslim’s home was a boundary marking behaviour.
It is not simply a matter of feeling like one cannot eat, or does not want to ask the
question and make the situation awkward, but it is also a matter of feeling that people may be
presenting a subtle notion of what it means to identify with a certain identity by what is the
offering on the table.
Ça, je l’ai remarqué une fois. A mon lieu de travail, il y avait le party de Noël et ils ont
voulu organiser un dîner de Noël dans un restaurant. On était dans les services 4 ou 5
musulmans. On avait de la difficulté. Finalement on n’est pas allé. Mais ça faisait partie
du menu, l’alcool…et c’est comme s’ils essayaient d’imposer leurs idées.1018
According to this informant, by eating in places with particular menu items, the organizers of the
event may be presenting ideas about who they are and who one is expected to be to be a part of
the group: “eat/drink this and you are one of ‘us.’” Having frequently been on the other side of
this equation (the “them”), it is fair to say that non-Muslim Canadians rarely if ever determine
menus to deliberately exclude others; exclusion rather comes typically through carelessness,
compounded by ignorance of how deeply food issues can matter to those in the minority (halal,
kosher, vegan, vegetarian, gluten-free, diabetic, etc.). This reality, however, is perceived
differently by my informants.
Overall, my informants went further than the traditional Muslim food practices when
distinguishing what made them different from others in relationship to food, so that it was not
only a matter of what one ate, but how.1019 In this, they presented five different “ways of eating”
between their group and the imagined “other.” My informants suggested that “we” are different
from “them” because “we” (1) do not eat to excess, (2) only eat with our right hand, (3) do not
waste food, (4) eat communally and (5) do not eat at restaurants. These were barriers that were in
place, whether real or imagined, between “us” and “them.”
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Unlike in Paris where I only shared meals with five of my informants in their homes, in Montréal I was invited
to share food in 22 of my 32 informants’ homes (68.75%).
1018
130520_001—“That I noticed one time. At my place of work, there was a Christmas party and they wanted to
organize a Christmas dinner in a restaurant. We were 4 or 5 Muslims in the service. We had difficulty and in the
end we did not go. But that was part of the menu, alcohol…and it was as if they were trying to impose their ideas.”
1019
Douglas, “Deciphering,” 66; Fischler, “Commensality,” 529; Harvey, “Respectfully Eating,” 39-40; Sutton,
Remembrance of Repasts, 5.
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7.2.5.2 Food as Bridge Between “Us” and “Them”
The idea that food places boundaries or barriers between “us” and “them” was countered by the
idea that it could also be a bridging element for those very boundaries.1020 I had informants
suggest that, in fact, “they” were sympathetic of “our” foodways. Unlike some of the previous
informants, who suggested that there was a boundary between “us” and “them” because they
could not go to a restaurant together, that their approach to restaurant eating was different than
other, more dominant approaches in Montréal, there were also informants who suggested that
eating together was a common practice in Montréal. This was the case because “they”
understood “us,” “they” were accepting of “us.”1021 The meeting of cultures, of different groups,
can occur over food. There may be two separate groups, and what or how they eat may define
these groups to some extent, but this difference can also be a point of entry, a place where
meeting can occur. As Fischler argues, commensality “counteracts the essential, basic,
biological, ‘exclusive selfishness of eating’ and turns it into, at the very least, a collective, social
experience.”1022 In fact, he posits that eating together creates bonding, a bonding that is possible
because it promotes equality among commensals.1023
This is particularly true in Montréal, where curiosity and openness toward the other is
common. For example, one informant explained to me the bridging power of food and its
prevalence in Montréal:
Ici au Québec, les deux cultures sont en train de se chevaucher, et c’est très bien. Il y a
pas mal de point commun. Quand on découvre de plus en plus les Québécois, on
commence, je ne dirais pas à les aimer mais à les apprécier…Et honnêtement, je les
apprécie maintenant dans leurs… même dans leurs habitudes. Parfois, au début, je
trouvais que c’était anormal qu’ils fassent ceci ou cela mais avec le temps je commence à
les connaître. Et je pense qu’eux aussi commencent à nous connaître sur nos traditions,
1020

It is important to note that these binaries between “us” and “them” are imagined and not real. There are many
different non-Muslim subgroups, especially in a context such as intercultural Québec, which have various ways of
addressing the question of who eats what and with whom? Many of these binary statements serve a larger
psychological role than a real means of distinguishing between groups.
1021
130517_001—“Je n’ai jamais trouvé de tension, je n’ai jamais trouvé de problèmes. J’ai plusieurs amis
québécois et quand ils sortent faire une fête, ils savent que je ne bois pas; donc ils respectent vraiment mon choix.
Quand on va dans un restaurant, ils savent qu’ils ne doivent pas me commander du porc ou de la viande. Ils me
considèrent végétarienne. Ils savent que c’est du poisson ou du poulet, un plat végétarien. Je n’ai jamais trouvé
qu’il a des tensions.” (I have never found tensions, I never found problems. I have many Québécois friends and
when they go out to celebrate, they know that I do not drink, so they respect my choice. When we go to a
restaurant, they know that they should not order me pork or meat. They consider me vegetarian. They know that it
is fish or chicken, a vegetarian dish. I never found that there are tensions.)
1022
Fischler, “Commensality,” 531.
1023
Ibid., 534.
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nos plats, etc. C’est de bons augures. Et enfin je pense que la nourriture est l’un des
vecteurs qui peut tisser un lien fort entre des populations, parce que dans la culture, d’une
façon générale, la nourriture est un élément essentiel, très important.1024
For this informant, and others like him, food is one of the essential tools for building bridges
over the boundaries that are placed between communities. It is through sharing food that bonds
are created, between groups rather than within groups at the expense of excluding the “other.” As
another informant explained to me when presenting the centrality of food,
parfois on ne comprend pas ce que dit l’autre, mais on mange avec lui; donc on
commence à comprendre. Et chez nous, du point de vue culture, quand tu manges avec
quelqu’un, c’est partager son repas, il devient presque un frère pour nous.1025
This informant suggests that while there are two different groups present in this sort of exchange,
eating together breaks down some of the barriers between these groups. Food becomes an access
point to “them.”1026
While this access to the “other” through food is a possibility in any setting, it is
particularly successful in a place such as Québec/Canada where a national food culture is not as
restricted as a place such as France. Québécois(es)/Canadians are seen as particularly good at
approaching the other through food because “we” do not have our own, distinct food culture that
we are trying to protect.1027 One informant told me the following story as an example of this fact.
Il y avait un monsieur et deux femmes. Ils ont avoué ça. Ils ont dit: “le plus beau en nous,
c’est que l’on a accepté les autres cuisines et on a goûté de tout.”...Après, je leur ai dit
“moi j’en connais rien de votre cuisine” et ils m’ont dit, “nous, on n’a pas grand-chose.”
(Elle rigole.) C’est ça qu’ils m’ont dit. “Notre cuisine ça ne goûte rien. C’est ça la cuisine
1024

130517_002—“Here in Québec, the two cultures are in the process of overlapping and that is really good.
There are many common points. When we discover more and more the Québécois(es), we begin, I won’t say liking
them, but appreciating them…and honestly, I appreciate them now in their… even in their habits. Sometimes early
on, I found it abnormal that they did this or that but with time I begin to know them. And I think that they as well
begin to know us through our traditions, our dishes, etc. It’s good omens. And in the end I think that food is one of
the vectors that can build a strong bond between populations. Because in culture, in a general sense, food is an
essential element, very important.”
1025
130727_001—“Sometimes we do not understand what the other said but we eat with him and we begin to
understand. And for us, from a cultural point of view, when you eat with someone, it’s sharing his meal, he
becomes almost like a brother for us.”
1026
“Pour approcher, il découvre des choses qu’il n’a pas goûté avant et comme ça, ça donne l’occasion à des
discussions, pour s’ouvrir sur des autres cultures, sur des autres idées, sur des autres religions. C’est comme une
occasion” (130612_001).
1027
Many Québécois(es) would argue that Québec does have more of a food culture than the rest of Canada. Using
foods such as poutine, pate chinois, the food at the cabin au sucre (tarte au sucre, baked beans, pork dishes),
tourtieres, smoked meat, Montréal-style bagels, St-Hubert rotisserie chicken, pouding chomeur, etcetera, as
examples.
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canadienne, elle ne goûte rien. Heureusement que l’on a ça, on a accueilli les autres
cultures. Donc on a goûté de tout.”1028
Embedded in this response is stereotypical Canadian humility (“our food is tasteless compared to
yours”) and openness to other tastes, but the response clearly pleased this informant, who felt
that his food traditions were honoured—needed, even, to enrich the broader culture. It might be
“their” food, but in light of Canadian multiculturalism it becomes a part of “our” identity. This is
reminiscent of Fischler’s statement that “if eating a food makes one become more like that food,
then those sharing the same food become more like each other.”1029 The Canadian/Québécois(e)
may integrate “their” food practices as a means of understanding the Canadian/ Québécois “us.”
As a result, this lack of concern for protecting a type of food culture allows for a protection of
the food cultures of the “other.”
Many of my informants consequently told anecdotal stories of non-Muslim
Québécois(es) going out of their way to make sure that they would have cultural and religiously
appropriate food to eat, thus allowing them to continue their abundant food practices from back
home.1030 This consequently served as one effective means of maintaining their transnational
identities.
7.3 A Split Centre of Gravity: Navigating Transnational Belonging for Maghrébine Muslim
Immigrants in Montréal
Although I have discussed the various identities that my Montréal informants hold separately
above, these numerous identities interact as a part of my informants’ overarching transnational
identity. Before addressing the transnational identities and practices of my informants in
Montréal, specifically their transnational food practices, I would like to briefly address my use of
transnationalism here. First, as I discussed in Chapter 4, I take Vertovec’s definition of
transnationalism as the base of my own understanding of the term so that transnationalism
1028

130703_004—“There was a man and two women. They confessed just that. They said ‘the most beautiful thing
about us is that we accept other cuisines and we taste everything.’ …After I said to them ‘I myself do not know
anything about your cuisine’ and they said to me, ‘we do not have much.’ (She laughs.) That’s what they told me.
‘Our cuisine tastes of nothing. That is Canadian cuisine, it tastes of nothing. Luckily we have that [the fact], we
welcome other cultures. So we have tried everything.’”
1029
Fischler, “Commensality,” 533.
1030
130518_001; 130615_002; 130731_002.
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encompasses “sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social
formations spanning nation-states”1031 I would like to develop this further, and discuss why I use
transnational instead of diaspora in this context. Vertovec describes how “diaspora” can refer to
three things: “(a) the process of becoming scattered, (b) the community living in foreign parts, or
(c) the place or geographic space in which the dispersed groups live.”1032 For the purposes of my
exploration below, I am using Vertovec’s second definition of diaspora.
When trying to determine whether a group should be labeled as transnational or diasporic
the principal orientating question that I ask is “Where is the identity’s centre of gravity?”1033 In
considering this question, I would argue that individuals and groups who profess a strong
longing for home, with their identifying centre of gravity firmly located in the homeland, are
individuals and groups on which one can place the identity of “diasporic.” On the other hand,
transnational individuals and groups have a comfort with many homes, moving between those
homes (whether physically or psychologically) with none necessarily claiming one’s identity
more than the other. While there was some presence of the “myth of return” in my informants’
experiences (one informant explained to me that many Maghrébines keep houses in the Maghreb
even though no one lives there,1034 or some profess a desire to retire in the Maghreb1035), most
were quite comfortable in their Canadian home, while still feeling as though they were connected
to a “home” at a distance. Their feet were firmly placed on either side of the transnational fence,
with their identity strongly placed in both the Maghreb and Canada. Canada had become “home”
but the Maghreb (whether Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia) was still their orientating
“homeland.”1036 In agreement with Peggy Levitt, I see transnational migrants as “individuals
1031

Vertovec, Transnationalism, 2.
Vertovec, Transnationalism, 130.
1033
Parts of this section are published in Rachel Brown, “Bread Beyond Borders: Food as a Lens into Thomas
Tweed’s Theory of Religion,” Bulletin for the Study of Religion (forthcoming 2017).
1034
Personal correspondence with the researcher, April 1, 2013.
1035
Personal correspondence with the researcher, March 1, 2013.
1036
For some the homeland was specific to one of the countries of the Maghreb, but for others, all three countries
acted as an orientating homeland. In a context such as Canada, where the distance between homeland and hostland is large, similar regional identities can begin to act as national bonding factors. For example, in Paris there are
large communities of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian immigrants and as a result in that context one can easily
maintain a specific national identity; the immigrant is surrounded by enough of his national compatriots to solidly
support his national identity. In Montréal, on the other hand, the Maghrébine community is much more interlaced,
with regional Maghrébine identity sometimes taking on more importance in one’s transnational practice. Following
from this regional identity, the Algerian immigrant can make not only an Algerian dish to feel connected to the
homeland but also a Moroccan dish. His identity’s centre of gravity is in Canada, Algeria and more broadly the
Maghreb.
1032
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who live aspects of their social, economic and political lives in at least two settings.”1037 Another
essential reason why I have chosen the word “transnational” and not “diasporic” to describe the
Maghrébine Muslim community in Montréal is simply because of the self-understanding of my
informants. I would argue that most of my informants, and the people with whom I interacted
more generally in my field work, would not see themselves as part of a diasporic community
(they are not praying “next year in Algiers”). Instead they were comfortable with the fluid
movement between various identities and places that is essential to transnational identity.1038
7.3.1 The Many Means of Bridging the Gap Between Homeland and Host-land
While my informants move between both homeland and host-land, there is still a gap both
physically and psychologically that must be bridged. There are various ways that this gap is
traversed. Before exploring the role of food in the transnational agenda, I briefly explain how my
informants bridge this gap.1039 While in France the need to recreate homeland in host-land was
less prevalent, because of the closer distance of France to the Maghreb and frequent trips back
“home” this need was much greater in Montréal. In Québec, where distances are much farther
than between France and the Maghreb in terms of space, climate and culture, the transnational
effort is much more important and deliberate. Canada seems more foreign, not having a colonial
relationship to the Maghreb, and there is less overlap in culture and experience, making the two
sides of the transnational land that the immigrant straddles quite distinct. Because of this, the
action that the individual or group must take to bridge the two sides of one’s transnational
identity may be much more deliberate than consequential in Montréal. Levitt posits that one
deliberate way that that migrants maintain connection to their sending communities via religion
is to “engage in informal, popular religious practices that affirm their continued attachments to a
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Levitt, “You know, Abraham,” 850.
Levitt posits that diasporic studies tend “to treat migrant and nonmigrant religious life as discrete entities
rather than as occurring within the same transnational social field and influencing each other” (Levitt, “You know,
Abraham,” 848). Because I focus specifically on the migrant’s religious life in his/her host context, Levitt would
most likely argue that I am in fact conducting diasporic studies and not transnational studies.
1039
I already mentioned the “myth of return” above. This means of staying connected to the homeland, with an
ideal of returning one day, is a powerful means to cross the psychological boundary between homeland and hostland. The transnational migrant may not be able to physically bridge the large gap between the Maghreb and
Montréal, but envisioning a “one day” where they may be able to do so helps him/her to feel connected to that
homeland in the here and now. Even if one hopes to retire in the Maghreb, there is also a strong sense that one
will stay in Canada, and this desire to “return home” is more a psychological trope than an actual plan (Personal
correspondence with the researcher, Field Journal, April 1, 2013).
1038
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particular sending-country group or place.”1040 These informal actions take on an important role
in the migrant experience.
One of these deliberate actions that many of informants took in Montréal was to organize
and construct their living spaces in ways reminiscent of their living spaces in the Maghreb. One
evening during a meal with an informant she explained what houses in the Maghreb are like and
proceeded to tell me how immigrants set up their homes in the host-land as a result. She
explained that Maghrébines like to have all the rooms closed off from one another. Most
importantly they like a closed kitchen, which proves difficult in Canada where people like open
concept home spaces. They do not like having a living room that you enter directly from the
front door. In her apartment for example, they made the dining room the living room so that
people could come in the front door and not necessarily see the people in the living room. They
also had a curtain hung up in the doorway between the kitchen and the “living room” so that
those two rooms felt separate.1041 I had noted on previous occasions during my fieldwork that
many of my informants had set up their living rooms with multiple couches, often with elaborate
Moroccan style furniture.1042 I had noticed this fact so often that I wrote the following in my field
journal:
We also spent a long time talking about the new living room that they would be installing
in the next couple of weeks. They live in a very normal Canadian split-level house, but
are going to transform the living room to a traditional Moroccan living room and the
pride and excitement for this task was evident. They are having traditional Moroccan
couches built along with matching tables and all of the cushions and tapestries will
match. At another’s house on Saturday I also noticed that her living room seemed very
traditional and was told that it was very Moroccan. Again, as I have noted before, most
Maghrébine living rooms look well suited to host a large amount of people. It is clear that
receiving guests is incredibly important in their culture. This informant who was building
her new living room was pleased that she would have a traditional living room for
Ramadan this year and has invited me back to see it when it is done and to celebrate with
them.1043
As I noted in this field journal entry, my informants lived in “very normal Canadian” homes, and
yet when one walked in to the home one was transported to another land, to the Maghreb and the
“homeland.” This home structure became so clear that I was able to start identifying someone’s
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Levitt, “You know, Abraham,” 851.
Participant observation, Field Journal, May 20, 2013.
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Participant observation, Field Journal, May 18, 2013.
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Field journal, May 19, 2013.
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cultural background before I even knew from where he or she had come. For example, one
afternoon I went to interview an informant on my own (without my usual Maghrébine hostess)
and immediately identified the living room set up. As soon as I entered the living room space I
got my first hint that the woman I was meeting with was Moroccan. I did not know her
nationality before arriving at her house, and could not tell by the look of the apartment, but as
soon as I saw the living room it was clear. There were multiple couches/beds lining all the walls
of the living room, creating a mini amphitheatre of seating and extra sleeping space. There were
elaborate, colourful, and Mediterranean style couch coverings, pillows and drapes, which all
matched. The table was decorated with a tray on which was a traditional Moroccan tea pot and
tea glasses. I expressed how much I enjoyed the Moroccan style living room, and she seemed
impressed that I even noticed or would know what it meant. For her it was a sense of pride, but a
fact not normally noticed by an “outsider.”1044 By structuring their outwardly appearing
Canadian homes in inward Maghrébine ways, these informants took deliberate steps to connect
with the homeland in real and tangible ways.
7.3.2 Food as Transnational Bridge
While some of the transnational efforts touch on the tangible, others address subtler ways of
connecting to one’s homeland. Ultimately, the role of memory in transnational practice is
essential for those who live at a distance too large to bridge physically. As argued by Sutton, it is
through memory that one accesses the past and imagines oneself in relation to that past.1045 The
process of making those memories come to life is another way that my informants connect to the
homeland. This process is essential for “remembering” where one came from, without which one
may feel lost and confused. As one informant explained to me, “après je peux vous dire que
quelqu’un qui ne tiens pas à sa culture, à ses normes, les normes de son pays, tu le trouves un
petit peu perdu. Il faut garder cette culture-là. Il faut être fier d’elle. Tu es fier d’avoir une culture
comme ça.”1046

1044

Participant observation, Field Journal, May 29, 2013.
Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts.
1046
130518_001—“After, I can tell you that a person who does not hold on to his culture, his norms, the norms of
his country, you will find him a bit lost. One must guard that culture. One must be proud of it. You are proud to
have a culture like that.”
1045
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This feeling of being lost often comes from the fact that one feels far from one’s origins
when one does not engage in memory-accessing practices. For one informant, this was
noticeable specifically through what she ate or did not eat. For her, “c’est important pour moi
parce que l’on a grandi en consommant les plats marocains. Si parfois je ne mange pas un plat
marocain, je me sens comme si je suis éloigné de mon origine.”1047 Ultimately, attachment to the
homeland is often done through memory and food plays important role in memory making and
recall.1048
For many, memories of the homeland are tied to and evoked by foods and smells,
because, “c’est des odeurs qui ramènent des souvenirs.”1049 According to one informant,
accessing memories, whether through food or some other means, is an essential aspect of the
immigrant experience. While all people need this access to their homeland, she argues, “certaines
personnes ont besoin de se retrouver dans leur communauté” in order to find that “d’autres
personnes comme moi se contentent d’épices.”1050 Engaging in certain food practices, making
particular dishes, seasoning with specific spices, gathering around a table that is set in a
particular way, in a kitchen that is set up like it would be in the homeland, are all means of
accessing “home” for the Maghrébine immigrant in Montréal. These practices traverse time and
space, recreating places and times for the people engaged in them.
I remember one afternoon going to an informant’s home for an interview and lunch, and
her explaining this experience to me. She explained that many of the dishes we were enjoying
(chorba, saffron chicken, tajine) were dishes common for Ramadan and so lunch would take us
back to Ramadan. She reflected the conclusion that Sutton posits, that referencing and using
specific foods “has the effect of placing one in time.”1051 When she sat and smelled the chorba in
front of her and looked at the tajine across the table she commented that she was being taken
back in time and place to Algeria during Ramadan.1052 For many informants, like this woman,
using food to access memory was a way of recreating “home” in one’s current “home,” i.e. the
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130615_002—“It’s important for me because we grew up eating Moroccan dishes. If sometimes I do not eat a
Moroccan dish, I feel as though I am away from my home/origin.”
1048
Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts, 2, 74, 89, 100-101.
1049
130501_001—“It’s scents that bring memories.”
1050
130706_001—“Certain people need to be in their community”…other people like me, simply spice.”
1051
Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts, 28.
1052
Participant observation, Field Journal, May 2, 2013.
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host-land. In fact, she noted, one feels like “home” when one cooks and enjoys food from the
homeland.
C’est ça, je trouve que ma mère, quand elle fait les plats traditionnels, ça nous touche
parce que c’est vraiment notre enfance. C’est la nourriture que l’on a connue quand on
était jeune. On n’allait pas dans les restaurants. Quand j’avais 5, 6 ans, je n’allais pas
dans les restaurants comme je vais maintenant, donc je n’avais pas accès à une grande
variété. C’est pour ça que maintenant j’en mange. C’est vraiment quelque chose qui me
touche.1053
For this women and other informants like her, by making the home food “on se sent comme si on
était dans notre pays,”1054 “on se sent chez soi.”1055 The power of food to traverse boundaries is
so strong that some even use food as a means to escape the realities of the Canadian context. To
feel nostalgia for the homeland, and even to flee winter (“évader l’hiver”) and evoke the summer
of the Maghreb, informants make dishes from back home to figuratively leave the reality of
Canada behind for the dream of the warm homeland.
As a result, people eat the food from the homeland in larger percentage, more than they
eat the food of the host-land. Although, my informants did state that they make food from
outside the homeland from time to time, they eat “their” food primarily. Let us remember that,
with one exception, we are dealing with first-generation immigrants for whom “home” is still
vivid. In fact, one informant suggested that this was a “normal” pattern for people of any
background. For her, she ate “les plats algériens. Et tous les Algériens mangent leurs plats, les
Iraniens mangent leurs plats, les Indous, les Tunisiens, les Marocains mangent leurs plats. Mais
de temps en temps on fait des exceptions.”1056
I had informants explain that while they try other dishes, especially Canadian dishes, for
the most part the base of their cooking was Maghrébine.1057 For some, cooking majority
Maghrébine food is simply a matter of habit; the home food is what they are used to. For
example, one informant explained that “c’est l’habitude. Moi je suis arrivé ici, j’avais l’âge de 33
1053

130517_001—“That’s it, I find that when my mother makes traditional dishes, that touches us because it’s
really our childhood. It’s the food we knew when we were young. We didn’t go to restaurants. When I was 5, 6
years old, I didn’t go to restaurants like I go now so I didn’t have access to much variety. It’s for that reason that
now I eat it, it’s really something that touches me.”
1054
130517_001—“We feel as if we are in our country.”
1055
130612_001—“We feel at home.”
1056
130401_001—“Algerian dishes. And all Algerians eat their dishes, Iranians eat their dishes, Hindus, Tunisians,
Moroccans eat their dishes. But from time to time we make exceptions.”
1057
130430_004; cooks 70% Moroccan food at home, 130430_006; cooks 80% Algerian food at home,
130501_001.
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ans … c’est toute une vie que j’ai passé là-bas; pour changer après 33 ans c’est un peu difficile,
et c’est ça.”1058 On the other hand, for many, the food practice is the easiest form of connection
to the homeland. When everything else around them feeds their Canadian or Western identity,
the traditional dishes of the Maghreb feed their home identity. When I asked one informant why
it was important for her that she prepare traditional dishes from the Maghreb she illustrated this
fact. She explained that “c’est ma culture. Je suis là au Canada mais je garde toujours ma culture.
Elle est là, elle est née avec moi, elle a grandi avec moi, donc je ne peux pas. Je cuisine d’autres
plats, mais le couscous c’est ma culture, c’est depuis que je suis née.”1059
This informant and others like her make the home food in larger percentage because they
want to “rester liés, pour ne pas perdre le lien avec le pays,”1060 while nevertheless remaining
open “aux plats que l’on ne connait pas.”1061
Finally, informants also stressed the importance of cooking the home food as a means of
educating their children about the homeland. It was essential in passing on the Maghrébine side
of one’s transnational identity.
Toujours on parle des anciens temps à nos enfants. Ma maman faisait ça, ma maman…donc
ils savent maintenant que ça c’est un plat marocain, ça c’est un plat…Ils savent, ils
différencient. Quand tu mets le poulet avec l’olive, c’est un plat marocain—spécialement
c’est un plat marocain. Ils savent. Il faut que les enfants sachent ça. C’est comme ça qu’on
tient notre culture: avec la cuisine et avec beaucoup d’autres choses.1062
Consistency with one’s food practice from back home is important, in sum, because of habit,
because of a desire to maintain links with the homeland, and because of the need to educate the
younger generations.
While most of my informants largely cook the home food, a significant difference than
the cohort I interviewed in France, there were clear indications of the mixing of the two sides of
one’s transnational identity in one’s food practice. This was evidenced in people having dishes
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130424_001—“It’s habit. I arrived here when I was 33 years old, … it was a whole lifetime that I passed there,
to change after 33 years is a bit difficult, and that’s it.”
1059
130518_001—“It’s my culture. I am here in Canada, but I always keep my culture. It is there, it was born with
me, it grew with me, so I cannot. I cook other dishes, but couscous is my culture, it is since I was born.”
1060
130731_002—“Remain attached, so to not lose the link with the country.”
1061
130430_002—“[We remain open to] dishes that we do not know.”
1062
130518_001—“We always speak about the old days to our children. My mother made this, my mother…so
they know now that it is a Moroccan dish, that’s a dish…they know, they differentiate. When you put chicken with
olives, it’s a Moroccan dish, it’s specially a Moroccan dish. They know. It’s necessary that the children know that.
That’s what maintains our culture. With cuisine and with many other things.”
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from both their Maghrébine and their Québécois/French homes at the same time. For example,
one evening during Ramadan, this mixing of both side of transnational identity was clearly
represented in the dessert table. For the most part the meal consisted of entirely Maghrébine
food, but there was an important addition of a Québécois/French element. After a feast of purely
Maghrébine fare, the mint tea and Maghrébine sweets were placed on the table, alongside a
lemon meringue pie, a dessert that my Algerian host pointed out was her favourite dessert.1063
Here we see an example of the “Dual National” identity according to Peggy Levitt,1064 and an
example of Paulette Kershenovich Schuster’s “parallel eating.”1065 To an outside eye, this dessert
seemed out of place considering all of the dishes that had preceded it, and yet, it was a natural
inclusion in the Ramadan meal for this transnational informant. These combinations of cultures
and contexts in food practice do not just show up in what is placed on the table beside particular
dishes, but also within a single dish itself. One informant explained to me how she took a
Québécois dish and altered it with Maghrébine ingredients as an inevitable outworking of the
fact that “on vit avec deux cultures,” and:
on essaie de prendre de celle-ci et de celle-là et on fait un mélange…C’est bien de mélanger
deux choses différentes, puis ça donne quelque chose de bien. C’est s’inspiré de deux
choses pour faire quelque chose de bien. Et tout le monde l’a aimé.1066
Food is clearly representative not only of one’s connection to the homeland but also to the hostland.
That being said, food practices that support the connection to the homeland become more
prevalent in the host-land context than those practices would have been in the homeland. While
one may not need to stress one’s Canadian identity through what one eats, not only because
Canada does not have a distinct food culture but also because one is in a context where everyone
eats in their own way, the need to stress one’s Maghrébine identity outside of the Maghreb is
strong. This is why there is not only consistency of food practice with what one did in the
Maghreb in the transnational context, but why there is in fact an increase in homeland food
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Participant Observation, Field Journal, July 11, 2013.
Levitt, God Needs No Passport, 77.
1065
Kershenovich Schuster, “Habaneros and Shwarma,” 290.
1066
130520_001—“We live with two cultures…. We try to take from this and from that and we make a mix…It’s
good to mix two different things because it gives something good. It’s inspired by two things to make something
good. And everyone liked it.” She went on to say, “Je mélange, je fais le pâté chinois [a variation of Shepherd’s Pie]
à ma façon. Je fais la poutine, des fois je la fais. Je mélange tout.”
1064
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traditions outside of the homeland. One informant gave a clear example of this increase in
homeland food practice in the following story:
Il ne faut pas dire que c’est juste pour les enfants parce qu’on a cette nostalgie du pays.
Par exemple, quand j’étais en Algérie, je ne préparais jamais le pain. Quand je suis au
Canada, je prépare le pain. Quand en Algérie je leur dis que je prépare le pain. “Ah bon?”
C’est bizarre parce qu’on achetait le pain. Je ne préparais pas mon propre pain. Mais ici,
tellement que l’on aime cette nostalgie on prépare notre pain. Il y a beaucoup de choses
que je ne faisais pas en Algérie, mais ici je les fais.1067
When in a context where one’s homeland identity and practice is not the norm, one may have to
ramp up one’s efforts in order to maintain the transnational connection.
The increase in verifying of ingredients on any given product is another realm where
transnational Muslims demonstrate their connection to a homeland where such verification was
not necessary. Many women offered stories similar to the following:
Puisque j’habite ici quand je fais le magasinage avec mes enfants, je vérifie toujours la
composition des ingrédients de chaque aliment que j’achète parce que je ne dois pas
trouver de la gélatine, c’est-à-dire le porc, parce que le porc, on ne peut pas le manger
dans notre religion. Quand j’étais dans mon pays, comme c’est un pays musulman, on ne
se souciait pas avec quoi ça avait été fait, mais maintenant ici on devient de plus en plus
vigilant. Vu le contexte je respecte bien, c’est le pays qui nous a accueilli, on le respecte
bien, mais en même temps je dois respecter Dieu, ce que Dieu m’a dit de manger qu’en
soit pour moi ou pour mes enfants.1068
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130520_002—“One cannot say that it is just for the children because we have this nostalgia for our country.
For example, when I was in Algeria, I never made bread. When I am in Canada, I make bread. When in Algeria I tell
them that I make bread ‘Oh really?’ It’s strange because we bought bread. I never made my own bread. But here,
because I love that nostalgia, we make our bread. There are lots of things that I did not do in Algeria but I do there
here.”
1068
130430_001—“Because I live here when I do the shopping with my children I always verify the composition of
ingredients in every product that I buy because I cannot find gelatin, that is pork, because we cannot eat pork in
our religion. When I was in my country because it was a Muslim country we did not worry about what it was made
with but now, here, we have become even more vigilant. Given the context, I respect well, it’s the country that
welcomed us, we respect it well but at the same time we must respect God, what God told me to eat whether for
myself of for my children.” Here’s another instance: “en Algérie ou dans les pays arabes c’est tout halal, donc on ne
se pose pas la question. Depuis que l’on va à l’étranger, bien que je vous dis que certains imams nous disent même
à la mosquée que lorsque l’on est dans un pays étranger et que l’on n’a pas le choix on peut manger non halal—ce
n’est pas une faute grave—mais tant que le halal existe autant l’utiliser” (130401_001) ; In Algeria or in the Arab
countries it’s all halal; thus, one doesn’t ask the question. Since we’ve gone abroad, even though I’m telling you
that some imams tell us, even at the mosque, that when one finds oneself in a foreign country and we don’t have a
choice one can eat non-hallal food, it’s not a major problem—but to the extent that halal’s available, use it.”
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While one respects the host context, one tries hard to maintain one’s practice as one did in the
homeland. It is an effort that often requires not only a consistency, but an increase in religious
and cultural food practices.
If these food practices are essential to the transnational Maghrébine Muslim in Montréal,
then the necessary ingredients for these practices must be available. If my informants were
cooking 70, 80, 95 percent Maghrébine dishes in Montréal, the availability of these ingredients
becomes particularly important. All my informants suggested that it was easy to access all the
necessary ingredients from the Maghreb in Montréal. As one informant pronounced, “On n’a pas
de difficulté à trouver les ingrédients. On trouve tout, sur les épiceries, je ne dirais pas halal,
mais les épices. On arrive à préparer tous les plats que l’on veut préparer.”1069
Beyond just the facility of finding the necessary ingredients for various traditional dishes,
one can, in fact, find even more than one could in the homeland in the transnational context. One
young woman explained to me “qu’au Québec, c’est rendu que tu peux faire n’importe quel plat
de n’importe quel pays, n’importe quelle culture.”1070 In fact, she went on to explain:
Je pense que même ici on a accès à plus de choses que dans nos pays parce qu’ici ils sont
disponibles toute l’année…Je trouve que c’est plus facile ici de magasiner, d’aller au
magasin, d’acheter les choses et de cuisiner.1071
For other informants, it was not only the seasonal accessibility of ingredients but also the fact
that one could find ingredients from all regions of the Maghreb that made the transnational
context easier to cook traditional dishes.1072 We saw the same phenomenon earlier with my
Parisian informants. While in the Maghreb they would only have access to the ingredients of
their region, while in Canada they had access to all ingredients, allowing for a greater ease of
access to multiple traditional dishes.
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130430_002—“We don’t have any difficulty finding the ingredients. We find everything, in the grocery stores; I
won’t say halal, but the spices. We manage to prepare all of the dishes that we want to prepare.”
1070
130517_001—“In Québec, it’s come to the point that you can make any dish from any country, any culture.”
1071
130517_001—“I think that here there is even access to more things than in our country because here they are
available all year…I find it easier here to shop, to go to the store, to buy things and to cook.”
1072
“Il y a toutes les choses. Tout le Maroc il est là. Je trouve même des choses parfois, je me dis, je n’ai jamais
pensé l’acheter au Maroc, tiens je vais l’acheter” (130529_003); “on peut trouver tout, même plus que chez nous.
Par exemple, ici on peut importer des choses de tout le Maroc, toutes les régions marocaines. Par exemple, au
Maroc, pour trouver un produit il faut chercher un petit peu. Est-ce que vous avez le produit de la ville de Safi, par
exemple? Safi s’éloigne de 400km de chez moi, de la capitale de Raba. Ici on peut tout trouver, on peut trouver des
tajines, tout” (130615_001).
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Although it seems as though it is easy to access all of the necessary ingredients to make
traditional Maghrébine food, there are still some people who bring things back with them from
the Maghreb.1073 There are those who bring couscous, spices, etcetera, from the Maghreb when
they come back from visits to the homeland.1074 Even if one can find the ingredients, and often
even more, there is still a desire to have a physical connection to the homeland through the
ingredients that one cooks with. One woman explained that, “même les épices pour la chorba, je
les ramène d’Algérie. Ça se vend ici, mais je ne les ai jamais utilisées—pour la chorba surtout, je
ramène celles de l’Algérie.”1075 As can be seen with this example, even if one has access to the
necessary ingredients, there is still possibly something missing in the host-land that one can only
gain access to in the homeland. Hence, people try and bring that difference back with them when
they visit the homeland. Like my informants in France, many attribute this difference, that
missing “je ne sais quoi,” to a difference in taste—both real and imagined. I had informants
explain to me that even if one could find all necessary ingredients, the vegetables, meat, grains,
everything tastes better in the Maghreb.1076 For most of my informants, like those in Paris, this
difference in taste came from the belief (they called it a fact, but evidence belies their claims)
that in the Maghreb the ingredients were organic while the ingredients in Canada were
industrial.1077
1073

A similarity to my Parisian informants, and to those represented in studies by Kershenovich Schuster,
“Habaneros and Shwarma,” 290; Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts, 81.
1074
130430_001; 130430_006; 130706_001, 130731_002; one informant who expressed that she did not bring
back ingredients from Algeria, but instead ingredients from France. While she could find everything she needed to
make Algerian dishes, French ingredients were a different story: “il y a des gens qui ramènent des choses de
l’Algérie. Moi je n'ai jamais rien ramené. Quand je vais en France, je ramène du fromage et de chocolat. Mon fils il
me dit chocolat. Moi je ramène une variété de fromages français parce que j’aime beaucoup ça. À part ça, je n’en
ai rien du tout… des gâteaux algériens peut-être, de l'Algérie. Des gâteaux algériens qu’on me donne”
(130731_003).
1075
130520_002—“Even the spices for chorba, I bring them from Algeria. They sell them here, but I never use
them—for chorba especially, I bring the ones from Algeria.”
1076
130401_001.
1077
“Ça dépend de la viande. Elle n’a pas le même goût. Ici c’est plus industrialisé. En Algérie, maintenant ça change,
mais avant c’était plus biologique. On avait vraiment les fruits de saison, les légumes de saison. Ici tu peux trouver
les fruits et les légumes à n’importe quelles saisons. Mais ça n’a pas le même goût car ils ont été congelés, puis ils
ont été grossis avec les produits chimiques. Alors que chez nous c’est vraiment biologique. Ici, il y a des fermes
spéciales biologiques. Chez nous c’est vraiment biologique à toute l’échelle du pays parce qu’on a vraiment les fruits
de saison, les légumes de saison. Les choses d’été, tu ne peux pas les trouver en hiver. C’est vraiment chaque légume
mais ça a un goût et une odeur différente” (130520_001); “ça ce n’est pas par rapport à la disponibilité des choses
mais c’est plus par rapport au goût. Parce que l’on trouve que les légumes, étant donné que c’est comme tous avec
des pesticides; ça ne goûte pas la même chose. Là-bas tu trouves des choses plus biologiques. Tu vas prendre des
carottes et ça ne va pas être des carottes parfaites, des carottes moches, des vrais carottes finalement. C’est des
carottes bio. C’est ça qui fait la différence du goût. C’est vraiment cet aspect-là. Mais sinon, tu vas trouver tous les
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For others, the difference in taste is purely psychological.1078 For example,
il y a des gens qui disent, le goût ce n’est pas le même. Ici c’est du chimique. Mais je
crois que c’est la même chose, je crois que c’est psychique. Lorsque tu es loin de quelque
chose, ça te manque. C’est comme le passé chez tout le monde. Le passé est toujours
bon.1079
This informant stresses how when someone is far from something or somewhere that you miss,
that person engages in psychological means of traversing the distance between themselves and
that missed thing or place.
Overall the desire to maintain connection to the homeland is strong in the community of
Maghrébine Muslims that I studied in Montréal. Whether it was through the actual structure of
the eating spaces, the kind and amount of home food one consumed, the search for culturally and
religiously accurate ingredients, or any other number of bridging activities, the focus of their
daily experience was largely on getting back to some notion of home with which they could
identify. With such a strong focus on creating a new homeland that bridges both sides of one’s
transnational identity the question becomes: Can one be integrated and transnational?
7.3.3 Can Integration and Transnationalism go Hand in Hand?
If one considers “integration” as “assimilation,” or as a process of giving up one’s past identities
to be a part of the national “we” (as is often the case in France), it becomes easy to see how
transnational efforts may preclude integration. In a context such as France, where any action
considered outside the French norm is considered evidence of a lack of integration, transnational
efforts can be seen as fodder for communautarisme and lack of integration. The Canadian
context seems to provide a different backdrop for transnational immigrants to engage in
transnational practices and yet still proclaim fully integrated status. Because of a general lack of
tension over religious identity and practice in Canada, according to my informants, immigrants
légumes ici aussi” (130615_003); “Le goût non. (Elles rient.) Je ne sais pas pourquoi. Même mon mari me dit ça. C’est
moi, c’est la même personne qui prépare la même chose, je la prépare là-bas, elle goûte mieux qu’ici. Je ne sais pas
pourquoi…Et pourtant c’est les mêmes ingrédients. Les légumes peut-être parce que chez nous c’est frais, ça vient
directement des champs” (130731_002).
1078
Others express that the psychological difference lies in the missing familial ambiance, and eating in culturally
and religiously accurate ways helps to re-establish that missing ambiance (130430_004; 130615_001;
130615_002). As I presented in Chapter 4, Kershenovich Schuster argues that taste is socially and culturally
influenced (Kershenovich Schuster, “Habaneros and Shwarma,” 297).
1079
130404_001—“There are people who say, the taste is not the same. Here it’s chemical. But I believe that it is
the same thing, I think that it is psychic. When you are away from something, you miss it, it’s like the past for
everyone. The past is always good.”
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feel more capable of integrating into the Canadian/Québécois context. They feel like they at least
have a chance to be “fully integrated” and yet “fully Maghrébine/Muslim” (a right not outwardly
given to similar communities in similar Western contexts, such as France). When interviewing
my informants about integration many stressed their ability to integrate while at the same time
not giving up their religious and cultural traditions. In fact, many spoke about the ease with
which they could live their religious lives in Canada. One informant explained how the desire to
live both a Canadian and Muslim life was viewed in the Canadian context. He explained:
j’ai remarqué c’est que l’on pratique facilement notre religion ici au Canada. On n’a pas
trouvé de difficultés. Le mot magique que je trouve ici, quand vous parlez avec les gens,
ils vous disent, “ça ne nous dérange pas.”1080
Unlike in France where differentiating practices were viewed as more problematic, in the
Québécois/Canadian context my informants expressed that there was little tension over these
kinds of practice.1081 In fact, some of the transnational practices in which they engaged in the
host-land actually strengthened their ability to integrate.
The issue of communautarisme was an often-mentioned reason for the lack of integration
in the French context. It is sometimes argued that communautarisme prevents integration and
that Muslim communities are particularly prone to communautarisme. One rebuttal against such
a claim may be the emphasis on hospitality in the Maghrébine Muslim community. One may
argue that, with the lack of emphasis on the “need” to integrate as understood as “to assimilate,”
immigrants feel free to maintain practices that are essential to their religious and cultural lives in
the homeland, i.e. hospitality. My informants spoke about how essential maintaining a context of
hospitality outside of the Maghreb was for their cultural and religious self-understanding.1082
This trait allows for a higher level of integration, more reaching out between
communities, and more of an emphasis of interacting with the “other” than one may expect. By
being free to express one’s religious convictions while at the same time being a part of Canadian
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130430_006—“I noticed that we practice our religion easily here in Canada. We have not found difficulties. The
magic word that I found here, when you speak to people, they will say to you ‘that doesn’t bother us.’”
1081
130401_001; 130517_002.
1082
As I mentioned above, many of my informants set up or constructed their kitchens and living rooms in such a
way as to make hospitality easy. There were many couches, all which could double as beds, and the general flow
was such that people could easily flow into the space and be comfortable in it for long periods of times. No one
needed to sit on the floor, or on an uncomfortable folding chair. Instead, all people could be comfortably seated in
the living room for many hours of discussion, or even to sleep for the required three days that one is expected to
house a visitor, according to the religious tradition.
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society, informants felt as though there could be a greater reaching out to one’s neighbours of all
backgrounds and identities. In a non-communitaristic setting such as Montréal, where there is no
real “Muslim neighbourhood,” one’s neighbours are varied and consequently one’s interactions
with the larger community are inevitable. As I argued in Chapter 6, even the “petit Maghreb”
neighbourhood in Montréal is not highly populated by Maghrébines. In fact, many Maghrébines
come into this neighbourhood to do some shopping but then they return home, to
neighbourhoods made up of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In terms of reaching out to
one’s neighbours, then, this is not just to fellow Muslims, but also to the “Québécois(e) de
souche,” Italian, or Polish neighbour down the hall.
7.3.3.1 Hospitality as Means of Integration
Many of my informants reflected on the importance of hospitality in Islam and the role that it
plays in their lives in Québec. For these informants, welcoming someone into one’s house and
providing the best of the best for them was essential to their religious practice, something that
brought great blessing.1083 For example, one informant explained to me why performing
hospitality was especially important. She expounded that “on aime ça parce qu’on a été éduqué
comme ça, et aussi dans l’Islam quand on reçoit du monde, quand nos invités sortent, il y a des
anges qui restent chez nous.”1084
Hospitality is not only about having the space to house people, but is also about how one
demonstrates the welcome. This welcome is often professed through food. When I asked one
informant what was the place of hospitality in Islam, she explained the centrality of food for any
understanding of hospitality when she exclaimed that, “nous, quand tu fais hospitalité, tu
prépares de la bonne nourriture pour tes invités… La nourriture c’est un signe d’hospitalité pour
nous.”1085 It is not just any food that one is expected to prepare, though. Instead, one is expected
to welcome in abundance, not just with meager offerings. This abundant welcoming is
considered part of one’s religious and cultural obligations.
C’est notre religion. Notre religion, on ne peut pas [la] vivre séparé des gens. Inviter les
gens c’est vraiment dans l’Islam. Inviter les gens, bien les recevoir, préparer les meilleurs
1083

130424_001; 130505_001.
130519_001—“We like that because we were educated like that, and also in Islam when we receive people,
when our guests leave, there are angels who stay with us.”
1085
130731_002—“For us, when you engage in hospitality, you make good food for your guests…food is a sign of
hospitality for us.”
1084
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plats, c’est notre religion. D’ailleurs nos coutumes viennent de notre religion. Dans notre
religion il faut être très généreux avec un invité, il faut bien recevoir les invités. Par
exemple, je ne peux pas inviter quelqu’un pour lui donner juste un café. Si quelqu’un
frappe à ma porte et il rentre, le minimum que l’on peut lui offrir c’est un café avec des
gâteaux. Ça c’est le minimum. Je ne peux pas inviter une personne pour juste prendre un
café. C’est le minimum chez nous. Et dans notre religion, il faut être très généreux avec
un invité.1086
This extensive hospitality was something that I experienced directly in my fieldwork on multiple
occasions.1087 Because the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants whom I was interviewing were also
comfortably situated in their Canadian context, because they felt much freer to be both Canadian
and Muslim or Maghrébine the doors were much more easily opened. Here we can see how food
plays a role in Phillip Connor’s third theme of “integrating faith,” in the Canadian context. As he
sees it, that quality is embedded in religion, and religious expression, of which hospitality is an
example, according to my informants, helps the immigrant in their integration.1088 Hospitality is
in fact, according to one informant, a way to bring together “toutes les cultures, tous les gens.
1086

130520_002—“It’s our religion. Our religion we cannot live separately from people. To invite people is core
Islam. Invite people, receive them well, prepare the best dishes, it’s our religion. Besides, our customs come from
our religion. In our religion, you must be very generous with a guest, you must receive your guests well. For
example, I cannot invite someone and just give them a coffee. If someone comes to my door and enters, the
minimum that we can offer him is a coffee and cakes. That is the minimum. I cannot invite a person just for a
coffee. That’s the minimum for us. And in our religion, one must be very generous with a guest.”
1087
I recall experiencing this abundant hospitality to the extreme one afternoon when I, along with a colleague,
went to an informant’s home for a meal and an interview. Already, the fact that my colleague was welcome to join
me was a significant sign of my informant’s hospitality. We showed up on a Sunday afternoon to a feast for both of
us, with vegetarian dishes made especially for my colleague who was pescatarian. There was chorba with meat and
an onion and cheese soup made specifically for my friend. There were boureks with meat and boureks with tuna as
well as the little potato pancakes. There was a shrimp dish for my colleague and a veal and chicken dish for the rest
of us, with salad and homemade bread rounding it all out. The veal dish was accompanied with zucchinis stuffed
with ground beef and spices. The chicken was served on top of a mound of vermicelli noodles. It was all around
delicious. We talked around the table about how the women learned to cook, and the similarities and differences
between their culture and others. My informant’s children joined us for the meal and timidly shared their own
experiences with food. After the meal was complete, or so I thought, as per usual we were not allowed to help
clean up, and we headed into the living room to chat and drink tea. My informant and her daughter then began to
bring out the tea and sweets to the table and we were taken aback by how much food there was. She had made
brownies and small chocolate and pistachio tarts as well as a traditional Algerian sweet made with couscous and a
filing of dates. Then they brought out a plate of cheesecake. Once we had finished the interview and did not think
it was possible to fit any more food in us, my informant then asked her daughter to bring in the strawberries. She
had made up small cups of sliced strawberries in lovely light syrup for us to enjoy. We spent 4 hours eating; it just
did not stop. After we left, we noted how they took out their best serving dishes and teacups for us and how we
were treated like absolute royalty. Despite this huge demonstration of hospitality, more than one could have
expected, my informant still humbly suggested that her actions were not spectacular, that she had simply
welcomed us as she would have welcomed any guest. In that moment I was no different than a member of her
family, coming home from a long journey.
1088
Connor, Immigrant Faith, 74. I will address Connor’s four themes in more depth in Chapter 9.
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Même si [on a] des religions, des cultures différentes, on dit que l’être humain partout, c’est un
être humain.”1089 In this case, integration is to interact with all human beings, no matter the
culture or religion, to be open to all. That is the ideal.1090
7.3.3.2 Definitions/Understandings of Integration
For most of my informants, integration did not mean that one had to change one’s practices.
Food practices were just one realm where this fact was evident. Informants stated that “ce n’est
pas parce que je vais manger du porc et boire de l’alcool que je suis intégré, pas du tout.”1091
Whether one ate strictly according to Muslim religious traditions or not, or whether one ate a mix
of cultural foods or not, it did not have an effect on one’s integration. Another informant
explained how this notion of requiring change in some food practices had no effect on one’s
integration by showing how absurd a request such as this may be.
Est-ce que je suis obligé d’aller prendre un verre pour que je me sente intégré? Non. Ça je
ne peux pas me le permettre. Maintenant si le Québécois m’accepte comme je suis, je
l’accepte comme il est. Je ne vais pas interdire à quelqu’un de boire de l’alcool pour que
je me sente en sécurité. Non.1092
Just as bizarre as it would be for this informant to tell a non-Muslim Québécois(e) that they
cannot drink in order for him to feel secure, a non-Muslim Québécois(e) should not be able to
tell a Muslim person that they have to drink to show some form of security and integration. On
the other hand, food can be a positive means of integration. As one young woman explained to
me, “je regrette vraiment qu’au Québec on ne met pas l’accent sur la tradition culinaire. Et ça,
par contre, c’est un bon moyen d’intégrer les gens.”1093 Food can or cannot be a way to
demonstrate one’s integration and can and cannot be a tool that people use to integrate the other.
Overall, integration is a mutual thing, engaged in by both sides.

1089

130612_001—“All cultures, all people. Even if the religions, the cultures are different, we say that a human
being everywhere is a human being.”
1090
This idea that hospitality, as represented by food practice, can assist in “integration” is not exclusive to the
Muslim community. In fact, Desjardins and Desjardins also highlight the role of hospitality in integration, in
reference to the Sikh Langar (Desjardins and Desjardins, “Food the Builds,” 12).
1091
130430_005—“It’s not because I am going to eat pork or drink alcohol that I am integrated, not at all.”
1092
130517_002—“Am I obligated to go for a drink so that I feel integrated? No. That I cannot allow myself. Now if
a Québécois(e) accepts me as I am, I accept him/her as they are. I am not going to forbid someone from drinking
alcohol so that I feel secure. No.”
1093
130706_001—“I really regret that in Québec we do not put an accent on [a particular] culinary tradition. On
the other hand, [not doing so] is a good way to integrate people.”
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My informants were clear in explaining that integration was not just about their
integration into Québécois society, but the efforts of the Québécois society to integrate to them
as well. It was a mutual effort. It was reflective of Micheline Milot’s “two-way street approach to
integration” in Canada.1094 The same informant who suggested that food could be a good means
to integrate people stressed that
l’intégration n’est pas unilatérale. Ce n’est pas uniquement à l’immigré(e) de se fondre/
de s’assimiler intégralement dans la société en refoulant sa personnalité. C’est également
à l’Etat d’accueil de mettre en place les moyens nécessaires à son insertion.1095
Not only is it a responsibility of the state to make sure that the immigrant could engage his/her
integration, but it is also the responsibility of the regular citizen to offer mutual acceptance and
understanding. Another informant expressed this view as follows:
Je préfère la reconnaissance, même pas la tolérance. Parce que la tolérance ok, ok je [ne]
t’aime pas mais je te tolère. La reconnaissance, je crois que c’est mieux. La
reconnaissance, et la reconnaissance mutuelle. L’intégration mutuelle. J’essaie de
m’intégrer mais j’attends à l’autre aussi d’intégrer.1096
Other informants, like this one, spoke of integration as a mutual process. Many used the words
“mutual acceptance” as a way to explain what it meant to be integrated.1097 For these informants,
religious and cultural idiosyncrasies were not important, but instead the base acceptance,
recognition, and ultimately respect for the “other” was what integration was all about.
For many of my informants, integration is primarily about respect, between and among
various parties. As the informant mentioned above, if the majority Québécois culture accepts him

1094

Milot, “Modus Co-vivendi,” 117.
130706_001—“Integration is not unilateral. It is not uniquely on the immigrant to blend/ to assimilate fully into
the society by repressing his personality. It’s equally up to the welcoming State to put the necessary mediums in
place for his insertion.” As I discussed in Chapter 6, this often involves an effort by the Québécois government to
provide services for immigrant communities to learn the common culture in Québec to which immigrants are
expected to integrate.
1096
130404_001—“I prefer recognition. Not even tolerance. Because tolerance: ok, ok, I do not like you but I
tolerate you. Recognition I believe is better. Recognition and mutual recognition. Mutual integration. I try to
integrate but I wait for the other as well to integrate.”
1097
“C’est comme ça que je vois mon intégration. Ils m’acceptent comme je suis, je les acceptent comme ils sont”
(130517_002); “Et si je rencontre par exemple une personne du Québec, j’accepte aussi leurs valeurs comme ils
vont accepter mes valeurs. C’est une acceptation de plusieurs cotés” (130615_002); “L’intégration c’est que je
t’accepte ou tu m’acceptes en tant qu’être humain. C’est la fraternité humaine, avant la religion. Tout ça c’est des
choses. Mais je ne touche pas à ta religion, tu ne touches pas à ma religion. Je ne touche pas à tes coutumes. Je les
respecte, tu respectes mes coutumes. Et comme ça on arrive à être en collaboration” (130731_002).
1095
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for who he is, then he is integrated. The centrality of respect for the understanding of integration
was clearly outlined by one of my informants when she explained to me the following:
Moi, Rachel, il y a une chose que je peux vous dire: quand tu respectes n’importe qu’elle
personne qui est devant toi, il te trouve le respect, tu es intégré. Automatiquement tu es
intégré. S’il n’y a pas ce respect entre les deux religions différentes, la même religion, tu
ne peux pas être intégré. Même si tu es dans ton pays, le Maroc, et tu changes de vie,
c’est que tu es immigrante. Mais il faut ce respect-là.1098
According to this informant, whether someone is in his or her homeland or in their host-land, if
there is respect there is integration.
Respect for the laws of the society is also an important aspect of integration, according to
my informants.1099 One explained how integration was on two levels: interior and exterior. For
her, the exterior integration was about respecting the laws, but more importantly the interior
integration was about “le respect entre les gens…ce n’est pas que moi je dois me changer
complètement pour devenir Québécoise; ce n’est pas ça l’intégration pour moi.”1100 If respect is
present between and among groups, then according to these informants integration is present.
Food can be one way to show this respect, as the following extract shows:
Avec mes voisins il n’y a pas de problèmes. Ils mangent, ils trouvent que c’est
intéressant. Le fait de préparer et de partager avec eux, ils trouvent ça vraiment, ils disent
“mais pourquoi?” et je dis, “c’est juste parce que vous êtes mes voisins, et dans notre
religion on doit respecter le voisin. On doit montrer que vous êtes très important pour
nous.”1101
It is a religious obligation to respect one’s neighbours, this informant notes, and that respect is
shown through food. Other informants highlighted the respect of specific food practices as
evidence of integration. Whether it was respecting the non-Muslim who eats pork and drinks
alcohol or having the respect of the non-Muslim Québécois(e) about the fact that they do not eat
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130518_001—“For me Rachel, I can tell you something, when you respect any person who is in front of you, he
finds some respect, you are integrated. Automatically you are integrated. If there is not this respect between the
two, different religions, same religion, you cannot be integrated. Even if you are in your country, Morocco and you
change your life, it’s that you are an immigrant. But there must be this respect”; “L’intégration, à mon avis, c’est de
respecter les autres” (130615_001).
1099
130520_001—“Alors, c’est les lois et le respect des gens du pays d’accueil” (130505_001).
1100
130520_002—“Respect between people…it’s not that I have to change completely to become Québécois(e);
that’s not integration for me.”
1101
130430_004—“With my neighbours there is no problem: they eat, they find that interesting. The fact of
preparing and sharing with them, they find that very… they say ‘but why’ and I say ‘it’s just because you are my
neighbours, and in our religion we must respect our neighbour. We must show that you are very important to us.’”
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pork or drink alcohol, these were clear examples that respect, and correspondingly integration,
was present.1102
For most of my informants, integration is not about changing one’s cultural or religious
traditions to assimilate into the Québécois culture. As I argued above, integration had nothing to
do with change as much as it had to do with acceptance, understanding and respect. Some of my
informants spoke about the fact that integration was about putting some efforts forward to
highlight the Québécois/Canadian side of one’s transnational identity. Informants spoke about
how one should try to live “comme eux,”1103 or live your life “à la Québécoise, à la
canadienne,”1104 or even this: “tu fais ta vie comme chacun qui est né ici,” which can show by
the fact that “tu fais les courses comme lui.”1105
Another clear example of this change toward living more like a Canadian is the emphasis
on following Canada’s Food Guide.1106 When I spoke with a group of women at a mosque about
their food practices in Canada and their integration processes, they spoke about adopting some
“Canadian practices” such as the tenets of the Food Guide.1107
While most of these informants spoke about the fact that one could change toward a
Canadian way of life and still not lose any of one’s cultural or religious traditions, one informant
explained how one can lose certain parts of one’s homeland identity by trying to live in line with
the Québécois(e). Although Maghrébine/Muslim hospitality tends to thrive in the Québécois
context this informant spoke about how such an integral trait can change in the integration
process. She explained how it was “normal back home” for her to share whatever food she was
making with the neighbours or with her co-workers, but that it is seen as strange in the
Québécois context, and because of that, “j’ai perdu un peu de ça ici. J’ai vraiment perdu un peu
de ça ici. Parce que c’est différent. Et de l’un, on n’a pas le temps, on travaille. Et de deux, c’est
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130430_001; 130505_001; 130615_002.
130401_001—“Try to live like them”; “Mais s’intégrer dans ce pays, vivre comme les Québécois. Sortir comme
les Québécois, faires des études comme les Québécois. Voir la vie comme les Québécois.”
1104
130727_001—“Like the Québécois(e) or like the Canadian.”
1105
130529_003—“You live your life like everyone who is born here…you do your grocery shopping like them.”
1106
The Canadian Food Guide is a nutrition guide provided by Health Canada. It is translated into 10 other
languages other than English and French (http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/food-guide-aliment/ordercommander/guide_trans-trad-eng.php). Many sites for new immigrants across the country highlight the Guide,
such as: http://settlement.org/ontario/health/nutrition-and-healthy-living/healthy-living-and-nutrition/eatingwell-with-canada-s-food-guide/.
1107
Participant Observation, Field Journal, May 22, 2013.
1103
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différent ici.”1108 Because of a desire to not seem strange, to not stand out and to embrace the
“Québécois way,” some traits were changed.1109
While minor changes were made to one’s daily life based on an effort to embrace the
Québécois side of one’s transnational identity, there was generally a great deal of consistency
with one’s practices, especially food practice, in the Maghreb for my informants. Integration was
more about respect and acceptance and even celebration of difference than it was about
change.1110 Again, this is not surprising given the fact that my informants were almost all firstgeneration immigrants. Integration was, in fact, seen as a process of mutual advancement and
enrichment.
On peut très bien vivre ensemble, c’est un enrichissement mutuel. Je prépare du pâté
chinois, quelque chose que j’ai découvert ici, je le mange, ça ne me dérange pas. Et
d’autres personnes ne le mangent avec moi. Mais il n’y a pas que ça, la vie ici elle est
différente de chez nous. Il y a des activités que l’on ne faisait pas chez nous, que l’on fait
maintenant, parce qu’ici on fait ça, tant que ce n’est pas interdit, ce n’est pas illicite. Si on
a envie de le faire, on va le faire.1111
In Québec, for my informants, integration is about fully embracing both sides of one’s
transnational identity, about being both in Canada and in the Maghreb, and in bringing that
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130520_001—“I lost that a bit here. I really lost that a bit here. Because it’s different. For one, we don’t have
the time, we work. And second, it’s different here.”
1109
Another informant told me of wanting to help an elderly neighbour of hers by visiting with her and making her
food, etc., but she was told by others that she could not do such a thing in Québec, that she had to realize that it
wasn’t like “back home,” and so she told me that “j’essaye de me reprogrammer” (I try to reprogram myself)
because the Québécois culture was different than her Algerian culture (130424_001).
1110
Due to space, and the focus of this work, I cannot fully explore one of the significant aspects of integration for
my informants: the role of work. This is a significant issue for immigrants who come to Québec because they are
sought after, as immigrants, because of their work, yet when they arrive they typically cannot work in their
respective domains. For these informants, integration comes through work. If one can work in the society, then
one is integrated; an opportunity not granted to many. “Parce que l’intégration ça passe par le travail. Si on ne
travaille pas, on ne peut pas parler d’intégration. Ça c’est comment je vois les choses. Maintenant, l’intégration
pour moi aussi ne veut pas dire adopter les mêmes pratiques culturelles. Intégration, c’est être en harmonie avec
son entourage, avec sa société. Ça ne veut pas dire se décolorer et laisser tout ce que l’on avait avant comme
culture qui était notre identité et paramètre identitaire; on les jette et puis ok, et on se met à imiter telle ou telle
personne pour être intégré. Ça me parait, ça n’a pas de sens” (130430_002); “l’intégration professionnelle facilite
les autres niveaux d’intégration. C’est ça le problème” (130430_006); “je commençais à m’intégrer mais je pourrais
dire toujours comme je ne travaille pas encore, je ne suis pas encore intégrée. Parce que ça demande qu’il faut
travailler, il faut avoir un poste et travailler dans la société. C’est là que je dirais que je suis intégré” (130703_004);
“Intégrer c’est travailler” (130723_001), etc., e.g. 130519_001; 130520_001; 130807_0001.
1111
130519_001—“We can easily live together, it’s a mutual enrichment. I make shepherd’s pie, something that I
discovered here, I eat it, that doesn’t bother me. And others don’t eat it with me. But there is not just that, life
here is different than back home. There are activities that we did not do back home, that we do now because here
we do that, as long as it is not prohibited, that it is not unlawful. If we want to do it, we are going to do it.”
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richness of the two sides together into something new; a process which is facilitated by strong
religious and cultural practices brought from the “homeland.”
7.4 Conclusion
I began this chapter with an exploration of the various ways that my informants identify
themselves, interact with, and present those identities through their food practice in Montréal. In
terms of national identity, two thirds of my informants claimed Canadian identity to some extent.
Many of my informants argued that Canada’s general openness to diversity, as well as their
perception that “everyone is an immigrant in Canada” made them feel comfortable claiming
Canadian identity, whether they had Canadian citizenship or not. Furthermore, I argue in this
chapter that the emphasis on one’s origins led to all my Montréal informants claiming their
nation of origin as one of their primary identities. What is fascinating in regards to national
identity is that, for my informants, Québécois identity did not seem to come into play in their
own identity negotiations. While two of my informants claimed this national identity, the other
30 did not. My informants did show some understanding of a separate Québécois national
identity when they spoke about Québécois food. They did not use the word “Canadian” food but
spoke about the various foods that could be part of the Québécois national identity.
After discussing my informants’ national identifications, I explored their religious
identity claims. For 30 of my 32 informants, Muslim identity was one of their central, orienting
self-understandings. For these informants, their religious identity was not just made up of belief
or institutional practice, but of the things of everyday. Here food played an essential role in one’s
religious identity. For many of my informants, food was central to what made someone
“Muslim.”
Within the discussion of Muslim identity, I challenged the simplistic understanding of the
sometimes-posited subcategories of “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslim. I showed how,
for my informants in Montréal, non-practicing could refer to someone who felt like they could do
more, or to someone who was not going “far enough” in their practice. In fact, I showed how in
Montréal my informants often felt the need to “go further” in their practice, to go beyond the
traditional Muslim food practices to demonstrate their Muslim identity.
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I then addressed how my informants saw themselves as different, as holding different
identities from the non-Maghrébine/Muslim Québécois(es) who surrounded them; “we” are
different than “them,” according to my informants. Food was the realm within which my
informants demonstrated these identity differences. My informants often felt like they needed to
go further than the common differences in foodways to draw lines between “us” and “them” and
as a result, they mentioned five differences in “how” “we” eat differently than “them.” I explored
the argument that my informants would make that “we” are different from “them” because “we”
(1) do not eat to excess, (2) only eat with our right hand, (3) do not waste food, (4) eat
communally and (5) do not eat at restaurants. In this section, we can see how my informants use
binary distinctions that overemphasize difference, in the face of vast variation, to highlight the
positive value of their home culture in the face of unfamiliar practices in the host land.
I close this section by exploring how food can also be a means of accessing this
imagined, unfamiliar, “other.” In this I showed how for my informants in Montréal food can act
as a powerful means of bridging the gap, often perceived as being larger than it actually is,
between communities. I argue that this bridging through food is particularly successful in a place
like Québec/Canada where multiple food cultures are seen as accepted and encouraged as part of
the national food culture, leading to a great ease of maintenance of transnational identity through
food.
This led me into an exploration of my informants’ transnational identities and efforts in
the second half of the chapter. I explained that for the Montréal informants of my study
“transnational” is a better label for their identity and experiences than “diasporic” because they
were comfortable with the fluid motions between various places and identities that are essential
to the transnational experience. Because my informants saw themselves as firmly located in both
the home and host land identities they needed a means of bridging the gap between the two,
whether real or imagined. Beyond just constructing their home spaces in ways reminiscent of
their lives in the Maghreb, my informants used specific food and food practices to help gain
access to both sides of their transnational identity. I argued how for many of my informants
using food to access memory was a way of recreating “home” in one’s new “home.” Beyond just
a means of bridging the gap between home lands, my informants also prepared home food out of
habit and out of a desire to educate their children about this side of their transnational identity. I
went on to show that while maintaining connection to one’s home land through food was
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important to my informants, they also engaged in food practices that allowed them to tap into the
host land side of their transnational identity. In this context, they spoke of the various ways that
they prepared and consumed Québécois food as well.
After discussing how my informants saw themselves as bridging the two sides of their
transnational identity, particularly through food practice, I discussed the idea of integration and
its role in transnational experience. I presented the idea that by being able to maintain homeland
characteristics, such as hospitality, in Montréal, my informants were able to “integrate” more
easily into their Québec context. They interacted with their neighbours, in a joint process of
integration, which often fostered mutual respect. My informants saw integration as a mutual
effort between themselves and the host society, suggesting that both sides needed to make efforts
of acceptance, understanding and respect. Both sides could use food as a tool to aid in this
endeavour.
My informants did suggest that part of their integration efforts had to do with fostering
the Canadian/Québécois side of their transnational identity. They did not feel the need to
assimilate fully into Québécois culture by leaving behind their culturally and religiously specific
practices and identities, but to make some effort to understand and incorporate parts of the
Québécois culture into their own daily experience. Food, again, was a good avenue through
which to pursue this, for example by following Canada’s Food Guide.
Throughout this chapter I have addressed the role that food plays in my informants’
various identity negotiations and in their transnational efforts. In this process, I have mentioned
several food practices which my informants perform as a means of aiding in these processes. I
continue the exploration of food practice in the next chapter as it specifically relates to the
understanding of culture and religion.
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Chapter 8: “Il y a la culture d’une part et il y a la religion d’autre part”1112: Religious and
Cultural Food Practices in Montréal
8.1 Introduction: Culture vs. Religion
As I discussed in Chapter 5, people often make a distinction between cultural and religious
practices and values. Coming up with a definition of either of these terms is an especially
difficult task; coming up with a universally acceptable definition is impossible. Like in Paris,
instead of imposing a definition of religion and culture onto my informants in Montréal, I sought
out their own understandings of what these terms meant. While most did not give a clear
definition of these terms they did suggest that there were two distinct realms within which their
practices or values lay, even if a particular practice or value could lie in both. While Ahmed
argues that one cannot break apart any given phenomenon into perfect categories of culture
versus religion, for my informants, “il y a la culture d’une part et il y a la religion d’autre
part.”1113
There is clearly a difference between the two, in their view, and my informants offer
some suggestion as to what those differences are for them. First, my Montréal informants would
often interchange the word “tradition” for culture. Traditions are understood as changing,
depending on place and time. Religion on the other hand is more stable, has more universal ideas
and expectations. While “la culture, les traditions, sont liées à la culture musulmane” they are
different from “la religion musulmane, [qui] est beaucoup plus diversifié.”1114 While cultures are
specific to certain groups and times, religion, according to my informants, is “pour toute
l’humanité. Ce n’est pas pour un arabe ou un africain; c’est pour tout le monde.”1115
Alongside the universal versus distinct argument, some informants also argued that there
was a difference between culture and religion based on its locus in either public or private life.

1112

130727_001—“There is culture on one hand and religion on the other.”
Ibid. Ahmed addresses this in What is Islam, 116.
1114
130404_001—“The culture, the traditions, are linked to the Muslim culture…the Muslim religion, that
[referring to Muslim culture] is much more diverse.”
1115
130517_002—“For all humanity, it’s not just for an Arab or an African; it’s for everyone.”
1113
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These informants presented the idea that religion is private versus culture being more of a public
expression of identity. One informant explained this idea to me as follows:
D’abord, la religion c’est quelque chose qui est propre à moi. Je ne dois pas imposer ma
religion à quelqu’un d’autre….Ma religion reste propre à moi, les choses personnelles
restent propres à moi. Je peux intégrer dans les choses qui sont communes. Je n’ai pas de
problèmes dans ce sens-là.1116
This informant clearly differentiated between what he could change and what he could not.
While his religion was private and unchangeable, the aspects that were more public were more
changeable; there were things that are “purement culturel”1117 and things that are “religieux.”
In this chapter I show how these kinds of distinctions are represented by and enacted in
the food practices of my informants in Montréal. Consequently, I explore the fourfold typology
of food practice that I presented in Chapter 5 as it applies to the Montréal case study. I present
each of the seven individual food practices and discuss the various means of argumentation that
my informants make for engaging in these traditions. While there are variations in practice in
Montréal there is a great deal more consistency of engagement with these seven practices than
was the case in my Paris study.
8.2 Fourfold Typology of Food Practice
Food practice is one of the biggest realms of debate as to what is cultural and what is religious.
The line between culture and religion can be blurry when you consider normally “religious”
practices that are continued by people who “do not care about the religion,” “are not religious,”
etcetera. One informant presented this casually when she explained to me that she had grown up
in a non-religious home and then went on to talk about the (normally understood) religious
practices that her family performed. She explained, “Je n’ai pas été élevé dans un milieu
religieux, personnellement. Mes parents s’en foutaient. On faisait le carême, on ne mangeait pas
de porc, ça s’arrêtait là. Le reste, tout était permis.”1118

1116

130430_006—“First of all religion is something that I keep to myself. I must not impose my religion on
someone else…My religion is kept to myself, personal things are kept to myself. I can integrate in the things that
are common. I have no problem with that.”
1117
130430_001—“Purely cultural.”
1118
130401_001—“I was not raised in a religious setting personally. My parents didn’t care. We did the fast, we
didn’t eat pork, but it stopped there. Everything else was permitted.”
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There is a great diversity of responses as to what is religious and what is cultural. How
someone acts in relation to their food practice may be primarily dictated by culture (according to
their own understanding and explanation), or by religion, or a mix of both. Some find it easy to
distinguish between the two realms and others find the lines much more difficult to draw. For the
most part, food is seen as cultural, except for “deux ou trois trucs qui sont en rapport avec la
religion,”1119 or, as another informant suggested, “ce qui est interdit est interdit, et les traditions
diffèrent.”1120 For the most part, “religious” is often given as a label if the practice or value can
be found in the Quran as injunction (not just food mentioned in the Quran, or else olive oil,
dates, camel milk, etcetera, would be considered religious foods), or in the Sunnah as something
that the Prophet did that the community would like to follow. The situation is similar to the one I
noted in Paris. There is a spectrum of religion and cultural food practices and how they relate to
obligation and flexibility. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, food practices were often then labelled as
religious or cultural depending on whether they were grounded in religious texts or tradition. So,
the hierarchy of religious practice worked out in this way.

Because of this similarity, the four categories of food practice that I posited in Chapter 5
can also apply to my Montréal case study. Those categories are: (1) the Quranically-documented
and “prescribed” food practices, i.e. the abstention from consuming pork and alcohol, practicing
1119

130520_001—“Two or three things that are related to religion”; “Mais d’autre chose qui est acceptable et pas
acceptable, ce n’est pas la religion à 100% parce que ce qui est interdit dans la religion, dans le texte, ce qui est pas
beaucoup, 6 ou 7 choses: le sang, tout ce qui est mort, cochons, 4 ou 5 [autres]. (Il réfléchit) Je dois réciter en
arabe. Mais d’autre chose que l’on ne mange pas, que l’on n’approche pas, que l’on n’accepte pas, c’est la culture”
(130404_001).
1120
130520_002—“What is forbidden is forbidden [understood as religiously forbidden] and traditions are
different.”
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the fast of Ramadan and the obligation to eat properly-butchered animals (halal). (2) the
Quranically-based but not prescribed category, e.g. the lamb of the Eid Al-Adha. (3) The Sunnah
inspired food practices, e.g. dates and milk, and (4) the purely cultural food practices, e.g.,
couscous and other traditional dishes. While in Paris informants may have given cultural reasons
for their keeping of the commonly understood “religious practices,” in Montréal most of my
informants engaged in such practices because of religious reasons.1121
In Montréal, there was a large effort by my informants to give more than just a religious
reason for their practice. Food practices would be neatly tucked into the categories but then they
would also give more “cultural” reasons for these practices. In this way, the Maghrébine Muslim
immigrants of my study tended to be influenced by the culture to show how the practices they
engaged in were not only based on religious conviction, but had a “more solid scientific”
grounding as well. I often felt like my informants felt the need to give a culturally-significant
reason for their religious practice, almost in a defense against a perceived attack on the logic of
the religious practice. One informant explained that,
il y a 30 ans en arrière, mon père me parlait toujours que les gens voulaient des preuves
scientifiques. De 1980 à çà, tous les étudiants parlaient de découvertes scientifiques, et
aujourd’hui, en 2013, on est conscient que la manière la plus saine pour notre santé est la
manière islamique.1122
For many of my informants Islamic practice did not go against the modern, Western emphasis on
science, but instead was the perfect outworking of this approach. I explore these arguments from
“logic” when I address each category of practice.1123

1121

I address the possible reasons for this difference in labeling practices “cultural” or “religious” in Paris versus
Montréal, in Chapter 9. Furthermore, even though I contrast the categories of “culture” and “religion,” as I did in
Chapter 5, I still provide insight into the varied ways that my informants interact within and across these
categories, thus revealing the “human and historical phenomenon of Islam” that Ahmed suggests is lost in this very
effort (Ahmed, What is Islam, 116).
1122
130615_001—“Thirty years ago, my father always told me that people wanted scientific proof. From the 80s to
here, all students spoke of scientific discovery. In 2013, one is aware that the healthiest way for our health is the
Islamic way.”
1123
I will further explore why my informants felt the need to give “logical” explanations when I compare the Paris
and Montréal data sets in Chapter 9.
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8.3 Quranically-Documented and “Prescribed” Food Practices
The first category covers the Muslim food practices that are most commonly understood as
strictly religious: the “Quranically-documented and ‘prescribed’ food practices.” These are the
practices that are seen as universal and usually obligatory. Like in Paris, when examining the
four different practices in this category a slight hierarchy of obligation appears, with the
Ramadan fast being the most religious, followed by pork abstention, then alcohol abstention, and
finally eating halal meat.
8.3.1 Ramadan
The fast for Ramadan is easily considered the most “religious” of Muslim food practices for my
Montréal informants and as a result it was the most commonly practiced. Thirty one of my
informants fasted for the month of Ramadan, leaving only one informant who did not.1124 For
those who label themselves as practicing, religious Muslims, Ramadan is always present. For
those who have a more cultural approach to their Muslim identity, Ramadan still remains
essential. It is the foundational Muslim food practice because of its place in the five pillars of
Islam and in the Quran.1125 Even those who do not pray five times a day, or practice the other
pillars, still fast during Ramadan.1126 Ramadan is labeled as a “sacred month” by many of my
informants. One informant explained how this practice was more than merely religious; it was
part of a larger sacred moment for Muslims. She explained “Oui, le jeûne c’est vraiment sacré.
Le mois de ramadan c’est un mois où l’on doit être relax, zen…. C’est vraiment un mois plus que
sacré.”1127 Because this month and its affiliated practices are considered “more than sacred,” it is
considered a serious sin not to fast during Ramadan.
Par exemple, si quelqu’un ne jeûne pas pendant le ramadan, comment on dit ça? C’est
…en dehors de la bénédiction de Dieu. C’est comme s’il affronte Dieu. C’est vraiment un
péché très grand.1128
1124

This informant sees herself as not really Muslim, but just coming from a Muslim culture and family. She
celebrates Muslim holidays, and holds a religious morality, but that is far as she would argue that her Muslim
identity goes (130706_001).
1125
As noted in Chapter 5, the Quranic verses that explain the fast for Ramadan are: 2:185, 187.
1126
130806_004.
1127
130529_003—“Yes, the fast is very sacred. The month of Ramadan is a month where we must be relaxed,
chilled out (Zen)….It’s really a month that is more than sacred”; so too 130615_001.
1128
130615_002—“For example, if someone does not fast during Ramadan, how do we say it?…. It’s outside of the
blessing of God. It’s as if he confronts God. It’s a huge sin.”
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This clearly placed the practice of the Ramadan fast in the religious category.
When personally experiencing the Ramadan fast, its religious elements became poignant
to me.1129 For those who are practicing out of religious conviction or obligation the practice
appears to be much easier than for those who may do so simply out of culture or experience. For
example, I could see these differences in my own experience of Ramadan, both on the days that I
fasted and on the days that I did not. When I was fasting, although I found it difficult to wait
until the evening prayer to eat, the women I was with seemed to have no issue. On our first day
of Ramadan the women with whom I was breaking the fast got lost in conversation and barely
realized that it was time for the iftar (the name of the break-fast meal during Ramadan). There
was not such a sense of urgency about it. The women explained to me about the power of
intention, about how God rewards those who fast and follow him. The funny thing was that we
were just talking and no one was really watching the clock, so when the call to prayer came on
they were all surprised. Even though I seemed to be much more aware of my grumbling stomach
than they were of theirs, their sense of calm helped to quell the vicious hunger that would have
normally been at work inside me. There was no rush to eat, but we calmly sat at the table and
waited for the call to prayer to finish, and then we took our dates and milk and broke the fast.1130
This intentional element became clear to me when breaking the fast surrounded by people who
were not fasting or who were just doing so out of culture. When I broke the fast with my one
informant who does not generally keep the fast I could definitely sense this difference. I reflected
on it as follows in my field journal.
I found the last hour today to be particularly difficult. When I am surrounded by others
who are also fasting, it is not as tough. But tonight, being surrounded by a group of girls
who were not fasting [or who didn’t have a religious reason to do so], who were drinking
beer on the hot summer evening and were talking all about food, made it so incredibly
difficult. I was counting the minutes until I could break the fast. My host [who was a self1129

In both my Paris and Montréal fieldwork experiences I fasted for some of the month of Ramadan. In Paris, I
fasted for 10 days. In Montréal, I fasted for 15 (half of the month). In Paris I found the experience to be difficult
because of the summer heat and the desire to go out for meals with my friends before the setting of the sun. In
Montréal, the heat and long hours were again a factor in making the fast difficult, although most of my evenings
were spent at informants’ homes so there wasn’t the same desire to go out for dinner with friends. Some days felt
easier than others, and just when I thought that it was getting easier, it would prove to be difficult again. In both
cases, I stopped fasting because I felt as though I had been sufficiently saturated in my fasting experience and
because I felt as though the lack of energy and focus that often characterized my fast days was detrimental to my
work in the field. I felt less focused, less able to capture all the little nuances in the field when I was trying to keep
myself from not passing out.
1130
Participant Observation, Field Journal, July 10, 2013.
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proclaimed cultural Muslim] had set aside dates for me and a glass of water and as soon
as the moment came, I jumped up from my seat and grabbed them.1131
In my admittedly very limited experience of fasting there seemed to be a different sensitivity to
the practice when practicing it religiously, as it was meant to be, as most of my informants would
argue, in comparison to simply doing so for the experience of it. I felt my hunger more deeply on
the days I fasted with my culturally Muslim informants or when I fasted on my own than when I
fasted with my informants who were fasting out of religious conviction.
Although the fast for Ramadan was largely seen as a strictly religious practice by my
informants, like all the practices in this category, and the other categories for that matter, my
informants would find culturally significant reasons to engage in the practice as well. At base,
they fasted because it was a religious obligation to do so, because it was cited in the Quran and
was part of the five pillars of Islam, but they also expressed other reasons for why it was a
beneficial practice. One informant explained the logic, as they understood it, behind the religious
obligation to fast. After explaining the various religious reasons for the fast she noted the
following:
De l’autre côté ça a été prouvé que le corps de l’être humain a besoin de jeûner de temps
en temps pour éliminer toutes les toxines de la nourriture mauvaise qu’il a dans le corps.
Il a besoin de jeûner. Ça a un côté médical aussi; on commence à se poser des questions
et à chercher.1132
For this informant, and others like her, one looks beyond the simple reason that the practice is
“Quranically-documented and prescribed” and seeks out a scientific reason as well for any
practice.
This search and its conclusions are logical given the belief that God is behind the food
practice, and the Muslim understanding of God that makes him all-knowing, and able to transmit
his knowledge to humans. Within that frame of reference, how could Ramadan not be good for
people? Outside this frame of reference, the logic is on shakier grounds.

1131

Field journal, July 14, 2013.
130520_001—“On the other hand it has been proven, that the human body needs to fast from time to time to
eliminate all of the toxins from bad food that he has in his body. He needs to fast. That has a medical side as well,
and we begin to ask ourselves questions and to search.”
1132
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8.3.2 Pork
The second type of food practice in this category is the abstention from eating pork. Similar to
the Ramadan fast, thirty one of my informants did not eat any pork, while one did.1133 The
injunction to not eat pork is firmly grounded in the Quran and is strictly mentioned as
“haram.”1134 I had informants explain, simply and purely, that they did not eat pork because it
was “interdit dans ma religion”1135 because “c’est un verset Quranic qui dit [c’est] haram, la
consommation de la viande porcine.”1136 The practice is clearly based in religious text and
values, and thus the argument was made that, “si notre Dieu nous a interdit cette chose, c’est
qu’elle va nous faire mal. On ne va pas discuter.”1137 For this informant, and others like her,
there was no need for further arguments than the fact that it was forbidden and documented in
the divinely-delivered Quran.
For some of my informants, on the other hand, cultural arguments were also important.
Although cultural arguments are made in support, the practice of abstaining from pork is
considered more of a religious than a cultural practice. My one informant who views herself as
more of a cultural than a religious Muslim eats pork, and yet maintains other culturally Muslim
practices. If it were at base cultural, she would not eat it either. One can see the cultural influence
on the practice when one considers that some do not know why they engage in the practice other
than the fact that they have done so since they were young. As one informant purported, “ils ne
prennent pas le porc parce que …c’était mis dans leur tête quand ils étaient jeunes: ‘On mange
pas de porc, on mange pas de porc.’”1138 It is not so much a religious argument that is given, but a
cultural one for the religious practice. Furthermore, another informant explained how this
practice, which is at base religious, can become cultural.
Je pense qu’à la base c’est religieux, ensuite c’est devenu culturel…. Le porc,
culturellement, il n’y avait pas de porc en Algérie quand j’étais petit. Ça n’existait pas, ça
ne se vendait pas. Ma mère ne mange pas de porc. Donc, en plus, culturellement, ils nous
ont dégoûté du porc: le porc est dégueulasse, le porc est un animal très sale. C’est pour
1133

Again, this informant was the same one who did not fast for Ramadan and viewed herself as more culturally
Muslim than religiously so.
1134
As noted in Chapter 5, the verses that are used to support this injunction are as follows: The Quran, 2:173; 5:3;
6:145; 16:115.
1135
130424_001—“Forbidden in my religion”; see also 130430_001; 130520_002.
1136
130424_001—“There is a Quranic verse that says the consuming of meat from pigs is ‘haram.’”
1137
130529_003—“If our God forbade us from this thing, it’s because it will do us harm. We are not going to
discuss it.”
1138
130731_003—“They do not take pork because it was… it was put in their head when they were young. ‘We
don’t eat pork, we don’t eat pork.’”
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ça, beaucoup, que je ne mange pas de porc. C’est plus par habitude que par
conviction.1139
It is for this reason that it is possible, according to some of my informants, to find atheists with
Muslim origins who do not eat pork.1140 This supports Bergeaud-Blackler’s conclusion that the
cultural revulsion around pork consumption is so strong in the Maghreb, that it is almost not
necessary to give religious reasoning, or support for, the abstention from consuming it.1141
The logical arguments for this religious practice also came to the fore. I spoke with a PhD
candidate in Islamic Studies, who also happened to be a Maghrébine Muslim, and he explained
how strict the interdiction against pork is, for both religious and cultural reasons. He explained
that there is no argument that can be made for eating pork, there is absolutely no reason to eat it.
It is entrenched in the Quran and is clear as day. When another informant asked him what the
reason is behind not eating pork, he gave a classic explanation: not only is the meat weak, but the
pig only has one stomach and consequently the food it eats does not get properly digested and is
toxic, which then makes the meat of the pork toxic for humans to eat. He then asked if we would
like to know the real reason why it is forbidden, the reason that Muslims do not want to admit. I
responded with an “of course.” He then began to explain that the pig is the only animal where the
male does not get jealous of the female. He explained that if another pig mates with his female,
the male pig does not care, and this sort of lack of jealousy of the female is completely against
Arab culture. He suggested that the person who eats pork then takes on this characteristic to
some level and becomes less jealous of others around the women in his life.1142 I was surprised
by this argument; I had never heard it before and did not hear it again, nor could I find textual
support for it, but it proved to be a striking example of people finding logical reasons to not
engage in a particular practice.

1139

130806_004—“I think that at its base it is religious, and after it became cultural…pork, culturally, there was not
pork in Algeria when I was young. It did not exist; it was not sold. My mother did not eat pork. Moreover,
culturally, they made us feel disgusted about pork: pork is disgusting, the pig is a very dirty animal. It’s for that
reason that I do not eat pork. It’s more of a habit than a conviction.”
1140
130404_001.
1141
Bergeaud-Blackler, “Social definitions of halal quality,” 102.
1142
Personal Correspondence, Field Journal, March 1, 2013. What is noteworthy about this response is it highlights
the centrality of food to identity. As I have argued food is a means of presenting, and of labeling others’, identity.
After all, “we are what we eat.” If we are what we eat, we take on the characteristics of the things we are eating.
This idea seems to be at play in this informant’s idea of why pork is problematic.
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The more common “logical” reason given for this practice was related to health. Some
informants explained that pigs were created to clean the planet; they consequently ate everything
and were considered dirty and best to be avoided.1143 While many would state this idea as a
matter of fact, without any real grounding, others would go further and cite specific studies or
scientific knowledge for why the abstention from pork was the only logical way to go. One of
my informants, a medical doctor, took this approach. He explained to me,
Je sais ça parce que j’ai fait des recherches, mais sinon les gens ne le savent pas. Mais il y
a maintenant 27 maladies qui sont liées au fait de manger du porc. Surtout quand on
mange du porc on ne le cuit pas suffisamment, donc ce ver là, ou les œufs de ce ver là,
vont rester vivant. Ils vont sporuler et, une fois dans le corps humain, ils vont prendre
forme et ça forme des maladies. Mais les milieux hospitaliers savent ça, ils reçoivent des
gens atteint d’infections liées à ça. Mais on n’en parle pas car c’est tout un commerce, un
business, ça fait tourné l’économie.1144
There was clearly a scientific reason to this religious practice given by this informant (in this
case, accompanied by a bit of conspiracy theory)—and by many others who cited the health
reasons for not eating pork. Both cultural and religious reasoning was given for this normally
understood religious practice.
8.3.3 Alcohol
A similar situation arises for the practice of abstaining from alcohol. When examining my
informants’ practices, there is the slightest bit more flexibility in this practice than in the
abstention from pork, with 30 of my informants abstaining and two consuming alcohol.1145 Some
of my informants saw the abstention from alcohol as a religious obligation while others saw it as
a cultural practice. While it was “Quranically-documented and prescribed” the lack of clarity in
the Quran regarding this practice may be a reason for why it is not as clear-cut of an
injunction.1146 For example, one informant explained the effect of the language of the Quran in
this case to me. He said,
1143

130615_001.
130727_001—“I know this because I did research, but if not people would not know this. But there are 27
illnesses that are now linked to the fact of eating pork. Especially when we eat pork, we do not cook it sufficiently
so the worms or the eggs of the worms will remain living. They will populate and once in the human body, they will
take form, and that causes sickness. But hospital settings know that, they receive people who are suffering with
infections related to it. But we do not talk about it because it is commerce, a business, it turns the economy.”
1145
Again, the cultural Muslim and a mid-thirties Algerian male.
1146
As I described in Chapter 5, the commonly cited verses in the Quran to support the abstention from alcohol are
as follows: 2:219; 4:43; 5:90-91.
1144
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Ça me vient à l’esprit que dans le Coran, si on lit très bien les versets Coraniques ... il n’y
a pas de verset Coranique qui dit que l’alcool c’est haram. Le Bon Dieu nous a dit les
conséquences de la consommation de l’alcool et il dit à la fin “attention n’approchez
pas”; c’est un ordre, mais ce n’est pas dit que c’est haram…Une fois, j’ai eu une
discussion avec des gens qui consomment de l’alcool, c’est ce qu’ils m’ont répondu en
fait. Ils m’ont dit que ça n’a pas été dit dans le Coran que c’est haram.1147
Other informants focussed on the stages of the injunction against alcohol as the reason why there
may be some confusion as to whether the practice is a religious obligation or not.1148 Regardless,
whether the practice is considered haram or simply something one must avoid, it is argued as
being religious because of its place in the Quran.
Most of my informants would argue that it was a strict religious obligation to not drink
and yet they all seemed to know Muslims who broke this obligation. The argument was typically
made not that these folks were not practicing Muslims, but instead, Muslims who sinned, who
did not follow Islam quite as closely as others, etcetera.
L’Islam c’est comme le code de la route. Il y a des personnes qui vont le respecter de
50%, d’autres à 60%, d’autres à 70%. Aussi ça dépend du cheminement spirituel, de
l’éducation, il y a plusieurs paramètres qui rentre. On ne les juge pas, parce que ça
dépend de tous les paramètres dont je t’ai parlé tout à l’heure, mais oui, il y a des
personnes qui prennent de l’alcool. Oui. Ils savent que c’est…Un musulman va jamais te
dire que l’alcool n’est pas…un péché. Il n’y a pas quelqu’un qui va te dire ça, mais il va
te…donner d’autre raisons. Peut-être c’est la pression au milieu du travail, ça dépend, son
entourage…mais il n’y a pas quelqu’un qui va te dire “non, c’est pas un péché.”1149
1147

130517_002—“It comes to mind that in the Quran, if we carefully read well the Quranic verses …there is not a
Quranic verse that says that alcohol is Haram. God told us the consequences of the consumption of alcohol and he
said in the end ‘Be careful, do not approach it’; that’s an order, but it does not say that it is haram…One time, I had
a discussion with people who drink alcohol, and that what they told me. They told me that it was not said in the
Quran that it is haram”; So also: “Oui, par exemple, pour l’alcool, c’est écrit dans le Coran … évitez-le. Ce n’est pas
écrit le mot interdit. Il y a des musulmans qui en prennent. Mais l’alcool nous a été interdit car quand tu bois de
l’alcool tu as [perdu] un peu les idées” (130529_003).
1148
“Donc la première, c’est l’alcool est bon, bon pour la santé, mais il est mauvais pour autre chose. Et ce qui a de
mauvais l’emporte sur ce qu’il y a de bon. Donc les gens ont dit, on va faire un petit régime, on va réduire. Puis la
deuxième, c’était n’approchez pas de la prière en ayant bu de l’alcool; comme ça vous saurez ce que vous direz. Et
puis la troisième, c’est éviter, en terme arabe, si vous voulez la satisfaction d’Allah. Alors, ce n’est pas écrit et des
gens jouent sur ça. Ils disent, oui ce n’est pas écrit clair. Alors qu’en arabe le mot ‘éviter’ c’est beaucoup plus
important, il a plus de poids que le mot haram. Haram c’est dans certaines circonstances, mais éviter c’est dans
toutes les circonstances (130727_001).
1149
130424_001—“Islam is like the highway code. There are people who will respect it 50% of the time, others at
60% and others at 70%; also that depends on the spiritual path, education, there are many parameters that enter
into play. We do not judge those people, because that depends on all of the parameters that I told you about
earlier, but yes, there are people who drink alcohol. Yes, they know that it’s… a Muslim will never tell you that
alcohol is not something that is not a sin. There is no one who would tell you that, but he will tell you, he will give
you other reasons. Maybe it is the pressure at work, it depends, [or perhaps] his entourage, but there is no one
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Instead of placing people in the category of “not a real Muslim”—something that happens often
when people act in ways that seem to conflict with a general understanding of religious
membership—my informants would explain the situation in another way so as to not take away
the person’s Muslim identity, but to merely qualify it. Like Beyer’s categorization of Muslim
identity along a ten-point scale,1150 my informants seemed to believe that people practice to
differing levels and alcohol is one realm where this is evident. The notion of culture and religion
can be blurred here.
The context in which one finds oneself sometimes leads to more flexibility in this
practice. My informants sometimes spoke about living in France, where alcohol is much more
prominent and accessible, with this possibly leading to changes in practice.1151 Other informants
suggested that people will come back to practicing lives later on in life and will stop drinking,
but that many drink when they are young; it is accessible and acceptable.1152 One informant
described the various contexts that one may find oneself in where this abstention from alcohol is
not as culturally driven.
En Algérie, il y a beaucoup de musulmans qui le prennent. Il y a une région au sud, là où
je faisais parfois mes missions, il y a des gens qui reviennent de la mosquée après avoir
pratiqué une prière donnée, après ils prennent de l’alcool normalement. C’est étonnant
mais c’est comme ça. En Algérie il y en a beaucoup; ici aussi, il y en a beaucoup. En
France, parce que j’ai fait mes études en France, il y en a aussi énormément de
musulmans qui prennent de l’alcool, et même qui mangent du porc le plus normalement
du monde.1153
In these contexts, where alcohol is accessible, it seems as though many leave the religious
injunction aside and take on a more cultural reason to engage in this practice.
Another aspect of the injunction against alcohol that helps to reveal some of its cultural
elements is the fact that it is considered more acceptable for a man to drink alcohol than a

who will tell you ’no, it’s not a sin.’”; see also: “C’est interdit mais il y en a qui transgressent” (130430_002); “Oui, il
y a des musulmans qui boivent. Ils savent que ce n’est pas halal, mais…(silence)” (130505_001).
1150
Beyer, “Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism,” 58-60.
1151
130401_001.
1152
130404_001.
1153
130517_002—“In Algeria, there are many Muslims who drink it. There is a region in the south, I did some of my
missions there; there are people who come back from the mosque after practicing a certain prayer; afterwards
they drink alcohol normally. It’s shocking but it’s like that. In Algeria, there are many; here as well, there are many.
In France, because I did my studies in France, there are also a large number of Muslims who drink alcohol and also
who eat pork as normally as the rest.”
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woman. If it were strictly religiously forbidden, the gender of the consumer would have no effect
on the acceptability of the practice. One of my informants who drank alcohol explained that
“culturellement, c’est très mal vu qu’une femme boive de l’alcool,” and because “la règle est la
règle, si elle ne s’applique pas de la même manière pour tous, je préfère m’inscrire dans le
groupe le plus privilégié.”1154 She justified her lack of practice by the fact that to her it was
culturally malleable.
Whether someone used religious or cultural reasons to explain the injunction against
alcohol, logical arguments were also made for the reason why someone should abstain from it.
One informant spoke of the fact that one cannot drive after having consumed alcohol and so it
was logically problematic to consume it. She posited that,
parce que vous voyez dans ces sociétés-là, c’est interdit pour vous de conduire quand
vous buvez. Donc ce n’est pas bien de boire. (Elles rigolent.) Si c’était une bonne chose,
on ne peut pas dire, ne buvez pas de l’eau quand vous conduisez, vous ne pouvez pas
prendre du coca cola; donc ça donne à réfléchir pourquoi je n’ai pas le droit [de boire de
l’alcool]. C’est pas bon pour la santé, ce n’est pas bon.1155
Whether or not it was because we cannot drive when having consumed alcohol or we cannot
drink alcohol when we take certain medications,1156 these reasons were seen as clear, logical
reasons for the religious injunction against this consumption practice.
8.3.3.1 Alcohol vs. Pork
Where the complexities of the role of culture and religion become evident is in the comparison of
the injunction against pork and the one against alcohol. Although most of my informants did not
consume either product, as I explained above, all my informants knew Muslims who consumed
alcohol, but barely any could come up with an example of Muslims who ate pork. Mohammed
Benkheira, in his article on Muslim food prohibitions, similarly states that although, “du point de
1154

130706_001—“Culturally it is frowned upon for a woman to drink alcohol…. The rule is the rule, if it is not
applied in the same way for all I prefer to register in the more privileged group”; so also: “Tous les Algériens ne
boivent pas, quoi que les hommes, ils boivent; ne croyez pas qu’ils ne boivent pas. Mais en général, les femmes ne
boivent pas” (130731_003).
1155
130430_004—“Because you see in those societies, it’s forbidden for you to drive when you drink. So it’s not
good to drink. [They laugh.] If it was a good thing, we cannot say don’t drink water when you drive, you cannot
drink coca cola, so that makes one think why I do not have the right [to drink alcohol]. It’s not good for one’s
health, it’s not good.”
1156
"Je trouve que ça n’a aucun sens franchement d’interdire la consommation d’alcool et de la permettre dans les
restaurants. C’est une complication de vie. Et même si tu as des problèmes de santé, le médecin t’interdit de boire
de l’alcool. Si tu consommes un médicament, il est interdit de consommer les deux simultanément. Je crois que
c’est assez clair pour tout le monde que l’alcool n’est pas bon pour notre santé” (130615_001).
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vue pénal, il vaut mieux manger du porc que boire du vin, les Maghrébins transgressent plus
facilement le second interdit que le premier.”1157 If the injunction against alcohol is considered to
be at the same level as that against pork, and sometimes even more problematic as we see in
Benkheira, then what led to this difference in actual practice? First, a large portion of my
informants argued that there was no difference between the two practices: both are religious food
obligations and cultural influences do not matter.1158 As one informant exclaimed, “C’est
exactement la même chose. Il faut tout écarter à 100%...C’est interdit, c’est catégorique, c’est
blanc ou noir.”1159
Although this informant and the others like her saw the issue as black and white, others
argued for larger grey areas in the discussion. Some would argue that fundamentally it was the
same and yet there was a difference in practice on the ground of the two.
C’est un peu bizarre parce que la restriction est la même, les deux sont vraiment interdits
mais vous pouvez trouver plusieurs musulmans qui boivent mais vous n’allez pas trouver
des musulmans qui mangent du porc. Je n’ai jamais compris pourquoi. Si tu leur dis, tu
manges du porc? Ils disent non, c’est impossible que je mange du porc malgré qu’ils
boivent. C’est la même chose, mais c’est bizarre.1160
For these informants, the situation is bizarre, almost unexplainable.1161 Others come up with
reasons why there is a difference, and most of those have to do with cultural influence.
For some, the way that the two practices were written about in the Quran is the reason for
this difference in approach. As I explained above, the language around the injunction against
alcohol is muddier than that for pork, despite the fact that the Quran is clear that Muslims should
not drink alcohol. Why? While pork is explicitly labeled as haram in the Quran, alcohol is not,
and for that reason there is more room to argue for exceptions to the rule.1162 For others, it is the
1157

Benkheira, “Alimentation,” 266. “From the criminal point of view, it is better to eat pork than to drink wine,
Maghrébines more easily transgress the second interdiction than the first.”
1158
1304301_001; 130430_003; 130430_004; 130430_006; 1305050_001; 130519_001; 130520_002.
1159
130501_001—“It’s exactly the same thing. One must exclude everything to 100%...It’s forbidden, it’s
categorical, it’s black and white.”
1160
130517_001—“It’s a bit strange because the restriction is the same, both are very much forbidden but you can
find many Muslims who drink but you will not find Muslims who eat pork. I never understood why. If you ask them
‘you eat pork?’ They say ‘no, it’s impossible that I could eat pork’ despite the fact that they drink. It’s the same
thing but it’s bizarre.”
1161
“They are exactly the same, so much so that if someone feels they can consume alcohol they can also consume
pork, and yet, people in Algeria will drink alcohol but not eat pork” (130518_001); see also: “Oui c’est ça, pour
l’alcool tu peux trouver des musulmans non pratiquants qui boivent de l’alcool, mais le porc c’est vraiment interdit.
Il y a une certaine difference” (130731_002).
1162
130807_001; 130706_001.
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fact that alcohol is more readily available in the Maghreb than pork.1163 The other informant who
consumed alcohol explained his practice and the difference between the approach to alcohol and
pork in this manner. He would not eat pork but he did drink alcohol, and when I asked him what
the difference was he responded as follows:
Mais, culturellement, c’est quasiment plus facile de boire que de manger du porc...Je
pense que c’est parce que l’alcool est plus à la base dans notre culture que le porc. Nous,
la viande, c’est plus l’agneau ou du mouton, par rapport aux asiatiques pour qui le porc
est tout pour eux. J’imagine mal comment ils font ça là-bas. Pour nous, ce n’est pas
vraiment difficile. Je [ne] me prive pas en ne mangeant pas de porc. Ça m’est égal. Ce
n’est pas comme si j’aime ça et que je ne le mange pas. Mais, l’alcool ça a toujours été
là.1164
For this informant, and others like him, pork was not present, it was not something he would
miss out on, but alcohol was.1165 In fact alcohol was often a part of young peoples’ lives in the
Maghreb, while pork was not.1166 One of these products was made more normative while the
other was kept as foreign, strange, bad.1167
This fact generally led to a different level of cultural revulsion or digust surrounding the
two practices. One informant explained how the two products were viewed differently in a
cultural sense. He suggested that
il y a le silence. Socialement c’est plus facile pour l’alcool que pour le porc. Pourquoi?
Parce qu’ils ont associé le porc à quelque chose de malsain. Le porc est omnivore, le porc
mange n’importe quoi. C’est plus une révulsion pour le porc que pour l’alcool.
Socialement, c’est peut-être plus accepté [de boire], c’est moins une violation de la
religion.1168
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As I argued in Chapter 5, alcohol, specifically wine, has been a prominent market in the Maghreb since France’s
colonization of the region. Wine was not just present, but a part of the market economy of Algeria and Morocco.
Pork is almost non-existent.
1164
130806_004—“But culturally, it’s much easier to drink than to eat pork…I think it is because alcohol is more
present in our culture, at its base, than pork. For us, meat is more lamb or sheep, compared to Asians for whom
pork is everything. I cannot imagine how they do it there. For us, it’s not very difficult. I am not deprived by not
eating pork. I do not care, it’s not as if I like it and I do not eat it. But alcohol, it was always there.”
1165
130517_002; 130529_003.
1166
130723_001.
1167
One should note that alcohol consumption differs from pork and halal eating because it’s physically addictive.
Once hooked (and this differs, of course, from person to person) it is far more difficult to stop drinking alcohol than
it is to stop eating pork.
1168
130806_005—“There is a silence, socially it is easier for alcohol than for pork. Why? Because they managed to
associate pork with something unhealthy. The pig is an omnivore; the pig can eat anything. It’s more of a repulsion
for pork than for alcohol. Socially, that may be more accepted, it’s less of a violation of the religion.”

348

Here the informant expands the cultural effect to the religious realm. It is not only less of a social
or cultural violation but is consequently less of a religious violation. For another of my
informants this difference in violation was evident in her own thoughts about how she would feel
if she ate pork versus if she drank alcohol. Through a colourful explanation of what she imagined
would happen in the two circumstances, we can see how disgust is a strong emotional, and even,
physical response.
Il sait que le porc c’est pire que l’alcool. Personnellement, je sens que si je vais manger
du porc, je sens que ça va partir dans tous mes tissus, ça va habiter mon corps. (Elles
rigolent.) Alors le liquide pour moi, plus ou moins ça peut disparaitre mais le porc je vais
sentir que j’ai un morceau quelque part qui appartient définitivement.1169
Similarly, other informants spoke about the effect of eating with your eyes in the Maghrébine
culture. They related this to the question of eating pork and suggested that pork is not attractive
to them. It is not an attractive looking thing and there is not the same pull toward eating it.
Alcohol on the other hand, specifically a cold, crisp beer on a hot summer’s day, is incredibly
nice to look at and consequently more tempting.1170 The elaborate visualizations of pork and
alcohol that are present in the Maghreb influenced how each substance was viewed, in spite of its
religious significance. So much so that Bergeaud-Blackler suggests that “the distaste for pork in
Muslim societies is so profound that it is hardly even necessary to forbid its consumption.”1171
Pork is “culturally” inherently more problematic.
8.3.4 Halal Meat
The final of the four “Quranically-documented and ‘prescribed’” practices is that of consuming
halal meat.1172 This practice was the most varied of the four, although there is still a large amount
of consistency of practice in the data set. Of my 32 informants, 27 ate halal meat exclusively,
three ate mostly halal but would sometimes eat non-halal meat, and two have no interest in
keeping halal.1173 Despite some slight variation, halal was generally seen as absolutely central,
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130430_005—“He knows that pork is worse than alcohol. Personally, I feel that if I eat pork, it will spread in all
of my tissues; it will live in my body. [They laugh.] Whereas liquid, for me, that can disappear more or less, but
pork I will feel like I have a piece of it somewhere that will stay indefinitely.”
1170
Personal correspondence with the researcher, Field Journal, February 22, 2013.
1171
Bergeaud-Blackler, “Social Definitions of Halal Quality,” 102.
1172
The verses of the Quran that support this practice are: 2:173; 6:145; 16:115. The most extensive verses in the
Quran that address the various points behind halal slaughter are 5:3-4.
1173
The two who had no interest in keeping halal were also the two who consumed alcohol.
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sacred, and completely religious. It was “vraiment primordial, sacrée, ça c’est très important.”1174
It was so essential that some of my informants spoke about the fact that they would even decide
where they would live based on the availability of halal meat.1175
The religious significance of the practice was also highlighted by the fact that trust was
one of the most important aspects of keeping halal that my informants mentioned. Like my
informants in Paris, most of my Montréal informants spoke about the fact that they had to trust
the people who are selling them halal. Even if the sin is ultimately on the person selling the meat
and not the person buying it, it was still essential that my informants knew that the meat was
coming from a Muslim. These informants tended to trust a Muslim butcher more than the
grocery store, and furthermore, they would have more trust in a Muslim butcher that they knew
personally than just any Muslim butcher. Even though there is halal in the grocery stores, it is not
good enough for many of my informants. For example, one informant explained that
les grandes surfaces, malgré qu’ils disent halal, je garde une petite restriction. Même les
boucheries, je n’achète pas chez n’importe qui. Il y a des bouchers, tout dépend des
personnes. Tu sais, je n’ai pas confiance à n’importe quel boucher. S’il y a des bouchers
que je connais…je vais acheter d’eux parce que je les connais et j’ai confiance.1176
If keeping halal was simply a cultural practice, then where one bought the meat would not matter
so deeply to so many people. The fact that one must fully trust the person who is telling them
that the meat is halal, even if the blame would be on the seller and not the buyer, is a clear
indication of how religiously significant this practice is for these informants.
One can see the cultural influence on this practice when one considers those who do not
keep halal strictly. These informants tended to give three different answers for why they did not
keep halal. The first reason was by “politesse.” This informant would not eat pork, would not
drink alcohol, but saw halal as a bit more flexible. She told me that normally she keeps halal but
if she is invited to a friend’s house who does not eat halal, she will eat out of politeness, even if it
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130430_001—“Really crucial, sacred, it is very important.”
“La seule raison pourquoi on a choisi Montréal [c’est l’halal]—car mon frère a fait ses études à Trois Rivières.
Maintenant je sais qu’il y a halal là-bas, mais avant, à l’époque où il faisait ses études, il n’y en avait pas; il faisait
l’aller-retour Montréal pour en acheter” (130529_003).
1176
130520_001—“The large grocery stores ,although they say halal, I keep a niggling restriction. Even the butchers
… I do not buy from just any butcher. There are butchers, everything depends on the person. You know, I don’t
trust just any butcher. If there are butchers that I know, I will buy there; because I know them and I trust them”;
also mentioned by 130731_002.
1175
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would shock people to know.1177 The second reason given for flexibility in this practice was
because the definition has changed:
C’est quoi le halal? Ça c’est un débat théologique. Donc on ne va pas rentrer ici. Je
mange [tout]. Pour moi, la viande c’est la viande…la viande [en temps passé] c’est ce qui
a été sacrifié en autre nom que Allah—quelqu’un a dit, au nom de bouddha, de Jésus, de
Jean. Pour moi, je ne crois pas que, d’après mes connaissances, ça existe maintenant. Les
gens qui travaillent dans les boucheries, ce sont des gens normaux. Ils font leur travail. Ils
ne font rien [étrange], ils égorgent. Ça c’est un travail de routine.1178
The third reason that informants would give for why halal was more flexible is because there is
an excuse given in the Quran for eating non-halal meat. According to this argument, because
there is a Quranic passage that says that if one is in extreme conditions and
on n’a pas le choix, malgré que ce ne soit pas halal et on sait que ce n’est pas halal, on
peut prononcer le nom bismillah, ça veut dire au nom de Dieu, et on consomme. La
religion est faite pour faciliter la vie des humains, pas pour la compliquer.1179
As I argued in Chapter 5, most of the verses that address the regulations around halal have
provisions for “one who is driven by necessity,” in which case it is not a sin to consume such
things.1180 Overall, there is some wiggle room to the religious obligation, whereas with
something like pork there is never a time when it is acceptable to eat pork; there is never a
loophole, or circumstance that allows for it. Some of my informants thought there is for halal.
Interestingly, the part of the verse that is often used to justify consuming halal, “when driven by
necessity,” is located within the same verses that forbid pork consumption, yet pork is practically
never included in the list of things that one can consume when this “necessity” arises. Here again
we may see the influence of culture on religion.
As is the case for all the other practices in this category, whether or not one used religious
or cultural arguments to explain their practice, they often gave a secondary reason for the
consumption of halal that was based in logic. The most important argument made in this regard
1177

130401_001.
130404_001—“What is halal? That’s a theological debate. So we aren’t going to enter it here. I eat
[everything]. For me, meat is meat… the meat [in times past] that was sacrificed to another name than Allah—
someone said in the name of Buddha, or Jesus, or John. For me, I do not believe, according to my knowledge, that
that exists now. People who work in the butcher shops, they are normal people, they do their work. They don’t do
anything [strange]. They slaughter. It’s a routine job.”
1179
130430_003—“We do not have a choice, although it is not halal and we know that it is not halal, we can
pronounce the name bismillah—that means in the name of God—and we eat. The religion was made to facilitate
the life of humans, not complicate it.”
1180
2:173; 5:3; 6:145; 16:115.
1178
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was that halal meat was healthier because it drained the animal of all of its blood, and they
believed that the blood was where disease was housed. Again this is argued as “scientifically
proven” by many of my informants: “scientifiquement, quand on égorge de cette manière-là, la
bête dégage tout son sang…Et la viande devient plus saine au niveau de la consommation;
beaucoup plus que celle où il y a du sang.”1181 Many others argue simply that meat without blood
is better for your health than meat with blood without any real explanation as to why that may be
the case. Some do posit why bloody meat is worse than bloodless meat, namely because “le sang,
quand il reste à l’intérieur, il est vecteur de germes. C’est scientifiquement prouvé que lorsqu’on
vide l’animal de son sang, la viande est plus saine.”1182 While these so-called facts are now only
available in recent years, many of these informants would suggest that they were already known
by Muhammad, through God’s revelation, and that is why this practice appears in the Quran. All
Muslim religious practices have scientific grounding, according to these informants—not
surprisingly, given the theological framework in which they imagine themselves in the world.
8.4 Quranically-Documented but not Prescribed Food Practices
We now come to the second category of food practice, that of the “Quranically-based but not
prescribed” category. The clearest example in this category is the lamb of the Eid Al-Adha. The
reason why it is placed in this category and not the first is that while it is a religious festival that
most Muslims around the world do celebrate there is no real injunction in the Quran that one
must eat lamb on this day. It is a religious act because it finds its grounding in a religious story
and tradition; it is based on the story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, which is an
essential story in the Abrahamic religious traditions.1183
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130615_001—“Scientifically, when we slaughter in this manner, the animal clears all of its blood…and the meat
becomes healthier for consumption; much more than the one that had blood.”
1182
130520_002—“The blood, when it stays inside, it is a vector for germs. It’s scientifically proven that when you
rid the animal of its blood, the meat is healthier”; 130424_001, 130430_004, 130517_002, 130520_001,
130615_003, 130727_001 all make similar arguments.
1183
As I presented in Chapter 5, the verses which are relevant here are: (1) The verses which describe the story of
Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael: 37:99-109; (2) the verse that people refer to in support of the
sacrifice of an animal at the end of the pilgrimage: 22:27-29; and (3) the verse which addresses the Hajj, to which
the sacrifice is related: 2:196.
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8.4.1 Eid Al-Adha Lamb
This practice is essentially the clearest example of a religious food practice that my informants
mentioned. For my informants, who generally gave cultural arguments for commonly understood
religious practices, such as the four mentioned in the first category, the Eid lamb stood apart as
something unique, something fully religious. One informant, when speaking of other, often
understood, religious food practices, focused mostly on the cultural or traditional elements to the
practice, but when it came to the Eid lamb she focussed on the religious. In response to this
practice she exclaimed: “l’agneau de l’Eid c’est religieux.”1184 Another informant, when
speaking about Islam and food, expressed that “la seule chose qui est religieux, c’est dans notre
fête du mouton.”1185 It is not surprising my other informants, who were more prone to giving
religious arguments for their food practices in general, also stressed the fact that slaughtering and
eating the Eid lamb was a purely religious act; it was seen as something beyond culture.1186
One of the clearest reasons why this was a primarily religious food practice, according to
my informants, is because of the fact that it was a universal practice: Muslims, they believe,
engage in this practice no matter where they are in the world. After all, “ça, c’est la religion
parce que même ici ou même en occident il y a les musulmans qui égorgent parce que c’est le
Prophète, c’est la religion.”1187 Whether in the Maghreb, the West, the East, or elsewhere, all
Muslims, my informants claim (with some measure of exaggeration, to be sure), acknowledge
the practice of the sacrifice and consumption of the Eid lamb as a religious endeavour. Instead of
being specific to a time and place, as cultural practices are, the sacrifice of the Eid lamb was
thought to cross boundaries spatially and temporally.
Just because the practice is seen as universal and essentially religious, it did not mean,
according to my informants, that the practice was obligatory for all Muslims to engage in, like
those practices in the first category. There are those who cannot afford to partake in the practice,
and they are not obligated to do so as a result. As one of my informants clarified,
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130401_001—“The Eid lamb is religious.”
130518_001—“The only thing that is religious, it is in our festival of sheep.”
1186
130430_003; 130430_004; 130430_005; 130430_006; 130501_001; 130505_001; 130517_001; 130519_001;
130520_002; 130529_003; 130612_001; 130615_001; 130615_002; 130615_003; 130723_001; 130727_001;
130731_002; 130806_004; 130806_005; 130807_001.
1187
130404_001—“That is the religion because, whether here or in the Occident, there are Muslims who sacrifice
because it is the Prophet, it is the religion.”
1185
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on doit égorger le mouton, selon les capacités de la personne financière bien sûr. Si la
personne a le moyen, c’est une obligation de sacrifier le mouton. S’il ne l’a pas, ce sont
des gens pauvres, ils ne sont pas dans l’obligation de sacrifier le mouton.1188
Other informants suggested that, depending on the person’s means, it might not always be a lamb
or sheep, but instead may be veal or a cow or some other sacrifice, but it was important to
sacrifice something.1189 Another informant suggested that “ce n’est pas toutes les familles qui le
font. Il y en a qui paye de l’argent. Nous, on a le choix d’égorger un mouton ou bien de payer le
prix du mouton à des familles pauvres.”1190 Here an exception is made perhaps for those who do
not wish to kill an animal but still want to participate in the religious festival—and those who
live in places (like Canada and France) that forbid the killing of animals in public, and restrict
the slaughter of animals in general to licensed butchers.
While the practice of killing and eating the Eid lamb is considered to be strictly religious
by my informants there are still cultural influences on how the practice is played out. This
became clear to me on the day of the Eid Al-Adha in Montréal. My host for the day explained
the prophetic tradition of eating for the Eids. She explained that for the Eid that follows
Ramadan, according to prophetic tradition, one is supposed to eat before the prayer. After a
month of fasting it is important to eat right away. In comparison, for Eid Al-Adha the prophetic
tradition is to not eat anything before one eats the lamb. Muhammad would do the morning
prayer, pray over the lamb, sacrifice it and eat the liver immediately following. As a result, there
would be no real time of fasting during this Eid, a practice that she explained is not allowed. She
then explained that “back home” this practice was easy to follow. She explained that, like
Muhammad, they would not eat anything until they ate from the sacrificed lamb. The problem is
that in Canada the process of going to the farm and getting one’s sacrificed lamb was much more
complicated and took so much longer that it led people to fasting all day long, which is forbidden
on the days of festivals.1191 A conflict arises for the immigrant in Canada to follow two different
1188

130520_002—“We must slaughter the sheep, depending on the financial capabilities of the person, of course.
If the person has the means, it’s an obligation to sacrifice the sheep. If he doesn’t, these are the poor people, they
are not obliged to sacrifice the sheep”; also mentioned clearly by 130723_002.
1189
130424_001.
1190
130517_001—“It is not all of the families that do that. There are some who pay money. We have a choice to
kill a sheep or pay the price of a sheep to give to poor families.”
1191
This was one of the most interesting insights that I learned during the Eid. It speaks directly to how traditions
have to change based on the immigrant experience. It would be fascinating to see how the Eid works, and has
evolved, in the Maghreb to have a point of comparison and to explore the effect of migration. Perhaps this
prophetic tradition is only important to a certain community of which this informant happened to be a part.
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aspects of the tradition. To follow the tradition of not eating anything before the sacrificed lamb
is consumed one almost has to fast. Because of the importance of not fasting on festival days,
this tradition of not fasting seems to trump the tradition of eating the lamb meat first on the day
of the Eid Al-Adha in Canada.1192 We can see in this example that alterations are made to a
religious practice based on one’s cultural context.
8.5 Sunnah-Inspired Food Practices
Food practices that fall into this third category are based on a religious desire to imitate the life of
Muhammad. The Sunnah is meant to guide the follower’s life, to reveal the best path for following
what is presented in the Quran. One informant elucidated the importance of imitating the Prophet
when she told me the following.
On suit la Sunnah du Prophète, ce n’est pas obligatoire de le faire, mais on suit notre
Prophète. C’est comme si le Prophète a fait cette chose-là. Ça veut dire que c’est bon pour
nous, parce qu’on croit que notre Prophète ne fait pas des choses par lui-même. C’est Dieu
qui le dirige par des actions ou des paroles.1193
For this informant, and others like her,1194 one follows Muhammad’s lead because his way of life
is clearly the closest way of living according to God’s perfect plan that one could find. So the
food practices that the Prophet Muhammad engaged in, as represented in the Sunnah, become
essential to the religious practice of many of my informants.
8.5.1 Dates and Milk
The third category of practice is best represented by the consumption of dates, and to a lesser
extent milk, to break the fast during the month of Ramadan. Because the Prophet Muhammad
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Participant Observation, Field Journal, October 15, 2013. Here we see the working out of new, negotiated
foodways because of the context in which a religious individual finds him/herself, similar to those which Nora L.
Rubel describes in her ““The Feast at the End of the Fast: The Evolution of an American Jewish Ritual,” in Religion,
Food & Eating in North America, eds. Benjamin E. Zeller, Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson and Nora L. Rubel (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 234-250. For an overview of Eid Al-Adha, in the context of sacrificial theory
and examples of lived religion across the world, see Michel Desjardins and Aldea Mulhern, “Living Sacrifice:
Rethinking Abrahamic Religious Sacrifice using Field Narratives of Eid ul-Adha,” in Not Sparing the Child: Human
Sacrifice in the Ancient World and Beyond, eds. Vita Daphna Arbel, Paul C. Burns, J. R. C. Cousland, Richard Menkis,
and Dietmar Neufeld (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 190-212.
1193
130615_002—“We follow the Sunnah of the Prophet; it is not obligatory to do but we follow our Prophet. It’s
as if, if the Prophet did that thing, that means that it is good for us because we believe that our Prophet did not do
things on his own. It is God that guides him by actions or words.”
1194
130430_001; 130430_004; 130518_001; 130519_001; 130612_001; 130731_003; 130807_001.
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broke the fast of Ramadan with dates (and, some argue, milk), dates are given religious
significance in food practice.1195 Unlike the Eid lamb, which is mentioned in the Quran and thus
has a strong religious undertone, the practice of eating dates during Ramadan comes from the
Sunnah and has religious significance, but also allows for some flexibility in practice. There are
those who see the practice as strictly religious: “Les dattes, c’est religieux.”1196 For these
informants, because Muhammad consumed dates, and because this practice is located in the
Sunnah, it is a universal religious food practice.1197 For other informants the practice of eating
dates is “un peu religieux.”1198 These informants spoke about the muddled nature of labelling this
practice either religious or cultural. While there is a “un petit lien entre cette pratique et la
religion”1199 it was not as clear cut, not as universal, not as obligatory as some of the previously
mentioned food practices. As one informant explained,
je ne vais pas parler de choses et je vous dis: ça, c’est la religion à 100%. Je sais que notre
Prophète, parce qu’il y a le Coran, il y a Sunnah [et] ça complète. Notre Prophète, il nous
dit que c’est préférable de couper le jeûne avec les dattes et le lait. Je ne veux pas être
formelle, ce n’est pas que…pas le faire c’est un péché. Mais il nous conseille de couper le
jeûne avec les dattes et le lait.1200
For these informants, the practice is religiously grounded in the sense that it is related to the life
of Muhammad, but it does not have the same status as the practices mentioned in the previous
two categories.
That being said, there is some understanding that there are universal practices and there
are practices that change with time and context. While following “the Prophet” is seen as valid
and worthwhile, if Muhammad were alive in the current era perhaps some food practices would
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The commonly cited Hadith that supports the consumption of dates during Ramadan is: “The Messenger of
God used to break his fast with some fresh dates, before he prayed; if there were none, then with dried dates
(tamarat). If there were none of these he would take a drink of water” (Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, III.164) as found in Ibn
Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, Medicine of the Prophet, trans. Penelope Johnstone (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society,
1998), 224. As I explained in Chapter 5, although many of my informants also suggested that milk was an
important element of the iftar, I could not find a specific hadith that addresses the breaking of the fast with milk.
1196
130529_003—“Dates are religious.”
1197
130430_003; 130430_005; 130501_001; 130703_004; 130727_001; 130731_002; 130806_005; 130505_001.
1198
130615_001—“A little religious.”
1199
130430_002—“A small link between this practice and the religion.”
1200
130520_002—“I am not going to speak of things and say to you that it is 100% the religion. I know that our
Prophet, because there is the Quran, there is the Sunnah; that completes it. Our Prophet, he told us that it is
preferable to break the fast with dates and milk. I do not want to be formal, it’s not that … to not do it is a sin. But
he counseled us to break the fast with dates and milk.”

356

be different. This suggests that perhaps the essential is not what is consumed, perhaps not even
how, but why. As one informant aptly expressed it to me,
donc ils croient, les juristes, [que] le premier texte, la première autorité dans l’Islam, c’est
le Coran. La deuxième, c’est la tradition du Prophète. Donc on [examine le] Coran, si on
ne trouve pas [ce qu’on cherche]…si le Prophète a fait quelque chose [qu’on trouve dans
la Sunnah], c’est la religion, il faut suivre ça. Moi, je ne crois pas en ça littéralement, mais
c’est ça en général…Est-ce que je dois suivre le modèle prophétique à la lettre? Ou bien
non? Si le Prophète ou une autre personnalité qui a vécu en ce temps-là, et qui est avec
nous maintenant, est ce qu’il va faire la même chose ou bien il va changer beaucoup de
choses? Pour moi, il va changer beaucoup de choses. Donc je vois la projection pour imiter
quelqu’un. En général, je vois la projection de ça.1201
This informant suggested that if Muhammad, and others who were with him, were alive in this
day and age he may act differently; there may be different things highlighted in his actions. The
result for this person? While the general idea to model one’s life on Muhammad’s, according to
information found in the Sunnah, is valid, there has to be flexibility in understanding how that
plays out. In this specific example, of the dates for Ramadan, if the Prophet was fasting in
Canada in the twenty-first century, his eating habits may be completely different and he may
break the fast in a completely different way. This is why, this informant notes, it is the idea of
following the Prophet’s lead and not necessarily the food item itself that is important here.
The cultural effects on this practice can also be seen in the fact that, in spite of it being a
food practice highlighted in the Sunnah, it is still not a universal practice for all Muslims. One
informant postulated that “c’est traditionnel, [mais] je ne pense pas qu’en Indonésie ils font ça.
Je pense que la datte c’est localisé. Je pense, je ne suis pas sûr.”1202 The fact that not all Muslims
in all places break the fast with dates is one reason why this practice is seen as perhaps more
traditional than religious. Another informant highlighted this by suggesting that even in the
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130404_001—“So they believe, the jurists, [that] the primary text, the primary authority in Islam is the Quran.
The secondary is the tradition of the Prophet. So we [examine] the Quran, if we do not find [what we are looking
for]…if the Prophet did something [that we find in the Sunnah], it’s the religion, one must follow that. But I do not
believe in that literally, it’s in general…Do I have to follow the prophetic model to the letter? Or not? If the Prophet
or another personality that lived at that time and who is with us now, would he do the exact same thing or will he
change many things? For me, he will change many things. So I see the point to imitate someone. In general, I see
the point of that.”
1202
130806_004—“It’s traditional. I do not think that in Indonesia they do that. I think that the date is localized. I
think, I am not sure.”
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Maghreb this was not always a popular religious practice, but came into effect with the Arab
colonization of the Maghreb.1203
Maintenant c’est une habitude. Est-ce que c’est dans la culture Magrébine, par exemple?
Non. Nous l’avons acquise de la colonisation arabe. Je ne suis pas Arabe moi…Chez moi,
par exemple, à la maison je n’ai jamais vu mon père, que Dieu ait son âme, prendre des
dattes ou du lait…ce n’est pas culturel chez nous. Et après, au fur et à mesure que les gens
ont commencé à fréquenter d’autres gens, d’autres pays, à visiter d’autres pays, donc c’est
devenu maintenant une petite tradition qui s’est installé de plus en plus en Algérie. Je parle
de mon pays.1204
Still another informant suggested that it was more of a “psychological practice than a religious
one” and that one could break the fast with coconut if that is what one had access to, since what
was most important was the sugar in the food not the food itself.1205 In fact, some of my
informants suggested that they engaged in this food practice not for religious reasons, but
because of the logical health benefits of it.1206
Whether my informants saw the dates (and milk) as purely religious, as a little bit
religious, or as strictly cultural, the “logical” reason behind eating dates was central to all of their
responses. Informants spoke about the choice to break the fast with dates and milk as a religious
choice, based on a desire to follow the practices of the Prophet, but then would go on to give
“scientific” explanations for why this practice made sense. I had informants explain to me that
“les dattes, c’est un fruit qui contient tout au point de vue nutritif: des sels minéraux, des sucres,
des fibres,”1207 and because of this their religious practice was reinforced by a scientific truth.
Like the other rationally-based arguments, these informants talk about the fact that people did
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While the Arab colonization begins in 642 C.E in Egypt, Arab colonizers do not have a great deal of success in
securing the countries of the Maghreb in the first 3 decades of this colonial project. They finally gain some control
th
of the Maghreb in the early 8 Century C.E., turning the Maghreb into a province of the Arab Muslim empire and
imparting Arabization and Islamization of the Berber culture. For more information on this topic see Michael Brett,
Brian H. Warmington and Jamil M. Abun-nasr, “North Africa: From the Arab Conquest to 1830,” Encyclopaedia
Britannica, last updated May 19, 2015, accessed 12 December 2016, https://www.britannica.com/place/NorthAfrica/From-the-Arab-conquest-to-1830.
1204
130517_002—“Now, it’s a habit. Is it in the Maghrébine culture for example? No. We acquired that with the
Arab colonization. I am not Arab myself.... In my home for example at the house, I never saw my father (may God
keep his soul) take dates or milk…it is not cultural for us. And after, gradually people started to associate with
other people, other countries, to visit other countries, so it became now a little tradition that is installed more and
more in Algeria; I speak of my country.”
1205
130706_001.
1206
130517_002.
1207
130430_002—“Dates are a fruit that contain everything from the point of view of nutrition: mineral salts,
sugars, fibres”; see also 130430_003; 130723_002.
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not know why these practices were beneficial, but now “it has been proven” scientifically.1208 In
this, their religious practice is validated by science.
8.6 “Cultural” Food Practices
The final category of food practices that my informants spoke about is the “cultural” food
practices. The first set of practices that fit into this category are the traditional dishes that are
made for religious festivals, such as Ramadan and the Eids. Informants argue these food
practices to be completely traditional, the evidence of which comes from the fact that everyone
eats different “typical” dishes during these festivals. These differences were not only based on
country of origin, but also on regional differences. When I asked one informant about the dishes
that he ate during religious holidays he explained these nuances:
Je ne vais pas dire que c’est religieux. C’est beaucoup plus attaché à la culture, à la région
de laquelle je viens d’Algérie. En fait, ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion. Par exemple, au
ramadan, on prépare certains plats typiques. Dans d’autres régions, ils mangent autre chose.
Donc, on ne va pas dire qu’il y a un lien avec la religion.1209
Unlike the dates and milk that would most likely be on most tables during Ramadan because of
their religious position based on the Sunnah, these dishes vary in large degree. While they are
consistent and constant within a family or regional group, across families and groups there is
great variation. One may compare this to classic Christmas or Easter dishes enjoyed by Christian
families during the holidays, or the foods associated with Jewish holidays. For me, Christmas
would not be Christmas without my mom's apple cider enjoyed after the Christmas Eve church
service. This food practice has taken up a central role in the religious experience of Christmas
Eve for me and yet I would be hard pressed to find any religious significance in it. Just because it
has become “religious” for me does not mean that it is a religious food practice. This is an
important distinction that many, but not all, of my informants make. In fact, I had one informant
who still considers these practices religious because they are linked to religious festivals. She
explained that,
1208

130731_002; 130430_006.
130430_002—“I am not going to say that it’s religious. It’s more attached to culture, to the region of Algeria
that I come from. In fact, that has nothing to do with religion. For example, during Ramadan, we prepare certain
typical dishes, in other regions they eat other things. So one cannot say that there is a link with religion.” Similarly,
“non, c’est traditionnelle, religieusement parlant; je ne pense pas que tout le monde mange la même chose dans
tout le monde arabe. Et dans le monde islamique ce n’est pas la même chose non plus” (130430_005).
1209
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pour moi, c’est religieux car on les prépare pour des fêtes religieuses en fonction du
calendrier religieux. Cela peut être lié à la fin du ramadan, à l’Eid, ou encore à la fête de
Muhammad ou encore Noël, puisque dans ma famille, on fête également la naissance de
Jésus de la même manière que celle consacrée à Muhammad.1210
What is important to note in this case is that this informant, who is stressing that the food that she
eats during the festivals is religious for her, is the informant who considers herself a cultural
Muslim. She does not engage in any of the traditionally understood religious practices, including
abstention from pork, alcohol, consuming halal meat and fasting for Ramadan, etcetera, but here
she is arguing on the side of religion for the practices that more “religious” Muslims all label as
cultural. In this example one can see how complex is the issue of “culture versus religion.”
8.6.1 Couscous
One final food that adds complexity to the question of what is religious and what is cultural food
practice for the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in my study is couscous. We saw this with my
Parisian informants, and we see it again in Montréal. For many, it is a marker of Maghrébine
Muslim identity, both religiously and culturally. It is seen as Muslim at its base because even if
other religious groups make it, the Jews for example, “il est très bon. Tu manges un couscous
royal chez les Juifs, tu te régales: très riche, beaucoup de choses, mais ce n’est pas le vrai
couscous.”1211 The “real couscous,” the “authentic couscous,” belongs to the Muslim
community, according to this informant.
Not only is couscous seen as something that the community is known for—it is an
identity marker for them—but some would argue it has more significance than just that. While it
may be the case that “on est connu pour le couscous,”1212 it can also be much more. For example,
one informant articulated this in the following manner. She explained that
il y a vraiment une explication très profonde quand on mange le couscous. Ce n’est pas
juste un plat quand on fait la Harira ou quelque chose comme ça; c’est un plat très spécial
pour nous. Il faut le faire le vendredi, après la prière, et c’est la réunion familiale et après
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130706_001—“For me, it’s religious because we prepare them for the religious festivals according to the religious
calendar. That might be linked to the end of Ramadan, to the Eid or to the birthday of Mohammad or even to
Christmas because in my family we celebrate equally the birth of Jesus in the same way as the holiday that
consecrates Mohammad.”
1211
130401_001—“It is very good. You eat a Couscous Royal with the Jews, you savour it: very rich, lots of things,
but it is not the real couscous.”
1212
130430_005—“We are known for couscous.”
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c’est le weekend. C’est vraiment très relax. Il a une signification très profonde pour nous,
le couscous.1213
Couscous is more than just a traditional dish for this informant. In this community it is
tied to religious practice (the Friday prayer) and brings the family together which is also
foundational to Muslim culture. Here we see how “individual choice—the decision to distinguish
certain practices from other, ordinary, practices”—influences how something is categorized;
intention matters, such that the kind of cooking one does, for whom, in what circumstances,
etcetera, makes it religious.1214 We can similarly see the impact of individual intention on
religious categorization when looking at Courtney Bender’s Heaven’s Kitchen. In that work,
Bender describes one of her informants who argued that her cooking at “God’s Love We
Deliver” was a religious practice in comparison to just her regular everyday cooking.1215 Like my
informants, whom I describe above, who see couscous on Fridays as religious versus couscous
on any other day, Bender’s informants make ritual out of intention, as well as repetition. Mehta
similarly explains that,
while it is true that chocolate bunnies have little to do with the Resurrection, it is equally
true that gefilte fish is not related to the Exodus, yet for many American Christians and
American Jews, neither Easter nor Passover would be the same without those foods.1216
Couscous, like these other commonly understood “cultural” foods, can take on religious
significance.1217
Couscous is also seen as a perfect example of a Maghrébine dish, as something that
Maghrébines are known for, as a cultural food expression. One informant illustrated the
centrality of couscous for her cultural identity as follows:
Je cuisine d’autres plats, mais le couscous c’est ma culture, c’est depuis que je suis né. Je
suis venu ici à 24, 25 ans. Donc tu ne peux pas [oublier] 24 ans…ça veut dire que depuis
que je suis petite je mange le couscous chaque vendredi au Maroc. A chaque vendredi il y
a le plat couscous. Durant la semaine on sait c’est quoi les plats. Le vendredi c’est très
important: [pour] les marocains c’est le couscous. Donc, quand je viens là, c’est la culture,
1213

130615_002—“It really has a very deep explanation when we eat couscous. It is not just a dish when we make
Harira or something like that; it is a very special dish for us. You have to make it on Friday after the prayer and it is
the family reunion and after it is the weekend. It is really relaxed. It has a very deep meaning for us, couscous.”
1214
McGuire, Lived Religion, 109.
1215
Bender, Heaven’s Kitchen, 67.
1216
Mehta, “’I Chose Judaism,” 165.
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We can see another example of this process of making cultural foods into religious ones in Hicks, “An Unusual
Feast,” 134-153. Hicks suggests that, much like the couscous of my informants, gumbo takes up a religious place in
his home (Hicks, “An Unusual Feast,” 135).
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je ne peux pas changer ça. C’est très important pour moi. C’est quelque chose que je prends
dans mes veines.1218
Even though she also stressed the fact that couscous was consumed on Fridays, it was not the
religious aspect that was important to her. Instead, it was the fact that it was the clearest example
of a cultural tradition that was in her blood that she brought with her no matter where she would
go. As she said, couscous is her culture.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter addressed how my informants defined and consequently interacted with culture and
religion through the lens of their food practices. When considering food practice the lines
between these two categories often become quite blurry. The informants in my study often spoke
about a clear distinction between these two terms, whether based on arguments of universality
versus specificity, or public versus private, or obligation versus flexibility. Like in Paris, a
hierarchy of religious/cultural food practice emerged for my informants in Montréal as well. I
presented how, as was the case in Paris, food practice generally fell into the categories of (1) the
Quranically-documented and “prescribed” food practices, (2) the Quranically-based but not
prescribed category, (3) the Sunnah inspired food practices, and (4) the purely “cultural” food
practices. I broke down each of these categories and described my informants’ interactions with
these various food practices as well as highlighting their cultural, scientific, and logical
reasoning for why they engaged in each.
I began by exploring the fast during Ramadan. In this section I showed how, like in
France, this practice was considered the best example of a religious food practice, and was
consequently the most practiced. Its place in the five pillars makes it especially important.
Interestingly enough, I showed that even for those Muslims in my study who do not pray, or
engage in some of the other five pillars, they still fast for Ramadan. So, for some in my study,
not only was fasting important because it was one of the pillars of Islam, but it was considered to

1218

130518_001—“I cook other dishes but couscous is my culture, it is there since I was born. I came here at 24, 25
years old. So you cannot [forget] 24 years…it means that from the time I was little I ate couscous every Friday in
Morocco. Each Friday there is the plate of couscous. During the week we know what are the dishes. Friday is very
important: [for] Moroccans it’s couscous. So when I go there, it’s the culture, I cannot change that. It is very
important for me. It is something I carry in my veins.”
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be the most important Muslim practice. I also presented the idea that there seemed to be a
tangible difference in the fasting experience for those who practice based on religious conviction
versus cultural conviction (or in my case, “educational” conviction). My informants who fasted
out of religious conviction presented an air of comfort, calm and centeredness throughout the
day, even in those last difficult moments before the iftar. I, and my cultural Muslim informants,
on the other hand, seemed to feel the ravenous hunger, and all its side effects, that one would
expect from not eating for 16 hours.
I then went on to explain two of the other practices located in the Quranicallydocumented and “prescribed” category, namely, the abstention from eating pork and drinking
alcohol. After presenting the various religious and cultural explanations for my informants’
engagement with these practices I discussed the difference in approach to the two. I showed the
complexity of understanding and practice that exists within a given category. While both pork
and alcohol abstentions are considered to be religious obligations, based on their position in the
Quran, there is clearly a different approach to them on the ground. Most of my informants did
not eat pork, nor could they think of any Muslims who ate it. While most of them did not
consume alcohol either, they all knew Muslims who drank. Despite arguing that there was no
difference between the two injunctions, that both were equally haram, my informants came up
with possible explanations for why there seemed to be a difference in actual practice of some
Muslims. Some suggested that it was the way that both injunctions were written about in the
Quran that led to the apparent flexibility with which some approach the injunction around
alcohol. Others suggested that there was a different level of cultural revulsion surrounding the
two practices, with pork being continually culturally offensive and unavailable, and alcohol
being culturally available and acceptable. These cultural realities thus had a clear impact on
religious practice as was made evident through these differing practices.
While many of my informants kept halal strictly, by only consuming halal meat, some did
alter their practice in Montréal. In this we can see the effect of culture on religious practice yet
again. Those informants who did not continue to eat exclusively halal meat gave three different
types of reasons for this change in practice. First, they expressed that, to not offend a host who
offered non-halal meat, they would consume whatever was on offer; it was a matter of good old
fashioned Canadian politeness. The second reason was the understood shifting definition of what
exactly halal was. The third, and final, reason was that there was a caveat given in the Quran
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around eating halal meat which some of my informants argued applied to their situation as
Muslims living in a non-Muslim-dominant land. Ultimately, whether my informants kept halal
strictly or not, they all consumed halal meat to some extent, and, like in all of these categories of
food practice, gave what they saw as scientific/logical reasons for why they did so.
After addressing the four practices that are a part of the first category of food practice, I
moved on to the second category and specifically the practice of sacrificing and eating the lamb
for the Eid Al-Adha. What is curious about this practice is that although it is placed in the second
category of food practices, it was seen as the most “purely religious” food practice of them all.
The universality of the practice was one of the clearest reasons given for why the Eid lamb was
“purely religious.” Because Muslims across the globe engaged in this practice, according to my
informants’ understanding, it had to be religious. While it was universal, it was not necessarily
obligatory, hence its placement in the Quranically-based but not prescribed category of food
practice. I concluded this subsection by discussing the cultural influence on the practice of this
tradition by showing how the Canadian context influences the actual consumption that is done on
the day of the Eid Al-Adha.
When exploring the third category of food practice, namely the Sunnah-inspired food
practices, I showed how this category complicates the notion of religion versus culture
particularly well. While there are religious motivations and convictions for imitating the life of
Muhammad and accordingly for breaking the fast with dates as he is said to have done, my
informants also suggested that the cultural reasons behind this practice could not be ignored.
Some suggested that if Muhammad had lived in a different time and different context he may
have broken the fast with something else, and so cultural context clearly had an affect on this
practice. My informants argued that, whether one were to eat dates or not, there was a scientific
or “logical” reason to break the fast in such a way. Again, these informants suggested that their
religious food practice went beyond mere religious obligation, and they suggested that, as
Muslims, they believed that God had clear, beneficial intentions for each action; breaking the fast
by consuming dates was an excellent example of such divinely premeditated advice.
Finally, I closed this chapter with a discussion of commonly understood “cultural” food
practices, either food associated with religious festivals or the consumption of couscous. What
was fascinating about this category is that although it is overwhelmingly understood to be strictly
cultural, there were still people who gave these practices religious significance. One of my
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informants, who sees herself as a cultural Muslim and eats pork, drinks alcohol and does not
keep strict halal practices, argued that these food practices were, for her, religious. Some gave
similar religious arguments for the practice of eating couscous as well, often because it was
attached to the practice of the Friday prayers. More often than not, couscous was labelled as a
perfect representation of a Maghrébine, cultural food practice, revealing the variation of
definitions possible for any of the given food practices performed by my informants.
Overall, because of the complicated history of church and state in Québec, the
relationship to one’s religious and cultural practices gets worked out in fascinating ways on the
ground in Montréal. For most of my informants, religious food practice was not only maintained
in their move to Québec, but was in fact increased. There was no need to change their food
practices in this context as one could find all the necessary ingredients and the necessary setting
to feel as though these practices were acceptable. Because of the overall freedom to practice
religion in Canada, my informants felt comfortable maintaining, and even increasing, all their
religious, and cultural food practices in Québec.
One can still see the influence of secular reasoning on these very practices. My
informants did not shy away from labelling a practice religious, but almost always gave another,
more scientific, or logical reason for why they engaged in such exercises. No matter which
category of food practice we would discuss, whether documented in the Quran, Sunnah or
Tradition, my informants explained that the practice was religious at base, but then would go on
to explain why it also made logical sense to carry out that practice. True to Québec
interculturalism, my informants kept their religious identities but also adjusted them and their
reasoning and understanding of them to fit into the common culture of Québec.
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Chapter 9: Comparison, Critique and Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
Over the last eight chapters I have attempted to address the questions: How can food act as a
means of reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing sometimes complicated and
contested identities for minority immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? Does food
emerge as a more “politically or culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other
religious practices? In secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as
problematic, could subtler or more private expressions of religious identity help the minority
religious immigrant to engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally,
in contexts like France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up
some of the foodways of the host context, or leaving some of the home food practices that are
seen as especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and
pork), could my participants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their
transnational identity? Would they even want to? Finally, what is the impact of these societies’
unique and complex histories and interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and
nationalism on these foodways and their affiliated identities?
My study shows not only that the host contexts have distinct histories and interactions
with “the other” but that “the others” also have idiosyncratic responses to these contexts. Québec
is not a Mini-France, or better, Montréal is not a Mini-Paris. Furthermore, there is no unified
way that Muslims across or even within cultures and contexts respond to the challenges to
identity that they face. By choosing which religious and cultural food practices to continue and
which ones to alter, by choosing to label these practices, by relegating these practices to
particular places and times, the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study show the varied
ways that Muslims negotiate their identities in transnational contexts.
9.2 Comparison Between Paris and Montréal Results
When I started this project, I hypothesized that there would be a great deal of overlap between
the experiences of my informants in Paris and those in Montréal. I assumed that they would be
two case studies of similar phenomena, leading to two sites of support for whatever conclusions I
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was going to reach. I expected that there would be variation in how my informants lived their
daily religious lives and constructed their individual identities; after all, every individual has
his/her own personal history and set of circumstances that influence such things. What I did not
expect, and what came to be one of the most fruitful discoveries of my research, was how the
two contexts of reception, or host societies, would have such a differing impact on my
informants’ lives.
I knew that the host societies’ histories would influence my informants. That could not be
denied, but having bought into the myths of “Québec as a Mini-France,” and “Québec as distinct
in Canada” (in this case in relation to its approach to immigrants), I assumed that their impact
would be similar, perhaps with my Montréal informants feeling slightly more comfortable in
their lives in Québec than my Parisian informants in France. In this next section I address some
of my key findings of similarity and difference between my Paris and Montréal data to show how
the context of reception impacted my informants’ identity negotiations in distinctive ways.
9.2.1 The Effect of French Vs. Québécois Nationalism on Immigrant Identity1219
In chapters 2 and 6 I explored the different approaches to nationalism present in both France and
Québec. In Chapter 2 I argued that because of the emphasis on French national identity, and a
distinct understanding of that identity, Muslims in France may need to make more concerted
efforts to show that they too are “French,” and all that that entails. These efforts often include the
outward manifestations of one’s identity, of which food is essential. In Québec, there is also a
distinct national identity at work. As I argued in Chapter 6, the common culture that makes up
the Québécois national identity consists of language and secular nationalism; thus, in general,
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants would support one aspect of this national identity but not the
other. Because of that Québécois reality I suggested that an “Islam du Québec” that fits with the
intercultural model of Québécois nationalism might lead to Muslims in Québec de-emphasizing
their religious identities, or even more so, giving them a Québécois flair, à la interculturalism.
While my Paris data supports these ideas, the Montréal data provides a different picture, which I
address below.
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France has a distinct relationship to food, with food playing a key role in the national
identity; a national identity that is seen as essential, specific and unique. Because of a complex
history of national development, to “be French” has specific connotations, and is seen as the
most important identity for an individual in France to hold.1220 National identity takes
precedence, and my informants knew this, felt this, and were impacted by this “fact.” My
informants stressed that national identity is seen as the most important, the only worthwhile
identity to mention in the French context.
Moreover, I showed how there is an idea that there is a “French, French” identity, a form
of national identity, to which only certain people have access. Because of this, only 16 of my 33
Parisian informants claimed French identity, while 17 did not. Of the 16 who did claim it, it was
not a straightforward identity claim. There were always qualifying “yes but…” explanations. As
one of my informants expressed so clearly, “France is wine, cheese and baguette. I eat only the
baguette. So there you go. I am not really French, French.”1221 This informant was French (she
was born in France), and yet, because she did not fit into a specific food practice pattern of what
it meant to “be French” she had a hard time claiming this side of her transnational identity.1222
This was the case for many of my transnational informants in Paris. Because of the particular
concept of the nation and thus what it means to “be French,” as I described in Chapter 2,
transnational identities are generally not encouraged or recognized. Trying to maintain a
transnational identity in such a context will inevitably be worked out in distinct ways.
In Montréal, on the other hand, the concept of nation and national identity is not as
closed. While I assumed, based on the Québécois nationalism that I outlined in Chapter 6, that
my informants would be interacting with and affected by the Québécois stance on nationalism, I
was surprised to see that instead it was Canadian nationalism with which they were interacting.
In fact, only two of my informants in Montréal even mentioned Québécois national identity.
Because of this, when it came to national identity only 11 of my informants in Montréal did not
claim Canadian identity. In those cases, it was not that they could not claim it, or that they did
not want to, it was simply a matter of fact that they were not yet Canadian (usually meaning they
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did not yet have Canadian citizenship). The other 21 all gladly professed this national identity, or
professed their desire to claim it, even if they might not have Canadian citizenship. My
informants suggested that Canadian identity is viewed as being open to everyone, as something
that is accessible to all migrants, as inherently multicultural and thus as encouraging to the
transnational experience. Many of my Montréal informants brought up the fact that this
accessibility and acceptance of both sides of their transnational identity was based on the fact
that in Canada “everyone is an immigrant.”
Because “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada, transnational identity and behaviour is
almost expected and is a focus for many of my informants’ daily actions. Because everyone is
Canadian, the need to express this identity is not as visceral as the need to go back in family
history and experience to explain one’s origins.
For many of my Montréal informants, expressing their Maghrébine identities, and often
their Muslim identities as well, was a means of displaying their Canadian identity. This is a
distinct difference between the Canadian situation and the French situation. While in France the
things that make you similar are the things that you must stress to show your national identity, in
Canada it is one’s origins that make you different that ultimately make you fit with the national
identity.
The impact of these two approaches to nationalism on my transnational informants
became obvious as I analysed my data and wrote up my ethnography. My informants in Paris,
feeling as though French national identity was not really an option for them, did not attempt to
claim it (hence the 16/17 split of national identity claims among my Parisian informants). In
Montréal on the other hand, the fact that my informants believed that the Canadian national
identity allowed for and even encouraged their other identities, made them want to claim this
national identity even more (21claimed it wholeheartedly). Moreover, for my Paris informants
who did claim French identity, it was always a complicated identity claim, and for my Montréal
informants who did not claim Canadian identity it was an uncontested fact rather than a
complicated claim.
While the fear may be that by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate
difference, that highlight the “homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may
not integrate fully into the host culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. By feeling
free to fully express and engage both sides of one’s transnational identity, often thanks to
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Canada’s official multiculturalism policy, my Montréal informants felt more Canadian, or had a
greater desire to “be Canadian.” In France, the opposite was true.1223 Furthermore, my research
provides indirect evidence for Micheline Milot’s claim that immigrants to Canada “outintegrate” immigrants to the United States and other places that do not have a multiculturalism
policy.1224 Finally, this conclusion gives ethnographic evidence to Susan Worbs’ findings that the
“results in France are surprising in some aspects: The self-identification as French is not as
widespread among migrant youngsters as should be expected judging by the strong assimilation
efforts of the republican state.”1225 These differing approaches to nationalism not only had an
effect on the national identity claims, or feelings of belonging, for my informants but also
directly affected their daily practices.
9.2.2 Differences in Levels of Practice in Paris and Montréal
Because of the different approaches to nationalism present in France, Québec and Canada, my
informants engaged with their transnational food practice in different ways. As I posited in
chapters 4 and 6, to maintain connection to the homeland, and to feed one’s transnational
identity, accessibility to the homeland is key, whether or not it is physical or symbolic
accessibility. As I have expressed throughout this dissertation, food and food practice are some
of the most strongly-held means of situating oneself spatially and temporally; they can help the
immigrant to cross borders of time and space.1226 For my informants in Paris, where distances,
between home and host land were smaller, and where acceptance of transnational identity was
low, their “crossing” was physical, whereas their creation of homeland in host land, their
“dwelling” practices, were less emphasized and more open to change. The feeding of the
Maghrébine/Muslim identity was done largely through trips back home, “au bled” as they would
say. Trips back home were frequent, at least once a year. These trips allowed my informants to
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keep the ties with Algeria (or Morocco, or Tunisia) that are essential to their knowledge of
themselves as Maghrébine.
Beyond just emphasizing ties to the homeland, these trips were used strategically as well,
mostly to bring food back to the host land. While many of my informants expressed the
importance of living by rules, whether of society or Islam, they were willing to break rules in
order to feed their transnational identities; they would bring back suitcases full of food. My
informants stressed that, as much as one could access the necessary ingredients to make all their
religious and cultural foods in the host land, there was a noted difference between the “host”
ingredient and the “home” ingredient. All but one of my 33 informants in Paris mentioned that
this difference was a difference in taste, or “goût.” Maintaining practices that give access to the
“home ingredient” is essential for the transnational immigrant in Paris then. Whatever the
argument was for why the “goût” was different, often meaning “better” in the Maghreb than in
France, it became clear that it was important to try and get to as close as possible to the full
“taste” of the homeland.1227 If one cannot go “home” to make the dish there, the next best thing
is to make the dish from ingredients from “back home,” hence the emphasis on bringing food
across the borders from the Maghreb to France.
For my informants in Paris, highlighting their French identity, or de-emphasizing their
difference, through food was a more essential process in the host land. Because they were close
enough to access the homeland directly, or the home food directly, and because of the emphasis
in France on “French identity,” the working out of transnational identity in the host land was
much more focussed on the French national side. Because of notions of French universalism,1228
and as a result because it was essential to highlight one’s French identity in France, or, if not
French identity, simply not to highlight any other identity, my informants altered their
Maghrébine/Muslim food practices to a great extent.
First, it is important to note that for most of my informants their ethnic and religious
identities were conflated. One was “born Muslim” because one was born in the Maghreb. One
engaged in Muslim practices as a means of maintaining Maghrébine identity and vice versa. I
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had informants explain that it was important to maintain religious food practices as a means of
maintaining their Maghrébine identity. They were Maghrébine/Muslim because they kept halal,
did not eat pork and made couscous at home. The continuation of such practices was seen as an
essential means of maintaining connection with the Maghreb.
On the other hand, I had informants who claimed this identity but also ate pork and drank
alcohol, did not keep halal and did not fast during Ramadan (or any variation of these practices).
The conflation of religious and ethnic/cultural identity allowed a greater variation of practice.1229
Because not eating pork was viewed as a cultural practice by many of my informants in Paris, it
was more open to change, to be left behind in the French context. In fact, concerning the
conventionally understood Muslim food practice my Paris informants engaged them in the
following way: Ramadan (24 strictly observed/ 5 practiced it from time to time/ 4 did not), pork
(24 abstained/ 9 consumed it), alcohol (17 abstained/ 16 consumed it), halal (only 9 kept it
strictly/ 24 did not). For most of these informants, to not eat pork, to fast during Ramadan, to eat
the occasional couscous was enough to mark off their transnational identity. More importantly,
to change those practices was a clear way of indicating their “integrated” French identity.
The situation in Montréal was much different. Because people there could not as easily
make trips home and bring back “home ingredients” (something they were generally not
interested in anyway), they needed to “cross the divide” in different ways. For many of my
informants in Montréal, memories of the homeland are tied to and evoked by foods and
smells.1230 According to one of of them, accessing memories, whether through food or some
other means, is an essential aspect of the immigrant experience. Engaging in certain food
practices, making distinct dishes, seasoning with specific spices, gathering around a table that is
set in a particular way, are all means of accessing “home” for the Maghrébine immigrant in
Montréal.
In Montréal where distances are much larger in terms of space, climate, and culture than
they are between Paris and the Maghreb, their dwelling effort was much more deliberate. For
many of my informants these dwelling practices (the process of finding place through mapping,
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building and inhabiting),1231 specifically making home food, help them to feel at home. One of
these deliberate actions that many of informants took in Montréal was to organize and construct
their living spaces in ways reminiscent of their living spaces in the Maghreb. By structuring their
“outwardly appearing Canadian homes” in inward Maghrébine ways, these informants took
deliberate steps to connect with the homeland.
More important than the structure of their kitchen and living room was what food was
prepared in those spaces. Because of the need to emphasize the Maghrébine aspect of their
transnational identity, my informants ate the food from the homeland in larger percentage than
host land food. Although they make food from outside the homeland from time to time, they eat
“their” food primarily. While for some, cooking majority Maghrébine food is simply a matter of
habit, many of my informants make the home food in larger percentage because they want to
“remain attached” to their homeland. Finally, informants also stressed the importance of cooking
the home food as a means of educating their children about the homeland. It was essential in
passing on the Maghrébine side of one’s transnational identity in a context that was distant from
the homeland.
While one may not need to stress one’s Canadian identity through what one eats, not only
because Canada does not have a distinct or narrowly-prescribed food culture, but also because
the emphasis is often placed on the “other” side of one’s transnational identity, the need to stress
one’s Maghrébine identity is strong. This is why there is not only consistency of food practice
with what one did in the Maghreb, but an increase in homeland food traditions in Montréal. I had
many informants suggest that religiously they were “more practicing” in Canada than they had
been in the Maghreb. For these informants, their identities as “practicing Muslims” were only
highlighted in the Canadian context; it would not have been an identity that they mentioned in
the Maghreb, as there would have been no need to emphasize it in that context.1232 Furthermore,
because, according to most of my informants, 99.99% of Maghrébines are Muslims, being more
religious was also a way to connect with being more Maghrébine. Because of this conflation,
examining the conventionally understood religious food practices, most were maintained by my
1231
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Montréal informants: Ramadan (31fast/ 1 does not), pork (31 abstained/ 1 consumed), alcohol
(30 abstained/ 2 consumed), and halal (27 keep it strictly/ 3 keep it sometimes/ 2 did not care).
Because religious identities are considered acceptable identities to hold in the Canadian context
religious practices can be labeled as such and continued in the host land.
In a context such as Montréal where these relatively well known religious food practices
are not so contested, more drastic means of showing different identity were emphasized. For
example, for many of my informants in Montréal, the avoidance of gelatin is a part of one’s
religious food practice, and a part of what makes them Muslim in Canada. The discussion around
gelatin was never mentioned by my Parisian informants but it played an important role in the
religious food lives of my Montréal informants. Furthermore, because of this focus on taking the
identity of practicing Muslim to the next level, many of my informants became obsessive
ingredient verifiers, making sure that every single ingredient in every single product they
purchased was halal. They became the community of “ingredient checkers” in a world
surrounded by those laissez-faire shoppers who throw anything in their cart. Whereas in a place
like Paris, the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a contested practice as
to distinguish a particular identity, it was almost as if, in Montréal, my informants needed
something even more distinct with which to identify themselves.
Because of the different contexts of Paris and Montréal, specifically the way that nation
and relatedly transnationalism are viewed, the immigrants with whom I interacted engaged in the
essential processes of crossing and dwelling in different ways. In Paris, practices that emphasize
any other national or religious identity other than “French” are kept to the homeland context, or
changed in the host land context. In Montréal, on the other hand, one can easily engage one’s
“other” side of transnational identity; it is in fact encouraged to do so. Because of this situation,
transnational practices are deliberate in Montréal and even increased. In Paris, my informants
relabeled their religious food practices as cultural to two ends: first, this relabelling allowed them
to see this practice as more flexible and open to change, and second, if they did not stop these
practices, this relabelling made their engagement in said practices more acceptable to the nonMuslim French majority that surrounded them.1233 In Montréal, because my informants felt as
1233
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though their religious food practices were an acceptable aspect of their multiple and varied
identities in their host context, they did not feel the need to relabel commonly understood
religious food practices as cultural. In fact, because these food practices were so acceptable, they
often emphasized other, more obscure religious food practices as essential to their lives as
Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal.
Again, it is important to note that an increase in religious practice by my Montréal
informants did not equate to more communautarisme; in fact, their ability to maintain
religious/ethnic identity often led to them making more efforts to integrate into the host society.
In Paris on the other hand, the effect on practice was generally of two sorts: either informants
changed their food practice to show their integrated identity, or they maintained their practices
(either relabelling them as cultural or not). In either case, most of my Parisian informants felt that
the very fact of being Muslim (whether culturally or religiously so) and/or Maghrébine excluded
them from being French, and as a result the community was fairly insular, and maintained a wary
approach to outsiders, making integration difficult.
9.2.2.1 The Disappearance vs. the Growth of Hospitality in the Host Context
Another important distinction between my Montréal and Paris informants can be directly related
to this feeling of acceptance or rejection of minority identities in the context of reception. Both
groups discussed the importance of hospitality to their cultural and religious identities, but the
way that hospitality was worked out on the ground was drastically different in the two settings.
As I discussed in Chapter 4, my Parisian informants argued that one of the most
important distinctions between “us” and “them,” between the Maghrébine immigrant and the
non-immigrant French society that surrounded them, was in their approach to hospitality. While
Parisians have a reputation for being cold and distant, even with their inner circle contacts, the
Maghrébine culture, they insisted, is one of warmth and closeness, of hospitality. My informants
suggested that hospitality was essential and yet, as became clear when comparing my Paris data
to my Montréal data, this hospitality seemed to be altered in the French context—Frenchified, if
you will. Hospitality, as an outworking of religious identity must, like all other religious
practices be kept private. This seemingly important approach of hospitality was not present
unless you were already inside the “us.”
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My Montréal informants also stressed the importance of hospitality to their religious and
cultural identities.1234 While this trait is somewhat altered in the community in Paris, it is alive
and well in the community in Montréal. In Chapter 5, I argued that with the lack of emphasis on
the need to integrate, as understood as “to assimilate,” immigrants to Montréal feel free to
maintain practices that are essential to their religious and cultural lives in the homeland, i.e.
hospitality. This trait allows for a higher level of integration, more reaching out between
communities, and more of an emphasis of interacting with the "other" than one may expect. By
being free to express one’s religious convictions while at the same time being a part of Canadian
society, my Montréal informants felt as though there could be a greater reaching out to one’s
neighbours of all backgrounds and identities. For these informants, welcoming someone into
one’s house and providing the best of the best for them was essential to their religious practice,
something that brought great blessing. Food was one of the essential ways that my Montréal
informants expressed this hospitality; they offered the best and in abundance to neighbours,
friends, family, and strangers alike.
Because my informants were comfortably situated in their Canadian context, because
they felt much freer to be both Canadian and Muslim and/or Maghrébine, the doors were much
more easily opened to non-Muslims. Hospitality was in fact, according to one informant, a way
to bring together “toutes les cultures, tous les gens. Même s’il y a des religions, des cultures
différentes, on dit que l’être humain partout, c’est un être humain.”1235 Integration, in this
context, is to interact with all human beings, no matter the culture or religion, to be open to all.
That is the ideal that my Montréal informants expressed and that they made evident through their
hospitality.
9.2.3 The Importance of Logical Reasoning to Support Practice
While I have been highlighting the differences between the two contexts of reception thus far, I
would now like to discuss a similarity between the two data sets. In both Paris and Montréal,
both highly secular contexts, my informants navigated this secular world by providing logical
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reasons for their religious and cultural food practices. It became clear to me that, while the
motivations for my informants’ practices were often religious or cultural in nature, they would
try to provide logical, secular reasons for why they did what they did. It almost felt as though
they needed to justify these practices to me—that as a Canadian, non-Muslim researcher I would
expect a different justification for them. Even more, their responses often came across as
rehearsed responses. They would describe their real motivations for, and engagement with, their
religious practices, and then, almost on silent cue, tell me why it made logical sense to do
whatever it was they were talking about at that time.1236
In Paris, my informants spoke to me about the logic of Islam on a frequent basis. If other
traditions or cultures did not seem “logical” they were somewhat discounted, and many of my
informants took pride in what they considered the fact that Islam and its requirements were
completely in line with scientific reasoning. It was almost as if they felt that they had to ground
their reasoning for fasting during Ramadan (fasting cleanses the body and helps counteracts
overeating), not drinking alcohol (alcohol breaks down body parts and creates social strains), not
eating pork (pork has worms, the animal is dirty and disgusting in other ways), eating halal meat
(blood in meat is unhealthy, killing animals with a knife blade is more humane), etcetera, in
something beyond mere faith. My informants gave logical, often health/scientific reasons as one
of the main justifications for why they practiced the way they did. They saw their food practices
as logical, as serving some purpose for their health, and as worthwhile engaging in.
In Montréal, there was a large effort by my informants to give more than just a religious
reason for their practice as well. Food practices in our conversations would be neatly tucked into
religious/cultural categories, but then they would also give more rational reasons for these
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practices. No matter which category of food practice we would discuss, whether documented in
the Quran, Sunnah or Tradition, my informants would explain that the practice was religious at
base, but then would go on to explain why it made logical sense to do that practice as well. In
this my informants seemed to be influenced by the intercultural outlook around them. They
showed how the practices they engaged in were not only based on religious conviction, but had a
“more solid scientific” grounding as well, keeping their religious identities but also adjusting
them and their reasoning and understanding of them to fit into the common culture of Québec.
9.3 Critique/Scholarly Context: Religion and Migration; Food and Religion
As I have argued throughout this dissertation my informants use food and foodways to negotiate
their transnational, immigrant religious identities in their host contexts. A work like this does not
stand on its own and hopefully offers new insight into two fields of inquiry within religious
studies, namely religion and migration, and food and religion. Both these fields are relatively
new in the social scientific study of religion, so while general themes are beginning to emerge,
there is still plenty of space for new studies, such as mine to offer insight and nuance to these
exciting and emerging fields.
9.3.1 Religion and Migration1237
While studies of immigrant religion now abound, it was not that long ago that it was uncommon
for both migration and religious studies scholars to take each other’s work into consideration.1238
Studies of migration on the whole were not interested in religion as an influencing factor and
studies of religion were not interested in migration as an influencing factor. That has now
changed thanks mostly to three specific reasons, according to Paul Bramadat. First, there has
been a “De-Christianization of society and a De-Europeanization of many of the major Christian
communities in the west.”1239 This means that recent debates around religion and migration are
1237
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no longer just about Christianity and Judaism but now include Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism,
Buddhism and Chinese religion. Second, he argues that the salience of religion has become more
obvious to scholars in the last 15-20 years and especially post-9/11; scholars are faced with the
“perplexing power of religion in the world.”1240 Finally, and relatedly, Bramadat suggests that
“unidirectional and simplistic versions of the secularization hypothesis have begun to break
down to reveal the far more complicated realities this hypothesis previously obscured.”1241
Scholars can no longer assume that religion does not matter, is on the decline, and therefore is
not a relevant aspect of any given subject, especially migration. There is consequently a large
body of work which examines the many and varied intersections of religion and migration.1242 I
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deal here with the work of a few key scholars in the field and show how my own research fits
with or challenges these scholars’ conclusions about the role of religion for the immigrant, or in
the process of migration.
Phillip Connor, in his book Immigrant Faith, outlines four of the major ways that
immigrant religion functions in the various stages and aspects of the immigrant experience. By
examining quantitative data across religious traditions and host contexts Connor argues that his
work gives big picture patterns and broad-based conclusions.1243 Looking at the United States,
Canada and Western Europe means that his study is inevitably comparative in nature but he
suggests that his use of comparison is not meant to display the distinctive characteristics of
destination (or host) contexts but rather underlines overall patterns that remain consistent across
contexts.1244 With this metaphor he is attempting to provide a view of the full tapestry and not
just one part of the cloth.1245 My work stands in stark contrast to Connor’s in this methodological
vein. While Connor focusses on quantitative methods and overarching cross-cultural
conclusions, I use qualitative methods and make context-specific conclusions. While he uses
comparison to find the breadth, I use it to find the depth. He does state in Immigrant Faith that
he uses vignettes to make sense of statistical patterns,1246 and he calls for research to disentangle
the exceptions to the rule.1247 I see my work as functioning in these ways; my work serves as a
larger vignette which highlights the themes that Connor outlines in his work, and it also offers
some insight into those exceptions that Connor mentions.
Connor addresses four themes in the study of religion and migration: (1) moving faith,
(2) changing faith, (3) integrating faith, and (4) transferring faith.1248 In what follows I tackle
each of these in turn and discuss how my work acts a vignette of these trends, as well as how it
challenges the conclusions that Connor presents in each.
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First, Connor addresses the various ways that immigrant religion plays a role in the
migration process itself. He explores the decisions that immigrants make about migration and
suggests some trends for who migrates, where they migrate, why they migrate, and what role
religion plays in all these decisions.1249 He shows that the religious identities of immigrants are
different depending on the receiving context. The majority of immigrants to the United States are
Christian, in Western Europe there is a fairly even split between Christian and Muslim
immigrants, and in Canada there is a slight majority of Christian immigrants with sizable shares
of other traditions and “no religion” represented.1250 Connor explores the various reasons for
these religious backgrounds in these contexts; that is, he discusses the “cumulative causation” for
these immigrants’ migration.1251 He explains that religious minorities often migrate to places
where their faith is the majority, as we can see in Christian migration to the United States.1252 He
discusses the role of past colonial relationships on the migration of Muslims to Western Europe
which results in immigrants being equated with Muslims in these contexts.1253 And one may
posit that the lack of religious preference and colonial history that underlies Canadian history
may reflect the diversity of religious backgrounds that make up immigrants to Canada, although
the country’s generic Christian heritage may lead Christian minority groups to migrate to
Canada.1254
My study emerged out of the assumption that Connor highlights here, namely, that in
Western Europe, specifically, France, “immigrant” is equated with “Muslim” based on the sheer
concentration of Muslim immigrants there.1255 His work provides the quantitative support for the
idea that, on the one hand, in contexts where the religious background of the immigrant is
reflective of or in line with that of the general non-immigrant population, that population tends to
“categorize immigrants by their racial or ethnic heritage.”1256 On the other hand, in contexts
where the religious background of the immigrant is different from that of the general nonimmigrant population, that population tends to highlight those religious identities and often not
1249
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recognize the immigrant’s nationality of ethnic group.1257 My work illustrates these patterns
quite well. As I described in Chapter 4, my Parisian informants spoke about the conflation of
“immigrant” and “Muslim.” On the other side of the equation, in Chapter 7, I showed how my
Montréal informants highlighted their ethnic identities, seemingly in line with what they thought
“non-immigrant” Canadians (a term that does not really apply to many Canadians according to
my informants) expected of them.
The other aspect of immigrant religion as “moving faith” that is essential to a study such
as mine is the impact of the context of reception, or host society, on the immigrant’s future.1258
Connor argues that while “the boundary line marking differences between immigrant and nonimmigrant groups seems to be religious in Europe,” it is an ethnic line in the U.S.1259 In fact he
goes on to suggest that while in the U.S. being religious falls in line with being American, in
Europe, clinging to religious practices makes you non-European; Canada apparently has
attributes of both.1260 These general attitudes towards the place of religion in society have a real
effect on how the majority non-immigrant population responds to and welcomes immigrants in
these contexts of reception. Connor presents the attitude of receptivity in the various host
societies in one of his tables (1.4). Using the 2006 World Values Survey he shows the
percentages of people not wanting neighbours who are either immigrants or neighbours of a
different religion.1261 When examining France and Canada, Connor’s table shows that in France
43 percent of informants suggested they would not want an immigrant neighbour; in Canada, the
response was only five percent. Furthermore, only two percent of Canadian informants said they
would not want neighbours who were of a different religion; in France, 30 percent would not.1262
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These figures paint a picture of Canada being a potentially more welcoming context of reception
to religious minority immigrants than France.
My work supports this picture. As I made clear throughout this dissertation, and
highlighted in section 9.2, this difference in context of reception has a significant impact on the
lives, identities and practices of immigrants in those countries. For example, several of my
Parisian informants suggested that no matter the efforts they made to show their “French”
identity, they always felt as though, as Muslim immigrants, they would never quite be accepted
as French. My Montréal informants all expressed sentiments reflective of the picture of Canada
being a more welcoming context of reception than other places, especially in comparison to
France.1263 For numerous informants in Montréal this had to do with the fact that in Canada
“everyone is an immigrant” and they felt that one’s minority identities (whether religious,
cultural, ethnic, etc.) were not only accepted but encouraged.
Before continuing with Connor’s other points, let me turn to another essential work in the
field of religion and migration which addresses the contexts of reception, and specifically their
governance of religious diversity: Paul Bramadat and Matthias Koenig’s edited volume
International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, to which I’ve already
referred.1264 Unlike Connor’s work, which highlights the commonalities across contexts, the
authors in this volume highlight the distinctive characteristics of various host societies in the so
called “West” in their approaches to interacting with and governing the religious diversity that is
present thanks mostly to recent immigration.
Bramadat in his introductory chapter suggests that there are three mitigating factors in
any given context of reception’s approach to the governance of religious diversity within their
borders.
First, the individual historical paths followed by each of these states as they entered the
contemporary era have set up distinctive social, political, and economic conditions that
have, in turn, strongly influenced the way religious diversity is interpreted and governed
by policy-makers in each state.1265
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Second, he argues that each state has its own relationship to, and history of,
contemporary migration and colonialism, and each state has particular demographics in relation
to migration because of these factors.1266 My agreement with Bramadat regarding these two
mitigating factors is obvious in that I dedicated two chapters of this dissertation to presenting
these very histories in France and Québec. I see these histories and their resultant policies and
attitudes as especially relevant to how immigrants live their daily lives in these states.
The third mitigating factor that Bramadat proposes is that policies which govern religious
diversity are not only influenced by these national forces but also by global or transnational
forces.1267 The way a given context of reception understands and responds to religious diversity
can be influenced by the way other states do or to the particularities of immigrant religions found
in other contexts across the globe. States do not operate within a vacuum. For my research, for
example, one cannot ignore the violence inspired by radical forms of Islam, or the colonial
violence imposed on Muslim nations by various colonial powers, which has led to fear and
mistrust on multiple fronts. Moreover, as Cesari suggests, any understanding of the Muslim
minority in the West must take the phenomenon of global Islam into account as well.1268
With these three factors in mind, the authors in this volume address the histories of the
context of reception and the global and transnational forces at work which influence the
receptivity of immigrant religion in each.1269 This dissertation has taken a similar appraoch to the
chapters found in this volume, just at much greater length, and with much more ethnographic
depth. Furthermore, although Cesari and Milot both address the impact of the context of
1266
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reception on the immigrant individual in this book, neither of them addresses the central role of
food in the immigrant experience.
These contexts of reception have a direct influence on the second theme that Connor
explores in his work: changing faith. In the chapter that examines this theme he shows the
various ways in which immigrant religion is not static. Connor, in another article, presents two
possible hypotheses about the host’s receptivity level and its effect on immigrant religion’s
changing faith: (1) welcoming contexts provide the space for religious immigrants to engage in
higher religiosity than the host population, and (2) less welcoming contexts create an “us” versus
“them” scenario that triggers hyper-religiosity.1270 In this article, and throughout Immigrant
Faith, he suggests that when it comes to Muslim immigrants, less welcoming contexts, such as
those found in Europe, lead to higher religiosity and religious outcomes in that community, while
“more welcoming contexts are associated with lower immigrant Muslim religious outcomes.”1271
His findings with regards to Muslim immigrants thus challenge his first hypothesis but support
his second. Unlike Muslims in Europe, who do not seem to be religiously adapting, Connor
suggests that, in general, other “immigrants begin, on average, to resemble the new country’s
population, becoming more or less religious over time, depending on the national and local
context.”1272 So, for example, Christian immigrants to France would become less religious over
time, while non-religious immigrants to the U.S would become more religious over time.
My findings regarding Muslim immigrants in both Paris and Montréal directly challenge
and complicate these conclusions. While it may be true that Muslim immigrants in the banlieues
(suburbs) of Paris, specifically second and third generation individuals, may be responding to the
unwelcoming context of reception with hyper-religiosity,1273 this was not the case for several of
my informants. In fact, most of my Parisian informants were making adjustments in their
religious identities and practices that reflected the national and local norm, as Connor suggested
was normal for immigrants who were not Muslim.1274 Some would only decrease some practices
1270
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and maintain others, while others would stop practicing all together, some would simply alter the
way they engaged with certain practices, or they would change the way they labelled them.
Furthermore, in Québec/Canada, where immigrants are seen as welcome, my informants were
not decreasing their practice to reflect the norm (especially the norm in Québec), but in fact were
increasing it, or upping the identification ante as I argue, to show their religious identity. In fact,
in a context such as Canada where the relatively well known practices (fasting for Ramadan, not
eating pork, not drinking alcohol) are less contested than some other locations, other practices
move to the forefront of practice and identity; hence, when avoiding gelatin becomes a
significant aspect of religious identity for some Muslims in Montréal. Whereas in a place like
France, the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a contested practice as to
distinguish a particular identity, it was almost as if, in Canada, my informants needed something
even more distinct with which to identify themselves, something more distinct to draw the line
between “us” and “them.” Therefore, in contrast to Connor’s conclusion that Muslim immigrants
would become “less religious” in more welcoming contexts, and “more religious” in less
welcoming contexts, my examination of “Muslim food practices” shows that my informants in
Paris (a less welcoming reception context) actually alter and leave behind their practices to a
large extent and my informants in Montréal (a more welcoming context of reception) increase
their religious practices and stress their religious identities even more in the Canadian setting.
As I argued in section 9.2 above, this receptivity may lead to an increase in religious
practice/identity, but it also leads to an increase in national identification as well. While France
may assume that by denying the religious identities of immigrants in the public sphere, those
immigrants will integrate more successfully into French society, my work shows the opposite to
be the case. In spite of the changes that my Parisian informants were making to their religious
food practices and related identities, they still felt as though they were on the outside of the
“French” identity. This often led them to conflicts of identity and relationship that simply were
not present for my Montréal informants. In fact, my Montréal informants, because they felt as
though their minority religious identities were accepted, not only highlighted more specific
religious food practices as a means of presenting their religious identities, but also felt more
“Canadian” and consequently more invested in this side of their multifaceted identities. In
agreement with Margarita Mooney’s argument, “greater recognition of immigrants’ religious
identities and organizations would probably improve the cultural and structural incorporation of
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immigrants in France.”1275 By comparing the experiences of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in
Paris and Montréal through the lens of food practice, we can see that more welcoming contexts
of reception can actually lead to “more incorporation” of minority religious immigrants, and less
welcoming contexts of reception can actually lead to minority religious immigrants distancing
themselves further from the majority groups and identities. While France may assume that by
denying the religious identities of immigrants in the public sphere those immigrants more
successfully integrate into French society, my work shows the opposite to be the case.
Connor’s third theme addresses the topic of “integrating faith.” He discusses how
immigrant religion can act as both a help and a hindrance to integration, again often dependent
on the context of reception in which the immigrant finds him/herself.1276 He highlights the role of
religion in providing the three Rs made famous by Charles Hirschman: Refuge, Respect and
Resources.1277 In another article he suggests that religions provide “psychological refuge for
immigrants facing cultural and other stresses, public respectability through opportunities for
leadership, and finally resources in helping immigrants start businesses, get leads on jobs, and
increase language proficiency.”1278 While immigrant religion may be able to provide the three Rs
and consequent integration, this is unfortunately not always the case, or at least not always
uniformly the case. While for most immigrants religion may provide refuge, especially
psychological, in the migration process, respect and resources may be further from reach. Connor
states that, in fact,
Western Europe and the United States are two extremes of immigrant societies where
religion plays either a hindering (Europe) or helping (United States) role for immigrant
integration. But not all countries fall so neatly into this categorization. Canada, for
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example, provides a middle case where elements of both the American and the European
contexts are simultaneously present.1279
My work clearly supports this categorization of religion’s role in the integration process.
I argued that in Paris, religion and religious practice were generally seen as hindrances to
integration, at least, when integration is understood as assimilation. Furthermore, in support of
this idea, my informants spoke of and engaged in transformations of their religious identities and
practices as a means of showing their integration. Since religion became a hindrance, the
removal of religion was a tool that my informants could use. Conversely, religion served as both
a help and a hindrance in the Montréal context, showing the middle ground approach that Connor
suggests is present in Canada. It was a hindrance to claiming secular national identity in
Montréal and at the same time through the religious emphasis on hospitality allowed the
immigrant to interact with and be transformed by his or her non-immigrant neighbours, an
essential element to integration in Québec.
Finally, the last theme of religion and migration that Connor presents in his work is that
of “transferring faith.” He shows how immigrant faith is often not transferred perfectly to the
next generation.1280 One can, consequently, understand why many immigrants go to such lengths
to attempt to transfer at least some aspects of their faith to their children.
For my informants, food practices were an essential means of this transference. For some,
this was the main reason why they maintained, and often increased, their religious food practices
in the host context. Doing so was a means of transferring not only religion but also ethnicity,
since these two things often went hand in hand. Connor shows how, rather than following a
pattern of decline in religiosity as is found from first to second generation in other traditions and
contexts, second generation Muslim immigrants in Europe tend to stay in faith and practice as
much as their parents do.1281 Since most of my work, focusses on first generation, I cannot
directly support or critique this finding.1282
Connor’s work addresses the role of immigrant religion in migration but only in the host
context, as a means of integrating into one’s new home. While he does point to the field of
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transnational immigrant religion in his conclusion, he does not address it in any depth. Peggy
Levitt, another important scholar in the field of religion and migration, fills this gap by
highlighting the role of religion in transnational migration. While Connor addresses how
immigrant religion plays a role in moving, changing, integrating and transferring faith for the
immigrant in their host context, he does not address how immigrants’ moves are often not
unidirectional, and often involve movements back and forth between home and host land,
whether these moves are made in the real world or in the imagination. Levitt, in her work, does
just that and consequently shows “the ways in which religious identities and practices also enable
migrants to sustain memberships in multiple locations.”1283 Connor, like other scholars of
immigration, focusses on immigrant incorporation (what many call integration), while Levitt,
and other transnational scholars like her, seeks to challenge the focus on integration by revealing
that individuals stay connected to their home land communities even as they establish “homes”
in their host society.1284 One way in which they do this is by using religion as a means of
crossing and dwelling in both home and host land. Echoing Tweed and his theory of religion,
Levitt argues that
religion is the ultimate boundary crosser. God needs no passport because faith traditions
give their followers symbols, rituals, and stories they use to create alternative sacred
landscapes…religion also transcends the boundaries of time because it allows followers
to feel part of a chain of memory, connected to a past, a present, and a future.1285
But there are more than just home and host land influences at work; religious immigrants are also
in constant communication with, and in the process of creating, global religions. Levitt suggests
that “the study of transnational migration and religion, therefore, provides an empirical window
onto one way in which religious globalization actually gets done.”1286 It shows the ways in which
immigrants negotiate their transnational identities in a global context.
While some people think that “one land, one membership card, and one identity is a
secular version of the Holy Trinity,”1287 as I argue in the case in Paris, the truth of the matter is
that most immigrants do not fit within this Trinity. They interact with nationalism and citizenship
in vast and varied ways and religion plays a significant role in each. Levitt, in her work God
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Needs No Passport, outlines six of these possible national responses.1288 She asks: “if people
have lots of food in their pantries, what are the main ingredients they cook with every day, and
what do they use only occasionally? How do the recipes they prepare change as a result?”1289 as
a means of symbolically describing the various identification processes that people may go
through. While she uses this question, and the resultant descriptions as mere illustrations of these
larger processes at work, my research shows that food is not just an illustration, but is at the heart
of these negotiations.
The first national identity that immigrants may choose, according to Levitt, is the
“American” identity; to apply her typology beyond the American context we could call it “the
host land” identity. An immigrant who claims this identity sees him/herself as a non-hyphenated,
fully [insert host country identity here] individual.1290 As Levitt states, this immigrant is the first
person to bring apple pie to the Fourth of July picnic.1291
The second possibility is the “homeland” national citizen. This individual also claims
non-hyphenated national identity and emphasizes that no matter how long he or she is gone from
the homeland he or she will always be [insert home country identity here].1292 These immigrants
are those who bring “samosas to the Indian Independence Day,”1293 or, in the case of my
research, those who bring chorba or harira to the iftar.
The third national identity that Levitt presents is the “ethnic national” identity. For these
immigrants being ethnic is what being American is all about. They claim both sides of their
transnational identity, but they interact with both sides in a very particular way. It is an
Americanism that is infused with ethnic culture and an ethnic culture that is made in America. It
has nothing to do with the outworking of the ethnic culture in the homeland and everything to do
1288
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with the experience of being [insert homeland identity here] in the United States.1294 Adding
masala to ketchup on their hamburger would be a food move that ethnic nationals would engage
in;1295 my Montréal informant who added Maghrébine spices to shepherd’s pie was engaging an
ethnic national identity, according to Levitt.
A fourth approach, which highlights both sides of the transnational identity, is the “dual
national.” The dual national immigrant identifies strongly with both the home and host land,
feeling at home in both, and engaging in life in both contexts.1296 A table at the dual national’s
Fourth of July celebration may have both apple pie and samosas on it; on the Eid dessert table in
Montréal, there was lemon meringue pie alongside Maghrébine sweets.1297
The fifth identity that Levitt examines is the “cosmopolitan.” She argues that these
immigrants blur the lines between all borders and are at home wherever they may be. They either
see home as portable, moving from place to place but always having a similar set of possessions
and acquaintances, or they see home as having roots. While they can be home anywhere, they are
selective about where that may be.1298 For cosmopolitan identifiers no cuisine dominates their
pantry, and consequently “they eat from the world’s table and are proud of it.”1299
The sixth and final national identity that Levitt describes is the “religious global citizen.”
The religious rules and rulers matter most to these identifiers, and they consequently take their
cues from those leaders and rule books.1300 This does not mean that political, national and other
forms of belonging do not matter to these identifiers. In fact, religious global citizenship can be
complementary to other forms of belonging. Levitt states, concerning this group:
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It was not that they were oblivious to their surroundings or the salience of political
borders. It was that they thought of themselves as living in an alternative topography,
with residents, rules, and landmarks that mattered more to them than their secular
equivalents.1301
Religious global citizens, then, fast during Lent, or feast on lamb for the Eid based on religious
calendars and rules. An excellent example of this identity at work is the story of my Parisian
informants looking to the religious leaders in the Maghreb for the start date of Ramadan (who
base that date on what is happening in Mecca) rather than to the official French date, as
represented by the leaders of the Grande Mosquée. My informants wanted to make sure that they
were acting in line with their fellow religious global citizens and not just performing an ethnic
national version of their Islam.
Overall, Levitt argues that where people place themselves within these national identities
depends largely on “how people think of themselves racially, ethnically, or religiously”; these
factors strongly influence “how they see themselves as citizens, how they perceive their right and
obligations, how they participate in the public sphere, and why.”1302 The kinds of faiths that all
of these various identifiers bring with them into these identities are far from monolithic and are
being constantly recreated and redefined.1303 Even within these different national identities, there
is wide variation of the kinds of immigrant religion at work.1304 She argues, because of these
variations in religiosity, nationalism and citizenship, and the constant influence of global and
1301
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transnational networks on all of the above, that global religiosity requires new religious
organizational architecture, and ultimately “major changes in business as usual.”1305 Both
religious individuals and organizations, she says, need to engage in new and creative ways to
meet the needs of their personal and collective selves within these complex transnational and
global worlds.
I argue that food is one such way to creatively navigate the rough waters. My work
answers the call that Levitt proposes in her influential article “You know, Abraham was really
the first immigrant,” where she states that
many more studies are needed to flesh out how migrants’ transnational religious practices
are actually enacted, what their impacts are, what explains the variations between them,
how transnational religious life differs from transnational life in other social arenas, and
what these dynamics mean for home- and host-country life.1306
By showing how immigrants’ transnational religious practices are enacted, specifically through
food, I have proposed responses to most of Levitt’s inquires above.
9.3.1.1 Religion and Migration Summary
In this section I have discussed some foundational works in the field of religion and migration
and have shown how my work complements or challenges the conclusions found within them.
After a brief overview of the three reasons why religion and migration is now an important field
within religious studies, as outlined by Paul Bramadat, I outlined Phillip Connor’s quantitative
study of immigrant faith and showed how my project acts as qualitative support for many of his
findings.
As “moving faith” Connor shows how the relationship between the immigrant’s faith and
the context of reception can impact the future of the immigrant in that context. My work
highlights this aspect of Connor’s work and emphasizes the significant impact of the context of
reception on the lives, identities and practices of immigrants. Because of this, I also addressed
Bramadat and Koenig’s edited volume International Migration and the Governance of Religious
Diversity to show how others have approached the discussion of context of reception and
immigrant religion. In regards to “changing faith” I presented Connor’s argument that
immigrants tend to become less religious in more welcoming contexts, and more religious in less
1305
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welcoming ones, and furthermore, that immigrant faith starts to reflect the non-immigrant faith
represented in the host context. I then discussed how my research directly challenges these
conclusions. In Paris, a less welcoming context, my Parisian informants were making
adjustments in their religious identities and practices that reflected the national norm. While, in
Montréal, a more welcoming context, my informants were not decreasing their practice to reflect
the norm (especially the norm in Québec), but in fact were increasing it to show their religious
identity. I then showed how my work supports Connor’s “integrating faith” category; in Paris,
religion is a hindrance to integration, while in Montréal, it can be a help. Finally, I discussed how
my work acts as a vignette of Connor’s “transferring faith” by showing that food practices were
an essential means of this transference.
After exploring Connor’s work, I then presented Peggy Levitt’s work on transnational
religion. Levitt’s work shows how immigrants’ moves are often not unidirectional and often
involve movements back and forth between home and host land, whether real or imagined. In
this, I showed how Levitt presents six different options for national identities for the
transnational migrant. I outlined the six possibilities and used food as an illustration of each.
Overall, I argued that food and food practice can be a means of creatively navigating the rough
waters of transnational experience; my work serves as evidence that food can provide insight into
the kinds of negotiations at work that Levitt suggests are present throughout her work.
9.3.2 Food and Religion
Like the study of religion and migration, the study of food and religion is also a relatively new
field of investigation in the social scientific study of religion. Like the situation I described above
regarding religion and migration, both food studies and religious studies have long and complex
histories of research attached to them but neither has taken the other’s subject matter as
particularly relevant until very recently. Early anthropologists of food did examine some of the
religious elements of people’s food practices, particularly people’s food relationships with their
gods including feasts and sacrifices, taboos and injunctions. But, as Sidney Mintz explains in his
Tasting Food, Tasting Freedom, most of the food work (gathering and preparation) was being
done by women and most of the anthropologists were men who were not interested in the real
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stuff of food practices.1307 For that reason, “it would probably be accurate to say that food and
eating got much less attention in their own rights as anthropological subjects than they really
deserved.”1308
This is no longer the case. In this section I examine two volumes that address food and
religion, comprised of scholars who pay a great deal of attention to food and eating in their own
right, to situate this dissertation within recent work done in this field.1309 Although some
1307

Michel Desjardins in his “Religious Studies that Really Schmecks,” suggests that by exploring religious food
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in new ways is Daniel Sack, Whitebread Protestants: Food and Religion in American Culture (New York: St Martin’s,
2000).
For early works exploring the historical accounts of the various ways that religious food practices have
come to be see, Rudolph M. Bell, Holy Anorexia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Marvin Harris, Good
to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast, and
Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
For some excellent cultural histories, which primarily address food but also include some exploration, albeit
sometimes quite brief, of religion see: Hasia Diner Hungering for America: Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the
Age of Migration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Robert C. Fuller, Religion and Wine: A Cultural
History of Wine Drinking in the United States (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996); Franca Iacovetta,
Valerie Korinek, and Marlene Epp, eds., Edible Histories, Cultural Politics: Towards a Canadian Food History
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012)—for chapters which directly address religion see chapter 3, 10 and 11;
for chapters that address food and ethnicity see chapters 7, 8, 9 and 12. For historical explorations of specific
religious traditions and their foodways see Kenneth Albala and Trudy Eden, eds., Food and Faith in Christian
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Desjardins and Desjardins, “The Role of Food,” 70-82;
Leonard J. Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins, and Gerald Shapiro, eds., Food and Judaism (Omaha: Creighton
University Press, 2005).
For foundational religious studies texts, which have some mention of food to elucidate larger themes, see
Karen McCarthy Brown’s Mama Lola: A Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991);
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Robert A. Orsi, The Madonna of 115 Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985). In fact, my first foray into the study of religion and food was a conference paper that I
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wrote exploring of the place of food in Orsi’s Madonna of 115 Street. For explorations of the ways that religious
food rules affect relationships between and amongst religious communities see, Desjardins and Mulhern, “Living
Sacrifice,” 190-210; Claudine Fabre-Vassas, The Singular Beast: Jews, Christians, & the Pig, trans. Carol Volk (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997); David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and their Food: Constructing Otherness
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common themes and threads are present in the two, they present distinctive pictures of the field.
Someone picking up Zeller et al.’s edited volume Religion, Food and Eating in North
America1310 may have a different understanding of what the field looks like than someone who
just read the special “Food and Religion” issue of Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis.1311 I
address each of these volumes in turn, describing the picture that arises of the field of food and
religion in each, and situating my work in both.
Religion, Food and Eating in North America arose out of the “Religion, Food and Eating
in North America” seminar, which met at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of

For important works on halal and Muslim food practices see, Bergeaud-Blackler, “Social Definitions of
halal Quality,” 94-107; Marjo Buitelaar, “Living Ramadan: Fasting and Feasting in Morocco,” in The Taste Culture
Reader, ed. Carolyn Korsmeyer (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2007), 175-180; Johan Fischer, The Halal Frontier: Muslim
Consumers in a Globalized Market (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Richard C. Foltz, Animals in Islamic
Tradition and Muslim Cultures (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006); Peter Heine, Food Culture in the Near East, Middle East
and North Africa (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2004)—while Heine focusses on Muslim food practices in this
work, he also addresses Jewish and Christian holidays and food practices.
For another work that deals directly with food and religion in the North American context see R. Marie
Griffith, Born Again Bodies: Flesh and Spirit in American Christianity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
Related to a project such as this, for a work that addresses food as one of the principle elements of everyday
religion see Graham Harvey, Food, Sex and Strangers: Understanding Religion as Everyday Life (London and New
York: Routledge, 2013).
For important works that address the role of food in identity formation and maintenance see Anderson,
Everyone Eats, especially Chapter 10 where he directly addresses food and religion; Demossier, Wine Drinking
Culture; Donna R. Gabaccia, We are what we eat: Ethnic Food and the making of Americans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998); Linda Keller Brown and Kay Mussell, eds., Ethnic and Regional Foodways in the
United States: The Performance of Group Identity (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Leon Rappoport,
How We Eat: Appetite, Culture, and the Psychology of Food (Toronto: ECW Press, 2003); Peter Scholliers, ed., Food,
Drink and Identity: Cooking, Eating and Drinking in Europe since the Middle Ages (Oxford: Berg, 2001)—chapters
which are especially relevant to my work are Kolleen M. Guy, “Wine, Champagne and the Making of French
Identity in the Belle Epoque,” 163-178 and Willy Jansen, “French Bread and Algerian Wine: Conflicting Identities in
French Algeria,” 195-218. For an exploration of the role of food in the migrant experience see, Anne J. Kershen,
ed., Food in the Migrant Experience (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002); Jeffrey M. Piltcher, Food in World History
(New York & London: Routledge, 2006)—especially Chapter 9, “Migrant Cuisines”; Desjardins and Desjardins,
“Food that Builds.”
Finally, the work of two anthropologists have thoroughly shaped the way many scholars of food and
religion think about the subject. First, Sidney W. Mintz shows how “food and eating afford us a remarkable arena
in which to watch how the human species invests basic activity with social meaning” (7) in his Tasting Food,
Tasting Freedom; Mintz’ overview of the anthropology of food and eating in Sweetness and Power: The Place of
Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1985) is also foundational. Anyone who studies food and
religion cannot help but also be informed by Mary Douglas’s work, specifically Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger:
An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Praeger, 1966) and Mary Douglas, ed., Food in the Social
Order: Studies of Food and Festivities in Three American Communities (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).
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Religion (AAR) between 2008 and 2012.1312 This is important to note, as this book’s providence
offers an insight into the potential for an unbalanced presentation of traditions that Marie Dallam
addresses in her introductory chapter. Self-selection is one part of this equation, but as Dallam
describes there does tend to be an imbalance in the North American context which examines
Christianity and Judaism and mostly in the context of the United States.1313 Dallam states that
this book is in fact a call for other works which are set in Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean,
and works that address traditions outside of Judaism and Christianity. I take up this call with this
current work as it addresses the Canadian context and Islam.
The book is broken up into four thematic sections, namely, Theological Foodways,
Identity Foodways, Negotiated Foodways, and Activist Foodways. In the Theological Foodways
section, articles address the religious rules and spiritual inspiration for the religious foodways of
a variety of Christian communities who practice vegetarianism in some way or another. The
authors, through an exploration of theological imperative, show the development of (Grumett)
and the consequent impact on religious foodways for members of these communities (Primiano),
often describing the ways in which individual believers enact their religious lives through the
dietary restrictions that they practice (Rapport, Blazer).
In the Identity Foodways section, authors show how individuals and groups have
constructed and maintained both individual and group religious identity through their foodways.
In these chapters the reader is presented with the various ways, across traditions, in which
religious actors tap into shared histories, e.g., via cookbooks (Gross) and ceremonies (Crawford
O’Brien), and come to understand and consequently present, their religious and ethnic identities,
i.e. via gumbo (Hicks) and Christmas cookies (Mehta).
The Negotiated Foodways section consists of four chapters that reveal the complicated
negotiations that often occur between “ideal” and “lived” religious foodways. In these chapters
the reader gets a view into the ways that people navigate their religious lives through what they
eat and how they eat it. The authors show how, when one looks outside the rule books of a
tradition, commonly understood rules, philosophies and practices are altered or reimagined to fit
with the lives of religious practitioners. Religious rituals are transformed by lived religion, as we
1312
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see in Perez’s chapter; food becomes a focus where it was not before, as we see in Holbrook’s
chapter; traditional religious concepts are altered because of foodways, as we see in Wilson’s
chapter; and new religious foodways are created, at the expense of traditional ones in light of
cultural influences on the community, as we see in Rubel’s chapter.
Finally, in the Activist Foodways section the authors show how religious individuals and
communities can use food as a means of effecting change in the world, using food as a tool for
social activism. Levasseur addresses this by looking at the social justice activity taken up by a
Christian community in the American south, revealing the challenges of this kind of food
activism. Robinson enters the conversation by describing the efforts of a Chicago Muslim
organization to expand the definition of halal beyond just ritual slaughter to include socially just
food practices and the problems that that move brought to the organization. Finally, in an
interesting twist, Zeller takes the reader outside of the realm of commonly labelled “religions” to
show how normally understood secular American foodways function as “quasi-religions” in their
activist initiatives.
Across these themes, there are subthemes which many of the articles address. A main
goal of the book is to “look across traditions to find commonalities in the expression of the
relationship of both food to religion and eating to religion.”1314 Dallam outlines these
commonalities in her introductory chapter and suggests that food and religion, as they are
presented in this book, cross the larger thematic boundaries via subthemes of foodlore,
distinction, abundance, conversion, politics and comparison.1315 The essays in this volume show
how people create stories around their food practices (foodlore), how foodways can act as
boundary marking symbols distinguishing “us” from “them” (distinction), how many religious
foodways act as a means of counterbalancing the North American (mostly American) pursuit of
abundance (abundance), how religious actors reveal changes in their religious outlook via
foodways (conversion), how food can be a means of individual and local power (politics) and
how the food practices of one group can illuminate the experiences of another group
(comparison).
Taking all these themes and subthemes into consideration, the book illuminates the many
ways that the food practices of individuals and communities reveal a great deal about what it
1314
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means to be religious in North America. As Mintz states, eating is never a “purely biological”
activity,1316 and in this case it acts as a strong symbol of meaning making. For that reason, and
many others, this work shows that food should be taken seriously in the study of religion.1317
My work could easily be placed into Zeller et al.’s work in either the Identity Foodways
section or the Negotiated Foodways section. First, throughout this dissertation I have shown how
my informants use food and foodways to understand themselves and to present those identities in
their immigrant contexts. Like Derek Hicks and Samira Mehta I show how by eating certain
foods my informants place themselves alongside other individuals and groups who also eat those
things. For Hicks, this was gumbo, for Mehta, Christmas cookies, and for my informants it was
couscous, the Eid lamb, dates during Ramadan, etcetera. Hicks argues that by eating or not
eating certain foods the food actor is able “to communicate messages about cultural identity” on
at least three levels. The individual can, through their foodways, (1) focus on the host context
identity and reject the home; (2) aggressively maintain traditional home identity; or (3) blend the
two.1318 These categories relate to Akhtar’s typology of identity consolidation possibilities that I
use in Chapter 4 to describe the ways in which my Parisian informants use food to negotiate and
present their identities.1319 So for Hicks, and for my Parisian informants, food is a powerful
means of expressing identities.
Furthermore, like Hicks and Mehta, I also complicated the categories of religion, culture,
ethnicity, etcetera, throughout this work. Just as gumbo took up a religious place in Hicks’
home,1320 couscous took up a religious place in the lives of many of my informants. By using
commonly understood cultural food practices as means of expressing religious identity, my
informants show how the line between culture and religion, or religion and ethnicity, is often
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blurred and highly dependent on individual experience and history. It reveals, as Ahmed insists is
necessary, “the human and historical phenomenon” of a tradition.1321 Mehta also shows how
culturally-significant foods are taken up in religious communities, and in the minds of outsiders,
as symbols of religious events and identities, even if they have no place in the texts and traditions
of the religion.1322 For my informants, ethnic components of their Muslim culture also become
associated with Islam as a whole, so that Friday prayers would not be Friday prayers without
couscous, or the Eid al-Fitr would not be the Eid without baklava.
Another of my conclusions comes to light when reading Mehta’s chapter. She suggests
that labelling a food practice as traditional, cultural or ethnic rather than religious can lead to two
important outcomes. First, that practice can be seen as more flexible or not as strict.1323 I directly
address this in chapter 5 and 8 when I present my spectrum of religion versus culture as it relates
to the food practices of my informants. I showed how my informants engage this relabelling
process to allow them to alter their commonly understood religious food practices to fit with
their lives in their host societies. The second and related outcome that Mehta expresses is that
food, in its very nature, can “be easily read simply as ethnic and is therefore not threatening to
perceived religious identities”1324 or, I would add, national identities. Because food has the
ability to cross the often-blurred boundaries between ethnicity, culture and religion, focussing on
one side of this triple symbolism can allow the individual to present an “acceptable” identity to
others. My informants could engage in religious food practices more than other religious
practices because those food practices could be argued away as ethnic/cultural practices and thus
were not seen as threatening to the secular national identity present in both Paris and Montréal.
My work could also fall into the Negotiated Identities section of Religion, Food, and
Eating in North America as it addresses the ways in which “lived religious foodways are distinct
from the ideal religious foodways we might expect to see.”1325 Like the groups which Holbrook
examines in her chapter, the Nation of Islam and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints,1326 my informants highlight what some may see as secondary religious values and
practices over the more commonly understood central tenets and practices of the faith. Some of
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my informants do this to such an extent that they replace some of the five pillars of Islam with
religious foodways (i.e. replacing the shahada with the injunction against pork).1327 For some, it
is these practices that make them Muslim. While many may assume that the daily prayers, the
belief in one God and Mohammad as his Prophet, and other such things are the foundation of all
Muslims lives as Muslims, my informants show how it is often more mundane practices which
take up the place of utmost importance in their religious lives.
This situation can sometimes involve the creation of new religious food practices as well,
similar to the feast which Nora Rubel describes in her chapter.1328 My informants, when faced
with cultural and logistical challenges to enacting the traditions around the Eid al-Adha in
Montréal (i.e. by having to go out to a farm and wait all day to perform one’s sacrifice of the
lamb), create new traditions which sometimes even go against commonly understood religious
traditions (i.e. not fasting on a feast day trumps the tradition of eating from the sacrificed lamb
before anything else on the day of the Eid al-Adha). By emphasizing uncommon practices in
uncommon ways, religious individuals and groups are living their religious lives through
negotiated foodways.
While these negotiated foodways are perhaps different from the “common” religious
practices (food or otherwise) of these communities they do not necessarily contradict them. Jeff
Wilson, in his chapter, comes closest to addressing the issue of people acting in contradictory
ways to the values or practices of a given religious tradition. He shows how writers on and
practitioners of “mindful eating” engage in a very un-Buddhist Buddhist practice. He states that
mindful eating acts as a
religious technique that has been largely stripped of its original religious context, then
repackaged as a universal panacea that delivers all sorts of practical benefits, especially
ones relating to health issues. Because mindfulness is said to deliver practical benefits—
such as weight loss and better health—it is enthusiastically picked up by Buddhists and
non-Buddhists alike.1329
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While some of my informants, who act in contradictory ways in relation to religious food
practices, argue away their contradictory behaviour by removing the religious element to the
practice, like those mindful eaters whom Wilson describes, most act in contradictory ways
without removing the religious implications. For example, they know that the injunction against
alcohol is a religious one, but they drink alcohol. Or they know that eating strictly halal meat is a
religious foodway, and yet they order potentially non-halal chicken when out for a meal at a
restaurant. My work fills a gap in this section of Religion, Food, & Eating in North America by
adding ways in which religious individuals negotiate the rules and values of their traditions in
their daily lives in sometimes directly contradictory ways.
The second recent collection on religion and food is found in the special issue of Scripta
Instituti Donneriani Aboensis. Some important distinctions between this and Zeller et al.’s
Religion, Food, & Eating in North America are obvious from the outset in looking at the content
list. First, there is very little overlap in authorship. Arising out of a conference held by the
Donner Institute in Finland in June 2014,1330 the collection has an immediate international flair
that is missing in Zeller et al.’s work. The authors in the Donner Institute’s anthology come from
a vast array of backgrounds and their subject matter is equally vast. While the AAR volume
focuses primarily on Judaism and Christianity, the Donner volume covers a variety of religious
traditions, albeit with a slight emphasis on Judaism (four of the eighteen articles discuss Jewish
foodways). While the AAR anthology purposefully restricted its scope geographically, culturally
and temporally (twentieth and twenty-first centuries),1331 the Donner anthology chose to cover
the whole span of human history, from antiquity and all the way up until today, from several
different theoretical and methodological points of view, exploring several different
religious traditions.1332
If someone outside of the field were to pick up the AAR volume they might assume that
food and religion was mostly about Christians and Jews trying to sort out their lives in America
in the last one hundred years. If that person were to pick up the Donner volume, the picture
would become a bit more flavourful, giving insight into the ways in which religious individuals
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outside of the American context, and in many religious traditions, also use, or have used in the
long ago past, food in similar ways to those presented in Religion, Food & Eating. In fact, one
can see the Donner volume as an answer to the call that Dallam makes in her introduction to
Religion, Food & Eating in North America for work outside of the U.S context and outside of
Christianity and Judaism.
While there are no separate thematic sections in the Donner anthology the articles are
organized according to general approach. First, after a brief editorial, the volume opens with two
theoretical articles that show how foodways can provide answers for, and explanations of, what
is religion/religious studies. For example, Zeller’s article complicates the very idea of “religion”
by examining quasi-religious foodways such as veganism, gluten-free, and Paleolithic diets
revealing that “one finds religion not only in churches, synagogues, mosques and temples. One
also finds it at the grocery store.”1333 Graham Harvey relatedly challenges previous held ideas of
what constitutes religion, and suggests that food take up a fundamental role in our understanding
of religious studies itself. In fact, he posits that “perhaps religion (as a locus of scholarly
attention) ought to be defined not as believing but as eating.”1334 Believing food to be some of
the essential “stuff” of religion, my work falls in line with these theoretical positions, arguing
that by examining what and how individuals eat or do not eat we as scholars of religion can gain
insight into many other arenas of religious life.
After two chapters with a theological focus, Desjardins’ exploration of the historical
Jesus through the lens of current, anthropological food data, and Pihkala’s exploration of
ecotheology and Christian theological approaches to food and eating, four historical chapters
follow. In these chapters the authors (Moragas & Mazzetto, Filocamo, Gutierrez and Malieckal)
present historical accounts of different religious food practices from different time periods and
contexts. These articles show how food has historically acted as a means of connecting with the
spirits and gods, is a symbol of religious proportions, acts as an identity marker for religious
groups, and can be a means of enacting power.
Following these historical accounts are six articles (by Soderlind, Abu Salem, Walsh,
Plank, Zamorska, and de Souza) that present more contemporary, ethnographic studies of food
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and religion. They too address the role of food in spiritual communion, its use as religious
symbol, its ability to delineate group and individual identity, and its function as a source of
power. Furthermore, they address the ways in which food is used by various individuals and
communities in the negotiations that individuals go through in the modern, global, often
transnational contexts of their lives.
The volume closes with four articles that present Jewish perspectives on religion and
food. By separating these articles into their own section, the editors draw attention to the
emphasis on this tradition in the anthology. This separation leaves the reader wondering, “what is
so special or different about Judaism that it requires its own subsection of this work?”
Regardless, these articles present views into the role of food in transnational identity negotiations
(Kershenovich Schuster), in ecological activism (Krone), in definitions of religion and religious
practice (Mulhern) and in memory (Kasstan).
Other than supporting the theoretical musings presented by Zeller and Harvey, my work
falls most in line with the ethnographic articles that make up the bulk of this collection. Much
like Paulette Kershenovich Schuster, my work shows how my informants are negotiating their
transnational identities through foodways. Whether through food fusion, “the trend of combining
foods from more than one culture in the same dish”1335 (such as my informants who added
Maghrébine spices to shepherd’s pie), or parallel eating, the trend of eating dishes from different
cultures at the same meal, but not in the same dish1336 (my informant who had lemon meringue
pie on the Eid table alongside Maghrébine sweets), my informants were “actively engaging in a
reconstruction of an ideal and identity, a home in limbo.”1337 Furthermore, my informants were
able to not only define this identity but to proclaim it, both to themselves and to others through
their consumption practices. My work is in agreement with Kershenovich Schuster in that we
both show that “food plays a central part in their construction of religious, spiritual and cultural
identity, which was constructed in a multiethnic and transnational context through everyday
social interactions, cooking and eating practices.”1338 Like the habaneros and shwarma that were
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representative of Kershenovich Schuster’s Jewish Mexican informants, the harissa-spiced
shepherd’s pies, and couscous with baguettes were representative of my Maghrébine Muslim
informants. Like the other works in this anthology this dissertation addresses themes of
“tradition, memory and nostalgia; boundaries, identity, and control; symbolism, authenticity, and
fluidity; and consumption and abstention.”1339
9.3.2.1 Food and Religion Summary
In this section I situated my research within the field of Food and Religion. While there were
many sources I could have addressed, I focused on the two most recent anthologies on the study
of religion and food to show the current state of the field and to place myself within it. First, I
presented an overview of Zeller et al.’s edited work Religion, Food and Eating in North
America. After discussing the four subsections of this work: Theological Foodways, Identity
Foodways, Negotiated foodways, and Activist foodways, I showed how my work best fits into
the Identity and Negotiated foodways sections.
In agreement with the authors in the Identity Foodways section, my work shows how
food is a powerful means of expressing identities. It also complicates previously held notions of
religious and cultural identifications and shows how the flexibility of foodways to be relabelled
in these ways can aid the religious actor in their national identifications. I also described how my
work could fall in line with those authors who contributed to the Negotiated Foodways section,
showing how everyday religious practice can sometimes conflict with the ideals we may be
expecting to see. While the authors in this section discussed the ways that people highlight
surprising foodways, none really addressed how people can act in directly contradictory ways to
religious food ideals. I suggested that my work can help to fill this gap by discussing situations
where my informants acted in blatantly contradictory ways to the religious “norms.”
After discussing Zeller et al.’s work I then gave an overview of the special issue of
Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis on religion and food. I argued that the Donner Institute’s
work addressed the call made in Zeller et al.’s work for more studies in food and religion outside
of the U.S. and outside of Christian/Jewish traditions; while there was still an emphasis on
Jewish foodways in this anthology. Instead of a thematic approach the Donner volume was
divided, for the most part, into methodological approach: theoretical, theological, historical,
1339
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ethnographic, and then, strangely, four articles with a specific focus on Judaism. In this
methodological visioning, I placed my work alongside the other ethnographic articles. I
specifically drew lines between my work and Kershenovich Schuster’s work on Jewish Mexican
transnational immigrants, showing how my informants were actively reconstructing identity in
their transnational contexts through their foodways.
9.4 Limitations
While I have attempted to present a fair and accurate depiction of what the daily lived religion of
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Paris and Montréal looks like, and the effect of these
religious lives on my informants’ self-understandings as transnational immigrants, the project
inevitably suffers from some limitations that impacted the collection of my data as well as its
presentation in this dissertation. As much as we may wish to think that we perform perfect work,
no project is faultless, or complete. I turn now to some of the limitations that I faced in the field
and in the writing of my ethnography.
9.4.1 Method: Access/Time, Snowball, Field Work
First, my time in the field was limited to roughly six months in each location. While this is a
significant amount of time for a current PhD project, more time in the field would have allowed
me greater access to the communities I was studying and could have significantly changed the
outcome of my project. This is especially true of my Paris fieldwork. Because of the suspicious
attitude against which I was working for most of my time in the field in Paris, especially in the
early days, it took a great deal of time to build rapport and to convince my informants that I had
good intentions and was not, in fact, a journalist who would likely misrepresent them later in
public. I found that by the end of my time in the field the doors were beginning to open for me
and people were starting to trust me enough to pass on my name to their friends and family. My
interview schedule picked up in pace significantly in the last month in the field and I am sure I
could have gained some more important voices had I had another month or two in that field
setting.
For example, my Paris data is missing the voices of older informants. While I have
middle aged men and women, and younger men and women, my access to eldery men and
women, the early, post-war immigrants to France was limited. I was just beginning to make
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connections with families and gaining enough trust within these circles to provide this access
when I had to leave. My data set is thus skewed to the younger, first generation immigrant
experience in Paris.
Furthermore, while I had a couple of informants who invited me into their homes and
allowed me this close access to their real, everyday lived experiences, this access was restricted
as well. By the end of my six months in Paris, I was finally making inroads into some other
circles and probably could have increased this “Islam at home” experience, but unfortunately six
months was just not enough time to break that barrier of mistrust.
In Montréal, on the other hand, my work got underway quickly and I gained access to the
inner realms of my informants lives from very early on. Again, more time would have allowed
for more data and more access to different people, but in Montréal my stream of interviews and
experiences was a never-ending flow of rich ethnographic material. Building rapport was easy,
hesitation was not ever on the table, and thus I was able to gain easier and more intimate access
in Montréal than I could in Paris. The result is a Paris – Montréal comparison that is uneven in
breadth and depth.
Moreover, my data collection was limited by the fieldwork process itself and by the
method I employed to recruit informants. Trying to restrict my influence on the data I was
collecting as much as possible, I followed a snowball method for recruiting my interviewees.
While this allows the data to develop along a natural, informant-led line, it inevitably affects the
people and thus the type of data to which I had access. In Paris, while this snowball began at the
Grande Mosquée, and with generally more traditional and conservative Muslim informants, as
soon as one of those informants introduced me to a “cultural Muslim,” one of the flows of
informants easily continued along that line. If I had never met a so-called “cultural Muslim” I
probably would have not met others and my comparison with the Montréal informants may not
have been as different as what it was. Similarly, my snowball effect in Montréal began in two
places which affected the two strands of informants to which I had access. One strand began at
another well-established mosque with fairly devout, traditional and conservative Muslim
informants and continued along that line. Another began with an acquaintance of one of my Paris
informants, who saw herself as less traditional, although as I argued in Chapter 5 would fit
within many definitions of “traditionally religious” in spite of her self-understanding as quite
liberal. This strand of the snowball led me to other informants who did not go to the mosque on a
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regular basis and who lived their religious lives purely in their daily lives, outside of the
institutional setting of Islam in Québec. Finally, this method most likely meant that I was also
limited in the sectarian differences that might influence my informants in both Paris and
Montréal. Again, while I did not ask my informants about their sectarian background, by
following a snowball method I inevitably narrowed the kinds of views that would be present in
my data set.
Despite these limitations, the field provided me with valuable though complicated access
to the lives of my informants. By engaging in participant observation, I sometimes encountered
problematic and conflicting information to what my informants told me in our interviews. I was
able to get glimpses into their lives, that I would not have had access to if I had done skype
interviews, or flown in, did a series of interviews back to back and flown back out again, or built
my data primarily from surveys. By building the necessary rapport, even if it took me months
and months, by showing up every day, by observing even the minute moments of my informants’
lives, I was able to gain a more nuanced picture than I could have based on interviews alone.
Ethnographic fieldwork has limits, but it also offers opportunities to access to parts of my
informants lives in their immigrant context that I would not have had access to if it were not for
the time I spent in the field.
9.4.2 Home Context
While this time in the field gave me privileged access to the intricacies of my informants’ lives
as immigrants in Paris and Montréal I did not have the opportunity to see what those lives looked
like “au bled.” The scope of this project is such that I could only look at one side of the
transnational experience, namely the experience of transnational immigrants in the host society.
Levitt suggests that one important aspect of any transnational study is to consider how the
migration of certain individuals has an affect on those individuals who stay back home:
“sometimes migration is as much about the people who stay behind as it is about people who
move.”1340 By focusing solely on the immigrant in his/her host society I do not have insight into
the effect of transnational migration on those still in the homeland.
Furthermore, all the information I do have about the home land context I have second
hand; I learned everything about what life was like “back home” from people who no longer
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physically lived in those homes, and consequently had to take them at their word. It is quite
possible, as I learned through the process of fieldwork, that my informants were telling me one
thing about life in the Maghreb but the “actual” life of the Maghreb might be quite different. In
this dissertation I address the changes in practice and identity which my informants engage in
from home land to host land, but these documented changes are fully based on the word of these
informants. It is possible that my informants did not change their practice or identity at all from
what it was in the homeland, but they simply told me that they did. Without any previous
knowledge of the Maghrébine context I have no way of knowing how “true” these accounts are. I
do not actually know if “halal is a given” or if there is “alcohol but never pork,” or if “everyone
sacrifices a lamb in their backyard,” in the Maghreb.
Whether these statements are factually “true” or not is not particularly important for my
study. My concern is with the way that my informants understand themselves and their practices
as immigrants, how they see themselves as changed or not through the process of migration,
regardless of the ways that things “actually” happen or do not in the homeland. I took my
informants at their word, even if I sometimes did not fully understand the full import of their
words.
9.4.3 Language
This brings me to the final limitation that I highlight here: language. The issue of what language
to use in this project was prevalent throughout my entire ethnographic experience. I was acutely
aware of the language question before I even entered in to the field, over and over again in the
fieldwork context, and while I was writing up the ethnography that is presented here. I knew that
to conduct this project I was going to need to use a language other than my own primary mode of
discourse.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Spradley argues that learning the language of your
informants is the “first and most important step to achieving the primary goal of ethnography—
to describe a culture on its own terms.”1341 In one sense, I did learn the language of my
informants; I was strong in French but not strong enough to have preconceived notions of what
words my informants “should be” using to describe any given thing. I was able to learn the
French that my informants used in their immigrant context. For some of my informants French
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was their first language, and for most others it was a secondary language, often being spoken at
home or at work. Some of my informants knew French better than Arabic, and it was generally
the most common language amongst myself and my informants. All but two of my informants,
one in France and one in Montréal, spoke French fluently, so my interviews were generally able
to go off without a hitch.1342
The problem arose in participant observation. Not knowing Maghrébine Arabic left me
sometimes on the outside of the conversation and thus on the outside of the experience. While
my informants would mostly speak French when I was around, I know that there were moments
missed and good data that was lost in the moments where my informants would break off into an
Arabic/French blend and I could not fully understand the conversation. This happened often in
the kitchen of the Grande Mosquée in my early days in Paris, and continued to happen in my
informants’ living rooms in Montréal. It is hard to say exactly what I missed in those moments,
but I am certain that my ethnographic account would have been even richer had I been able to
understand the Arabic terms and expressions that my informants used; I would have been able to
more fully understand the world that was unfolding around me (perhaps even allowing myself to
be more prepared for the marriage proposals that seemingly came out of no where). Beyond just
getting the data, knowing Arabic could have possibly helped me to build rapport in those early
days in the field.
I remember when I was nearing the end of my time in the field in Montréal, sitting in the
living room with some of my informants as they got caught up in conversation and thus switched
from full French to the common Arabic/French blend that they would speak when I was not in
the room. I sat quietly, listening, following what I could. When my host noticed that they had
gotten carried away, she quickly apologized and switched back to full French. I told her not to
worry and then proceeded to tell her what I had understood of the conversation. I will never
forget the look on her face, and the others in the room when they thought that I had learned their
language; they were so excited and so proud. I was getting there, the blend of French with the
Arabic helped me for sure, but I was not quite there yet. I am sure with more time in the field I
could have learned more, and would not have missed out on some of these moments.
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9.5 Future Research
My project was limited by the logistics that I described above, but it was also limited in content.
With a year in the field, and two field sites, there was only so much that I could examine and
only in particular ways. The data that I gathered from July 2012 until October 2013, in Paris and
in Montréal, led to the very specific findings that I have presented in this dissertation, but it also
has led me to posit the possible avenues for future research that could grow out of a project such
as this.
First, as I mentioned above I did not have access to the homeland context for this project.
I am unaware of what the transnational immigrant experience does to those left behind, and to
their own negotiations of identity and lived religious experiences. Furthermore, I do not know
how people in the Maghreb negotiate their identities and live their religious lives in general. I do
not know how many of my conclusions about transnational experience actually has to do with
the migration experience itself and how much it has to do with the specific contexts and histories
of those who migrate. It would be valuable to do a similar project to this one in the Maghreb to
explore the ways that Muslims in the Maghreb negotiate their identities through food and how
that compares to the data that I found in this project. This could reveal potentially helpful
insights into the role of food in the migration and integration process itself, as well as the role of
food in identity construction itself. If food was not highlighted in the Maghreb, if people did not
use it as a means of identifying themselves as Muslim or Maghrébine, this could give support to
the idea found in this dissertation that food acts as a particularly strong symbol and hence as a
tool for the transnational migrant in creating and maintaining his/her transnational identity. It
would also allow for an opportunity to explore Levitt’s suggestion that migration is often about
those left behind, giving me the chance to see how the interactions with those making return trips
from France or Québec influence the daily food practice of those “left behind.”
Another possible future avenue of research that grows out of the conclusions of this data
is to explore the role of food in the immigrant experience in other “secular” contexts. Having
lived in Victoria, British Columbia, for the past two years I have become acutely aware of what
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it is like to live in an area populated by “religious nones.”1343 I would be curious to see how the
dynamics that I describe in this dissertation would get worked out in this secular context. In
comparison to locations like France and Québec that both have complex histories with religion,
both being highly Catholic dominated contexts having undergone drastic secularization
processes, what sorts of pressures might be imposed on an immigrant from a religious minority
in a different kind of secular context like British Columbia? How might members of religious
minorities in a secular context that is characterized by a religious illiteracy rather than a direct
antagonism negotiate their identities? What role might food play in these negotiations? Would
religious immigrants begin to relabel their religious practices as cultural to fit in with their
“none” neighbours? This kind of project could reveal the real implications of various types of
secularism on the lived religious experiences of religious minorities.
The question of re-labelling and re-identification of people and practices as cultural rather
than religious is another fruitful research path to explore out of this project. As I described in
Chapter 4 of this work, a surprising number of my informants labelled themselves as cultural
Muslims. In highly secular and globalized contexts individuals are creating and discovering new
ways to “be religious” and to live out the traditions that are affiliated with those identities.
Foodways are often the only maintained affiliated practice with the more traditional religious
practices by “culturally religious” people. Because this category was only prevalent amongst my
Paris informants (my Québec informants almost exclusively saw themselves as “Religious
Muslims”) I posit that the host context has a large effect on this category. Future work that
examines the category of “cultural religion” across different contexts and religious traditions
would be highly valuable. Because of the position of foodways for the individuals who claimed
this identity in my study, I believe that examining the food practices of individuals who claim
this identity is the best way in to understanding this new and exciting realm of religious
identification.
Finally, the timeline of my fieldwork inevitably led to a certain picture of the experience
of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Paris and Montréal. By picking up this dissertation the
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reader may assume that life is quite comfortable for Muslims in Montréal and even that life is not
all that uncomfortable for Muslims in Paris, as long as one is willing to adjust some of their
practices to fall in line with French secularism and nationalism. Unfortunately, a few major
events have happened in both settings that have drastically impacted the daily lives of my
informants, and I am sure many of their compatriots.
First, I finished my fieldwork in Montréal roughly a week before the Charter of Québec
Values gained popular media attention in Québec. The Charter, as proposed by the PQ
government at the time under the leadership of Pauline Marois, sought to address the controversy
around “reasonable accommodation” in Québec by emphasizing state neutrality, most precisely
through limiting the wearing of “conspicuous” religious symbols in the public sphere.1344 My
informants went from giving me very pleasant pictures of their lives in Québec, to writing me
emails, distraught, and confused as to what was happening in the province that they called home.
In fact, in the time since I conducted this fieldwork my informants have expressed feeling not as
“at home” as they used to feel, and have described unfortunate situations of discrimination that
they have experienced in their daily lives in Montréal. Ultimately, it has become clear to me that
the situation of discrimination felt by Muslims in Québec ebbs and flows dependent on what is
happening in the world, and in Québec at the time. My research was conducted in a moment
where the tide had ebbed, and the picture presented here is accordingly fairly rosy. If I were to
have conducted it a year later, it is unclear as to whether the “Mini-France” that I was expecting
to see would have in fact appeared.
In France, multiple acts of terrorism have had an impact on the lives of my Muslim
informants and others like them in Paris. The attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in January
2015, the November 2015 attacks, including the massacre at the Bataclan theatre, and the 2016
Bastille Day attacks in Nice, heightened the fear of Islamic extremism in France, and many
feared that these events could lead to further marginalization of Muslims in France. While it is
hard to know how much the aftermath of such events is a product of the media and how much is
true, one cannot help but wonder what the effect of such events might be on the daily lives of
Muslims in France. Would these events, and the general increase in awareness of and activity by
a group such as ISIS, increase the pressure that my informants felt to alter their identities and
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their related food practices in France? Would these kinds of events make French national identity
even more elusive? Internal French politics also plays a role in such matters, and if experience
can be used as a guide, the upcoming French presidential cycle is likely to fan the flames of
intolerance and fear.
Accordingly, what is needed to gain a deeper understanding of these French and
Canadian communities would be a series of studies over time, ideally longitudinal studies, that
could reveal the lived religious lives of North African Muslims in Paris and Montréal.
9.6 Conclusion
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions: (1) how can food act as a means of
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested
identities for minority religious immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? (2) What
impact does the context of reception, particularly the host society’s unique and complex history
and interaction with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism, have on these
identity negotiations? In examining these two principal questions my research has arrived at
three key findings: (a) that food is an effective and prevalent tool for the minority religious
immigrant to use in their inevitable identity negotiation and integration efforts; (b) that altering
how one interacts with, labels, and practices these foodways can change the way an individual
enacts their religion and culture, and, relatedly, that the very definitions of religion and culture
can be muddied by examining the foodways of religious individuals and finally, (c) that the
context of reception has a significant impact on the daily lived religious practices and identities
of religious minority immigrants.
First, in regards to finding (a): that food is an effective and prevalent tool for the minority
religious immigrant to use in his/her inevitable identity negotiation and integration efforts, I
show throughout the dissertation how food is often the most important symbol of identity
engaged by my informants. I argue that food may be a more politically or culturally correct
symbol of religious identification in highly secular contexts like Montréal and Paris. In secular
contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic, I found that subtler and
more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant to engage
with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally, in contexts like France and
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Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the foodways of the
host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as especially in
conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), my participants
claim and demonstrate their Québécois or French side of their transnational identity.
This lays the ground work for finding (b): that altering how one interacts with, labels and
practices these foodways can change the way an individual enacts their religion and culture and
can muddy the waters, so to speak, regarding the definitions of religion and culture themselves.
While I entered the field expecting to find fairly consistent definitions, and understandings of,
religious and cultural food practices, I quickly realized that these topics were not as clear cut as
scholars might like to imagine. In presenting my fourfold typology of food practice in Chapter 5
and Chapter 8, I showed the varied ways that my informants enacted and understood these
practices and therefore complicated the very categorization that I set out to make. By choosing to
alter the way that they labelled certain practices, some of my informants revealed the difficulty in
delimiting the lines of definition for any practice or identity. For example, while not eating pork
is often viewed as a religious foodway, for some of my informants, particularly some in Paris, it
was a cultural one. On the other end of the religious/cultural spectrum, couscous was most often
understood as a cultural foodway that had nothing to do with religion, and yet I had informants in
both Paris and Montréal who gave it religious significance. For them, “L’eau, la semoule
[couscous] et la respiration. On a besoin que de ça en l’Islam.”1345 Furthermore, some of my
informants seemingly changed the label of a given foodway from religious to cultural to make
that practice less obligatory and therefore easier to alter, e.g., not drinking alcohol became a
cultural practice instead of a religious one in order for some informants to enjoy a drink with
their friends after work. In fact, in Paris, my informants relabeled their religious food practices as
cultural to two ends: first, this relabelling allowed them to see this practice as more flexible and
open to change, and second, if they did not stop these practices, this relabelling made their
engagement in said practices more acceptable to the non-Muslim French majority that
surrounded them. They consequently presented malleable definitions of both culture and
religion, using these categories as a means to continually engage in important foodway practices
in light of the tension they faced.

1345

121008_001—“Water, couscous and breath. We only need that in Islam.”
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In Montréal, there was not the same felt pressure to alter the definitions of the terms
culture and religion. They stressed that there was in fact often a difference between the two, but
there was general consensus on which foodways belonged to which category. In fact, because
these “religious” and “cultural” food practices were so acceptable, and uncontested, they often
emphasized other, more obscure religious food practices as essential to their lives as Maghrébine
Muslims in Montréal, i.e. gelatin. Emphasizing the avoidance of gelatin as a “religious” food
practice again, further complicates the definitions of these terms. While my Montréal informants
would be comfortable labelling a religious food practice as religious, they still often revealed an
influence from the Québécois intercultural context to provide cultural, logical, or “scientific”
reasons for their religious practices.
This brings me to my final, and most significant finding, finding (c): that the context of
reception has a significant impact on the daily lived religious practices and identities of religious
minority immigrants. In line with scholarship in religion and migration, I demonstrate throughout
this dissertation how a context of reception directly influences the practices and identities of its
immigrant communities. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, I describe those contexts of reception in
depth, particularly related to the most influential factors that shape how immigrants from
religious minorities are received in both locales. I show how the differing histories of, and
interactions with, colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism in both France and
Québec provide distinct settings with which any resident must interact and construct their
identities in relation to. Then throughout the data chapters, Chapters 3-5 and 7-8, I show how
these histories have real effects on the lived religion of my informants.
For example, in Paris, my informants were clearly responding to the post-colonial,
immigrant, secular, nationalistic situation which surrounds them. Consequently, they expressed a
wide variety of identities such as “born Muslim,” “double culture,” “cultural Muslim,” “French,”
etcetera, which they represented through the food that they ate and did not eat and the ways that
they altered these foodways in Paris. Furthermore, because of the context of reception, and my
informants’ interactions with it, a kind of transnational identity emerged for my Parisian
informants which I discussed in Chapter 4. There was a clear dichotomy presented between “us”
and “them” which framed my informants’ thinking about, and acting in relation to, integration
and transnationalism. For my Parisian informants, foodways played an essential role in defining
the differences between “us” and “them,” as a tool for or against integration, and in representing
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the multiple sides of their transnational identity. Specifically, because of the “French only”
approach to nationalism found in France, I argue that members of religious, ethnic or cultural
minorities feel excluded from the French national identity and as a result often remain on the
margins of that identity. Even those who make efforts to fit within the French national identity
frame, that I describe throughout the Paris data chapters, often still feel as though they can never
quite claim French identity. Although the French secular national approach is meant to remove
distinction, my data shows in fact that it can increase difference and communautarisme.
While my Montréal informants were affected by the Québécois context of reception in
some ways, they also seemingly bypassed the Québécois context and placed themselves more
within the Canadian context as a whole. This led to a much more uniform response from my
informants in Montréal in regards to identity and practice, than what emerged from my Paris
data. In Chapter 7, I showed how my Montréal informants saw themselves as in conversation
with Canadian identity, more than Québécois, and because to them, “Canada is a country of
immigrants,” and because “what makes you distinct is what makes you Canadian,” my
informants stressed the identities which made them different from their non-immigrant, nonMaghrébine, non-Muslim neighbours. Again, food acted as an important symbol and practice
that represented these identities for my Montréal informants.
What was particularly revealing in the Montréal context was the fact that, because my
informants felt as though they could comfortably express their religious identities in Montréal,
more specific religious food practices became an important part of their daily religious lives and
identities. Because not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, fasting, etcetera, were accepted, nonproblematic practices in which to engage, my informants seemed to feel as though they needed
something even more distinct with which to represent themselves; gelatin and ingredient
verifying consequently took up an important place in my informants’ foodways in Montréal.
Being comfortable with expressing multiple identities, my informants were able to fully engage
their transnational identities in Montréal. Both sides of the transnational identity were respected,
promoted and nourished in the Montréal context and foodways were essential in accessing and
presenting these transnational identities.
These differences present a culturally and socially important finding of this dissertation,
namely, while the fear may be that by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate
difference, that highlight the “homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may
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not integrate fully into the host culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. In Canada,
within multi- and inter-cultural contexts, my Montréal informants felt more Canadian or had a
greater desire to “be Canadian,” and on the whole felt free to express and engage their individual
identities, whether religious, ethnic or cultural, In France, the opposite was true. I use food
throughout as the lens to reveal that France’s universalistic and assimilationist immigration
policies undermine its efforts to emphasize equality.
Ultimately, by emphasizing how the host society’s approach to, and interaction with,
immigrants drastically impacts those individuals’ daily religious lives and self-understandings,
my work falls in line with other scholars in the field of religion and migration who highlight the
distinct characteristics of the contexts of reception of their informants. Furthermore, since most
work conducted in religion and migration is undertaken by sociologists, and mostly with
quantitative methods, my work, as a qualitative ethnography, fills a gap in the literature by
showing how the general trends that these sociologists find, i.e. Phillip Connor, get worked out
on the ground.
My work also fills a gap in the highly Judeo-Christian focussed field of Food and
Religion, that I described in section 9.3.2 above. By providing a picture of the daily negotiations
of identity that people engage in through their use of food, my work, like many of the articles in
both Zeller et al’s work and the Donner Institute’s special volume on Religion and Food,
highlights the essential role of food in the lived religious experience of global and transnational
religious actors. My work shows how food can be one of the most important expressions of a
variety identities for immigrants in highly secular, often hostile environments.
It is my hope that this work supports the importance of this new, but rapidly increasing
field of inquiry, and will lead others to assess people’s foodways as an essential aspect of those
individual’s religious lives, whether majority or minority, immigrant or non-immigrant, women
or men, etcetera. Brillat-Savarin famously stated, “we are what we eat.” My work shows how by
modifying, reimagining and redefining, what we eat we can modify, reimagine and redefine who
we are, thus providing a strong tool to the minority immigrant in their inevitable identity
negotiations in contexts such as Paris and Montréal.
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Appendix A

James Spradley’s 12 Step Ethnographic Interview Sequence
1. Greetings
2. Giving Ethnographic explanations
2.1 Giving project explanations
2.2 Giving question explanations
2.3 Giving recording explanations
2.4 Giving native language explanations
2.5 Giving interview explanations
3. Asking ethnographic questions
3.1 Asking descriptive questions
3.2 Asking structural questions
3.3 Asking contrast questions
4. Asymmetrical turn taking
5. Expressing interest
6. Expressing cultural ignorance
7. Repeating
8. Restating Informants’ terms
9. Incorporating informants’ terms
10. Creating hypothetical situations
11. Asking friendly questions
12. Taking leave
Source: James P. Spradley, The Ethnographic Interview (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1979), 67.
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Appendix B
REB Approved Research Questions
Exemple du questionnaire en français
Intégration et Ingestion: aliments, boissons et identités religieuses dans les
communautés maghrébines musulmanes à Paris et à Montréal
1. Pourriez-vous me donner une idée sur votre lieu d’origine? Êtes-vous né en France
(Québec), ou ailleurs?
2. Là d’où je viens au Canada les personnes s’identifient de façons très différente, surtout en
fonction du lieu où ils vivent, ou de leur pays d'origine, ou de leur appartenance ethnique, ou de
leur religion. Ils sont, par exemple, Torontolais, ou Irlandaise ou Aborigène, ou Catholique. Et
vous: comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie?
3. Je suppose que vous êtes musulman/e. Est-ce correct? [Yes; if No, the interview possibly
ends, but sometimes a “No” can really mean “I’m not a good Muslim,” so a few other questions
can be asked to tease out a proper response]. Pourriez-vous me parler du type d'Islam que
vous pratiquez?
(a) Allez-vous à la mosquée pour la prière du vendredi ou pour lire Le Coran ou pour
des célébrations religieuses?
(b) Mangez-vous des aliments halal? Tout le temps?
(c) Avez-vous jeûné pendant le ramadan? Ou en d'autres occasions?
(d) Combien de fois priez-vous par jour?
(e) Vous habillez-vous d'une manière que vous considérez islamique, sur une base
régulière?
4. Pensez à votre vie religieuse, à la fois à la maison et dans d'autres endroits, et maintenant
penser à la nourriture dans ces contextes. Quels sont les exemples qui viennent à l'esprit?
5. Permettez-moi d'explorer un peu plus loin ce lien entre l'alimentation et votre vie religieuse.
La nourriture fait une partie de notre vie de façons différentes, comme faire la cuisine, manger,
et célébrer. La plupart d'entre nous utilisent aussi la nourriture spéciale pour les événements
religieux spéciaux. Je suis intéressé par toutes ces choses, en particulier en ce qui concerne les
liens à votre vie et l'identité religieuses.
(a) Lorsque vous mangez des aliments, chaque jour, est-ce que votre religion guide ce que
vous mangez? (Si oui, comment?)
(b) Y a-t-il certains aliments que vous ne mangent pas du tout, ou que vous éviter à certains
moments, parce que vous êtes musulman/e?
(c) Est-ce que vous préparez votre nourriture vous-même? Y a-t-il des moyens particuliers à
préparer votre nourriture de manière musulman?
(Or if the interviewee does not prepare food:) Est-ce qu’il est important pour vous, à
l'égard de votre religion, qui prépare la nourriture et / ou comment il est préparé?
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(d) S'il vous plaît donner quelques exemples d'aliments que vous préparez et mangez pour des
occasions religieuses. Est ce que ces aliments ont une signification particulière pour ces
manifestations religieuses?
(e) Y a-t-il des choses que vous mangez qui sont difficiles à préparer, à Paris [Montréal], qui
étaient faciles à préparer dans votre pays d’origine? Si oui, lesquels? Pourquoi / Comment?
(f) Pensez-vous que votre nourriture d’origine Maghrébine traverse une transformation à la
française [Canadien]? Si oui, comment? Si non, pourquoi pas?
(g) Trouver-vous que les Français [Canadiens] non-musulmans vous obligent ou pas, à changer
vos coutumes de nourriture? Si oui, à quel niveau?
(h) Quelle place occupe la nourriture d’origine Maghrébine à Paris [Montréal], dans votre avis?
(i) Est-il important pour vous de manger de la nouriture halal? Si oui, pourquoi? Si non, pourquoi
pas?
(j) Trouvez-vous qu'il est difficile de trouver de la viande halal à Paris [Montréal]? Craignez-vous
que les viandes halal que vous achetez ne sont pas réellement halal?
(k) Buvez-vous de l’alcool? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas? Connaissez-vous des musulmans qui
boivent de l’alcool?
(l) Pensez-vous que la nourriture que vous mangez et la façon dont vous le mangez ont un effet
sur vos interactions avec les non-musulmans français (québécois/es)?
6. Lorsque vous entendez le mot «intégration» de quoi pensez-vous? Est-ce que vous vous
voyez « intégré? » dans la société française? Vous souciez-vous de cela?
Sample Interview Questions (English)
Integration and Ingestion: Food, Drink and Religious Identity in Maghrébine Muslim
Communities in Paris and Montréal

The following set of questions forms the scope of issues that I want to explore. Beyond # 1 and
#2, they do not have to be asked in this order, and if participants volunteer the information
pertaining to a particular question, then I do not need to ask it. However, each question
represents only an opening, and would be followed by probes to encourage further details,
stories, descriptions, meanings or explanations on areas where it may be warranted.
1. Could you tell me something about your background? Were you born in France (Québec), or
somewhere else?
2. Where I grew up in Canada people identified themselves in a lot of different ways, for
example according to the place in which they lived, or their country of origin, their ethnicity, or
their religion. I heard people call themselves, for example, Torontonians, or Irish, or Aboriginal,
or Catholic. How would you identify yourself?
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3. I assume that you are a Muslim. Is this correct? [Yes; if No, the interview possibly ends, but
sometimes a “No” can really mean “I’m not a good Muslim,” so a few other questions can be
asked to tease out a proper response]. Please tell me a bit about the type of Islam that you
practice.
(a) Do you attend Mosque for Friday prayers, Quran readings or other religious
ceremonies?
(b) Do you eat halal food? All the time?
(c) Do you fast during Ramadan? Or on other occasions?
(d) How often do you pray?
(e) Do you dress in a way that you would consider Islamic on a regular basis?
4. Think of your religious life, both at home and in other places and now think about food in
those contexts? What examples come to mind? (Objective: to determine the first thing people
think of when confronted with this question.)
5. Let me explore this connection between food and your religious life. Food is part of our lives
in many different ways, like cooking, eating, and celebrating. Most of us also use special food
for special events. I am interested in all these things as they are related to your religious life and
identity.
(a) When you eat food, on a daily basis, does your religion guide what you eat? (If so, how?)
(b) Are there certain foods that you don’t eat at all (if this has not been brought up yet), or that
you avoid at certain times?
(c) Do you prepare food yourself? Are there ways of preparing food that matter with respect to
your religion? Does it matter who prepares the food?
(Or if the interviewee does not prepare food:) Does it matter to you, with respect to your
religion, who prepares your food and/or how it is prepared?
(d) Please give some examples of foods that you prepare and eat for religious occasions. Do
these foods have any special meaning for these religious events?
(e) Are there things that you eat that are difficult to prepare in Paris [Montréal] that were easy to
prepare in your homeland? If yes, which ones? Why/How?
(f) Do you think that your Maghrébine food has gone through a transformation toward being
more French [Québécois]? If yes, how? If no, why not?
(g) Do you find that the non-Muslim French [Québécois] expect you to change your food
customs in France [Montréal]? If yes, to what level/extent?
(h) What place do you think Maghrébine or Muslim food holds in Paris [Montréal], in your
opinion?
(i) Is it important for you to eat halal meat? If so, why? If not, why not?
(j) Do you find it difficult to find halal meat in Paris [Montréal]? Do you ever worry that the meat
that you buy is not actually halal?
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(k) Do you drink alcohol? Why or why not? Do you know people who drink alcohol?
(l) Do you think that the food you eat and the way you eat it has an affect on your interactions
with non-Muslim French?
6. When you hear the word “integration” what do you think of? Do you see yourself as
“integrated?” Do you care?
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